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SERVICE WITH FIGHTING MEN

AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF
THE AMERICAN YOUNG MEN'S
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN
THE WORLD WAR

VOLUME I

SERVICE WITH FIGHTING MEN

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An Account of the Work of
the American Young Men's
Christian Associations in
the World War

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TO
WILLIAM SLOANE
WHO ALSO GAVE HIS LIFE
FOR HIS FELLOWMEN

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FOREWORD

This work sets forth one of the greatest achievements of peace in all the history of human warfare. The American Young Men's Christian Association in its welfare work served between four and five millions of American soldiers and sailors, at home and overseas. As General Pershing has said, it conducted nine-tenths of the welfare work among the American forces in Europe. Moreover, alone among American welfare societies, this organization, first and last, ministered to not less than nineteen millions of the soldiers of the Allied Armies and extended its helpful activities to over five millions of prisoners of war. Its operations were conducted on western, southern, and eastern fronts in Europe; in northern and eastern Africa; in western, southern, and eastern Asia; in North and South America; and in different parts of the island world. It may be questioned whether in all time a human society has ever brought its helpful ministry to such vast numbers of men over such wide areas, under such varying conditions, and in so short a time.

The preparedness of the Association for the stupendous task thrust upon it with startling suddenness was most impressive. It offered its services to the American Government the day the United States entered the world struggle. Even more striking is the fact that, by the time the World War itself was fairly under way, this organization had placed itself at the disposal of armies on both sides of the conflict, and from the earliest months of the War until long after the signing of the Armistice, it brought cheer and practical helpfulness to both Allied and enemy war prisoners. This prompt and ingenious adaptation of methods, and this rapid and world-wide extension of activity were not surprising to one like myself who has had opportunity through three decades to observe the successful workings of this agency in as widely differing fields and civilizations as those of Anglo-Saxon and Latin America, of many parts of Europe, of the Far East, and of the islands of the Pacific. Its wonderful resourcefulness manifested in the World War was not the result of chance or magic or of the stimulus which comes from meeting a sudden emergency, but rather the product, as it were, of many extensive practice games.

The Association first functioned in the armies of the North and South in the Civil War, later in the Spanish-American War, and in the Japanese-Russian War, and, still later, as I had occasion personally to know, in the Philippines, and in the troubles along the Mexican Border, not to mention the ever-expanding peace-time work on behalf of all classes of men and boys, at home and abroad, during the past two generations.

Notwithstanding the extended, varied, and rich experience of the Association Movement before the War, its efforts, like those of all other organizations, and, in fact, like virtually all departments of all governments engaged in the conflict, were attended with shortcomings and mistakes. It is one of the merits of this history of the Y war work that these are frankly admitted and treated with unusual candor. It should be added, however, that, taking full account of the flaws and blunders in the pathway of this great undertaking, they seem relatively negligible when placed in contrast with the vast volume of patriotic, constructive service rendered by the tens of thousands of men and women workers in charge of the enterprise, and likewise by the multitudes of American citizens who so generously backed them by advocacy, by use of influence, and by sacrificial gifts.

It would be difficult to overstate the value of the unselfish action of the Association in the War, viewing it from a military point of view. Here I can not do better than to quote the words of Marshal Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, in an address given in Washington last November at a banquet of leaders and supporters of the Y M C A. After calling attention to the terrific nervous and moral strain to which men were subjected in the recent war, he added, in commenting on the work of the American Y M C A in the French and other Allied Armies, these significant words:

"Thanks to your powerful help we were able to maintain our morale; thanks to the Foyers du Soldat Union Franco-Américaine Y M C A, into which the tired soldier came for new strength, and to find a touch of that family life, or at least that familiar contact which seemed to him an infinite comfort. This was the means by which resistance was maintained. . .

Then, let me, gentlemen, attribute a great part of our success to you, as much in the defensive as in the offensive by that support which you gave us, and because you sheltered all that work in the shadow of the finest of ideals, the principle of humanity—unselfish service. . . ,

I would never conclude . . . if I attempted to tell you all the sentiments that inspire me in the presence of such results, but I must tender to you the greatest "Thank you!" that I find in the depths of my heart, for all the work you have undertaken—and realized."

The reflex influence of the welfare work in the War on the life of the young men of the various nations as they returned to their native lands has been, as is already observable, far-reaching and profound. Its ideals and methods have been transplanted to countless communities, near and far, and are, we believe, influencing permanently the program and practice of social and religious welfare work for men and boys. Internationally, this work takes on the largest possible significance. If we confine our thought to the ministry rendered by the Y in the many prisoner-of-war camps in the countries on both sides of the struggle, the fascinating story of which is told in these volumes, we recognize in it a new and most potent international bond, the real strength and value of which, in helping to rebuild the international structure of mankind, will continue to grow upon us.

Throughout this history the reader will find his attention held close to the human issues of the War. Always the reactions of the men to changing conditions and experiences are sympathetically studied, and the forms of activity employed are related to the ends aimed at in behalf of the soldiers. Errors and deficiencies, both of policy and of performance, are practically treated, with the result that students of community welfare work, for civilians as well as soldiers, will find fruitful suggestions for their reflection. In a sense, the book is prophetic as well as historical, for nothing is clearer than that its authors have a broad vision of a possible ideal. The treatment of the successive themes has breadth and true catholicity, with constant recognition that the organization with whose performance it is specifically concerned was one of numerous forces which worked for the benefit of the men, and for the triumph of the cause they served. The Y M C A itself is conceived as a channel through which the whole people rendered service, and which was chosen to perform that function because of its long and deep experience in dealing with young men.

I can not close this Foreword without saying something of John R. Mott, to whose initiative, genius for organization, and inspiring executive leadership the work of the Young Men's Christian Associa-

tion in this War is chiefly due. He would seem to have been trained by Providence to do this work. There is no one of the present day who has a greater world vision of promoting the better side of all men and more experience fitting him to do so than Dr. Mott. His knowledge of the moral and religious spirit of peoples of all countries and of the effective method of reaching and stimulating that part of their natures is extraordinary. Leaders in centers of influence the world over have a familiarity with his genius and capacity. This has made him a great agent in the progress of civilization. No man knew so well as he did, when we were brought into the war, the problem we would have to meet, because he had made himself intimate with the conditions in all the war area by extended visits to the countries of the combatants and to their prison camps. Behind Dr. Mott was a thoroughly well-organized association of men in the Y M C A who understood what welfare work meant, and who were eager and capable in solving the enormous problems of the war. While of course the Y M C A was not prepared for the war, because its huge necessities made anything like adequate preparation in any of its fields impossible, the Y M C A had a more effective nucleus for its task than any other branch of our war activities.

The Association has thus far expended in its war work nearly \$155,000,000. This very large sum it had to raise by organized methods which it had first initiated and developed in its regular work at home. It invented the rousing of an entire community to the necessity and satisfaction of contribution to a needy and worthy cause. It created and inaugurated "the drive." The country is indebted to it for this indispensable machinery for transmuting the patriotic and philanthropic spirit of our people into generous and effective financial action.

During the war, the burdens put upon the Young Men's Christian Association by the Government were too heavy. The limitations imposed by the paramount requirements of the campaign prevented it from doing all that was assigned to it. The Government gave up the canteen work overseas, and required the Y M C A to take it over. The difficulties that it had to meet are fully set forth in these volumes, and the shortcomings of the service are candidly recognized and stated. These, which it was impossible to avoid, taken with the attitude of discontent of our soldiers after the Armistice, psychologically natural in their impatience to get home, led many to utter complaints and spread criticism that did the Association great injus-

tice. Fortunately a proper sense of proportion has returned and the probability of injury to the prestige of the Association, which was so freely predicted, has faded away, and the institution is to-day stronger than ever in the appreciation of the people.

The problems of the Young Men's Christian Association in this war and the way in which they were met are set forth in these volumes in a most attractive and informing way. They will be one of the most permanently valuable contributions to the history of the war. They will preserve a marvelous story of American energy, executive genius, enduring patience, self-sacrificing Christian spirit and saving common sense.

WILLIAM H. TAFT.

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¹ From The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary, by Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Wash-
ington, D. C., 1919, p. 37.

² The same, p. 33.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This book is a chapter of human experience in the World War. It is not a military, still less is it a political, history. It is the story of one of the welfare agencies through which the American people endeavored to discharge its obligation to the American soldier and sailor and to honor their preferred claim on the material and spiritual resources of the nation. How this service aided in sustaining the fighting morale of the forces, how it helped the individual soldier to increase his value to himself and to his country as a citizen, and lastly, but of prime consequence, how it freshened spiritual values in the abnormal life he was called upon to lead—such are the characteristic themes which are the province of this history.

In the great struggle of nations in the World War, the fighting forces were a part of the people. It was as inevitable that those at home should maintain a vital personal interest in their representatives at the front as that they should cherish their own children. With the passing of that type of war which was merely a gladiatorial contest staged by hired warriors, there has arisen the profound conviction that an army of free citizens, though it go to the ends of the earth, should carry with it a substantial contact with the normal life of the community in whose interest they are offering their lives. To be constructively solicitous of the welfare of their fighting men is a perfectly natural and spontaneous function of the people, especially since in our own time social responsibility is no longer a philanthropic fad but a recognized obligation of corporate life.

Relief work for the American forces in the World War was throughout concentrated in the hands of the Red Cross. A number of organizations shared in the welfare operations. At first the Y M C A, as experienced and equipped for service, was the only authorized agent. Later, on the ground that probably one soldier in four was a Roman Catholic, the National Catholic War Council represented in service by the Knights of Columbus, volunteered its services and was accepted, first in the American camps, and then in the American Expeditionary Forces overseas. The Jewish Welfare Board pressed similar claims and was similarly accepted by the War Department. The Young Women's Christian Association chose to per-

form overseas an unostentatious service to the army of women workers—nurses, telephone operators, Red Cross and Y M C A women—which, with its splendid chain of hostess houses for the men and their visiting relatives and friends in the American camps, has never received the recognition which it merited.

The unconquerable Salvation Army, the American Library Association, and finally the group of local agencies that effectively united for work under the War Camp Community Service, complete the list of organizations recognized by the Government. All these were responsible to the Commissions on Training Camp Activities—the official representatives of the War and Navy Departments. Within their own fields, of course, they were practically independent; and the combined achievement of their welfare work in the war was in the best sense a joint product of diverse groups of men and women with widely different background and outlook, knit together in common devotion to a supreme task of human fellowship.

This is a history of the war work of one agency, the Y M C A. The field covered is, in principle, the entire range of welfare work carried on in the American Army, and by Americans for the Allied armies. Not only did the Y M C A perform more than 90 per cent of the welfare work for the American Army and Navy overseas and more than half in the home camps, but it was the one welfare organization that was pinned down to definite responsibilities in every area occupied by the American Army abroad. Its leaders had to face the problem as a whole as did none of the other welfare organizations, singly or collectively, that went into the war. Its particular task was not so much to build a perfect hut or run an ideal canteen wherever it liked, but to have some kind of hut and canteen at every place where it was needed. It had to run not such leave areas as it could handle with full effectiveness but all the leave areas. It planned and operated almost the whole entertainment service abroad and—so far as welfare organizations were concerned—the major part of the athletic program, simply because it was responsible for getting these things done. Other organizations did splendid special jobs and deservedly received great credit for them.

In a very real sense, then, a history of this kind is the story of the human experience of the American fighting forces; for it is the record of an institution that seriously set out to measure up, as far as it could reach, to the whole military and naval welfare problem. Its experience furnishes a distinct contribution to applied social science.

There is another broad obligation recognized by this history. The welfare societies in the war received their mandate from the American people, carried on their work by virtue of great public contributions, and served throughout in the name of the American nation. To the nation an accounting of their stewardship is due. For one organization it will be found, as nearly complete as space and opportunity will permit, in these pages.

The war organization of the Y M C A was created for the emergency. It drew its strength only in part from the parent society; the vastly expanded personnel was a genuinely national army of volunteers. Out of 13,000 workers sent to France, only 750 were regular peace-time Association Secretaries. These recruits naturally swamped the older group just as the National Guardsmen and the drafted men swamped the American Regular Army and for a while totally changed its character.

For another reason the war organization of the Y M C A took on a special character. The task set before it was not only larger than anything attempted before but really different in principle. The national character of the undertaking involved a new range of obligation and it could not confine its objectives to the characteristic ideals of its regular membership. In the acceptance of official privileges and public support, it committed itself to the promotion of public purposes. The consideration which led the Government to grant concessions of precious ocean tonnage and rights of station and movement in military areas, was the prospect that, through morale promotion, welfare organizations would contribute to victory. Many people gave liberally of money because they wanted the soldiers to be comfortable and happy, and without special interest in their spiritual welfare, for which the leaders of the Y M C A, Knights of Columbus, and Jewish Welfare Board were frankly solicitous. So the Association, as did other societies, supplied cigarets, promoted theatrical entertainments, dancing, amusements on Sunday, and other activities, some or all of which many of its members disapproved. On the other hand, in view of their obligation to the whole Army, made up of men of various religious beliefs, none of the welfare societies was free to emphasize its specific religious appeal beyond a certain definite limit. Whether the societies erred in either direction—whether they were narrow in the face of the broadest human needs of modern times, or yielded too much of principle to circumstances; whether they proselyted for religion with funds given to them for

the temporal comfort of the soldiers, or betrayed the trust of sincere men and women who felt that temporal comfort was of secondary importance—these are questions to be fairly faced but only on the cumulative evidence of the story as a whole. The welfare workers constituted the largest body of religiously minded Americans ever enlisted in such a cause; that they should face such a survey and a just appraisal is their right and their obligation. This book is designed to be a strict accounting of realities to the public whose generosity and support made welfare work possible and to the Army whose exuberant and victorious youthfulness made it supremely worth while.

The aim and method of this history prescribe the most careful attention to the psychological elements in the total war situation. Welfare societies were not organized for the purpose of demonstrating the welfare worker's skill or of opening up a field of gallant adventure for the social expert. They exist as a response to perceived social needs, and their activities are determined by the nature of those needs. The welfare experience is significant only in its relationships; it can be told only as a part of the very large story of what the American soldier had to face and how he acquitted himself.

It is not our concern, nor within our province, to discuss the relative contribution of the armies that succeeded in defeating the Central Powers. It is quite true that our men were never subjected to the long and exhausting effort of resistance borne by the other Allied forces. But is it not enough that the American Army exceeded every hope, even those of its own leaders, and at each step achieved more than was expected of it? On the narrowest margin of preparedness with which any army—except, perhaps, England's volunteers of 1914—entered a great war, with brief training and novel equipment, and with almost no traditional mental background of military life, the American soldiers crossed 3,000 miles of submarine-infested seas and played their full part in turning seeming defeat into overwhelming victory. To us in America, the unconquerable ardor that marked that youthful improvised army from Cantigny to the Meuse-Argonne, from Yaphank to the Coblenz Bridgehead, constitutes a spiritual achievement even more memorable than the military victory which was its tangible result. Through all his trials and adventures of the spirit, the American fighting man sustained a morale that is, to his countrymen, at once a source of patriotic pride and of confidence in the future.

The welfare societies shared in this strenuous adventure. The leaders of the war organization of the Y M C A know better than anyone else that it was the solid character of the American fighting man—soldier, sailor, marine, and S O S man alike—that brought him through. The function of the welfare societies was to provide means and leadership whereby the men in the armed forces might help themselves in the various situations and circumstances into which the war brought them. In the end, the American fighting man was his own best welfare agent; and the Y M C A at large never doubted it.

He has indeed lost his sense of humor who ever imagined that an American citizen soldier would submit to being regarded as a mere passive "object" of welfare work. Religious and philanthropic Pharisees, some of whom inevitably found their way into the civilian services, have had their own reward and have had it in unmeasurable abundance; they met the same fate they would have met in any American community and really deserve our pity rather than our censure. The Young Men's Christian Association did bring to the Army the plans, the material equipment, and trained experts for carrying out the huge program of athletics and outdoor mass play from the base-ports to the trenches; but it was the American soldier who put the energy and teamwork into the idea so that it swept along from one series of games to another, and culminated in the Association-promoted but Army-administered games in the Pershing Stadium near Paris, itself a memorial of a race against time, handicapped by bad luck, as grueling as that run by any athlete. The soldiers "bucked up" the entertainment program; in emergencies, they built Y huts, ran canteens, taught in educational classes, and carried welfare supplies into the trenches. The community of the American forces never handed over its affairs completely to anyone, and always regarded the non-combatant with a certain degree of skepticism. And the long tradition of the Y M C A, not always strictly regarded, to be sure, in the strain of the war emergency, has always been that it existed neither to distribute largess nor to impose an external scheme of its own, but to help men to help themselves.

Demobilization thinned the Army down again to pre-war strength by the early fall of 1919. By that time military welfare work, no longer an experiment, but resting on the response and participation of four million American soldiers, had become one of the genuine traditions of the war. The Army had taken over the huge program of education and had carried it through to a sweeping suc-

cess. More and more the opinion began to be heard that the military authorities, and not any privately initiated welfare societies, should plan for the future the entire Army and Navy welfare program.

With the merits or defects of the Government's welfare policy the present history has no concern. It has only one responsibility as a guide to the future, and that is to present a full and honest account of the experience of the immediate past. The starting point of this experience is the militarized organization of the Y M C A. The story is not confined to the American Army alone; it follows the Allied forces to Egypt and Mesopotamia, to Russia and Italy and East Africa; it gathers in its course the groups of American Y men who did memorable service in the French Army, who shared in the Siberian Odyssey of the Czechoslovaks, and who entered Jerusalem with Allenby's troops. It touches on the reconstruction of Poland and the fundamental welfare problems American Association men are helping to work out in Roumania and Greece and throughout southeastern Europe. It is a world story, for just as the United States, focussing its military force in France as a striking point, contributed also of its varied power to the Allied cause throughout the world, so the American welfare workers carried American co-operation to the armies of 28 nations and touched every sensitive spot of the war on four continents.

Such, then, are the general purposes of this history. Behind it lies the immense background of a war-distorted world amid the chaos of which men strove to keep alive order and humanity and the graces of civilized life. Among the forces which cooperated to conserve the spiritual assets of Christian civilization, the Y M C A was assigned a large and important place. It is a privilege to tell the story now, both because of its intrinsic interest and because of its record of the victorious passage of American youth through the greatest spiritual adventure our country has ever known.

The story has been divided into five parts. Part I consists of a survey of welfare objectives and problems as they appeared in the course of experience in the World War. Part II deals with the work of the Association for American Soldiers in the United States and Part III records service for the American Expeditionary Forces. Part IV describes the work of the Y M C A War Prisoners' Aid for the millions of men in captivity. Part V surveys work in Allied Armies in which the American Association assisted allied national Y M C A's.

This history is based primarily upon the original records of the American Young Men's Christian Associations. These consist of correspondence, general and financial reports, and contractual agreements, supplemented by memoranda of a large number of personal interviews with active workers. These documents represent, in all save a few cases, primary source material; and it has been necessary to study and digest with the greatest care this vast mass of records sent in from every part of the world. Interesting books on certain topics and aspects of Y M C A welfare work by Association secretaries and other writers have been published. These works, to which frequent references are made in connection with the treatment of special subjects, are of especial value as records of individual experiences. From their restricted scope, however, they have been, comparatively, of little service in dealing at large with the more extensive, comprehensive, and most important aspects of Y M C A war work. Quotations which appear in the text without reference to source are taken from the original material in the archives. When thus printed they are used merely as illustrative material and the references have been omitted in order to avoid the multiplication of unimportant detail.

The Y M C A records have been studied side by side with the official orders and reports of the Army and Navy of the United States and various other government documents.

As regards all matters of military history, the editors have selected in each case the authority that appeared from careful study to be the most reliable; and no attempt has been made to harmonize or to decide among opposing points of view. It is hardly necessary to add that all governmental reports are regarded as authoritative on the subjects with which they deal. The editors have kept ever before them the necessity of basing every important statement upon sound documentary evidence. It is quite true that in the bustle of war activities, reports from the active zones are prepared under all sorts of local conditions, and thus they vary greatly in value. Also, such reports frequently present conflicting points of view. At a great number of points the written records have been checked and supplemented by the oral testimony of individuals who were in a position to observe and understand the basic facts, and who willingly assisted in the investigations of the editors. The references in general—both to documents and to standard works—will indicate the character of the authorities consulted.

The editors acknowledge gratefully the assistance and encouragement of the large number of those who have supplied useful material and made valuable suggestions. It would be quite impossible to record the whole list of generous helpers: there are some, however, to whom a special acknowledgement is due.

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Even in a work as extended as the present, limitations of space have made necessary one striking omission: it has been impossible to acknowledge the contribution of individuals in connection even with large and important pieces of service. To have attempted to recognize all those, among nearly 26,000 workers, entitled to special recognition would have carried the book to thrice its present size. The editors, therefore, have mentioned, simply as a matter of record, only the names of those who occupied positions of major administrative responsibility. To the thousands deserving praise and gratitude only a general acknowledgment can be offered.

PART I

OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEMS OF WELFARE WORK

CHAPTER I

THE ORDEAL OF BATTLE

It is estimated that more than fifty millions of men answered the call to arms in the World War.

Practically every race of mankind was represented.

Under the flags of a score of nations men fought on land and sea in every part of the globe.

This fundamental human ordeal, bound up with a series of tragic events, vital to civilization and world progress, constitutes the primary interest of this book.

To understand the experience of the men who fought and the efforts of those who sought to mitigate the bitterness of that experience, it is essential to keep clearly in mind the leading episodes of the great struggle. The experience must be seen in its setting. At the beginning, therefore, it is proposed in a single chapter to review rapidly the course of the war with particular reference to those circumstances and events which deeply affected the lives of the men who participated. The purpose of such an outline is not to present a critical analysis of military strategy; the aim is simply to bring within one narrow compass the principal high points of emergency upon which the issues turned. Since this book is chiefly concerned with the American experience, special emphasis has been laid on those circumstances which shaped American experience.

Before the closing in of the winter of 1914, what may be called the general form of the World War had taken shape. The first few months of open fighting in France and Flanders produced a dead-lock that remained the comparatively fixed point of the struggle. In spite of desperate assaults from both sides, this dead-lock held for nearly four years, while on other fronts a series of battles—rather, a series of wars—was fought as preliminaries to the final test of strength in the West.

Twice after the First Battle of the Marne, in 1914, the Germans sought a decision in the West and it is convenient to group the events of the war about these two grand offensives. In 1916, the Crown Prince of Germany tried the road to Paris by way of Verdun. The end of the long battle left the situation unchanged. After more than

Drawing the
Lines

a year of active campaigns elsewhere, the whole force of Germany was thrown into the sustained drive of 1918. The dead-lock was broken and the last period of the war was marked by terrific open battles fought over wide areas.

Throughout the course of the long conflict, in spite of the dangerous challenge of the submarines, the Allies maintained control of the seas. Had they failed at this point, their victory could never have been achieved.

the Marne

The Germans thoroughly understood the strategic and moral value of swift attack. In 1870, the action of Weissenburg was fought on August 4th; in less than a month ten great battles ensued and France was hopelessly beaten. In 1914, the Germans crossed the Belgian border on August 4th, and on September 6th faced the French before Paris in the Battle of the Marne. They had crushed the Belgian resistance in scheduled time, they had forced back the French and British on the left wing, the French offensive in Alsace had been successfully held up; it appeared as if they were on the full flood of a victory more crushing than that of 1870. This time, it is true, there were other matters to divert the attention of the General Staff; the Russians had penetrated East Prussia—the cradle of Prussian power: but as von Kluck spread out his men before Paris, on the anniversary of Sedan came the news that Hindenburg had administered a crushing defeat to the invading Russian forces at Tannenberg.

The victory on the Marne was wrested from the hands of the confident invaders by the stern resolution of fighters imbued with the moral temper of a great cause. The military significance of the defense of the Belgian forts and of the heroic resistance of "the contemptible little British Army" at Mons has been, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but the moral effect of such exploits was tremendous. The hideous destruction spread far and wide by the advancing Germans further served to fan the mounting ardor of the French armies preparing to receive the blow. These armies were quite different from the unfortunate battalions of 1870. There were no internal political dissensions to divide their energies; they had a united nation behind them. Early defeats brought no dismay to the ranks. They endured a long and seemingly disastrous retreat with absolutely unimpaired morale and perfect confidence in their destiny. When on the chosen ground the French strategists at last struck, they forced a hasty withdrawal that upset the whole plan of attack and effectively

prevented an immediate renewal. This action, one of the crucial battles of history, was won by the superb moral discipline of the French Army.

The moral attitude of the men of the principal Allies had, by this time, taken its clear form. The violation of Belgium, the reports of destruction and atrocity, the very completeness of German operations, fixed the conviction that the Allies were the desperate defenders of outraged and ambushed civilization against an enemy that appeared as conscienceless and unmoral as the winds of the air or the tides of the sea.

The Allies prevented Germany from winning a world victory at the Marne, but they themselves failed to gain one. They were not able to follow up their advantage after they had driven their enemies back to the Aisne. Within a few weeks the Germans succeeded in spreading a solid line of defense from Switzerland to the North Sea, with practically all of Belgium in their hands.

The problem of the Germans was now a serious one. The Russians had mobilized with unexpected speed and, in spite of their defeat at Tannenberg, were moving forward again. It was manifestly impossible to conduct vigorous offensive action in both directions. According to Ludendorff, the German General Staff at this point decided to conduct a purely defensive warfare in France and Flanders until the ground could be cleared in other directions.¹

The Germans did not overrate their power to conduct economically a defensive warfare in the West. Fortresses had passed out of date finally. The extent of the operations practically precluded the possibility of a Gettysburg or a Waterloo; there could be no single decisive action. The extraordinary power and precision of the new offensive weapons—artillery, machine guns, poison gas, and bombs from the air—were matched by elaborate trench systems and barbed-wire entanglements, and the offensive devices themselves proved terrible weapons of defence. Though the Germans carried many divisions from the West Front to conduct their operations in the East, they were able to hold their position and to take a fearful toll from their enemies in the series of determined assaults made by the French and British during the three years of the dead-lock. This trench fighting with its incessant activity, was probably the most striking feature of the war.

Warfare of
Position

¹Consult The General Staff and Its Problems, Erich von Ludendorff, 2 vols., London, 1920. Vol. I, Chap. VI, pp. 369-370.

It must be remembered, too, that in these early days the submarine began to appear as a factor of critical importance. The leaders of Great Britain and France were under no illusion as to the necessity of securing material from overseas. Their huge armies were consuming supplies and munitions at a rate far beyond their own resources. Behind all the long fight on land lay that grim struggle on the ocean whose final result hung in the balance month after month and year after year.

With the Western Front secure, the Germans turned to the East. Steadily through the winter of 1914 the Russian troops streamed to the front. Their disastrous defeat at Tannenberg had checked their advance only in the extreme north. The Austrian armies, in whose ranks was much disaffection, were unable to stop the Russian advance through Galicia; and Cracow was besieged early in December. The Germans came to the rescue just in time. Vastly superior in organization and equipment, the Kaiser's forces drove the Russians back in the last days of 1914. Austria was saved on the point of overwhelming defeat. Into the treacherous fields of East Prussia, Russia advanced again. Here her soldiers once more fell victim to the skill and knowledge of the German generals and in the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes were involved in a terrible disaster. It was an unequal fight. The Russians were ill-supplied; time and again they were actually in action without ammunition. Their movements demanded in every case the most exhausting marches. While their commanders at certain times displayed the highest skill, there was no sound general plan of campaign; and frequently, as in the Mazurian Lakes, the men were thrust into positions where the most stubborn courage was of no avail. Throughout all this period they had no help from the West. The Allies in France were unable to develop any demonstration serious enough to withdraw German divisions from the East.

The final result of Russia's initial campaign was the complete defeat of two armies and a long forced retreat of a third; yet the spring of 1915 found her forces advancing in a resolute invasion of Austria. The Russians once more drove the Austrian Army to the Carpathians; aided by the diversion created by Italy's entrance into the war in May, they stormed the most important passes. But the Germans again came to the aid of their allies. In spite of the fierce attacks of the French and British, the German line in the West held firm; and the new German divisions were sent to the East to help

Hindenburg and Mackensen operate the fearful "nutcrackers" that, during the summer and fall of 1915, squeezed the life out of the Russian Army. Their ammunition exhausted, cruelly decimated and outnumbered, the Russians rolled back from the Galician plains leaving in the hands of their enemies their fortresses, their railroads, and their industrial provinces. By the end of September, Russia was counted as beaten. The German General staff regarded the ground as cleared on the Eastern frontier.

Meanwhile, the ill-fated Dardanelles expedition ran its course. It was a superb demonstration of human courage; it proved to be nothing more. When it became plain that the Allies were to be denied success in this enterprise, Greece took a firmer hold on her neutrality and Bulgaria threw in her lot with the Central Powers in October. This sealed the fate of Serbia and Montenegro, and railroad communications were once more opened between Berlin and Constantinople. The ground was cleared in the Balkans.

The Italians had achieved some success since their entrance into the war but, with Russia no longer threatening, the Italian gains were not serious. They, too, were fighting in a very difficult country. The minor operations on the Tigris, in Egypt, and in East and Southwest Africa had as yet developed nothing to alarm the strategists in Berlin. Altogether it appeared that their purpose had been achieved. Had not the time then arrived for the final test in the West?

The great trial of strength was made at Verdun. With picked divisions, many of them drawn from the East, the Germans, under the Crown Prince, launched at the lines around the famous fortress an attack prepared with the most scrupulous care and pushed home with unsurpassed energy. Followed then that long and bitter struggle when again the perfection of German mechanism met the unconquerable resolution of the French. The battle opened in February, 1916, and raged with terrific vigor till the end of May. Every railroad connection was cut and supplies were carried on one slender road, the famous Bar-le-Duc highway. During these months, every division of the French Army passed through the immortal citadel of Verdun. But the Germans were once more disappointed. They did not pass and on June 6th the fighting died down. The Germans could not hold the gains purchased so dearly; by the end of the year, nothing remained to show for the enterprise but the graves on the hillside.

The battle proved costly not alone for the Germans. The French losses had reached a terrifying total. For the first time there arose in

France a real fear of being "bled white." As on the Marne, the Allies had prevented an enemy victory without winning one themselves; and the grand attack of the new British Army in the long Battle of the Somme, lasting from June till the middle of November, had proved largely indecisive in spite of the ground gained. There was no breach in the German lines. The dead-lock had survived both the German and the British offensives.

Even had the warning of Verdun proved insufficient, the Germans were unable to launch any more attacks; for the "cleared ground" in the East had once more become encumbered.

The "beaten and annihilated" Russian armies had again taken the field early in 1916. Even while the attack on Verdun was being pushed home, this new advance began to assume unexpected proportions. The Grand Duke Nicholas in the Caucasus was steadily driving back the Turk and Brussiloff's movement against Austria was proving so successful that Roumania ventured to join the Allies in August on the strength of what appeared to be a powerful strategic contact with Russia.

Again the Germans turned their attention to the East. Relying on their defensive ability in the West, they withdrew picked divisions from that front and, under the direction of Mackensen and with the cooperation of the Bulgarians, an attack was launched against the Roumanians. Within a few weeks, Roumania was put out of the war and the Russian forces were once more compelled to retire. This German troop movement was a very large and difficult operation, but it was absolutely necessary to protect Austria. For the time being the situation was saved.

In spite of the negative elements in the situation at the end of 1916, the Allies had high hopes of finishing the war in 1917.

In the West, the French and British had made up their material deficiencies; there was a full supply of artillery and munitions. The British Army was a seasoned force, and its numbers were increasing steadily under the operation of the new conscription law. It was believed that a sound victory could be won on this front if in the East pressure could be kept on the enemy sufficient to prevent the reenforcement of the German line in France and Flanders. Turkey was to be kept busy by the Russians in the Caucasus and by the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Bulgaria and Austria were to be beset by French, British, Italian, and Serbian forces through Saloniki, by the Italians on the Isonzo front, and by the Russians—aided possibly

The East
Again

The Eve of
Nineteen-
Seventeen

by the Roumanians—in Galicia, Bukowina, and Roumania. The defeat of Roumania was disappointing in the extreme, but Russia was still in the field and stubbornly refused to be counted out. It appeared quite possible to make a demonstration sufficiently impressive to keep the German divisions in the East.

On the sea, the submarine was increasing in effectiveness: but supplies were still coming in steadily from America; and Germany's one naval challenge, which resulted in the great Battle of Jutland, had not been repeated.

The truth is that Germany's tremendous effort had not been made without an exceptional expenditure of human energy and material resources. She was feeling the strain, and her high command was not certain how long the pace could be held. Her allies had proven unreliable and Russia remained dangerous. All her splendid victories in the East had been insufficient to guarantee that front. The fact that Germany at this point began to think of making peace is proof that the Allies' hopes were not fantastic.¹

With the opening of "fighting weather" in 1917, there fell suddenly upon the world that startling event, the total significance of which is still beyond human ken; on March 11th, the Russian Revolution won out at a single blow, and four days later the Czar abdicated. For the moment no one knew what the future held.

The Year of
Frustration

The Germans had made elaborate preparations to resist the Allied attack in the West. The preparations included one movement of great significance. Behind the sector of the lines which was unquestionably the object of the Allies' proposed attack, the Germans had been building that elaborate system of defense known as the Hindenburg Line. On March 15th, the very day of the Czar's abdication, the German forces on a sixty-mile front began a rapid retreat to this prepared position. In their retirement they destroyed everything—not only roads and railroads, but every form of shelter, including all the trees. After the first feeling of exultation, the Allies realized the significance of this surprise. It was the cool calculation of an enemy who was seldom at fault in his grand operations. He had set the Allies a new and most difficult problem of offense.

At this point Germany made her one stupendous miscalculation: America was forced into the war, early in April, 1917. Evidently,

¹ On Dec. 12, 1916, Germany made a peace offer through neutral governments. The Allies rejected the overture on the ground of the unsatisfactory character of its terms.

the German General Staff was convinced that, as long as the submarine campaign was pushed vigorously, a decision could be reached before America could possibly figure in the conflict.

The Allied
Offensives

Without waiting for the development of the Russian situation, the Allies launched their offensives. Beginning with the British attack on Vimy Ridge in April, they kept up their furious assaults throughout the spring and renewed them again in the early fall. Vimy Ridge, Cra  ne, Messines Ridge, Ypres, Chemin des Dames, Passchendale Ridge, Cambrai—the very names recall vividly contests that will ever stand among the bloodiest in history. The soldiers of Great Britain and France displayed the most superb courage, and they won notable victories; but German confidence was justified in the end—at the close of the year the lines in the West still held. The Allies were terribly punished in these offensives. The losses of the French in the early attacks brought the nation to the brink of despair. Again and again, sacrifices that struck the stoutest hearts with dismay brought no conclusive result.

These summer days of 1917 were in a sense the darkest period of the Allied cause. While the men of France and Great Britain were struggling for victory in the West, there was no help from the East; Russia was preparing to lay down her arms. In July, Kerensky staked the fortunes of his r  gime on an offensive in Galicia; but the power was gone. The Russian Army turned to interests other than the making of war; and, as by a miracle, Germany found her Eastern frontier cleared. Under such circumstances the edge was taken off the offensives in Saloniki, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. The entrance of Greece on the Allied side, on July 2d, brought little immediate encouragement in the great disappointment. The Germans handled the Russian situation skilfully. They made only one gesture of an attack, which resulted in the fall of Riga, September 3, 1917. For the rest, the German soldiers fraternized with the Russians till Lenin and Trotzky gained control. All signs of hostilities ended on December 15th.

But the German Staff took full advantage of the Russian retirement. Against Italy was directed a two-fold drive of clever propaganda and thirteen German divisions, withdrawn from the Russian front, introduced most unobtrusively among the Austrians at the proper moment in October. It was completely successful. In the disaster that goes by the name of Caporetto, the Italians were driven back to the gates of Venice; and for a time it appeared as if Italy

was out as surely as Russia. By a superhuman effort of her own and the timely arrival of supporting French and British divisions, she recovered her poise and succeeded in stabilizing her position by the close of the year.

As the year 1917 ended, there was little comfort for the Allies. Although their men on the West Front had a series of victories to their credit, nothing vital had been won; Russia was gone and Italy was for the moment paralyzed. There was no longer any pressure on the Central Powers anywhere. It seems almost ironic that, far from the critical scene of action, during the last weeks of the year a British general should have marched triumphantly into the most famous and conspicuous city in the world. Allenby captured Jerusalem.

The fortunes of war had helped Germany to the achievement of her main strategic objective. She was free to devote all her attention to a supreme trial of strength in the West. A few divisions were considered ample to watch any possible move of disordered Russia. Austria and Bulgaria were left to hold up Italy and the Allied forces in the Balkans. What happened to the Turks mattered little at this moment. German fighting divisions had been carried back and forth and up and down to meet the exigencies of the complicated situation. They had suffered heavy losses on half-a-dozen fronts, they had undergone many wearisome journeys, their replacements had of necessity been made from the older classes of men; yet they assembled on the Western Front in the winter of 1917-18 with their energy apparently in no degree abated and their confident morale unimpaired by their tremendous sacrifices—a supremely formidable fighting force.

Before the Last
Act

To meet the first onslaught, the French and British stood with a few small contingents of their allies. There was no immediate help to be expected. A score of nations had declared against the Central Powers; but the military value of China and of Costa Rica, for example, was not a factor in Allied calculations. France's resources were stretched to the limit; there was nothing more to be given. But the dark discouragement of the previous summer was over and the fighters and the nation stood firm. The British Empire was calling on the last of its reserve power. The main force of the British Army had been on the front much less time than had the French; the men were less exhausted physically and mentally and were grim with determination to fight to the end.

These human elements could be weighed and measured. But what of the Americans who began to appear behind the lines in 1917? They brought into the war area a fresh enthusiasm, a complete assurance, and a new access of physical vigor. The great question was: "Will they be of any service in this impending assault-at-arms?" The Germans had staked everything against the possibility. According to their calculations, time and the submarines would take care of the Americans.

One element must not be overlooked. The American Navy had added its strength to the Allied sea forces. The united navies were able to carry out wide measures against the submarines. From June, 1917, the shipping losses fell off, and the fear of this deadly enemy waned.

By the middle of March, 1918, the opposing forces were face to face. Germany had signed treaties with Russia, Finland, and Roumania. Italy was regarded as beaten. In any event, if France and Britain were conquered in the grand assault, such victories as Italy might achieve would be of little consequence. America, so the German General Staff believed, would be too late. On the western front Germany massed 206 divisions, 63 of which had come from Russia. The Allies, fully aware of the impending conflict, gathered their forces of defense during the winter of 1917-18. Italian divisions replaced the British and French that had gone to Italy. The British brought back troops from their scattered conflicts and rushed new recruits to the Picardy front. There was no lack of munitions and supplies in spite of the recent submarine successes.

The total Allied forces numbered more than the Germans, but this numerical superiority was only apparent. The Germans actually possessed a superiority in fighting infantry in the proportion of six to five, amounting actually to more than 300,000 men. Since Germany held the initiative she could mass a superiority of three to two or even two to one against any point chosen for attack.¹ Similarly, artillery, in which neither held any marked advantage, could be concentrated when necessity demanded. Possibly the most serious

¹ The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, pp. 104-105.

"On the 1st of April the Germans had an actual superiority of 324,000 riflemen on the western front. . . . By November 1 the Allied rifle strength had a superiority over the German of more than 600,000 rifles."

The rifle-strength figures given by Ayres for April 1, 1918, are: Allies, 1,250,000; Germans, 1,569,000. The total armies probably each exceeded 4,000,000 men.

disadvantage of the Allies was the lack of unity of command. Against an enemy directed by a single staff, they were still cooperating by means of conference. From the very beginning the division of authority had been an obstacle to Allied success.

One important measure of security was taken by the Allies. They urged America to hurry. There were only about 250,000 Americans in France. It was feared that the big American Army to be ready in 1919 would, as the Germans hoped, arrive only in time to view the ruins.

The first German blow fell exactly where it was expected—at the junction of the French and British forces. But the Allies had underestimated its power. The attack began on March 21st, between Cambrai and St. Quentin. The British Fifth Army was smashed, in a few days all the ground gained in the hard fighting of 1917 was lost, and when the fight was stabilized with the help of French reserves the losses totaled 175,000 men—one of the worst defeats ever suffered by a British Army. The dead-lock was broken, for the Germans had opened a breach in the line thirty miles wide and penetrated for perhaps twice that distance.

German
Success

As a result of this battle, two immediate decisions of first importance were taken by the Allies: on March 27th, America was asked to rush every available man to France; and two days later Foch was placed in supreme command. General Pershing put all the American troops in France at Foch's disposal.

The American plans, twice speeded up at the request of the Allies, were now radically altered. Great Britain loaned her ships; infantry and machine gunners were given right of way, and green American soldiers began to pour into France at the rate of 100,000, then 200,000, then 300,000 a month. The plan to develop an American sector was put aside for the moment, and until September the American divisions were distributed along the line to fight under French and British command. Men and yet more men to fill up the gaps in the Allied ranks was the urgent need. It is not hard to imagine what a profound effect this decision had upon the character of American operations and the experience of American fighting men.

The character of warfare in France and Flanders changed as it were over night. Another German attack on April 9th near Armentières broke through again on a wide front and fierce conflicts in the open were waged over wide areas. In three weeks the British lost another large part of their gains of 1917, and French reserves

were again called into action. The British losses had amounted to 350,000, while the French had lost nearly 150,000. The "army of maneuver," which was to have been reserved for a grand counter-attack at a favorable moment, had to be used simply for plugging holes in the line. During this battle the 1st Division of the American Army came into action, relieving the French in the Cantigny Sector, about three miles west of Montdidier.

The Germans believed they had now paralyzed the British Army. They were much mistaken; there was no breakdown in its command and its morale was still firm. Proof of its reserve power was not long delayed.

Château-
Thierry

The next attack was Ludendorff's unexpected drive on Paris between Soissons and Rheims, opened on May 27th. Weak and inexperienced French divisions gave way and a deep salient was thrust into the Allied line. The easy victory lured the Germans on and in a rapid advance they found themselves again on the Marne. Was there no guardian spirit to warn them that they were on fatal ground? The story that this attack was stopped by the American exploit at Château-Thierry is, of course, a romantic exaggeration; but the American 2d and 3d Divisions did come into the front line in the critical period of this battle, flanking the spearhead of the German attack, and bore their part with their French comrades in administering what proved to be a decisive check. The Germans over-extended in the salient tried desperately to widen the tip, but to no avail.

While this battle was in progress Ludendorff tried a thrust on the Montdidier-Noyon Front on June 9th. It was intended to aid the situation of his troops in this awkward Marne salient, but it came to very little. A vigorous counter-attack by the French on June 10th neutralized the gains of the Germans' first rush, and the attack was soon abandoned. Likewise, another assault in Champagne, from which Ludendorff had hoped much, was fully foreseen and stopped dead in its tracks by the French. The famous defenses about Rheims—"the best piece of staff work in the war," according to the generous opinion of junior British officers—weathered every attack. The Allied resistance was stiffening.

On July 15th, the German "peace offensive" was begun in the Marne salient. Paris was again menaced as in 1914. There were two great sags in the British line to the north and Ludendorff proposed to finish off what was left of the British as soon as he had

Paris at his mercy. The German advance in the Marne salient had been easy and rapid; it seemed for a while to be irresistible. The long-range bombardment of the city was thrown in as a little extra anxiety for the people and as surely an unimpeachable witness of the majesty and might of the invaders. This was all historic ground. Near by was Valmy where the soldiers of the French Revolution laid the foundation for the career of Napoleon, also Châlons, where 1,500 years ago Attila was crushed and the Huns rolled back from Europe. No less significant—it was the field of the Battle of the Marne. As in 1914, the French were retreating in perfect order and the cool genius in control of the Allied forces was watching his chance. It is generally agreed among military critics that this “peace offensive” was a serious mistake. It was tactically successful, but it deepened the Marne salient without widening it. The simultaneous attack to the east of Rheims was stopped dead. For three days the Germans drove forward. Then the blow fell.

Ludendorff had overreached himself. Foch seized the opportunity. On the morning of July 18th from the west or Soissons side of the salient he let loose the famous counter-attack. The attacking force was made up of French, French colonials, and Americans. It was a movement involving a tremendous risk, but the time was well chosen. At the end of the first day, it was plain that the Germans would have to retire from the Marne salient. Immediately all the French and American divisions surrounding the salient attacked. By July 20th, the Germans were withdrawing. They fell back in splendid order in one of the finest movements of the whole war. Though August 4th found them behind the Aisne and the Vesle, with Soissons once more in Allied hands and the Marne pocket emptied, they lost only 35,000 prisoners and 700 guns in the difficult retreat.

But Foch's victory marked a turning-point in history. The Germans had lost more than was generally apparent at the moment. To save the army on the Marne, Ludendorff had been compelled to throw in his reserves. For the time being, he could conduct no more attacks, and the opportunity never came again: for the eight American divisions that had been in this battle proved that the green forces of America could be trusted in combat; and, though the Germans could not bring themselves to believe it, in the month of July, 306,000 Americans landed in France. With the victory of July 18th to August 4th, the initiative in the war, retained by Ger-

The Turn of the Tide

many since the beginning, passed into the hands of the Allies once and for all; and from this moment to the end, Foch was no longer facing superior forces.

Except in a few quiet sectors trench warfare was now absolutely at an end. The Americans had been trained in the open style of fighting, in spite of all advice to the contrary; the wisdom of the action was plain, for when they entered actively into the fight the period of the final offensive had begun and open warfare was the order of the day till the end.

Ludendorff realized that he was fighting a losing battle. The first signs of weakening of morale appeared in the ranks. On August 14, 1918, at Spa, during an important conference at General Headquarters, Ludendorff by agreement with Field Marshal von Hindenburg, told the Imperial Chancellor and Secretary of State von Hintze that "Germany was no longer in a position to bring the war to a victorious conclusion in a military sense, as had been hoped hitherto. It would therefore be necessary to make overtures for peace through a neutral country."¹ Plainly in August, 1918, the German Army became deeply affected by the suspicion that it was beaten. The great test in the West had gone against them.

The situation proved satisfactory to the Allied generalissimo. He attacked. The British Army, which was presumably down and out, marched on Amiens on August 8th, and drove the Germans before it in a retreat amounting almost to a panic. In a week they had taken scores of thousands of prisoners, hundreds of guns, and a vast quantity of supplies.

Meanwhile, Austria tried to carry on alone against the rejuvenated Italian Army. The Austrian attack on the Piave of June 15th had been smothered almost before it was fairly started; and as the fighting continued it developed only a few local successes. In early July, Italy stood the winner. As the news of the Second Battle of the Marne and of the British triumph at Amiens reached this front, the Austrians gave up all hope. According to Ludendorff, Bulgaria, reading clearly the significance of the Marne, Amiens, and the Piave, decided then and there to find the most convenient way out. For now it was plain that the rescuing German divisions would be available no more, and the collapse of Austria and Bulgaria, though still delayed, was inevitable.

¹ The General Staff and Its Problems, Erich von Ludendorff, 2 vols., London, 1920. Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 588.

There was no rest on the West Front. The British again advanced in early September crossing the Somme battlefield in twelve days; it had been gained in 1916-17 only after eight months of terrific fighting. Further north a simultaneous thrust recovered more lost territory. Then, evidently to show that this was open fighting indeed, the Canadians promptly smashed a hole in the Hindenburg Line at the Drocourt-Quéant switch.

These actions were well-timed lunges and surprises designed to gain again the ground lost in the spring and to maintain a continuous pressure on the enemy. When the Allied military chiefs met at a conference early in September "no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918."¹ Austria and Bulgaria were still in the field and the Germans were retiring in order and putting up a stubborn fight. On July 24th, the Meuse-Argonne attack was planned, with the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient as a preliminary, first, to free the Paris-Nancy and St. Mihiel-Verdun railway lines from interruption of traffic by artillery fire, and second, to afford an advantageous base of departure for the attack towards the Metz-Sedan railway which was the vital line of communication for the Germans west of Verdun. "The extent to which these operations already planned might carry us could not then be foreseen. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn which would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919."²

Against a general opinion that the American Army needed much more seasoning before it could be trusted with a comprehensive and prolonged offensive, General Pershing insisted that his troops should operate as a unit under American command. During the period of emergency the American divisions fought under French and British command, and for many reasons it was urged that they should continue so. But General Pershing persisted and at a conference held September 2d, the point was conceded, and the definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great Allied convergent attack was taken. The scattered American divisions were drawn together in the Toul Sector near St. Mihiel. Since early in the spring, the American Services of Supply had been taking over this area from the French and it had become known as "The American Zone of

The
American
Army

¹ Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 40.

² The same, p. 39.

Operations." Out of 36 American divisions then in France, 26 had had some front line experience when St. Mihiel was fought.¹

St. Mihiel

There was some excuse for anxiety in trusting the American Army in an independent action. Compared with Grant's Army before Richmond or the British Army in the Battle of the Somme, it was a green organization. Its men were largely unseasoned and its higher staffs certainly lacked experience. The Allied chiefs had seen again and again at first hand the terrible punishment that veterans were usually able to inflict on inexperienced troops. St. Mihiel had witnessed some of the ghastliest slaughters of the war.

On September 12th, General Pershing faced the salient in command of the largest American Army that had ever taken the field. There were about 430,000 Americans and about 70,000 French in the attacking force.² Grant's Army of the Potomac at its maximum strength numbered only about 125,000; and, previous to the World War the record had been held by the Russian and Japanese Armies at Mukden, which numbered each a little over 300,000 men.

The Germans actually did not wait to fight it out. Indeed, so widely was the operation advertised in the press, it was feared that they would evacuate before the attack could be made. But the assault met with a determined resistance from 75,000 Germans. The end was never in doubt, but the remarkable feature of the exploit was the precision with which this inexperienced army carried out its program. The objective was practically achieved in twenty-six hours by a perfect cooperation of all services. Beyond a few such mistakes as were inevitable, there was no hitch. Colonel Repington, the British military critic, summed it up:

"The battle was a complete American victory. There was a bit of a block on some of the narrow roads in the rear of the troops, and a few minor observations might have been made, such as the hearty manner in which troops finished two days' rations at their first day's lunch, and threw away their slickers when it stopped raining, but broadly—the whole affair was conducted by General Pershing, his staff, and his troops, according to the best and latest practices of the art of war."³

¹ For a complete story of American operations overseas, consult *The History of the A. E. F.*, Shipley Thomas, New York, 1920.

² Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 43.

³ Colonel Repington, of course, was probably repeating gossip regarding the "rations and slickers." Consult *The First World War, 1914-1918*. Lieut.-Col. C. à Court Repington, 2 vols., Boston, 1920. Vol. II, Chap. XXXVII.

The American losses barely reached 7,000. In three days the salient was gone.

This battle showed very clearly the power at the command of General Foch. The huge artillery concentration—the guns furnished by the French and British, the abundant supply of ammunition, the complete control of the air by the combined Allied airplane squadrons, together with the general effectiveness of the new American forces, made plain that the Allies possessed a tremendous striking power in spite of all the reverses of the spring. Most important of all, the action made plain that the American Army could be trusted with a major operation.

The news from other fronts grew more encouraging daily. On Other Fronts Germany's deserted allies began to waver. A force of French, British, Serbian, and Italian troops, under the French general, Franchet d'Esperey, fell on Bulgaria on September 15th. On September 27th she asked an armistice. This meant Austria's doom, for a way was now opened to attack her from the south. The Greek Army was now ready to assist such an advance. Austria lingered on, but it was clear that she could not sustain another assault. When the Italians were ready, they struck on October 27th, and their ancient enemy collapsed. Turkey, also, was fading out of the picture. The British generals in Palestine and Mesopotamia had the situation well in hand in September. First Allenby shattered the Turkish forces in Palestine; then Marshall, in October, took the entire force opposed to him. The defeat of Turkey was complete.

As the Germans prepared to meet the great Allied offensive ordered for September 25th the horizon was dark. It was only two months since they had stood on the verge of victory. Now, deserted by their allies, they faced an enemy burning for revenge whose strength far exceeded their own. They had laughed at the possibility of danger from across the sea; yet an army of more than a million Americans was assembled in the Argonne. All these forces were directed by one mind whose whole bent was to follow attack with attack, and then attack again. Well might Ludendorff look anxiously toward the diplomats!

The German soldiers were not yet beaten, however; they prepared to give a good account of themselves. The firmness that had characterized them from the beginning had been shaken, but their commanders had brought them out of difficult places into strong positions with astonishingly small losses. Their fighting efficiency was con-

served as soberly and carefully as during the days of success. Ludendorff issued the most precise orders against overwork in the line and too arduous drill.¹ Though it was plain that Germany could never achieve a victory, she still hoped that a resolute resistance might open the way for a diplomatic draw.

The Argonne

In the last movement of the War, the Americans were assigned a task devoid of spectacular effect but of primary military importance. The British, French, and Belgian Armies swept forward over a territory familiar to the whole world; with the eyes of civilization upon them, they advanced in leaps, liberating wide areas that had been in the hands of the enemy for four years. The Argonne Battle where the Americans fought appeared to be but the capture of one obscure village after another in a little-known area. But it was an essential part of the whole plan. In Foch's words the American Army had "become the right wing of a large Allied offensive"—a proud position! Aiming its attacks directly at the trunk line of Germany's entire communication system on the Western Front, at a vital point in the defense which the Germans could not afford to give up, the object of the American Army, in the words of its commander, was "to draw the best German divisions to our front and consume them."² So it was. In this difficult country, fortified by nature as well as by the best skill of the enemy, every available German division was thrown in against the American Army; yet, at the end of 47 days of continuous fighting, our men had completed their assignment, finished their task, and won their objective.

This greatest of all American battles lasted from September 20th till November 11th. It cost in casualties 120,000 men, of whom 16,000 were killed. About 1,200,000 American soldiers were engaged; more than 2,400 guns fired over 4,000,000 rounds. Only 16,000 prisoners were taken, about the same number as were captured in the three days' battle at St. Mihiel. The real fruit of the long engagement was the advance in spite of desperate resistance, to a point that put the Army within striking distance of the Sedan-Mézières-Hirson railroad. Had the war continued, this line would have been cut; only the Armistice, November 11th, saved the Germans from the choice between the complete evacuation of France or the loss of their Army. It is doubt-

¹ Consult *The General Staff and Its Problems*, Erich von Ludendorff, 2 vols., London, 1920. Vol. II, Chap. IX, pp. 385-400.

² Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1918, p. 15. Consult also *The War With Germany, A Statistical Summary*, Col. Leonard P. Ayres. Washington, 1919, p. 111.

ful if a successful evacuation could have been carried out in any event. In the advance of 34 miles, 150 villages and 600 square miles of territory were liberated.

Between the end of the St. Mihiel combat and the opening of the offensive in the Argonne less than two weeks intervened. This period was very short for the work to be done. The ten divisions coming out of the St. Mihiel sector had to be brought to the Argonne across the line of communications, at the same time as the divisions that were the nucleus of the Second Army were crossing in the opposite direction to take up their position in the Verdun area. All these movements were going forward while the general preparations for an offensive were proceeding in the regular order of events. This produced a congestion behind the lines out of which it seemed impossible to bring anything resembling order. Yet, by the date set, all the units concerned were in their proper positions.

The Americans did well to "take a hitch in their belts" before entering this brief but furious campaign. They faced an enemy who, considering all the circumstances, was well prepared to receive them. The defense set up by the Germans did not suggest for a moment the desperate struggle of beaten men; it was the cool, relentless, highly scientific resistance of veterans whose machine-gun tactics alone were calculated to dismay any but the most determined warriors. In this broken and difficult country, German machine-gun nests were placed with the sure skill of old hands and were utilized with daring courage; and the artillery, light and heavy, trained by men experienced in four years' study of firing data, covered every vulnerable area with miraculous accuracy. It is not necessary to dwell on the character of the German infantry. At no point had they shown their worth with more effect than in their recent rapid withdrawals; these movements would have broken down hopelessly if to the skill of their commanders had not been added their own superb discipline. Against such an enemy there was no chance for a quick decision by means of an impetuous lunge. The way to success led through steady and careful advance, not for a few hours but for days and weeks. It was very clear that each position would be taken only with great sacrifice from an enemy who scarcely ever missed a tactical opportunity to inflict heavy damage. Every officer at least knew that the Germans could not execute a strategic retreat in this area, for they were defending the very heart of their position in France. The German Fifth Army, which held this sector, was told by its commander that the loss of this

The German
Defensive

battle would spell disaster for the Fatherland. Forty-six German divisions, first and last, did their best to save it, but in vain.

The battle developed in three phases, which will be recounted only in outline.

The First Phase
in the Argonne

The advance opened with a surprise attack on September 26th. The line advanced over a depth of ten miles and Montfaucon fell into the hands of the 79th Division. In spite of this success, however, the attack died down, for the Germans, recognizing the danger, threw six fresh divisions into the line and began a series of counter-attacks, and by the third day, halted the advance.

This first phase is said to have made an unfavorable impression on the Allied Staffs. It is reported that General Foch himself did not regard as very rosy the chances for the American Army's breaking through, and that he seriously considered the advisability of dispersing the American divisions again and of utilizing their attacking power under the direction of what he considered the more mature judgment of the European general staffs.¹ General Pershing, however, resolutely insisted that his army was equal to the occasion. It was to be expected that the first part of the action would reveal the necessity for readjustment. After three or four days' rest and reorganization, the next phase opened on October 4th.

The Second Phase
in the Argonne

General Pershing had hoped to open up a gap wide enough so that the French cavalry, which was being held in readiness, could have been thrust through the line to exploit a grand success in the manner of the actions on the Balkan and Palestine Fronts. However, confusion of transports on the roads and the intermingling of several divisions in the fog and darkness gave the Germans time to reenforce their lines and all hope of cavalry exploitation had faded. There was nothing in prospect now but a long hard fight by the infantry.

In the second phase of the battle, the American Army began to find itself. Its organization worked better. Especially was there marked improvement in the ability to follow up attacks with the vast paraphernalia of supply. This was important, for in all large-scale actions this ability inevitably conditions the advance of an attacking army. To some extent the lesson of caution had been learned but on the whole the Americans were filled with the confidence that leads to victory, and endorsed Ludendorff's warning that too great timidity is worse than too great temerity.

¹ Consult *The First World War, 1914-1918*. Lieut.-Col. C. à Court Repington, 2 vols., Boston, 1920. Vol. II, p. 458.

The Germans realized now that the American attack was not a mere feeler but a determined frontal attack with the full power of the American Army in France behind it. To protect their vital line of communication reinforcements were needed. The twenty divisions which held the line on September 20th were brought up to twenty-six on October 4th and to thirty-four by October 14th, including some of the finest troops in the German Army. Against this force were arrayed nineteen divisions, four of which were French; but since an American division was more than twice as large as a German, the Germans were numerically inferior.

By the close of the second phase at the end of October, the plan to keep the Americans at this difficult task was completely justified. Their earlier faults were largely overcome; those who had fallen short at first came to the front gloriously. What had been achieved? The southern half of the Argonne forest was in the hands of the Americans, thousands of prisoners and a large quantity of material had been taken, and picked divisions of the German Army had been drawn down from the north in what had become a final desperate attempt to prevent the victorious troops from cutting the main artery of German communications.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to recall the fact that the American Army was only a part of the grand attack. The German line was like a huge door with the Americans attacking close to the hinges in the Argonne. While our men were gaining slowly, the British and French swept across the Hindenburg Line and began rolling back the door in rapid and sweeping advances. These veteran troops were overpassing all their objectives with resistless energy. The Germans were now face to face with implacable fate. Their reinforcements were holding our men to slow and costly gains in the Argonne but these gains were none the less sure and deadly. Where were the reinforcements to oppose to the superbly-trained armies of Great Britain and France eagerly bent on vengeance? This majestic advance, rolling forward with smooth precision, overwhelming all resistance without pausing in its sweep, was one of the resplendent spectacles of history. In the van was the little Belgian Army winning back its own country. And as these warriors marched forward in the West day by day came the reports from their comrades in the East bringing welcome tidings of their unfailing victory.

The American Army shared in this larger movement. At the end of September the 77th and 30th American divisions joined the

Americans with
the Allies

Australian Corps in smashing the Hindenburg Line at Le Cateau. In this single attack, the combined forces advanced sixteen miles and took 6,000 prisoners. Conan Doyle's remark that the Australians and Americans were "extraordinarily like each other in type" is complimentary to both. In that hot engagement, those who were to follow up the American attack had not long to strain at the leash till the news came that the front line was smashed wide open for them. Again in October, the 2d and 36th Divisions, with the French Fourth Army, helped to free Rheims from its martyrdom and to drive the Germans beyond the Aisne; and on October 30th the 37th and 91st Divisions joined the general advance and remained with it till the end.

Elsewhere but few American units appeared. The 339th Infantry were at Archangel, the 27th and 31st Regiments in Siberia, and the 332d Infantry arrived in Italy in time to participate in the victory of Vittoria Veneto.

On November 1st the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne attack began. Although Ludendorff had already opened negotiations for an armistice, the Allied strokes had not slackened but were driving harder and faster. The enemy's line in front of the Americans was strengthened again and again till on November 4th it reached the maximum—41 divisions, including about one-third of the picked divisions of the German Army. It was of no avail; for the American Second Army, on November 5th, made an entirely new attack on the east of the Meuse; the German line here crumpled on the second day, and the German retreat became almost a rout.

Then the German High Command asked Foch for the privilege of a conference. It was not a moment too soon. The Americans were threatening their only way of escape; and if this were once shut off nothing could save the German forces from being torn to pieces by the close-following French and British.

On the night of November 7th the Germans asked Foch for an armistice. He gave them 72 hours to accept the terms which are now a part of history, but he pressed his attacks just the same. On November 10th the Americans reached the outskirts of Sedan and the French and American guns came within range of the railroad on which the fate of the German Army hung. On the same day Stenay fell, and next morning six American divisions were en route to join a French attack along the Moselle planned for November 14th. That attack was never delivered; for, at eleven o'clock, on November 11th, the Armistice ended the long ordeal.

CHAPTER II

THE DETERMINING CONDITIONS IN WELFARE WORK

The major rôles in the great drama that has been briefly sketched were played by citizen fighters. The civilian workers were cast in minor parts but they walked the same stage as those who carried the responsibility for winning the military victories; in each successive scene their actions were determined by the changing experience of the fighting men, and their operations were facilitated or limited by the fluctuating but always superior military claims upon material and human resources. The emphasis of their task changed as they accompanied the fighting men from one phase of experience to another—from home to training camp, on to the fighting areas, and back again. It changed, too, with the military situation. It was one thing when the entire resources of the Allies were being strained to the limit to withstand enemy offensives; it was quite another when the offensive was assumed by the Allies and their forces swept forward over devastated territory; and it was something quite new when victory had been won. Any program set up was tentative; it was at all times subject to the actual conditions created by the war. Innumerable influences played upon it, modifying not only the special activities but the emphasis upon ultimate objectives. It is the purpose of this chapter not to define the civilian task but to set forth for the reader's own judgment some of the most important elements out of which the civilian workers had to define and solve not a single problem but a whole series of problems. Before attempting to judge the skill of the players, it is necessary to know the rules of the game.

The civilian worker with the armed forces is the direct representative of the people at home. He is the embodiment on the field of that deep interest in the fighting man which slowly and steadily through more than two generations was taking definite shape till in the World War, the war of nations, it was displayed in its full power as one of the essential forces in the conflict. This interest is directed to the warrior as a person rather than as a fighting unit. Historically, the official conception of the needs of fighters has undergone great expansion, and the fact that modern armies are composed not of professional fighters but of citizens has brought about a much closer and

The Civilian Field
of Service

more sympathetic relationship between officers and men; the tendency is to include among the needs of the fighters their needs as persons to the limit permitted by military exigencies. But still there remains a broad distinction—subject, of course, to many important qualifications and exceptions—between the necessary attitude of the commander who must win battles with military units and the undying affection of home folks for the men at the front.

The army and navy organizations supply all needs which are common to the men as warriors, but pay only secondary attention to the desires, which may be very real needs, of the men as individuals. They provide food sufficient in quantity and in dietetic variety for the proper nutrition of human beings subject to heavy physical and nervous strain, but they do not take into consideration the personal likes and dislikes of individuals. They furnish shelter against the rigors of climate but do not consider personal privacy or congenial associations. There is instruction for military purposes; but intellectual tastes and habits, varying widely, are ignored. The medical corps, developed now to a high point of efficiency, cares for the sick and the wounded; in the midst of its task of bringing men back to fitness for service it can hardly pause to provide all those delicacies and comforts that the sick and wounded crave. General spiritual needs are ministered to by the chaplains, but only the broadest religious distinctions are recognized. The limitations of the official point of view are created by the definite responsibility for military success laid upon the officers.

Relief and
Welfare Work

The practical expression of civilian interest has developed along two general lines. First, out of sympathy for the acute suffering of the sick and wounded, the agencies of relief—represented now principally by the Red Cross—have opened up a wide range of activities, including, at one end of the scale the promotion of international understandings of a humane character and, at the other, the simplest services designed to relieve temporary discomfort. The second development, drawing its initial impulse from a desire to meet spiritual needs, has been concerned primarily with providing for the able-bodied fighter those social, recreational, educational, and religious activities that are lacking in the routine of army and navy life. The first activity has been generally distinguished by the term, "relief work," the second by the term, "welfare work."

The welfare organization operates mainly within the field of the personal needs and desires of men in active service. It takes cogni-

zance of the fact that soldiers, sailors, and marines come from civilian communities offering strong encouragement to the development of individual variations and rich resources for their gratification, and that the sudden suppression of personality, whether expressed in preference among foods, or in preference among modes of worship, has a negative effect upon efficiency and upon character. Contemplating men in their physical, mental, spiritual, and social aspects, it aims to make available in the camps something of the resources which the civilian community provides for the satisfaction of all four types of desire. When civilians go to war they must leave behind them much or most of the advantages of their accustomed life. The welfare organization seeks to minimize this deprivation and to render what cannot be avoided as endurable as possible.

The distinction of function as between official action and civilian welfare service must never be interpreted too rigidly. Most officers take pains to promote the personal welfare of the men of their commands. As the intensity of the war situation permits, the army and navy organizations directly further extensive activities for individual satisfaction and benefit. It is a long-established custom in the American Army to facilitate the cooperative post exchange, in which men may buy things to eat or smoke to suit their fancy. After the Armistice, the A E F put tremendous power into athletic, educational, and entertainment activities. On the other hand, there were special occasions and prolonged periods in which the Y M C A rendered service distinctly within the Army's province, for the reason that it was impossible or difficult for the Army to function. Lieut.-Col. Whittlesey, Commander of the Lost Battalion, reported that the first food received by his men after their terrible experience was that furnished by the Y M C A. Because, during the fighting period, the A E F did not wish to divert officers and men to run the post exchanges in France, the Y M C A was requested to assume the responsibility. It will be seen that the line of demarcation rises and falls with changing circumstances and that the function of the welfare organization is to supplement official effort in meeting the total need of the men.

The ultimate governing purpose of welfare work, if there be any single inclusive purpose, still awaits definition. No authoritative formulation has yet been made by sociologists or students of military science. It includes, unquestionably, contributions to the physical, mental, and moral well-being of individual soldiers, to the winning of victory, to the permanent civic health of the nations. How far each

Welfare
Objectives

of these is an end in itself and how far each is a means to higher ends is unsettled. Supporters of the work, the workers themselves, the soldiers, and the military and political directors of the larger enterprise of which the work was a part, differed and still differ on these questions. This was one of the anomalies of the situation. No such uncertainty exists about the objective of the military organization. However complicated and difficult the performance of its duty may be, its purpose is clearcut and simple. Its task is to win victory, and every military factor essential to that end is exactly defined and responsibility minutely divided. The duties of chaplain, surgeon, quartermaster, and all the rest are clearly differentiated, specifically prescribed, and graduated from general staff to enlisted man. But everyone concerned had his own idea as to the reason for the welfare organization's presence in the field, and the workers faced their task in the midst of conflicting opinions and subject to restraints and expectations often contradictory.

Conflicting
Views

Ideas and ideals were shaped and colored by the particular personal or official interest, responsibility, and breadth of view of the holder. To the mother of a young citizen soldier, the comfort and well-being of her son is all important. She would like to administer in person every possible alleviation of hardship and gratification of personal tastes. She would like to guard him against vague dangers, not so much of the battlefield as of the camp, and to keep in close communication with him in whatever strange, unknown place he may be. Denied this, she sees in the welfare organization an agent through which her desire may be realized. The soldier has a different conception. He speedily finds that his fundamental physical needs are, except in emergencies, well provided for. Newly formed habits make him indifferent to what, as a civilian, he deemed hardships. The dangers that make mothers anxious he waves lightly aside; he can take care of himself. Monotony is his *bête noire*; monotony of food, of occupation, of companionship. He wants change and variety—candy, cookies, smokes, the equivalent of a box from home, entertainment, sport, something to read—in a word the relaxations and recreations that give flavor and zest to life. Among the infinite possibilities, he craves most, generally speaking, the elements he most enjoyed in his home community. It may be a boxing match or a prayer meeting.

The line officer and the all-important sergeant have their own view. Their job is primarily to keep their unit fit and efficient, and

it is easier if the men are contented and happy. Generally speaking, the intrusion of civilians with undefined duties into the military organization in which every member's place is fixed, is more or less of a nuisance. If they must be underfoot, let them justify themselves by a demonstration of usefulness. Let them do something to keep the men happy. What they do or how they do it is immaterial so long as the result is achieved, and so long as the program does not interfere with the work which sergeant and lieutenant and captain are responsible for getting done. Individual workers found generally that the attitude of officers changed from a "willingness to be shown" to growing recognition of usefulness and eagerness to facilitate and assist.

Statesmen and officers of the high command see the matter from still a different angle. They deal with men in the mass. Individuals are of minor importance. They calculate, with the coolness of an actuary making mortality tables, the probable percentage of killed and crippled. The hardships and deprivations of those who come through safe and sound are comparatively negligible. But they are concerned with maintenance of a high pitch of efficiency, not only in the combat divisions but all the way back through the lines of communication to the training camps with their drill and drudgery. They know from military history or experience, that there is an element of efficiency which, however indefinable, is not a product of drill and discipline alone. There must be relaxation and recuperation from the mental and moral strains of soldier life, which cannot be secured by individual enterprise under military conditions and which are somehow denatured if officially administered. These see in organized welfare work the possibility of adding an important element to that morale which is made up of so many and so varied elements. This general conception appears with considerable clarity in various official authorizations, requests for service, and general orders emanating from American, British, and French headquarters, with which we shall be concerned in the course of this history.

To a large proportion of the supporters of welfare work, the outstanding objective is the spiritual welfare of the men. For them eternal issues overshadow all others. Two facts loom large in war—the fact of death and the fact of sin. It is not to be denied that, in the general demoralization caused by war, temptation is enlarged and intensified. Men go far from home and from the supports and restraints exercised by family and friends, by religious institutions,

Maintenance
of Efficiency

Spiritual
Welfare

and by organized and unorganized social influences. They go, too, into mortal dangers, where without a moment for repentance they may pass through death to eternity. Of all the elements of life in the home community, the soldier needs most, from this viewpoint, those which aid him best to keep his soul clean and at peace with God.

No one of these general conceptions, or others that might be mentioned, is entitled to prevail over the rest. Each arises in minds and hearts profoundly and sincerely interested in the men, in the nation they represent, and in the cause in which they are enlisted. The welfare organization must recognize all and adjust and balance its program with due regard to all. However intensely one may feel the superior claim of any one, it must not be forgotten that the freedom of the welfare organization to make its own decision is limited by very practical considerations.

It should be noted, too, that what may be loosely termed psychological factors modify the conditions of the problem. Without assuming that all recruits are alike, it is possible to differentiate broadly the state of mind of civilians in the first few weeks of initiation into army life from that of the same group in advanced training within sound of the guns. Again there are broad differences between men going into or coming out of battle, and men doing hard physical labor at docks and warehouses in the base sections. The psychology of anticipation of active service and of anticipation of return to home and, perhaps, to a job as good as the one abandoned, presents obvious contrasts. The sailor's experiences are a closed book to most of his fighting comrades. In any such situation, the service which men consciously desire may differ widely from the service considered wise by the high command or the intelligent observer with wider view. Just so, the physician's prescription does not always satisfy the patient's craving or the desires of his sympathetic family. The problem thus stated abstractly presents in practice the most perplexing difficulties. Ready reasoners see no trouble; just find out what the men want and give it to them. But the Army and Navy, as institutions, are engaged in transforming these men into victorious soldiers. They frown on softening indulgence. They want the sting of the spur to be felt. The welfare worker, feeling the home community behind him, perceives character values at stake that he feels to be more important, ultimately, than certain other considerations. But since his service has had no chance to develop professional standards, he cannot feel the certainty nor assume the authority of

a recognized expert. Meanwhile he must act under the critical observation of the fighting man with whom he is in hourly contact, of the command which authorizes and can cancel his status, and of the folks at home whose representative he is.

The practical interest in ultimate purposes lies of course in their influence upon the program of activities. Here there was something much nearer to a common understanding and agreement. The problem had been dealt with practically in the field and a considerable body of experience accumulated. Without attracting much attention from the general public, which in peace time concerns itself little with army life, the American Y M C A had developed, through service to men in the forces, a program that was acceptable to them, approved by military and naval authority, and capable of securing steady support from the men and women who held relations of responsibility for the accomplishment of its larger purposes. The Association had been in existence but a few years when the American Civil War turned its attention irresistibly to the problems of young men temporarily become soldiers. For a dozen years before the World War started, it had worked under official authorization by Congress in permanent Army and Navy posts, and, during the disturbance in Mexico, with outposts on the Border. Beginning with an almost exclusively evangelistic motive, it had developed a broadly humanitarian program of service to body, mind, and spirit, which took cognizance of the objectives aimed at by most of those concerned and achieved a practical balance of emphasis. This conception and program, like the conception and program of war itself, was broadened and deepened in the World War, but its essential character was in no sense radically altered.

The program of the Y M C A will so constantly recur in the following pages, that there is little need to enter upon the subject here. Its basic element was the "hut" which served as club, theater, gymnasium, church, school, post office, express agency, information bureau, and general store, and in which activities suggested by these functions were carried on in bewildering variety. Much more interesting, and more to the point of our present purpose, are the influences which modified the program at various places and times.

Certain of these influences and conditions are easily discernible. It is clear that the background from which the citizen warrior comes, by its degree of contrast with the military community, affects profoundly the intensity and the relative emphasis of demand. The

The Program

Moulding
Influences

French people, for example, are characteristically thrifty. They are not accustomed to the indulgence of momentary desires which is an American characteristic, nor is there such marked contrast between the comfort of civilian life and the discomfort of camps. American soldiers billeted in French villages were disagreeably impressed by the lack of comforts and conveniences which are commonly regarded as indispensable in America. Welfare service which was accepted by Americans as a minimum, was, when introduced in the Foyers late in the war, received by French soldiers with surprised gratitude; while what was hardly more, at times, than a demonstration of almost empty-handed goodwill, evoked appreciations from Russian soldiers pathetic in their implied revelations. There were similar contrasts between different groups of Americans.

Intellectual and social backgrounds also counted. The war permitted few exemptions, and in every fighting force all degrees from illiterates to poets and philosophers were present. Varying mental resources of different types called for supplements varying in quantity and quality from elementary instruction sufficient to enable men to understand written or spoken military orders to the provision of treatises on law, theology, and economics. Men from the larger cities were accustomed to crowds while those from small villages felt themselves overwhelmed in a sea of humanity. An occasional visit of a troupe of "barnstormers" represented the maximum of entertainment to some, while others regarded as a matter of course the opportunity to choose among fifty theatrical and musical performances on any night in the year. While some felt only a desire for amusement, others suffered from the absence of stimulus and food for intellectual or artistic capacities. These contrasts need not be multiplied. In almost any camp or military or naval unit the extremes could be found, and hardly an offering could be named that was not received by some with enthusiastic appreciation while it stirred in others only a languid interest or left them bored.

Closely related to such considerations is the degree of individual preparedness for war. Veteran soldiers and sailors are indifferent to much that raw civilians find exceedingly painful. They are hardened not only physically but mentally. They know what to expect at every stage and are spared the anticipations of the unknown which, in these days of war correspondents, wireless, and moving pictures, are fed daily with details of horror. German armies were composed of men to whom discipline and barrack life as well as arduous field

Varied
Mentalities

Preparedness

maneuvers were quite familiar. The French also had their three years of conscript service behind them. But the British, apart from the small Army of regulars with colonial service, the Navy and a few veterans of the Boer War, had no military tradition or experience. Members of the American National Guard were at home and knew how to make themselves comfortable in conditions where men of the selective draft needed at first the most elementary alleviations. Where one group, given a little equipment, could immediately forget itself in the excitement of a ball game, others needed most a bit of physical comfort, or a reassuring friend with whom to talk things over. These varying circumstances are reflected in the immediacy with which British and American welfare agencies initiated service and the comparative indifference with which tentative welfare undertakings were for two years regarded by the French Government, Army, and people.

The state of national preparedness for war is also of high importance. Poor or insufficient personal equipment, hastily improvised living conditions, inexperienced leadership, inferiority of weapons, inadequate munitions, all put a strain upon the individual soldier. It is the Government's task to correct these defects directly, but it is the function of the welfare worker to help the soldier bear the strain; and it may well be at times that this duty absorbs all resources and relegates every other effort to a less exigent future.

Geography changed the problem. It makes a difference whether a soldier's service calls him to Flanders mud, or the snows of North Russia, or the sands of the Sinai Desert. Experiences in these three environments agree in being exceedingly disagreeable; there the resemblance ends. The equipment and program which is to mitigate the discomforts must vary as widely as the climate. The war put some Americans in Camp Upton, within hail of New York City, and some at a post on the Mexican Border, sixty miles from a railroad. It sent some to London and Paris; thousands to tiny French villages where the appetite of the populace for news was satisfied by a town crier who gathered the people by beating a drum and then read them official bulletins; and some to stand guard over a conquered population at the Rhine bridgehead. The social as well as the physical environment required consideration.

It is necessary to recognize, still further, that the "accidents of war" and the changing military situation constitute determining factors. Two thousand years before the era of the biplane and the sub-

Physical and
Social
Environment

marine, Thucydides put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys the pregnant statement that "War of all things in the world is least likely to go according to program,"¹ and military history furnishes one long footnote to their words. On both sides in the World War, even major strategy had to be modified continually to meet the surprises of the moment. The forces operating in this conflict were so uncontrollably and grotesquely huge that they defied the comprehension even of that body of military scientists in Germany who had devoted a half-century to a united study of just such a war. Tens of millions of men, hundreds of billions of money, mechanical devices the power of which had never been really tested, complete concentrations of the moral energies of a score of nations—such were the elements out of which men attempted to construct sure combinations. The task proved beyond human power. The war was a sequence of stunning surprises, of emergencies for which all were ill-prepared, of events which so exceeded or confused anticipations as to make calculations relied upon to meet them practically valueless. The experience of the leaders of the nations was like a bad dream wherein an actor, well rehearsed in the part of Macbeth, suddenly realizes that the banquet-hall has faded into a "Street in Venice" and that he is delivering a meaningless declamation to a motley group made up of Shylock, Desdemona, Antony, and King Lear.

Military
Emergencies

At each high point of emergency, which it is possible in a general way to distinguish, supreme creative genius was called upon to improvise a new arrangement of resources; and then, until the next great crisis arose, there ensued inevitably a period of desperate effort to accommodate affairs to the new situation. No great effort of the imagination is required to realize that these readjustments are primarily readjustments of the fighting man. Extraordinary measures mean extraordinary activities for him. The plans were made at headquarters, but it was the German soldiers who traveled back and forth to fight first in France, then in Galicia, then in Roumania, then on the Piave, then on the Marne again. Nothing more profoundly affects the social experience of the warrior than the military crises of a war.

These crises affect welfare work in intensely practical ways. In a retreat, established and well-stocked service points are lost. In an advance, troops outdistance them. During preparations for a mili-

¹ Thuc. i, 122, quoted in *Life of Gladstone*, John Morley, 3 vols., London, 1903, Vol. I, p. 544.

tary movement, all available transport may be commandeered, or roads become so congested that the truckload of supplies destined for a smoke-hungry crowd is held up by the sentry at a control post far in the rear, or a general embargo placed on a whole district. Given the necessity of transatlantic transport for troops and supplies, modified by the potentialities of the submarine, the welfare organization faces a somewhat more difficult problem than buying a steamship ticket for its worker or making out a shipping manifest for its equipment. There is no occasion here to catalogue such elements of the problem. Some of them will appear as we proceed. They are all applications of the general principle that in war military considerations are supreme. The supplementary agency must be subject at all times to military prescription and restriction of movement, program, and procedure. Facilities granted at one stage may be withdrawn at another stage, and activities encouraged in one area prohibited in another. Over these modifications the welfare organization has no control. It may not question nor evade. Its problem is to find ways and means of performing the maximum useful service within the limitations set and to adapt its program to the prime needs of place and time.

There is no implication here that the military prescriptions are ^{Official Support} always restrictive. Often they have a simplifying and assisting purpose and effect. No one has a keener interest in the efficiency of welfare service than the army for which it exists. From general staff to enlisted man the attitude of the Army was one of helpfulness to the extreme extent compatible with its own responsibilities. The high command from the beginning regarded the Y M C A as a sincere and competent coadjutor and did not hesitate to suggest or request forms of usefulness that were far beyond the contemplated program. Some of these, like the post exchange, bulked so large as to over-shadow normal activities, while others, like remitting funds home for soldiers, resulted in benefits out of all proportion to the labor and expense involved. But no results at all could have been accomplished had not the Army consistently recognized that certain of its facilities were essential to the welfare service and had it not sought to concede, even to the extent of most generous interpretation of regulations, the needed aid from its limited resources.

The wide range and more or less abstract interest of such con- ^{Basic Materials} siderations as have been touched upon should not obscure the concrete elements of the welfare organization's problem. Nothing could be done without money, equipment, and workers. Men, materials, and

dollars were being outpoured in bewildering quantities for the accomplishment of specific war aims. The expenditure of the United States Government is roughly stated at a million dollars an hour. To divert from those rushing torrents sufficient resources for their supplementary tasks, involved for the welfare organizations a large amount of thought and action. Not that the people were slow or unwilling; they gave, whenever asked, more than was asked for. But there are many steps necessary to bridge the gap between a hundred million generous persons and a treasury that can pay bills, and between a couple of hundred thousand men and women willing to serve but scattered over a nation's territory, and a carefully selected, trained, organized, and militarized staff marshaled at definite points of service. The details of the processes involved need not concern us here. It is only necessary to remember that a high degree of skill and foresight, the tireless labors of countless volunteers and employes, and office and business equipment equal to that required only by the largest commercial enterprises, were necessary to the performance of this prerequisite of actual service. It should be remembered also that peace presents no need and no possibility of such a marshaling of resources, and only after the actual declaration of war, under pressure of demands for immediate service, could drives for men and money be organized and materials bought in the huge quantities required.

All these considerations involved in this brief analysis are to be evaluated as the data out of which the welfare organizations and their workers had to distil the essence of service. In order to understand and justly appraise what was done and what was not done, the student or critic must comprehend and weigh them, both in their general character and in the specific forms they assumed from time to time. The problems could only partly be solved in conferences of leaders with broad knowledge of events and trained insight. They presented themselves also in concrete form to workers in the field. Instantaneous diagnosis of the temper of an individual soldier or of a division, appreciation of what they had just been through or were about to experience, with as quick adaptation of material or mental resources perhaps absurdly inappropriate to the need, were the daily duties of men and women who themselves endured no light strains. The crises of the war which so upset military calculations effected sudden and far-reaching changes in the demands made upon the welfare organizations and in the resources by which they had to be met.

New needs arising unexpectedly called for creative improvisations like those demanded in the larger military operations. Nor was it chiefly improvisation. The past supplied the record and tested results of a historical development which cast illumination upon the new problems. Before following further the developments in the World War it will be useful to trace the main stages of that development.

CHAPTER III

THE CIVILIAN AND THE FIGHTING MAN

The days immediately following the entrance of America into the war on April 6, 1917, discovered two civilian agencies actively engaged in service for fighting men. The American Red Cross by its very constitution was an authorized national institution. The Young Men's Christian Association offered an extension of service which was accepted on the basis of its long experience in work for soldiers and sailors and its established official relationship with the Government. These two organizations represented two general phases of a single popular movement whose roots lie far back in history.

The Two-fold
Civilian
Enterprise

Though this record is concerned with one type of work, welfare service, the fields of activity of the two services were so closely related and the principles and conditions governing their growth had so much in common that some knowledge of the circumstances of their origin and the causes of their separate development is necessary to our understanding of the positions the two institutions came to occupy in America during the World War. Each appeared at the crisis in our history with a program covering a special phase of civilian enterprise that was not a mere device of the moment but the product of a long experience of men and women who had been working hard to embody active humanitarianism in service while their fellow-citizens were still for the most part preoccupied with other affairs. These programs were the means by which spontaneous popular enthusiasm was transmuted into effective service.

CHIVALRY AND MERCENARIES

Of course, it is impossible to say when first the spirit of compassion moved human beings to turn to the assistance of comrades wounded in battle; but it is probable that the earliest organized relief agencies appeared in connection with those astounding migrations, known as the Crusades, that swept into a series of united campaigns the turbulent feudal barons of Europe. The same adventurous piety that misdirected so much energy to destructive purposes did inspire the formation of the earliest religious institutions devoted to the alleviation of suffering caused by war. Such orders as the Knights of

St. John of Jerusalem, pledged to the relief of the wounded and to the knightly protection of women enlisted in the same cause, arose during those dark and stormy days. To such religious orders must be awarded the honor of having originated systematic relief, as distinguished from mere individual effort; they stood as an unconscious protest alike against the evils of armed conflict and against the conception of religion that promoted so many barbarous struggles.

These same Knights of St. John, known also as the Hospitalers or Knights of the Hospital, the Knights of Rhodes, and the Knights of Malta, have had a continuous existence from 1070, or earlier. In 1879, the original order established regular hospital service under the Convention of Geneva. Two Protestant orders of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem derive their origin from the same source; the Prussian Johanniterorden, dating from the sixteenth century, and the Anglo-French order of St. John of Jerusalem dating from 1814.¹ All served with honor in the World War.

The long period into which the Age of Chivalry merged (1300-1800) was the era of the professional soldier. The mercenary rose to a new position of importance; because, since the land levies owed their primary loyalty to the feudal barons, kings could be sure of having an army directly responsible to them only by hiring it. On the whole, the mercenaries were effective; because, although they were liable on occasion to desert to a more generous master, their training and experience made them formidable warriors when their interest was adequately secured. Such an arrangement, fairly satisfactory to all the parties concerned, developed into the situation where war became entirely the business of professionals who fought at the command of their sovereign employer.²

Under such circumstances, there was nothing to arouse any popular interest in the general conditions of the soldier's life and all relief work remained in the hands of the religious orders. New orders like the Knights of St. George, originating in Bavaria, were established; but of greater significance is the rise and growth of the Christian sisterhoods. The Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, established in the seventeenth century, is still the largest nursing institution in the world. The members of these sisterhoods

¹ Consult Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition, New York, 1911, Vol. 24, p. 18b.

² The same, Article Army, Vol. 2, p. 592.

devoted themselves in civil life to the care of the sick and poor, and it was by a natural extension of their service that they came to offer their aid to the sick and wounded in war. Sisters of Charity¹—a term now loosely used with reference to various orders—have accomplished on the field of battle a work which, both in the spirit that is its main incentive and in the results it has achieved, deserves the best appreciation that the historian may bestow.

The twentieth century mind, with its strongly secular bent, is most prone to forget that, through many vicissitudes, it was the religious impulse that kept the humanitarian impulse alive and that the first steps of secular humanitarian effort were made with support of both the Christian spirit and the technical skill of the religious institutions. The broad apprehension of social welfare that has created our splendid modern community efforts should be liberal enough to appreciate whence came alike the original inspiration for these enterprises and a large part of the present energy that makes them effective.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

In the nineteenth century, the business of making war in the western world entered upon a new phase in a new set of conditions.

The Napoleonic campaigns ended the dominance of the professional soldier, while the spread of democratic ideas made it exceedingly difficult to wage war independently of popular support. War became more of a national affair. The rapid progress of science revolutionized the whole machinery of conflict while at the same time the advance in the art of healing opened new prospects in the alleviation of suffering. The rise of modern social humanitarianism, repudiating the idea of "necessary evils," prepared the ground for leadership in the mitigation of the needless sufferings and privations of active service. This social movement began to move out beyond religious institutions, adapting the methods worked out by Christian agencies to the use of the whole community in schools, orphanages, hospitals, and asylums. Under such circumstances the civilian community first came to understand its responsibility for the well-being of fighting men.

The work of Florence Nightingale in the British Army during the Crimean War is rightly regarded as marking a turning-point in human experience. To gain a just comprehension of what she ac-

¹ "Sisters of Mercy" is also used in a general significance.

completed her whole career must be surveyed.¹ The official medical service had broken down completely. It was out of the question to plead the emergency; the death-rate in certain barracks in England was twice as high as that in the surrounding civil population. This determined civilian when she landed at Scutari on Nov. 4, 1854, with her corps of 38 nurses, backed by the goodwill of the nation, slipped in through a door inadvertently left open by inefficiency; once in, she proceeded to clean house. On the field, she brought order out of chaos, building up a system that was conceived on a scale adequate to the magnitude of the problem and at the same time comprehended the details of plain cleanliness and common decency. It is quite true that the men came to kiss Miss Nightingale's shadow as she passed; one said: "Before she came there was cussin' and swearin', but after that it was 'oly as church." When she returned to England, she allowed no one a moment's peace until the whole army medical system had been overhauled and reorganized. Her report, entitled "Notes Affecting the Health, Efficiency, and Hospital Administration of the British Army," remains an authority on the subject.

Miss Nightingale's concern was not alone for the sick. New to the war experience, she could see no reason for the soldiers' deprivation of the ordinary facilities of decency. The army dragged along a train of camp followers who lived handsomely at the men's expense. The canteen concession was in the hands of "sutlers"—individuals who conducted their enterprise for their own welfare. Recreation was in the hands of men and women of even less creditable character. There was no recognition of any responsibility for offsetting the evil influences that met the soldier on every hand. Miss Nightingale opened reading and writing rooms. She bid for the soldier's spare cash through her own system of "home remittances"; she bid for his spare time through her educational lectures. With the meager means at her disposal, she was able to point to such definite results as a marked decrease in drunkenness and a substantial amount of money forwarded to soldiers' relatives. While it is just and proper to regard Miss Nightingale as the "Angel of Mercy," the prototype of all Red Cross nurses, it must not be forgotten that the welfare worker, too, must trace the origin of such service back to that same determined woman who persisted in regarding the fighter as a man.

¹ Consult *The Life of Florence Nightingale*, 2 vols., Sir E. T. Cook, New York, 1913; also the interesting study of her character and work in *Eminent Victorians*, Lytton Strachey, London, 1918.

The Religious
Orders in the
Crimean War

The Sisters of Charity were on the field with the French Army; they were not present in large numbers, but they went ahead with their work in their customary inconspicuous manner. Since the popular movement diverged shortly after the Crimean War, the further efforts of the Sisters of Charity lie outside the scope of this history; but it would be an ungrateful omission to fail to set down the fact that they have been present in every war since and that they are still ready for such self-sacrificing service as the future may demand. It should be recorded, also, that Florence Nightingale received most of her training at a deaconess' institute and spent much time in study of the work of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul in France. The sisterhoods, in 1854, offered the only trained nurses available for service. She enlisted good workers wherever she could find them, and the character of her work tended to stimulate the development of the nursing profession beyond the walls of these institutions; but she never failed to acknowledge her debt to them in terms of sincere gratitude.

The Civilian and
the Military

A considerable group of officers deeply resented Miss Nightingale's "civilian interference," backed by the authorization of the civilian officials of the War Office. It was maintained that even if the situation was as bad as it had been painted—which was not proved—the army was capable of dealing with the emergency and that it was totally subversive of all military discipline to permit a civilian, and a woman at that, to interfere in the field of active operations. The sharp conflict that ensued brought out the contrasts in viewpoint that have been noticed in the preceding chapter.

In times of peace popular interest in the fighting forces as a rule runs very low. When in a period of emergency the veil is lifted, the sensitive civilian conscience is appalled by the hardships and moral dangers to which the thoroughgoing military mind is entirely inured. The brutality of war is seldom apprehended by the populace that hurls defiance to its enemies; it is regarded by the military professional as one of the standard elements in the situation. A certain amount of hardness is necessary in the business of making war. The whole civilian effort on the field becomes an outrush of compassion resulting very frequently in failure to appreciate the supreme pre-occupation of a commander with the definite task of defeating the enemy. The civilian grows impatient over red tape, forgetting that the fighting establishments must be built up on the basis of orderly procedure and that even triplicate forms are of considerable impor-

tance at times. That some officers prefer to be correct rather than right is only one more proof that the insignia of rank are attached to human shoulders. A fundamental difficulty in cooperation of this kind is the inevitable massed resistance of a professional caste to the interference of amateurs; it is the same in business, in politics, and in religion. Miss Nightingale had to fight this at every step, but this has been the lot of all reformers.

The contrast between the civilian and the military mind must not be overstressed. Miss Nightingale could not have won through if there had not been on her side officers who not only appreciated the value of her work but also understood and welcomed the corrective of the lay mind. The two generations that have passed since her day have witnessed an extension of the civilian function that never could have been realized without the support of broadminded professionals. Even more striking than the service performed in the World War by relief and welfare organizations was the continued approval and support of their efforts expressed so forcibly by the commanders-in-chief and the leading generals of the Allied Armies.

This military approval has been granted for two leading reasons among others.

First of all, army and navy men have not been completely insulated from the life of the world; many of them have thoroughly sympathized with the humanitarian movement of the last three-quarters of a century. The relationship between officers and men is greatly improved as compared with the conditions existing in 1850, and many officers yield to no relief or welfare worker in the matter of concern for the well-being of men under their command. They know better than the civilian how monotonous and how arduous is the daily routine, what pain must be endured in the field under the best circumstances; they understand the moral dangers that beset these concentrations of young men in the fighting forces and they have felt the peculiar power of the temptations. Thus, they welcome all national relief and welfare work because it tends to make the lot of the fighting man happier and more secure. Even beyond the charmed circle of the commissioned, many an old-time sergeant, hard-boiled enough to suit the most robust taste, recognizes in his own distinctive manner an alliance with the civilian societies in dealing with those close-range matters which are of such prime concern and importance to the "non-coms," but which, generally, are beyond the ken of the newly created second lieutenant.

Improved
Relationships

The second leading reason for military approval of these civilian services is found in the recognition of their military value. Relief and welfare work represent a humanitarian movement on the part of the community; in so far as they achieved their direct personal ends, they were satisfied. The military leaders, however, were bound to study the effect upon the main business in hand. Some have disapproved strongly, maintaining that the well meant efforts of the civilian agencies tended to impair the fighting efficiency of the men. As certain skeptics were sure Miss Nightingale was "spoiling the brutes," so in the Spanish-American War there were American officers who were convinced that the comforts offered to wounded men by the Red Cross agents would make them unfit to bear hardship in the field. Such, however, is not the opinion of leading officers in America, Great Britain, and France. The general aims of relief and welfare work have been approved on the ground that they help keep the army and navy in fit condition.

Official
Opinion

From the strictly military point of view, it is this judgment that justifies permitting the civilian societies within the zone of active operations. Throughout all the centuries of war, the conservation of the fighting temper has been a problem ever present to the mind of commanding officers; in the World War, it became a matter of absorbing moment. On this question of the maintenance of morale, this history touches with the greatest diffidence; the considerations involved are exceedingly complex, and a complete account belongs within the province of a purely military work.¹ Morale is not a magical creation of bandages, sweaters, chocolate, cigarets, and vaudeville shows. It depends, first and foremost, on the character of the fighting men. Napoleon's armies, for example, remained firm under the inhuman strains to which they were exposed because they were composed of highly intelligent soldiers thoroughly committed to the cause for which they were fighting. The fighting spirit of his great veterans disappeared at last simply because the men were exterminated. American confidence in the warriors we sent to France or set to guard the dangerous sea-ways was based fundamentally on our belief in the courage and constancy of the boys themselves. Then, of course, morale depends upon a whole range of purely military conditions—proper training, adequate equipment, food and shelter, sanitation, effective leadership, and all the rest. The best of men will finally

¹ Consult *The Management of Men*, Col. Edward L. Munson, New York, 1921.

lose their stomach for combat if they are compelled to fight hungry and barefoot and short of ammunition, for commanding officers in whom they have lost all confidence. Many other elements are involved such as belief in the cause and the assurance of the support of their own people. Wavering national resolution leaves the army and navy hanging in the air. But, again to emphasize the heart of the matter, morale measures are designed simply to stimulate and to conserve a spirit that is the essential possession of the fighting man himself. We know that fine armies composed of brave men melted away in the World War because they were subjected to impossible strains both physical and moral, but we also are quite aware that certain forces in fairly advantageous positions proved ineffective through plain lack of intelligence and resolution.

No relief or welfare leader imagined that his organization supplied the power that won the war, and no military leader ever relied on these agencies to such an extent. Nevertheless, the military leaders did welcome these agencies as allies in the work of keeping men physically and morally fit. They were called upon to assist in providing extra comforts, physical and mental relaxation, and spiritual refreshment whose purpose was to relieve as far as possible the abnormal strain that developed to such disturbing proportions under the new conditions in the World War.

In order still further to guard against misunderstanding one other point must be emphasized.

The development of measures to promote the well-being of fighting men has not been, since 1850, wholly in the hands of civilians. Even setting aside altogether those reforms that owe their accomplishment to popular movements, the military and naval establishments themselves have dealt in a large way with the human problem. All improvements in housing, sanitation, and equipment have played their part in mitigating the hardships of war. The A E F probably has no very pleasant recollection of its ocean voyages, but what would these trips have been in the accommodations of two generations ago? Compare a modern camp like Camp Dix with those barracks where the death-rate was double that of the civilian population. The modern battleship is something quite different from its predecessors. The improvement in all services of supply have utterly changed the conditions of active combat. The manner of conducting field operations has in itself greatly reduced the excessive hardship of battle. In the World War, many new military measures were adopted to protect the

Military Science
and the Well-
being of the
Forces

forces from the bloodsuckers who drew their sustenance from the vital energies of the fighting man. The medical corps of today would probably please even Florence Nightingale.

Most of these improvements have been made during the period when civilians sleep; they are the professional warriors' contribution to the task of mitigating the horrors of war. While it is impossible here to trace the truly fascinating story of technical progress, every word of this history is set down with a full realization of how large a part the establishments have played in the difficult enterprise of humanizing the life of the fighting man.

THE AGENT OF RELIEF

The work of Miss Nightingale became widely known throughout Europe and America within a very few years. The story of its success acted as a strong incentive to those whose minds were turning in the same direction, and her methods encouraged imitation because they were so splendidly direct.

Henry Dunant, of Geneva, Switzerland, was with the French Army as an observer at the bloody battle of Solferino in 1859. It is believed that the extraordinary slaughter of men in this engagement completely unnerved Napoleon III and hurried him into the rather unsatisfactory treaty which he concluded with his enemies soon after. The horror of the experience moved Mr. Dunant to action. He knew of the pioneering effort in the Crimean War and determined to make the example effective in a larger way. His vivid treatise "*Un Souvenir de Solferino*," (Geneva; 2d edition, 1862), became a kind of campaign document as he set out to arouse the public opinion of Europe. The result of his strenuous labors was the Convention of Geneva in 1864, called by the Swiss Government. Its aim was to bring the governments of Europe to an agreement which would make possible more humane treatment of the sick and wounded in war. The civilian appeared in a new rôle—the framer of rules of war that would permit workers unmolested to serve the wounded on the field of battle and that would guarantee some security for hospitals and ambulances. The International Red Cross Treaty was drafted at this convention and subsequently submitted to the various governments represented. More than forty nations have accepted this treaty, thus becoming in principle supporters of this humane code designed to mitigate the "needless severities" of war. Revisions proposed in 1868 and in 1874 were not adopted, but a fully revised treaty was

accepted in 1906; and by the Hague Convention of 1907, its provisions were extended to maritime warfare. At the first convention in 1864, the Red Cross—the Swiss flag with colors reversed—was adopted as the emblem protecting relief work in the field.

It is fortunate that the founders of this movement did not rest on their oars at this point. They recognized that something more than signing a treaty was necessary to give full effect to the agreement. Plans were made at once for the creation of national Red Cross Societies, approved by the governments, organized for the purpose of providing equipment and workers to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the treaty. An International Committee of the Red Cross, with headquarters in Geneva, was established as a clearing house, but of set purpose no standard plan of organization was imposed; it was wisely foreseen that the work could succeed only if developed along national lines, with each country free to devise that form of operation best suited to its character and needs. Though the sanction of the government was expected in each case, the Red Cross Societies were designed to be popular agencies. "The Red Cross means not national aid for the needs of the people, but the people's aid for the needs of the nation."¹ The societies have in general adhered strictly to their original purpose; they remain channels through which pours the energy of popular service.

The fighting man reaped early benefit from the new agent of relief. The societies were busy in the Franco-Prussian War (1870); the international touch became effective at once, for neutral nations poured in supplies of all kinds. It is no exaggeration to say that in every conflict since that date, the beneficent hand of the Geneva delegates has been felt.

The United States of America, preoccupied by the Civil War and separated from Europe by an ocean much wider in those days than it is now, did not join the movement, though American delegates were present at Geneva.

A Practical
Demonstration in
America

In the meantime, however, the United States Sanitary Commission was demonstrating in the Civil War the capacity of the American people for conducting the best type of relief work. This Commission gathered in the scattered efforts of the large number of "Soldiers' Aid Societies" that sprang up throughout the North on the outbreak of hostilities. Its president was the Rev. Henry W.

¹ The Red Cross, Clara Barton, Washington, D. C., 1898, p. 97.

Bellows, D.D. The United States Government, which looked upon the activities of the unrelated societies with some apprehension, finally recognized the united effort expressed in this Commission.

This work received the hearty support of the people. Its workers were recruited from all professions and gifts poured in from every source. Altogether over \$3,000,000 was received in cash contributions for general support and more than \$9,000,000 worth of supplies were donated. Its activities covered the whole range of supplementary medical and sanitary service.¹

The American
Red Cross

In 1882, the United States signed the Red Cross Treaty. There were reasons for this delay. Among them was a general disposition in official circles to feel that, after all, it was an affair for Europe—a continent a long way from America. Not a few, too, feared the possibilities of an “entangling alliance.” However, there was really no active opposition to participation; and when official inertia had finally been overcome by the persistent efforts of Miss Clara Barton, Congress took the necessary action. The formation of a national organization was, of course, deferred till the action of the Government seemed assured; but early in 1881 the prospect of early action appeared so favorable that the American Association of the Red Cross was formed on May 21st. Meanwhile America’s delay in participation had deprived her generous citizens of the privilege of helping in Europe. During the Franco-Prussian War, Americans made lavish gifts which were largely if not wholly wasted because of the lack of an authorized agent to handle the distribution. The American Red Cross received full recognition by Congress and President Arthur consented to act as President of the Board of Consultation. The Society has been maintained always as an agent officially recognized by the Government of the United States.

Largely through American influence, the societies of the Red Cross extended their sphere of action to cover relief in time of national calamities—fire, floods, earthquakes, and pestilence. Other undertakings, too numerous to set down here, have been put in hand by this institution, which has secured and maintains a firm hold on the affections of the American people. Its auxiliary societies are found in every community in the country.

During the Spanish-American War the American Red Cross rose nobly to its opportunity.

¹ Consult A History of the War of Secession, 1861-1865, Rossiter Johnson, New York, 1888.

In the World War, the Red Cross crowned its earlier achievements with a service whose magnitude startled the whole world. This romantic story must be read elsewhere.¹ The Society stands without question today as the most productive of all social efforts to bring the organized moral sense of mankind to bear on mitigating the horrors of war. The character, the methods, and the achievements of the Red Cross have largely determined the nature and limits of civilian relief work in war time. There is, as has been said, no sharp line of demarcation between relief and welfare; and the Red Cross Societies have in the course of the day's work done much that would be classed as purely welfare work. Dire need must supersede all formal agreements. But the main emphasis of this work lies in its chosen field and its position in the American forces was defined accordingly. The basic soundness of Red Cross principles commends the institution to the support of every friend of humanity.

The Mission of
the Red Cross
in the War

WELFARE WORK AND THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

While relief work was developing in the hands of the semi-official societies of the Red Cross, welfare enterprises entered the field from a different direction. As has been indicated, there was much individual effort in behalf of the soldiers and sailors of the western nations; but character and purpose of welfare work up to the present day has been largely determined by the experience and achievements of the Young Men's Christian Association. Reserving till later any account of the main developments of this society as a civilian organization, it is the purpose here briefly to summarize its war experience.

The Y M C A originated in London in 1844. Within a few years, this society of young men organized for mutual improvement on a distinctly religious basis had spread over Europe. Henry Dunant was president of the Geneva Association in 1859 and it may be said that through him the institution first came into contact with the war situation. The movement was planted in America in 1851, and in the Civil War first played any definite part in welfare work.

The American Civil War was fought under conditions that involved popular interest of the highest intensity. The sharp moral tension of the preceding decades ended in a fratricidal conflict fought

The
Civil War

¹ The American Red Cross in the Great War, H. P. Davison, New York, 1919.

The Story of the American Red Cross in Italy, Charles M. Bakewell, New York, 1920.

on no distant field but upon a wavering line stretched across the heart of the country. Every community in America was bound up with some sector of that line.

The United States
Christian
Commission

The Young Men's Christian Association was at this time a small group of local organizations federated loosely under their Central Committee. It held practically no property and employed no professional workers. The aim of the local organizations was largely evangelistic; they drew their impulse from the evangelical churches, which were in 1860 on the crest of a great wave of expansion and missionary zeal. The leaders of the New York Association saw in the volunteers who poured through their city a body of young men, drawn away from home to face the uncertainties and temptations of a soldier's life, in urgent need of spiritual sustenance. Realizing the extent of the undertaking as a result of their first efforts, they persuaded their Central Committee to call a convention. Fifteen Associations in the Northern States responded; and the Convention in October, 1861, created "The United States Christian Commission" to represent not only the Association but the whole Christian community. The Christian Commission was composed of twelve members; its chairman was George H. Stuart of Philadelphia, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association federation.

Thus while the United States Sanitary Commission, which was itself heartily supported by the Christian constituency, turned its attention to relief work, the Christian Commission projected welfare activities—conceiving welfare, of course, in the character of the evangelical mission. The "delegates," for by this name the workers were known, preached, held private interviews, and distributed religious literature. They represented the deep interest of that very large part of the community which regarded spiritual welfare as the matter of prime concern.

In the face of actual conditions, however, the work broadened almost immediately. These earnest evangelists recognized the need of "benefits for both body and soul." The 4,800 delegates—all working without salary—addressed themselves to all sorts of social needs and assisted very actively in strictly relief work. They established tents as social centers, provided stationery and periodicals, and rendered all the thousand and one personal services that lie in the path of the civilian welfare worker. In all about \$2,500,000 was spent on general maintenance and about \$2,800,000 worth of donated stores

were distributed. The American Bible Society supplied the Bibles, Testaments, and Scripture portions. Telegraph and railroad companies offered their services without charge; and, as a rule, the delegates were entertained freely in the hotels everywhere. Every effort was made to keep the spirit of the work broadly tolerant and national. The delegates were carefully instructed to cooperate with both chaplains and surgeons and to be punctilious in their regard for military regulations. Both men and women were used in the service.

The war over, the Executive Committee of the Commission held its final meeting on January 1, 1866, and at that time formally disbanded the organization.

In the Confederate Army there was no parallel comprehensive enterprise. The Young Men's Christian Association, however, found its field of service in the regimental Associations, which were soldier organizations stimulated by various religious workers who followed the fortunes of the army. The purpose of these organizations was primarily, and perhaps exclusively, spiritual; the members were banded for the mutual support of faith and character. The idea appealed to a large number of men. The Y M C A of the Thirty-seventh Georgia regiment, for example, reported on May 25, 1863, a membership of 99. The resources of the South in paper were so limited that comparatively little literature of any kind was available, but these Associations did receive gifts of pamphlets and hymnbooks for distribution to the men. New Testaments were actually secured from the American Bible Society in New York. These simple Y M C A organizations proved of considerable value to the men; though, of course, their very spontaneity rendered continuous effort extremely difficult.¹

After the Civil War, America settled back for a long period of peace. There appeared to be no particular need for welfare work when the Christian Commission disbanded; even the enlightened interest of the delegates saw no further than demobilization. Of course, the religious outlook of the period was restricted and the community was largely inexperienced in social methods.

Welfare work made its appearance again in connection with the militia camps of the United States and Canada, where groups of civilians were undergoing brief camp training. Between 1880 and

¹ With Christ in Camp; or, Religion in Lee's Army, J. William Jones, Richmond, 1887, gives a comprehensive and interesting account of religious work in Confederate camps during the Civil War.

1890 a large number of camps were entered by the Y M C A. The Association was expanding rapidly in the cities. The program had developed into something more distinctive than the exclusively evangelistic activities: educational, social, and physical work supplemented the religious meetings and Bible classes; buildings designed to embody this "four-fold work" were erected in many cities; professional secretaries were employed to give continuous direction to the extensive activities and to manage the more complex business of the organization; and the consolidation of the movement was greatly forwarded by the formation of provincial and state committees and by the development of the International Committee which is the Central Committee representing the Associations of the United States and Canada. The state and provincial committees handled most of the work in the militia camps in Canada and in the National Guard camps of the United States. There was, of course, no national crisis involved; the Association was impelled to offer its services to these young men as it had offered them to young men in the cities, in the colleges, and in the railroad communities. The activities generally included a religious program supplemented by social and recreational features.

Through this work the Y M C A gained some valuable military experience. Methods were tried out; and the secretaries became somewhat used to the ways of the military, which often appear most "dark and devious" to the uninitiated layman. Reports of the work stirred up a considerable interest in the Association's home constituency. A few efforts at regular army posts were tried during this period but they came to very little.

The Spanish-American War (1898) again stirred the popular interest. The people had followed the dramatic events that led up to the break with close attention, and it was understood from the beginning that a large number of volunteers would be required both in the Army and in the Navy. The Y M C A immediately offered its services. The Association now appeared as a well-organized institution with a solid supporting constituency and a professional staff; it had proved its acceptability to young men and had acquired considerable military experience; it was represented by a single authorized agency, the International Committee, which the Government could hold directly responsible. On April 30, 1898, the enterprise received the approval of the Secretary of War and of the General Staff; and the Y M C A was authorized to locate its tents in any command in the army, subject of

course to the supervision and direction of the commanding officers. The United States Christian and Sanitary Commissions were referred to as models of the work. Thus, the Y M C A became the officially accredited ally of the American forces in a time of war.

Service in the state camps was turned over to the state committees of the Y M C A and the International Committee supervised service in the national camps and the zone of operations. A staff of 150 men was maintained, and during the eight months of the war the expenditures ran to a little over \$130,000. The general program followed the lines tested out in the national guard camps. The religious program—in which the famous evangelist, D. L. Moody, participated—was strongly emphasized but was backed by extensive social and recreational features as formerly. It must be ever borne in mind that, twenty years ago, Christian agencies in the United States were still feeling their way very carefully into social enterprises; the individualistic viewpoint had not yet fully opened its heart to broader conceptions. The Y M C A, with its emphasis on the harmonious development of the individual in body, in mind, and in spirit—symbolized in its Triangle emblem—had, however, made some significant steps toward the wider understanding of the function of Christianity.

In the Spanish-American War the American Y M C A met its first real war experience. It encountered those problems created by the tension and grind of training which will be dealt with more completely later. It came into contact with sailors. Some of its men had a taste of life on transports. Still others saw service with “combat divisions.” They learned to face the grim problem of making one’s self useful in Cuban mud with no equipment but a hat. The conditions of prisoners-of-war came within its ken. Above all, its leaders gained experience in the larger administrative problems involved in war service—relations with the Government, harmonious cooperation with military authorities, and the raising of funds by popular subscription.

Possibly the most important part of the experience, however, was the situation brought to light on the cessation of hostilities. The officers and the Association workers alike were brought up against the problems of that period of reaction between the end of fighting and demobilization. It was gradually impressed on their minds that welfare work was needed more in times of idleness than in active service. One Ohio regiment by subscription among its own members raised a fund sufficient to keep the Association active within its ranks

Service with
Combatants

until it was mustered out. This total experience and the general satisfaction felt for the character of the service rendered led to the suggestion that some permanent arrangement should be made for welfare service in the interests of the armed forces. The President of the United States expressed his hope that the good work should not cease.

The Y M C A undertook to assume the responsibility for some form of permanent service; and in September, 1898, the Army and Navy Department of the International Committee was organized.

Permanent Work
for the American
Forces

Under such circumstances, the responsibility for permanent work with the armed forces of the United States was placed in the hands of the Young Men's Christian Association. In 1902, by a special act of Congress, the organization was authorized to erect buildings on government property on the basis of a revocable license. The details of this permanent work will be treated later; at this point, our concern is with its general significance.

The establishment of this service was due to approval of a series of practical experiments. No one had yet done any theorizing in the field; the distinctive term, welfare work, was not in use. Experience appeared to approve the methods used; and in the Association, the Government found a responsible agent represented by an authoritative central committee with which it could deal directly. The waning of popular interest after the drums had ceased to roll was as marked as ever; only a well-founded institution could possibly hope to secure the support necessary to maintain what has always been an expensive work. Thus, with no advertisement and supported largely by the gifts of a few generous individuals, the Association set to work to make available for soldiers, sailors, and marines a service the justification for which rested solely in the fact that it had been much appreciated wherever offered.

The Army and Navy Department of the International Committee then proceeded to install its work at army posts and naval stations, putting on a program adapted to the special needs of the men in the forces. At some points, quarters were allotted in government buildings; at others the Association erected its own buildings. Certain buildings, such as the large Navy Branch in Brooklyn, stand outside government property on sites owned by the Association. Special service has been conducted at expositions and in connection with naval maneuvers. A launch has touched the scattered army positions in Alaska. There was much post-war work to be done in the Philippines and a permanent work was established as a result. To admin-

ister this extensive service, a force of specially trained professionals was gradually built up; so that there came into existence a group of secretaries who thought in terms of the needs of soldiers, sailors, and marines, and who accumulated definite experience in acting in co-operation with officers. Meanwhile, the provincial and state committees of the Association renewed their efforts in behalf of the volunteers in camp.

The American Y M C A through the years preceding the World War conducted by far the most extensive service for men in the armed forces that was carried on anywhere in the world. The program of work has been comprehensive and every opportunity has been offered to permit the men to take responsibility for the management of their own affairs. Certain membership restrictions have been in force but the service has always been offered freely to all, irrespective of creed.

Before the period of the World War, the Y M C A had two other experiences in the field. Its operations were limited but they resulted in a useful extension of practice under war conditions.

War Experience
in South Africa
and Russia

During the Boer War (1899-1902) the Canadian troops were served by the Canadian Y M C A, the International Committee bearing a part of the expense. The Canadian contingent was not a large force so that work was not very extensive. However, it added materially to the war experience of the Association in North America. The Soldiers' Christian Association represented the British Y M C A in this conflict and by its services won a recognition in the British Army. Most of the work was at the ports and during the period the troops were in transit. The workers accompanied some of the troop trains.

In the Russo-Japanese War (1904) the Christian missions, after months of negotiation for permission to work with Japanese troops, found an insuperable obstacle in official suspicion and opposition to a religion of foreign origin. The official attitude not only reflected the sharp contrast between oriental and occidental ideas, but revealed the extreme military conception of the soldier as a fighting machine. Old Japanese tradition expected seriously wounded men to commit suicide and forbade them to be taken prisoner. The welfare program proposed by the Y M C A at last won grudging consent for the "Young Men's Christian Association Soldiers' Comforting Bureaus." In Manchuria abandoned Chinese houses refitted became "Comforting Bureaus." A Chinese well and an open fire with primitive steam disinfecting devices anticipated the delousing plants of the World War. The phonograph or "horn that talks like a man" became popular

throughout Japan. Post cards and letter paper supplied by the Y M C A carried news from the soldiers into every mountain village. The secretaries became expert barbers in a rough and ready way. During the course of the war the program of the Y M C A in Manchuria included the beginnings of most of the features which were developed on a large scale in the World War. Three American secretaries including C. V. Hibbard, who in the World War supervised at New York Headquarters all overseas work, and twenty Japanese secretaries carried on work at half a dozen important points on the lines of communication. About \$60,000 were expended of which one-half came from friends in America and half was contributed in Japan. Their Majesties, the Emperor and Empress, gave the seal of their approval in the form of a generous contribution. Japanese who had been reared in the tradition that the Christians were an evil sect subversive of individual integrity and national morals, were astonished that the good fruit of such unselfish service as they actually saw could grow from a tree so evil. Many came asking for books descriptive of the religion of the Y M C A. When the World War came, in 1914, no one questioned the desirability of a full welfare program for Japanese soldiers.

The Outbreak
of the World
War

The development of welfare work up to the World War has been traced in outline. The emphasis has been laid upon the work of a single organization because circumstances brought that organization to the forefront as the only agency assuming continuous responsibility for such work, and because its methods have obtained even through the larger experience of the world conflict. Our main concern has been with the Association in America because in that field the Y M C A carried its work for fighting men to the highest point of specialization. In subsequent chapters of this book an attempt will be made to set up vividly the welfare problems incident to the military operations of the earlier part of the World War, previous to America's participation. But in order that the whole Y M C A experience on which its authorization was based may be set in its proper light, the situation of the organization in 1914 must be comprehended.

The Y M C A in its earliest period was dominated by the international viewpoint. Seven countries participated in its first World Conference in 1855. By 1914, the movement had extended all over the world. The various national organizations are all independent; they cooperate through the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations, whose executive agent is the World's Committee

with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The older national organizations have undertaken very large responsibilities in assisting the first steps of new movements. Through the International Committee the Associations of the United States and Canada maintain a large force of secretaries whose services are at the disposal of other national Associations. The temper of the Association is an international temper and the results of experience are freely circulated.

Thus, the Y M C A at the very beginning of the World War—^{The Internationalism of the Y M C A} nearly three years before the American Association was called upon for service in the American forces—was drawn actively into the struggle on a dozen fronts. The British Associations, representing Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India, followed their forces everywhere. They raised the Red Triangle emblem and they soon arranged that the sun should never set on that sign any more than it does on the British flag. Through the Canadians, who are a part of the movement in North America, and through the American secretaries assisting the other Associations, the American Y shared this war experience from the start. All the methods used so effectively and acceptably among the British were thoroughly understood by American leaders.

The American Association, which by reason of its fortunate situation has been the national movement most able to render assistance over the world, did not rest content with indirect service. Dr. John R. Mott, then Associate General Secretary for Foreign Work of the International Committee, visited Europe in 1914, for the express purpose of discovering how America might best help the young men who were drawn into the struggle. He represented a neutral nation at that time and promoted the establishment of work for various armies on both sides of the war, commencing with the French and Austro-Hungarian forces and ultimately serving the men of a score of nations. During his stay in Germany, his attention was drawn to the plight of the prisoners of war. On his return he laid the case before groups of Americans and generous support was forthcoming for these various enterprises. American secretaries forthwith sailed for the war zone. By the time America entered the War, the Association was serving literally millions of men under arms and in the prisoner-of-war camps. The American Y was really in the thick of the struggle from the very beginning.

Meanwhile the Mexican Border situation took on a serious aspect. ^{The Mexican Border} American troops, accompanied by the Y M C A, had been on the

Border since 1911; but in 1916 matters approached a crisis. The conditions were not those of active combat but they occasioned a situation with some unique features. The trying climate, the scattering of the forces, the tedium of the service, all created an acute human problem which the War Department recognized very clearly. The Y M C A was welcomed as an ally.

The Association maintained on the Border an average force of about 150 men. During the nine months before April, 1917, the cost of the work reached nearly \$350,000. The service was appreciated and the experience was invaluable. During this period were developed the buildings, the traveling equipment, and certain administrative procedures that stood up later under the severe tests of the World War service. A more detailed consideration on this effort will be found in its proper place. It is sufficient to note here that without the work on the Mexican Border the American fighting man would have perhaps missed some of the best features of the welfare equipment that greeted him on his arrival at the training camps in 1917 and 1918. In this work, the first field welfare service for Americans since the Spanish-American War, the Association served under Secretary Baker and General Pershing.

The Record of
the Y M C A

The American Y M C A had then as a welfare organization the measurable assets of the experience with the United States Christian Commission, the work in the militia camps throughout the nation, the varied enterprise in the Spanish-American War, nearly two decades of service at regular army and navy posts including activities on many special occasions, a small but important service in the field in the Boer War and an extensive ministry in the Russo-Japanese War, close contact with the large efforts of the British organizations in the early years of the World War, active participation in various types of work in the armies of the other Allies and among prisoners of war, and a period of searching test on the Mexican Border with new equipment designed for modern conditions of warfare.

The original program of the earliest days was steadily broadened. The conception of ideal manhood as a harmonious development of body, mind, and spirit transformed the actual work; physical, educational, and recreational facilities were extended to supplement the specifically religious activities and the spirit of service for all grew so as entirely to overshadow even a very proper zeal for the organization itself. All lesser aims became gradually lost in the large purpose of endeavoring to surround the fighting man with the oppor-

tunity for activities corresponding to the best elements in a sound home environment. The Y in the field has sought to serve no sectarian purpose; its facilities have been offered freely for worship of all kinds, and, needless to say, no discrimination has been made in the ordinary service it has performed. The point of development to which welfare work was brought in its hands on the Mexican Border represents the fruit of a long-continued effort through the years when there appeared to be no other agency willing to carry the responsibility. By the time America entered the World War, welfare work was defined in terms of the methods of this organization.

So much of history has been reviewed to show the historic processes through which the civilian services of relief and welfare developed. If the question be asked, "Would it not have been possible for the Red Cross to carry on most welfare activities?" the historian must simply answer, "It did not happen so." The field was divided by a long process of experience.

The Position of
the Civilian
Agencies

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW WARFARE

From the moment of the declaration of war in 1914, it was thoroughly accepted that the fighting forces in modern warfare were an integral part of the nation. There was no escaping the conviction; for everyone was forced to share in the war-making enterprise, and the complete draft of all fit manhood in the principal warring nations carried anxiety and suffering into every community and into every grade of society.

It will be instructive, before proceeding with the American story, to review briefly the experience of the men who fought during the years that America was a spectator. This experience was before our leaders when we entered the war and to a large extent determined the character of America's plans for participation. From the point of view of welfare work the experience of the other nations was particularly important because it defined so vividly the character of the problems that such service was compelled to face.

THE MEN WHO FOUGHT

Germany's perfection of organization was developed with full regard to the necessities of the individual fighter.

The gray-coated soldiers who crossed the border into Belgium during the fateful summer of 1914 were physically and mentally the best prepared soldiers the world has ever seen. They were worthy representatives of a nation carefully educated to believe in the national cause and thoroughly disciplined for the trials to be sustained.

The German method leaves comparatively little place for independent civilian effort as it is understood in England and America. The German Red Cross was closely tied up with the war organization and welfare work was not distinguished as an activity in any way separate from the military organization. Everything was official down to the last triplicate form. In the grand march through Brussels before the Battle of the Marne, a great parade was made of the wonderful rolling kitchens, the extra footwear, the scientific pack, and other devices for maintaining the general fitness of each man; and the Prussian drill-master did not forget to place men with good voices

at proper intervals so that hearty singing might enliven the tedious marches. These soldiers lived as no soldier had ever lived before.

Upon her allies, Germany had imposed her absolute leadership and something of her military wisdom, but it was beyond her power to impart to them the character and fixity of purpose of her own fighting men. Austria-Hungary, a land of mixed races largely deficient in education, lacked the elemental material out of which national prosperity and national unity is constructed. The Austrian forces fell far short of the German not primarily through lack of individual courage, but because they felt as a whole no great compulsion, while to many of them the enterprise was decidedly distasteful. Similarly, the soldiers of Turkey and Bulgaria never appeared to have much heart for the fight. The master-artificers of Berlin succeeded in shaping circumstances so that these two nations were literally forced in on the side of the Central Powers. There was no possibility of these fighters acquiring in a moment the volitional drive of the Germans. General organization on the German scale for securing the well-being of the men of Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria was an impossibility. There were available neither the resources nor the genius to establish it. When all is said and done, it was not their war but Germany's.

The German soldier bore the brunt of the cause of the Central Powers. It must be recorded that, in spite of all the trials to which he was subjected, his courage, his discipline, and his carefully conserved general fitness maintained his superb firmness in battle until he was finally beset by forces he was powerless to resist.

The circle of Allies opposed to the Central Powers presented a study in contrasts. The
Allies

The people of France, of course, accepted the war as the arrival of a long-expected event. Quite apart from combinations of diplomacy, they had been convinced for decades that the time would come when they must try their quarrel with the Germans hilt to hilt. Their preparations were made; at the word of command the men fell in line to protect their homes against their ancient and very powerful enemy. The nation's mood was simply one of calm determination in the face of the inevitable crisis.

Like the Germans the French soldiers were familiar with the ways of military life. They knew what to expect, and the people of France even more than the people of Germany understood what was involved in war. The mind of the nation was concentrated on the Army independently of any conscious organizing effort. The ordinary

hardships of military life were so well comprehended that the men suffered little from the violent reaction experienced by raw recruits; their philosophical temper combined with the usual safeguards of the military organization caused them to accept the situation as it stood since there was no way of changing it. It must be remembered, too, that France itself was the battlefield; the men were among their own people and on periods of leave were usually able to return to their own homes. Early in the war the first steps were taken, with the cooperation of the American Y M C A, in the establishment of the Foyers du Soldat. The fact that this work was hardly noticed at the time indicates the general feeling that there was no pressing need for welfare work.

The British situation presented a marked contrast alike both to the French and the German. There is no advantage to be gained here by the discussion of obscure causes or inquiries into the sincerity of statesmen. It was the German invasion of Belgium that brought the men and women of the British Empire unitedly into the conflict. "A House of Commons that had hesitated an hour after the invasion of Belgium would have been swept out of existence by the wrath and indignation of the people."¹

This was the sign that rallied the Overseas Dominions where the people knew little of rivalries of Europe. The Navy was ready and took immediate command of the seas, but there was no extensive military organization and no pervasive military tradition. The sending of the little Army of regulars to Flanders in the first days of fighting just about drained England of effective forces. With the people aroused by what was regarded as a violation of the rules of fair play, the national movement took on outwardly all the tumultuous enthusiasm of a sporting event, concealing, as usual, the deep undertone of relentless determination. There could be no automatic falling in line; the British knew nothing about conscription. The call for volunteers was sounded out, recruiting posters were displayed, it was "put up" to the individual; and rich and poor, reckless adventurer and sober crusader, athlete and clerk—largely untrained and unused to military ways—joined up to participate in the "super-game." The instinctive loyalty of the overseas dominions asserted itself; they asked no questions but rushed to support the Mother Country in upholding fair play. What probably surprised the world more than anything else was the effective aid rendered by India on half-a-dozen

¹ The Mirrors of Downing Street, London, 1921, p. 43.

fronts. Finally, a military organization had to be created out of very meager material.

Since there was really no comprehensive "officialdom," everyone took a hand. Popular interest in the soldier and sailor was fresh and enthusiastic. It is a characteristic habit of the English-speaking peoples to engage in voluntary "uplift" work of any kind. The British Empire and America, as a rule, prefer to give the widest scope to free action and are genuinely suspicious of bureaucratic methods. It must also be borne in mind that the characteristic religious institutions among these peoples are moved by a powerful missionary spirit and are models to the world of zeal for extending their ideas and their service. Voluntary societies of all kinds, therefore, grew up most naturally. The Red Cross and the Knights of St. John led in the field of relief; the Y M C A became the chief welfare agency. The Y M C A held no exclusive charter; lecture bureaus, theatrical companies, and other social organizations cooperated with the Association. Welfare workers were decidedly feeling their way, for there was before them no example of work on any such scale as now appeared necessary. The British society, characterized by the strong evangelical motive, devoted much of its energies to the development of its moral and religious influences; but its broad usefulness was emphatically social in character. As the men from Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and India came on the Western Front, it was discovered that their own Young Men's Christian Associations had followed them from home.

What particularly attracted the attention of America was the part played by the women of Britain. In the British Army, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the volunteer nurses, ambulance drivers, and ordnance factory workers, and later women's auxiliary services attached to the naval and air forces, drew volunteers from the ranks of the hardy and adventurous women of the British Isles. Back of the lines, they baked bread, worked in quartermasters' stores, acted as couriers and clerical workers, and participated in all forms of manual labor.

Russia was the first of the great powers upon whom Germany declared war. Her great resource was man-power. It is estimated that the total mobilization of Russians amounted to 17,000,000 men.¹

¹ Major General Victor A. Yakhontoff gave this figure in his privately-printed pamphlet, "The Russian Army and the World War," p. 15. He has since affirmed that he believes this figure to be substantially correct.

It is impossible to comprehend in a single paragraph the motives of seventeen million men. Yet something more than the mere habit of obedience and loyalty to the Czar drew these vast masses of men into the fighting forces. The Czar's manifesto of August 2, 1914, appealed to the people to support the national cause, particularly emphasizing that the purposes of the war included the assisting of a sister Slav nation and the "defense of the soil of Russia." According to those who fought in the Russian forces, these appeals met with a deep response. Owing to circumstances of the Russian peasant's life, the defense of the soil—his "mother-earth"—had profound significance. Further, those who had any contact with German influence in Russia believed the Germans to be responsible for the corruption in the Russian Court and Government. There was also a vague hope that this war might result in decreasing the burden of armament that rested so heavily on the people. Such motives were at work among the brave, willing, and patient but uneducated Russian peasants. They responded readily to the appeal and were gathered together with a fair degree of expedition.

There were men—men in super-abundance; otherwise, Russia was quite unprepared. Since the available resources were so meager, the mobilization of so many men was a piece of almost inexcusable folly. Even the regular forces, about a million strong, were deficient in every essential. They were inadequately armed and equipped; they had little artillery and a meager supply of ammunition; their officers were poorly educated and unpopular. There were few railroads and not many good roads. There was no surplus of supplies. The industrial system of the country was not prepared to make up any of the deficiencies and many weeks were required to bring material from outside to the fighting front. The autocratic government was shot through with treachery and was sitting loose in the saddle; the rulers of the land lived in constant fear of an extensive and powerful insurrection. Energetic devotion—and there was plenty of it in Russia—was compelled to work with the most scanty materials.

The mood of Italy entering the war was probably dominated by an instinctive opposition to hereditary enemies. When the issue is once drawn in critical times, men's motives undergo a process of simplification. The agreement with Germany and Austria, the Triple Alliance, apparently had no vitality; and when this was definitely set aside, a united Italy joyfully took up arms to settle an old account that concerned themselves primarily. The Italian Army was well-trained

and fairly well-equipped. They fought with spirit under especially difficult physical conditions, and without the support of extensive welfare work. The efforts of certain far-seeing Italians served to show the need, but the nation had no tradition of welfare work and lacked the resources to carry it out on an extensive scale.

The case of other Allied forces adds no significant element. Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro were small nations in the way of a very great enterprise. They were desperate defenders of their own lands whose only hope was that they might slow up the progress of the invaders. They were compelled to fall back and join the ranks of their allies. Portuguese participation was represented by a small force on the Western Front. Japan, of course, limited her operations to the Far East. Other Nations

Such a review, incomplete and lacking in detail, is sufficient to suggest the central problem of the Allies—to coordinate not only military operations but the moral energies of men of diverse character and aim. To create in these various forces a unity of purpose and to sustain their enthusiasm and energy through desperate fighting and no less desperate discouragement, was a task the importance of which became more and more apparent with each month of conflict. Welfare work came to find a distinctive place in this task.

WARFARE OF POSITION

After the Marne, the opposing forces in France and Flanders settled down in two lines of trenches. According to the plan of campaign of the Germans, it was to their advantage to maintain this fixity of position along the Western Front as long as there was any danger elsewhere.

As month after month passed and the failure of the Allies to force warfare in the open became confirmed, there set in a state of mind wholly peculiar to trench warfare. The men saw nothing of the variety and excitement of war; they saw nothing but shattered and blasted countryside the monotony of which only increased the tensivity of the hours at the front and shadowed the periods of relaxation in the rear. The monotony was varied by raids, skirmishes, artillery exchanges, combats with limited objectives, and occasional "pushes" of an exceedingly bloody character. All these diversions, whether trivial or serious, ended in a return to the same old trenches or to the occupancy of other trenches that did not as a rule offer any new or diverting feature, except possibly more mud and water. Ex- The Trenches

cept in the quiet sectors here and there, men were compelled to live for months on end in a state of tense expectation.

Under such conditions the active life of the soldier very quickly lost all its glamor. The drudgery of the war came to be more dreaded than the danger; and the sheer, soul-wearying idleness more than either. He who could keep his crusading enthusiasm under such circumstances was a hero, indeed. Petty emotions—envy, grumbling, grudges between one service and another—absorbed much of the heroic comradeship of arms. In the British Army, for example, the shortage of shells roused the infantry to a constantly alert irritation against the artillery that threatened to grow into a feud until the crude limitations of the situation were explained to both sides by a long series of inter-service conferences. Hate of the slacker and the *embusqué*, hate of the politician and the labor leader, distrust among Allies, took the edge off the soldier's generous emotion. These were well-founded grievances most of them; and they do not reflect on the soldier's character either as a fighting man or as a citizen. They reflect rather upon war, which creates these abnormal conditions, bringing out the meanest as well as the highest qualities of mankind.

Over the lines there settled a strange aspect of permanency. The trench systems developed into elaborate underground cities. America very soon heard of German dug-outs steam-heated and electrically lighted, and photographs were circulated with legends that seemed to imply that the conveniences of a German trench possessed a marked superiority over those of the ordinary suburban villa. The armies grew into military communities with a round of life that differed little from one sector to another. The fighting men in the early days began to think that they were part of the permanent fixtures, for leaves were rare and short. The land-agent publicity did not affect their lives; they had to live in the reality and go the weary round over and over again. As one reads the records of this experience, one is reminded constantly of the stories of life in beleaguered fortresses; it was as if both armies were withstanding a siege.

This kind of life rather accentuated the force of those preeminent and wanton vices that tend to destroy soldierly morale and impair civil character. These vices are not at all peculiar to men under arms; they flourish with a special luxuriance wherever men are congregated in large numbers, and they are extraordinarily appealing to the imagination of men under abnormal and prolonged strain. Trench warfare imposed excessive strain without the emotional relief of ac-

tive combat. The discharge was all the more serious when the opportunity arrived.

These paragraphs have traced only a few of the outstanding features of warfare of position; but enough to remind the reader that this new mode of fighting introduced the men under arms to an extraordinary and exceedingly severe type of military experience.

There was nothing obscure about the needs of these fighters; they were plain to the most casual observer. The first step in relieving them centered about a fundamental physical requirement—a “place to go to.” This was the primary necessity. Relief from exposure and strain really demands a sheltered spot where there is some degree of warmth, of light, and of dryness; a center of sociability and hospitality, offering the suggestion of freedom and privacy; a corner that the soldier may feel in a certain sense is his own. Particularly welcome also were even the simplest facilities for “cleaning-up”—the desire for a bath may become an imperative obsession.¹ The welfare hut naturally became the foundation of all welfare activities.

The Possibilities
of Remedy

The craving of human appetite was another fact in this situation. Army rations are monotonous under all circumstances; in advanced trenches they could not always be served regularly, and the necessary restrictions against the lighting of fires meant cold meals—highly unappetizing under freezing or wet conditions.

Physical needs and the nature of the daily work brought about always the unnatural emphasis on food which disappears among the varied activities of normal existence. The rational offset to such conditions is the supply of the little luxuries of diet, such as hot drinks, sweets, and pickles—anything out of the ordinary, anything different from the regular ration. The soldier's demand for tobacco—particularly cigarettes—knew no limits. Many good people were appalled at the enormous supplies of this narcotic that went to the front, forwarded in many cases by societies that in the past had thrown the weight of their influence steadily against its use. Many moderate people felt exceedingly uneasy regarding the possible physical result of its greatly increased consumption. It is no part of our present purpose to argue the abstract merits of the question. Tobacco proved to

¹ It is interesting to note that the first requests of British soldiers in prisoners-of-war camps made to the War Prisoners' Aid were for “hair-cutting scissors, razors, razor strops, shaving brushes, hair brushes, combs, clothing brushes, toilet soap, laundry soap, boot brushes.”

Consult *In the Prison Camps of Germany*, Conrad Hoffman, New York, 1920, p. 126.

be one of the most effective, if not the most effective, solace of monotony, hardship, and misery. Ideally, it may be true that men ought not to be encouraged in the use of tobacco. But, then, it must be remembered that men ought not to be sent to war. Having sent these men into the abnormal horror of conflict, it would have been not only impossible but unwise and inhuman to hold back in the slightest from providing them with this simple means of relaxation, potent and relatively harmless as compared with other satisfactions sought under the abnormal conditions.

Such efforts, which basically are aimed to build up a legitimate distraction from the hardships of active service, are properly reinforced by recreational activities of all kinds. Concerts, lectures, theatrical shows, moving pictures, all tend to withdraw the mind from depression and restore thoughts and feelings connected with ordinary life and the home folks. To induce self-forgetfulness in men under the shadow of dangers past and more dangers still to come is no easy task. No method is more effective than wholesome and interesting entertainment; the response is instant and it may be shared by large numbers at one and the same time. Though antecedent opinion even among army men discouraged physical recreation on the ground that exercise is a poor offering to physically jaded men, athletics proved popular everywhere. The earnest contention of physical experts that games are restoratives of both the physical and moral energies was abundantly proved. The personal initiative and freedom in competition offered a perfect outlet for energies inhibited in the life of discipline.

To offset the meaningless monotony of occupation and the mental barrenness of idleness, educational activities were in demand where the situation permitted. Not all men felt this need keenly; but there were many who welcomed every possible opportunity for mental stimulus, whether through good books, lectures, or classes. All men did, however, eagerly reach for newspapers and magazines and for light reading in books. The favorite books were those of adventure. One would imagine that these men would have had adventure enough and would prefer milder tales. But the subject matter as subject matter was not the point; the requirements demanded something of sufficient interest and spice to compel the attention—such are the primary qualities of the literature of adventure.

The comfort of religion in adversity is a plain fact readily admitted even by the non-religious man. Religious faith suffered a

severe trial under the conditions of the front-line trench. There existed an unlimited opportunity to help such as desired to conserve their spiritual resources. A more inopportune time for proselytizing efforts can hardly be imagined, but something was required different from the offering of some drab least common denominator of all faiths. There was an urgent need and an open privilege to assist in bringing each man into touch with the official representatives of his particular form of faith and in maintaining such a variety of public religious exercises as would reach all of the various groups. In the extreme of experience, worship may be a source of infinite comfort even to the professed skeptic.

The practical measures developed according to circumstance and the genius of the people involved.

Warfare of position did present a condition favorable to the prosecution of all types of welfare work. The comparative stability of the lines made possible the maintenance of fixed centers of service, from which points special activities could be carried on, in some instances, right up to the front lines.

The German Army was able to establish its wonderful rest camps behind the fixed positions. Here Fritz was bathed and disinfected. Here he enjoyed rest and recreation in the *Soldatenheim*. The *Feldbücherei* supplied him reading matter; the *Kantine* sold him tobacco and personal necessities at incredibly low prices. This was all highly official, of course; but that is the principal way in which the German people express themselves. The service was highly efficient and was very promptly inaugurated. One must not forget, of course, the voluntary gift funds raised in Germany with enthusiasm and the personal service of a number of religious institutions.

The German
Official
Welfare Service

Among the Allies, voluntary agencies had an opportunity in the trench situation that they were not slow to grasp. They could operate with comparatively few military restrictions as long as things held firmly. In a rapid advance it was difficult for them to move forward abreast of the troops, and in hasty retreats they were bound to suffer large losses of equipment; but these were exceptional circumstances. The British agencies, in particular the Y M C A, found a place at once in France and Flanders, and spread their huts out over the countryside, while they slipped in an advance dug-out wherever an opening occurred.

In connection with all activities designed to the end of relief and relaxation, it must be borne ever in mind that freedom and self-

forgetfulness and re-creation are achievements. Neither the officers nor the welfare workers can do more than provide the men with the opportunity to work out their own welfare. The men are not looking for more supervision: they have had supervision in plenty. They want to do what they want, and as far as possible do it in their own way. If there is nothing left in the canteen but cough-drops they will take cough-drops so that they may eat something that has not been fed to them. Boys who have been brought up to sports only need the bat, the ball, and the field. Some very well-meant efforts in behalf of fighting men have gone astray just at this point; some welfare workers had to learn a bitter lesson.¹ If any welfare movement is to be successful, it must be the men's own; and preconceived notions of propriety and order must be reasonably adjusted to this point of view.

It will be evident to the observant reader that the relaxations suggested were intended to offset not only the hardships of war but also relaxations usually ready to hand that are in themselves exceedingly harmful. Here as elsewhere, the fundamental axiom set down in the preceding paragraph must be kept clearly in view. Subject of course to military restrictions, the fighting man must choose his own recreations; if any activity is to be really re-creative, it must be engaged in freely. In the World War for the first time in history, demoralizing recreations found themselves forced to compete with attractive wholesome recreations.

The British
Y M C A's

The welfare societies of the British Empire represented a popular feeling keenly sensitive to the abnormality of the life of the fighting man. The strangeness of the experience fixed the attention on the unpleasant features. It was plain to such a sensitized national consciousness that the necessary haste of preparation for fighting meant an enhancement of all forms of discomfort and of both physical and moral danger. Whatever their inherent faults may be, it must be said for civilian societies that they move quickly. Sir A. K. Yapp, General Secretary of the British Y M C A, rallied his forces at the very beginning; and in a fortnight there were 250 social centers in operation. The number rose to 1,500 during the first two years of the war.² These centers were located in the training camps, in the large

¹ For valuable hints in this direction consult *Morale and Its Enemies*, William Ernest Hocking, New Haven, 1918, Part II.

² The story of the work of the British Y M C A must be read in full elsewhere. Consult *With Our Soldiers in France*, G. Sherwood Eddy, New York, 1917; and *The Romance of the Red Triangle*, A. K. Yapp, New York, 1918. In recognition of the Association's distinguished service, Mr. Yapp was knighted by King George V.

cities, along the lines of communications and throughout the British area on the continent. They were served by a large staff of both men and women; the women workers considerably outnumbering the men. Civilians in war industries also came within range of the Association's activities.

One point of emphasis should be particularly noticed. The "home-ing instinct" of the Association has been almost universally noted by observers. If it began as an instinct, it was developed deliberately. The camp "sing-songs," the entertainments, the canteens, the writing-rooms, the religious services, were all directed definitely to draw men's thoughts away from the hard business of fighting and to remind them of home. For those who responded to the appeal, the "hut" presented a golden opportunity to leave behind the hardships and brutalities and meannesses of war and become again a part of the collective conscience of the nation. Owing to the nature of its whole approach to welfare work, the British Y M C A fell easily into the responsibility of caring for relatives who visited the sick and dying in France. It was all ■ part of the task of keeping the folks at home and the fighter at one.

The Home
Appeal

The forces from the overseas dominions and from India particularly appreciated their own Association organizations. The Australians and New Zealanders were half the circumference of the world away from home; and Canadians, for all their British loyalty, are not "European" in taste and practice,—to all the Y M C A meant the touch of home.

THE FAR-FLUNG LINE

While this desperate struggle continued in the West, on other fronts men were fighting more in the old style but under conditions which made the trial of the individual little if any less severe. The soldier in the trenches was probably quite convinced that nothing in the world could be worse than Flanders mud, but he who crossed the desert from Cairo to Palestine was always ready to argue the advantages of the hot sand of Arabia. Then again, there were doubtless those who would willingly place in competition the ice of North Russia, the swamps of East Prussia, and the high Alps in winter. Such of the land fighters as may have thought the navy was "having it soft" might have been referred to the mine-sweepers, the crews of destroyers, the men of the merchant marine, or the unsleeping watchers in the North Sea. There was little to choose among them all.

Ease of body or peace of mind was not to be found under any of these conditions.

In the scattered British campaigns there were enlisted a variety of forces. From India, men were sent to Mesopotamia, Egypt, Gallipoli, and Palestine. At these points they were joined by Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, and soldiers from the British Isles. In East Africa and South Africa the loyal citizens of the former Boer countries fought highly successful actions, sometimes with the aid of men from the old colonies, and of African black troops. A diversity of need was inherent in the very character of these fighters.

Gallipoli
and Egypt

The Gallipoli expedition was a harrowing experience. The men were under fire day and night continuously. All supplies, even drinking water, had to be landed from ships under the guns of the enemy. In the hard advance from Egypt into Palestine, men who had never been in the tropics before had to sustain the long march across the blazing desert with their water supply depending upon a single pipeline that they laid as they went along. The husky Anzacs, proof against all ordinary hardship, fell victims to treacherous tropical diseases that creep up like thieves in the night. Scattered outposts in the desert suffered the last indignity: marooned in the sand with nothing to do. In Egypt the men at the bases and in the training camps were brought into touch with Oriental vice among one of the most complex populations on the face of the earth. It is a far cry from Egypt to North Russia, but there was an expedition operating from Archangel made up of men as little used to the rigors of a Russian winter as to the sun of the tropics.

All this time, through the seven seas were plying the transports and supply ships, guarded by the long arm of the British Navy and by the sea forces of other allies. The men on the ships faced all the various hazards of the sea: when they did have a moment on shore, it was usually in one of a set of the worst ports in the world.

Welfare measures of all kinds had to be adapted to meet situations so radically different from those on the West Front and to appeal effectively to the different elements in the forces. The warm, cozy hut would hardly have been appreciated in the desert; shade and lime-juice were what was wanted. The forces in the tropical areas needed recreation suited to the climate. The outdoor swimming-pool welcome in Cairo was not needed in Archangel. Caring for the welfare of men of other races also introduces a problem whose solution requires much wisdom and tact. The so-called Anglo-Saxons are prone

to forget that others may be just as proud of their prejudices as we are of ours. To serve, aid, and stimulate without giving offense requires more than the mere good intention.

The British Associations, aided by men and money from America, followed the men of the armed forces everywhere. Fortunately the Association had trained men familiar with the ground of every campaign and also men who had lived and worked among the various races drawn into the struggle. The work among Indian forces, both in France and on other fronts, was directed by secretaries who had spent many years in India. On the Sinai desert, there were tents marked with the Red Triangle; the same sign stood on the Bourse in Cairo. It went up into Mesopotamia. Y workers shared the disastrous campaign at the Dardanelles and marched into Jerusalem with Allenby. In the jungles of Africa they stood by the fighting men. At the naval bases and at the ports there was practical welcome ready for sailors. To the very limit of its ability the Association worked to bring a touch of home to these campaigners in distant lands. Its resources for such service were exceedingly limited, but a surprising volume of work was reported from all fronts. That the organization was on the ground at all is a distinctive achievement, the credit for which must be accorded to the rank and file of workers.

Trained
Association
Workers

THE ACCUMULATING STRAIN

As 1915 and 1916 wore on, the effects of the magnitude and long continuance of the war began to appear. Hopes of a speedy and decisive victory faded on both sides and soldiers and people resigned or braced themselves for a test of endurance. Preparations for the manufacture of guns, munitions, and ships were made and production schedules on a huge scale were fixed for months and even years in advance. Food was everywhere put under government control, and the civilian population held to a minimum ration. Coal and gasoline, so necessary in industrial and military operations of every type, were also rationed, and even in England the heating allowance was fixed very low. Ordinary repairs on dwellings were postponed "until after the war": even railway equipment received just enough care to keep it moving; and petty discomforts and exasperations multiplied. Man power resources were strained to the limit, and in homes already with full cause to mourn, the demand for still more sacrifices was heard and answered. The consequences of the increasing strain varied with the resources and temperament of the nations.

Russia

There must arise a new Tolstoy to tell the mysterious, splendid, and infinitely pathetic story of Russia in the Great War. The total picture appalls the imagination. America has never appreciated Russia and the present confusion of voices appears to have postponed our understanding for an indefinite period. The Russian soldier still is thought of as one who had a great opportunity and failed, preferring amusing himself with a wild political experiment to playing the game. The estimate is unjust and we know it is unjust.

How the Russians went to war has been noted. What happened during those years of combat?

The quick invasion of East Prussia and of Galicia by the Russian Armies in 1914 surprised the whole world and people in England and America began to talk freely of the Russian "steam-roller." Paper estimates of the strength of the Russian forces suggested an early siege of Berlin. Then the fundamental weakness was revealed in sudden disasters. The Russian soldiers fought on under conditions that would have broken the stoutest heart. They marched incredible distances through sticky mud to fight in the swamps of the north or in the snows of the Carpathians. By reason of material deficiencies and bad strategy, they were deplorably sacrificed in such battles as Tannenberg. The lack of artillery on most occasions exposed them hopelessly to the murderous fire of the opposing batteries. It was of no avail to advance with magnificent determination for there were no resources for holding captured territory. These men were time and again reduced to throwing stones in order to defend themselves. Their casualties in battle exceeded five and one-half millions; more than two millions of them were taken prisoners in the unequal conflict.

Under the circumstances the collapse was inevitable. The Imperial system was rotten at the core; it had neither the material nor the moral resources necessary to conduct the war properly. The population was permeated with men and women who cared little for the problems of western Europe. They hated the autocracy with a passion fed for years on brutality and persecution. They lived and were ready to die for revenge on their tyrants and the emancipation of their people. Nothing else mattered. By assembling masses of men who could not possibly be used at the front, centers of discontent were created right in the heart of the critical area. The Russian soldier discovered that he would never have the means of carrying on the conflict at the same time that he became finally convinced there was nothing left to fight for. From the beginning to the end,

he was denied the essential support of supreme confidence in his officers and in his cause, of the consciousness of a united backing in his nation, and of all the material and moral measures that help to maintain fighting fitness: yet he did not give up until the ground was literally cut away from beneath him.

Through all this, victory and defeat, welfare work as it is known in the western world, simply did not exist for Russian soldiers. They did not expect it because they had no conception of it. The first glimmering of its possibilities came with the observation of service to prisoners by the American Y M C A. Officers of the guards inquired tentatively if the secretaries could not help them start similar work for their men. The response was immediate and willing, but the materials and facilities were few. With the entry of the United States into the War, an American Mission was sent to Russia, and sounded a note of urgent warning. The American Red Cross was already engaged in civilian relief. Recruiting of Y M C A secretaries for Russia began immediately and a large appropriation was set aside for expenses. America's abandonment of neutrality forced the workers out of the prison camps. They turned their attention to Russian soldiers, and their efforts met with pathetic surprise and gratitude. But events moved too fast. There was no unifying principle left; a distracted people and a disheartened army saw nothing ahead. The needs of such a nation emerging from the shadow of a medieval system of government are beyond summarizing. To have rendered any really effective assistance would have required the combined wisdom and energy of the Allied nations undistracted by any incidental task like a World War. It is comforting to think that America at least held out a helping hand. It is perhaps hard to realize that Russia in 1917 was busy with affairs more important to her than conquering Germany.

The developing situation in the Balkan area can hardly be appreciated without a complete knowledge of the complex story of the "danger zone of Europe." Conditions bad enough at any time, became intolerable. The Allied Armies in that section were at each stage wholly engrossed with the immediate present. They were surrounded by bewildered peoples who understood only imperfectly what was happening. There was hunger and disease everywhere; draining their slender resources is no great matter at any time. Armenia was as usual a chief sufferer in the general disturbance, but the people in every direction were in dire need. American relief and wel-

The Near East

fare agencies could only take up one by one the most glaring problems. Scattered ministrations could have little effect on a situation that has long been one of the chief puzzles of the civilized world.

The uniform ill-success of the Allies in this field of operations during the greater part of the war completed the ruin of Serbia, strengthened the hands of the pro-German faction in Greece, sacrificed Roumania to the armies of Mackensen, and threw a heavy burden upon Italy. The Balkan States have been the perennial victims of war, and their case is far from settled as yet.

Italy

Italy's task would have been comparatively easy had a striking success been achieved by the Allies at the Dardanelles and in Saloniki. As it was she carried on under very difficult circumstances. Her soldiers fought amid the snows of the Alps where the difficulties of supply were tremendous. Her civilian population was ill-prepared for the privations that followed the swallowing up of the men in the army. The thorough pre-war German penetration of the country had established many a secret pore for the dissemination of poisonous propaganda, and the combination of force and cunning that was brought against her in 1917 was the more effective because, in the Allied operations that touched her most nearly, there was nothing to support hope. The exit of Russia reacted directly against Italy, freeing as it did the Austrian divisions on the East Front.

After the reverse at Caporetto, Italy received the help of French and British divisions; and the welfare and relief agencies of America sent their aid to augment the efforts already initiated by the Italians themselves, and to bring assurance of effective American participation. The resources of Italy were straitened from the beginning. She should have been better aided but the fortunes of war upset all plans. The whole Italian experience exhibits most clearly the confusion of aim and imperfect coordination of Allied plans and operations that upset so many high hopes, and also the absolute necessity in modern war of extraordinary care for keeping the army and the nation at one. The recovery of Italy, after what appeared to be complete disaster, is sufficient testimony to the essential character of her warriors and people. Unquestionably the moral and material aids in maintaining fighting fitness were not present as they should have been; and welfare work, notwithstanding some excellent efforts, was developed too late to be of service when most needed.

The heaviest strain in this period of warfare of position inevitably fell upon the nation of France.

While the British were accumulating and organizing their resources, the French were expending theirs at a rate that very shortly stirred forebodings in the stoutest hearts. The early offensives were exceedingly costly; they are remembered with a shudder now under symbolic names such as "Les Éparges," where awful slaughter occurred. When the fighting at Verdun died down and the losses were added up, it is no wonder that men doubted the possibility of stopping another such assault. The British had helped to the limit of their readiness but the transformation of the British Empire into a military power could not be accomplished in a day.

France's
Ordeal

The spring of 1917 saw Russian support fading away. America's entrance into the war was a great source of moral reenforcement, but the extent and promptness of her aid were major uncertainties. American active help was promised in two years: Russia might be out in a few months. The submarine menace was very real in those days. Germany's confidence in her destroying raiders was flaunted in the eyes of the world; she had staked her very life on their power. The thoughts of the French are easily imagined: Suppose Germany is right! If her submarines are as powerful as she says they are, how can American supplies and an American Army ever reach us? The cooperation of the American Navy was encouraging, but Europe was not at all sure that it would be sufficient to abate the menace.

Then came the fighting of 1917. The shocking losses of the early offensives of the year nearly broke the heart of the French people and of their fighting forces; these casualties started the gravest questionings in the minds of the British. As early as April, General Pétain confirmed privately a statement that France had few reserves left except the *récupérés* and the yearly classes.¹ France had to hold on with what she had until help should come. In June, M. Painlevé, Minister of War, assured the Chamber of Deputies that methods of war "more economical of life than the great offensive had proved" would be adopted by the French Government.²

Within France there were powerful influences at work urging that the war be ended somehow or other. The French Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies were clamoring to attend the International Socialist Congress at Stockholm for the purpose of opening preliminary negotiations with the German Socialists. Dangerous strikes

¹ The First World War, 1914-1918, Lieut.-Col. C. à Court Repington, 2 vols., Boston, 1920, Vol. I, p. 543.

² La Vérité sur l'Offensive d'Avril, 1917.

occurred at such centers as Bourges, St. Etienne, and Paris itself. A small group of newspapers, some of which were actually in German pay, kept up a fire of cynical comments on French hopes of success. Politicians like Caillaux, Malvy, and Humbert were criticizing the Government in a manner that suggested a predetermined plan to force negotiations of peace.

The Fear of
"Defeatism"

Can it be wondered that a dangerous spirit of "defeatism" began to spread about the country? No one who understands the conditions is surprised at what he can read now in the lengthy report made to the French Senate of the indiscipline that shook the French Army.¹ When visitors from America addressed French audiences that summer there was one eager question everywhere, "How soon will the Americans be here?" When they were answered that a fully trained army could hardly take the field before the end of 1918, these suffering people answered in agony that France was lost. "*La paix blanche*" was the catch-word, the peace demand of a nation "bled white." We do not wonder at this "midsummer madness"; we can only stand in reverent admiration before the power of the true heart of France, which shook off the fatal malady and united solidly behind the troops that rose again during the autumn to their most substantial victory in the Battle of Malmaison.

Fortunately America was able to bring sure encouragement in these dark days. The parade of the First Division of the American Army in Paris on July 4, 1917, showed the people of France that there were American soldiers and that they could be carried across the seas. Over streets strewn with flowers they marched while the populace shouted: "The Americans have come!" No impassioned eloquence could have compared with the presence of the sturdy fighters in making clear that America was really in the fight. At this point, a golden opportunity was opened to the American civilian societies. They were by nature channels for carrying the goodwill of the American people: in this case, they served a wide purpose in bearing that goodwill to the people and the forces of a hard-pressed ally. The Y M C A and the Red Cross at once appeared in France as a part of the vanguard of America. These organizations had been rendering much assistance to other nations; but now that America was actually engaged in the conflict, they had far greater resources at their command. The Red Cross devoted itself to an extended and highly suc-

¹ La Vérité sur l'Offensive d'Avril, 1917.

cessful effort to hearten the people and the Y M C A immediately diverted a group of its secretaries into the Foyers du Soldat.¹

The British, too, faced an appalling casualty list. Homes that held places forever vacant were so numerous that people ceased to talk of private bereavement. The blue and white uniforms of patients of the military hospitals could be seen everywhere. Yet the demand for more men never ceased. The volunteer method, clung to for nearly two years, was at last recognized to be inadequate, and in May, 1916, the first conscription act became law. In March, 1917, the military critic of the *London Times*, who had undertaken an inquiry on man power at the request of the Prime Minister, reported that the recruits taken in the last three months were not half of the requirements for maintaining existing forces, and that there was no possibility of fresh divisions to meet the 56 new German divisions created in the course of the past few months.² In April, General Geddes³ was planning an extension of conscription limits downward to include boys of 18, on the ground that German boys of 17 would be fighting the next summer, and upward to include men of 50.

The surrender of General Townshend's force at Kut-el-Amara inflicted a painful blow to British pride, while the futile tragedy of Gallipoli struck horror to British hearts. The submarine menace was increasing, and actual and prospective food shortage had led to severe rationing, while shipyards were desperately trying to build faster than torpedoes could destroy. The extent of the industrial employment of women is suggested by the statement of a British shipbuilder who said, in 1916, "Give us two years more and we will build a ship from stem to stern with female labor only." Organized labor watched with anxiety and many protests the breakdown of safeguards and rights won through many years of effort, and, while recognizing the emergency, insisted on precautionary agreements for the future.

The Germans furnished a tonic. Their air raids on London and other cities, and their bombardment of seacoast towns yielded them no military advantage, but the killing of women and children turned patriotism into cold hate. England saw for herself what she had

¹ Consult Chapter LIV.

² *The First World War, 1914-1918*, Lieut.-Col. C. à Court Repington, 2 vols., Boston, 1920, Vol. I, p. 474.

³ The same, p. 569. The recorded conversations of the author with Allied statesmen and commanders during this period reveal that manpower was a subject of universal anxiety.

been told of Belgium. The executions of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt, and the sinking of hospital ships, furnished final confirmation. A world dominated by a nation who could do such things would not be fit to live in. General Haig's "back to the wall" order expressed the mood of the people. Better all be dead than defeated. Britain settled down to dogged resolution. They would see it through and count the cost afterward. Meanwhile whatever could be done to ease the strain on the fighting men should be done. The methods of the Y M C A had been well tested; it remained to support and expand them, and amid endless calls on purse and man power its claim in behalf of the fighting men was never slighted.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The World War spared no past records. The number of prisoners captured matched the scale on which military operations were conducted; about 6,000,000 men were finally hedged in by barbed wire.

The plight of prisoners of war is serious and pitiable. They have lost their significance for their own commanders, and they are cut off from those who are definitely interested in them. Being shut up in the midst of the enemy civilian population, they are naturally the object of the peculiarly violent hostility characteristic of most non-combatants. Whatever their guards might be disposed to arrange in their interest is strictly limited by the principle that energy and good material must not be expended under any circumstances for the benefit of the enemy. Withal, the prisoner's life is inevitably straitened, monotonous, and discouraging, even if living conditions are tolerable. Sickness is an overwhelming disaster. Interned civilians suffer perhaps more keenly than the fighting men, because they are frequently torn by a rankling sense of injustice and by the knowledge of the distress of their families separated from them.

All that could be done by the Y M C A, the Red Cross, and other agencies was little enough, but involved considerable thought, action, and expenditure of money as related in another section of this history.¹

AMERICA AT SCHOOL

The lessons for America in all this were not hard to read though it proved very difficult to profit by the teaching in the actual conduct of affairs.

¹ Consult Part IV.

For all the refinement of mechanism, all the development of the science of military and naval operations, for all the modern organizing power exhibited by the principal belligerents, war has remained essentially an affair of persons. Even against tremendous odds, moral superiority has been credited with a miraculous power of winning out. With all its immediate value, it was not only military training that counted. The fiber of men whose general character was the product of processes long at work told in the end. Intelligence, the product of education, actually sustained men through the protracted conflict. Great reservoirs of spiritual power in the nations were drawn on to supplement the efforts of fighters; and whenever this supply failed, the cause fell into imminent danger. The perception of these elements was no new discovery, but their importance was forced upon the dull apprehensions of mankind by the spectacular events of this tremendous struggle.

Moral
Values

The American people and the American authorities certainly learned many lessons. They saw with clearness the kind of an ordeal into which they were sending their own citizens. They recognized the inevitable facts of modern war: what these meant sobered every thoughtful man and woman. More than this America was taught how the conditions could be mitigated; and there was no question of her firm determination that her own forces should be spared every hardship that energy and devotion could eliminate and should be protected from every evil that could be fenced off. That the nation would stand solidly behind the fighting man was a foregone conclusion, but such support in the abstract is not of much service. The experiences rehearsed in this chapter indicated opportunities for service and tested methods that formed the basis for the practical effort of civilian agencies and actually did modify the American fighting man's experience far more than even he himself realizes. The national establishments were counted upon to do their part but it is not the American way to rely wholly on official resources. It was not hidden from the national leaders nor from the social agencies that "civilian interference" does add complications to an already complex situation, but the horrible experiences of Europe spread out daily before Americans made it impossible to deny the people their desire for direct service. It is not recorded, either, that the high military and naval authorities opposed this demand. They welcomed the supplementary service of the free agencies of the people.

CHAPTER V

FROM HOME TO CAMP

The Germans would certainly never have forced America into the World War in 1917 if they had not regarded active American participation under two years as a possibility so remote that it need not be considered as against the prospective advantages of maintaining the rigors of the submarine campaign. Some of the German leaders were undoubtedly convinced that, submarine or no submarine, America would eventually have joined the Allies; but the actual event could have been postponed for some months had such postponement been considered necessary.

The German General Staff evidently, in 1917, held two very firm convictions: first, that they could stand off the Allies in France and Flanders during the year, 1917; and second, that Russia had been at last rendered practically powerless, and would require only careful watching during the summer by a comparatively small force. It was assumed that the Italians could be kept back for the time being. Thus a grand attack in the West would be possible in 1918.

On the other hand, what about America? American unpreparedness was an open secret. The Chief of Staff of the American Army set down his sober judgment after the victory had been achieved: "The declaration of war, on April 6, 1917, found the United States, from a military, industrial, and economic viewpoint, thoroughly unprepared for the great task which confronted it."¹ The American Regular Army in April, 1917, was an inconsiderable force and even with the federalized units of the National Guard then on duty along the Mexican Border amounted to barely 200,000 men.² Few American officers had handled a complete regiment in the field under the new conditions of warfare; none had handled a division. The war organization had no actual experience in equipping, training, and transporting a large field army; the industrial plants of the nation, although comprising the greatest aggregate manufacturing resources

¹ Report of General Peyton C. March to the Secretary of War, Washington, 1919, p. 8.

² The War With Germany, A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 16.

of any country, had never been organized for war. To convey an army to Europe, America possessed less ocean-going tonnage than any other great nation. And even more serious than any of these considerations, the men of military age in America had little traditional respect for and no familiarity with twentieth century conditions of soldiering. There was, of course, effective power in the United States Navy; though it cannot be said that even this service was fully ready for action on a large scale. Can the German high command be blamed for believing that the Allied line in the West might be broken before a powerful American Army could appear in France?

America had been a watchful neutral. Her observations were checked immediately after her entry into the war by the authoritative representatives of France and Great Britain. It was absolutely plain not only to the leaders of the nation but to the rank and file of its citizenship that American aid to be really effective had to be offered on a huge scale, that only an overwhelming manifestation of physical and moral power could put the issue beyond a doubt. Already both sides had seen that slight advantages were not enough to tip the balances. America as a whole not only realized this truth but accepted its implications. The people determined on a complete concentration—men, money, military and technical material, and social force; there was to be no holding back at any point. Against the fact of America's failure to prepare during the years of warning must be set this immediate and enthusiastic commitment of every resource when at last the sword was drawn.

The National
Decision

The effect of this national decision cannot be over-estimated. If there had been hesitation, if the leaders had decided simply "to do what we could," the cause might have been lost and surely the sufferings of the Allies would have been very greatly prolonged. In America the decision brought in a whole train of special consequences. There was set a task demanding the fullest exercise of every power to be carried out with no delay. There was urgency enough in the situation as first comprehended, but the sense of immediacy increased steadily under the pressure of events till the apparently impossible was accomplished. Everything had to be brought into line at once. A huge army had to be recruited and trained while a big industrial program was put into action and a host of ships built and staggering sums of money provided; there was no time for leisurely procedure designed to produce perfect results at some future date. It was assumed, simply and completely, that the people would

submit to all measures necessary to achieve the end. Provost Marshal General Crowder in his first report on the selective draft paid tribute to the qualities which made for the success of the National Army in language which may fittingly be applied more generally:

"No great national project was ever attempted with so complete a reliance on the voluntary cooperation of citizens for its execution. . . The vaunted efficiency of which the German Empire stands (sic) as the avatar can offer nothing to compare with it. It remains the ultimate test and proof of the intrinsic political idea upon which American institutions of democracy and local self government are based."¹

Official action was matched by the voluntary efforts of civilians. Relief and welfare work had to be planned on a scale beyond all precedent at a time when the extent of the operations was still only a matter of conjecture. Every difficulty in the military, naval, and industrial program was present in principle in the civilian enterprises. The only point clearly understood was that nothing was to be spared not only for our own men but for the fighters and the people of the nations with which America was to be associated in the War.

The hard-pressed Allies had nothing to complain of in the American people's grasp of the magnitude of its task in any department.

THE HUMAN PROBLEM IN MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING

It is quite possible to forgive the old-line Army man who viewed the spectacle of this mobilization of citizen soldiers with deep misgivings. Out from one of the most diversified social organizations in the world, the selective draft had drawn into the camps the raw material for the new army—about two-thirds of a million citizens. Citizens, in the full meaning of the word, they truly were; men who had no military training at all, felt no liking for military life; men, indeed, who had many of them participated in a recent presidential election in which the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War," was emblazoned on the winning banner. Behind their experience as Americans in the twentieth century was a varied background. In one regiment at Camp Upton, where the New York City recruits were trained, twenty-seven languages were spoken, including such diverse tongues as Chinese, Armenian, Ukrainian, and Basque. In some of the Southern camps, there were numbers of men from the mountains who could not write their own names, some of whom, so it is related,

¹ First Report of the Provost Marshal General, Washington, December, 1917.

on arrival mistook the cantonment for "Sunny France." The large contingent of negroes brought their own peculiar unity and diversity into the parti-colored situation. Out of this material the military leaders were asked to create under the complex conditions of modern war a fighting force to take the field against veteran armies.

Some little comfort was derived from the presence of the National Guardsmen who knew the butt of a rifle from its muzzle and the fine group of volunteers entering the Navy and the Marine Corps.

European experts frankly expressed their opinion that America might furnish splendid engineers and crack aviators, and a few brigades of volunteer shock troops that might prove the equal of any fighting men in the world; but that the rank and file of the American Army would develop military aptitude and acquire disciplined intelligence equal to the occasion, appeared to them to be a piece of painfully credulous optimism.

It was in no spirit of paternal superiority that more mature citizens of serious mind viewed the situation as fraught with danger from the point of view of citizenship, particularly of that Christian citizenship whose character furnished the early ideals of the American nation. The boys were leaving behind them all the restraints of the home community—restraints none too effective in the complexity of American life under the most favorable circumstances—to enter an utterly strange environment whose possibilities were generally regarded with all the apprehension natural in a peace-loving and "military-shy" people.

Altogether, the citizen soldier was the object of much concern. Could he do his job? Could he conduct himself throughout as a worthy representative of American ideals? Could he go through a harsh and brutalizing experience and emerge neither harsh nor brutal? Such questions, of course, added to the apprehension regarding the discomforts, hardships, and actual physical suffering that lay not far ahead.

The new citizen soldier may have lacked military training but he knew very much about modern war. In Great Britain the first volunteer armies were in the midst of things before anyone realized fully just what was happening. The American, on the contrary, during the most impressionable period of his life had lived in a world in which the War was the predominant topic of public discussion and a most constant subject of private reflection. The veil of romance had already been torn aside by European writers. No citizen ever offered

The Spirit of the
Citizen Soldier

himself for service with more realistic knowledge of what war meant to the men involved in it than did the American citizen-soldier of 1917. The early and sudden revelation of the appalling horror of twentieth century war unquestionably held Americans back from participation, not in physical terror but in moral apprehension, until the progress of events made the appeal for justice absolutely irresistible. That the moral conviction was complete, let the reception of the draft bear witness; under any other conditions, the use of such a method would have been unthinkable. This conviction was in a sense reflected in the mind of every drafted man.

The American citizen-fighter brought with him into camp a quality that supplemented this realistic sense of responsibility—an infectious and enthusiastic confidence. All young armies have it, but ours had it in overflowing measure. Every man—soldier, sailor, and marine—was sure that America was “in this thing to finish it up.” He looked forward to participation in a series of powerful and irresistible lunges of attack which would appall the enemy by their audacity and strength—no hanging on to a line of trenches for him. He was imbued, like all the rest of us, with the national gospel of success and the national boast of the unlimited power of America; and his unconquerable cocksureness knew no limits. It carried him over those memorable and sobering occasions when he first stuck a bayonet into a sack, or threw a hand-grenade, or entered a gas-chamber, or watched a practice demonstration of artillery fire. It carried him through the long hard grind of drill and all the discomforts of camp, transport, and field campaigning. It was all very natural and most highly American. From the beginning the American high command understood that these fighters possessed the “constructive illusion” of victory, and the plans for training were shaped accordingly; our Army in France was prepared for adventurous, wide-open, old-fashioned warfare.

This boundless assurance was, of course, a sore point with many of the Allied soldiers. They are inclined to suggest that not so much would be said about it had American buoyancy been subjected to the gruelling of the first years of the conflict, in the forced periods of retreat or inaction before a superior force, or under the hail of death from the enemy's out-massing artillery. This is all quite possible, indeed, highly probable. In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to appreciate the superb courage of these years of strain and disappointment. But our friends must take us as we are. The fighters

and the people of America did what we were asked to do; we really did it under the spell of this characteristic "constructive illusion" of victory. It is our way; in the name of our honest intent we crave absolution for what may seem to be "frantic boasts."

Behind the fighting men of America stood the people, solid and enthusiastic. Everyone rushed to aid the national cause—men, women, and children; the Boy Scouts and organized labor; the churches and the lay associations; fraternities, clubs, and colleges. He would be daring, indeed, who attempted to dilate with assurance upon the general theme of the psychology of the American people; we shall avoid that morass. Only let us note that in the united manifestation of American national enthusiasm, American characteristics appeared strikingly true to type. Our public generosity, challenged at the very beginning by the unheard-of request of the Red Cross for \$100,000,000, responded with a huge over-subscription. All the passion for uplift and reform so deeply ingrained in the national habit sought outlet through a dozen channels. The powerful religious forces of the country, which with us from the beginning have been imbued with extraordinary missionary zeal in many directions, reached out eagerly for opportunities of service. Our organizing bent, which appears to Europeans generally as a kind of disease, resulted in the creation of all sorts of local societies whose object was to help win the war. Behind all the tinsel and the beating of drums, behind all the bombastic boasts of "showing what America could do," there existed a plain and honest determination on the part of every citizen—with astonishingly few exceptions—to assume his or her responsibility in the national enterprise.

The Spirit of
the People

The direct responsibility of the relief and welfare organizations for the service of men under arms was hardly greater than their plain duty to provide machinery for the transformation of this universal energy into concerted and effective action.

From the security of home to the training camp may be a short jump geographically; but in another way this first new experience of the citizen-soldier is a long and trying trip. In the light of his later voyage to France and his long march through the Argonne, this first experience seems a trivial affair. But for many it was serious and unpleasant enough at the time. Some men have indeed testified that nothing that happened afterward occasioned them anything like the shock of surprise and consternation that overwhelmed them when they were first thrown into the midst of the drab confusion,

The First
Lap

the merciless publicity, and the profuse profanity of the assemblies on the trains headed for the camps. The partings on the platforms endowed the scene with special seriousness at the very beginning, and the long hours of travel with the accompaniment of tedious delays usually succeeded in wearing down the spirits of the jauntiest. The whole experience marked the real break between home and the battlefield. Most of those who have gone from home to boarding school can remember the misery of that break; how much keener the misery when the possibilities of the new life involved excessive work, severe suffering, perhaps death!

Here lay the first opportunity for the civilian welfare agencies. This was the beginning of their problems, too. It was their peculiar business, first of all, to appreciate and understand this first of a long series of abnormal situations: then they had to devise simple means—no others could be employed—of softening the blow of leave-taking, of relieving the tedium of the long journey, and of suggesting activities counter to the demoralizing influences that immediately surround all movements of men. It all represents, of course, a very simple problem—to many a wholly trivial one. To hardened veterans the mere recognition of such a service provokes the smile offered to any harmless piece of sentimentality; if a soldier cannot face such an experience with a grin, what will he do when he is marching knee-deep in mud up to the front lines? The point is that the welfare agencies, both the national societies and the local temporary units, of a set purpose refused to overlook this period; they offered this first service as a sign that the people proposed to follow the boys through from the beginning to the end.

From first to last over four and a half millions of Americans in the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, went through the mill of the training camps. The civilian recruit on entering a training camp passed from one type of highly organized social community into another type quite as highly organized but determined by a totally different set of basic principles. The aims of the modern civilized community are widely diversified; the military community was governed by a single dominant purpose. This undivided absorption created a social life whose peculiar features, familiar as they are, have seldom been appreciated in their true bearings.

The personal initiative that has such a full opportunity in ordinary American life and is such an important element in civil achievement, has little place in the training camp. Personal responsi-

bility is sent off on a vacation. The bugle blows, and men eat; the bugle blows, and men drill; the bugle blows, and men sleep. Shelter, food, clothing, and equipment—all are provided in standard forms, and the manner of their use is determined by regulation. Freedom of movement is rigidly restricted in every direction. Each man is given a number. The way into this rigid life is hard; the confinement of quarantine, with possible feverishness due to inoculations, accentuates the shock of the new experience.

Western civilization has developed a high notion of the right of each individual to a certain amount of privacy. From the communal life of the tribe, we have progressed to the conception that every man's home is his castle, protected against invasion by the sternest laws. This right receives scant consideration in the process of training for war service. To a certain extent the same conditions apply in boarding schools, and the novels of youthful life are full of the tragic experience of sensitive boys who have essayed to practice in public such eminently private exercises as painting a picture or saying their prayers. In the barracks, in the mess-rooms, even in the open spaces of the camp, men are jumbled up with strangers—possibly uncongenial strangers—in a juxtaposition so close that there is hardly elbow-room for the body, to say nothing of the soul. There is a necessary publicity in the physical arrangements attending examination and inoculation on a large scale that is particularly harrowing to those whose experience and training have emphasized reticence and protection. Slight physical peculiarities that appear when men are exposed to public gaze in the state of nature are not always treated by the crowd with the delicacy that might properly be accorded to such infirmities.

Personal
Considerations

The business of fighting—in spite of the Legion of Death—is regarded as a function primarily of the young and vigorous man. The military community is thus highly specialized not only in its organization but also in its human make-up. It presents little but one long monotonous experience of male companionship of one stage of maturity. Women, old folks, the helpless, children—all these human elements are excluded. The prime feature of the ideal home, its varied companionship, is of necessity lacking, for it has no place in the purpose for which the training camp is established and that purpose must reign supreme. This aspect of training probably more than any other accounts for the sharp difference in atmosphere between the life of the camps and that in the home community.

The freshness and novelty of this experience carried many new comers over the first hard days, and an irrepressible sense of humor sustained others right to the end. But the adjustment to such a radically different environment was a problem for every man. The effort to achieve such an adjustment as made the new life bearable frequently resulted in men becoming prematurely "hard-boiled," partly through the influence of unconscious imitation and partly through the instinct of self-protection. The state of softness and too intent brooding on home and home folks passed rapidly to a condition in which acceptance of the new life tended to shut out the old. Thus, in the abnormal conditions there was a great tendency for a man to cut himself off from normal influences in a kind of grim effort to make the best of what most of them heartily disliked.

The round of life in training provides for plenty of employment; it keeps a man out of mischief, to be sure, for many hours in the day. But when the work is over and hours of recreation intervene, the fighting man, whose labors for the most part are plain drudgery, finds none of the resources for leisure that were present in his home community. The minutes of leisure are precious just because they are so few. America in particular is a land of recreation; provision for diversified amusement has perhaps been carried to great excess. If we grant the excess, then all the more is the deprivation of the means of diversion—whether through play or amusements or education—under the rigid conditions an irritating hardship.

The authorities who set up military training are responsible to the nation for the achievement of one very definite end. To hint that they are insensible to other considerations would be highly unjust, but they are ever faced with the fact that no excuses will serve if the chief purpose fails of accomplishment. The results of their efforts are tried in a test from which there can be no appeal. In most wars, these results have to be accomplished very quickly. In the World War America's watchword was "Speed." Therefore, it was inevitable that the communities of the training camps should hew close to the line; and the more strict the militarization the greater was the chasm between the life of the fighter and that of the civilian.

The failure of the search for the Average American prevents a general description of characteristic qualities and background of the men who came under these rigid conditions. There is little need to picture the kind of heterogeneity that the selective draft picked up

in each scoop through an American community, and the character of the volunteers of the earlier days proved conclusively that eagerness to fight is not confined to any particular race in our democratic *mélange*. All that has been written about the "Melting Pot" could be repeated in italics as a description of the raw material of the American Army.

The training camp is especially designed to take no notice of these differences except where they are so serious that ignoring them would interfere with the rapid and effective achievement of the war purpose. Negroes and whites were not mixed indiscriminately and cognizance had to be taken of the fact that certain men could not understand the English language. The Army and Navy cannot afford to encourage individual peculiarities. However much we may desire to maintain in civil life the richness of our national flavor by the deliberate cultivation of different racial traditions, the fighting forces need one kind of man in every service. The duties performed may differ greatly but the same temper is demanded throughout; and for the combat divisions, the real cutting edge of the forces, the urgent requirement is that each man shall learn to act like a unit in a machine. The need for uniformity extends distinctly to mental qualities and conditions. The leaders of the Army and Navy appreciate high intelligence and welcome men of inherent initiative, but the intelligence and the initiative are expected to function on strictly prescribed lines. The fighting forces are not arenas of discussion; the righteousness of the cause is not an open question; the methods and personnel of the official staff are not settled by the vote of the man in the ranks. Training for service is a process of reducing all differences to a few distinctive types. The design of the drill-sergeant is not merely to ignore variations but definitely to obliterate them.

In the officers' camps there existed a spirit of unity from the beginning. Since the regular forces and the National Guard were able to supply only about one-fourth of the commissioned personnel required—excluding the physicians and administrative officers—the quality of the leadership of the forces depended to a large extent upon the selection and training of new officers. The men in the Reserve Officers Training Camp were a picked group.

The New
Officers

As candidates for officers' commissions they were supposed to have had previous military training, but outside of a small percentage of regular soldiers who were admitted to camps and of a larger percentage of men who had been to previous training camps or who

had been members of the National Guard, that experience had been very meager indeed. During the three months of the camps' duration they were supposed to learn what a West Point cadet took four years to master under severe and scientific discipline. For the most part they were older men with more or less mature experience to guide and steady them; their average age was about twenty-five years. A very large proportion of them were college graduates. They came into the Army at the time when the enthusiasm of the war and the novelty of military experience were still at their highest pitch. They found at the camps a selected training staff of regular army officers who represented a better tradition of military life than they had ever experienced before.

As a whole, they found the conditions of training arduous to the limits of their physical endurance but not beyond them. Their application to the job, their industry and devotion, and general acquittal of themselves was one of the fine products of the early period of the war. The men at the officers' training camps went through their military apprenticeship in the spirit of an athletic training table at college, but with a maturer understanding and a finer loyalty to the far greater cause that lay at the heart of their work. Drunkenness, promiscuity with women, and indiscipline were absent from these camps to a perfectly amazing degree; their fine *esprit de corps* produced a conviction that the emergency for which these officers-to-be had entered the army allowed no place or time for physical indulgence. This fine standard was not and could not have been expected to be maintained when as officers they faced the far different conditions of war at the front and of the disorganized life of war-weary France, as well as in the more relaxed conditions that succeeded in the larger cities in America. But its elevating effect persisted throughout the war and as much as any other factor helped to make the American officer worthy of his country and the cause for which he was fighting.

While no one would deny the value of discipline or of the endurance of hardship for a just cause, the fact remains that the rigid régime of training must be mitigated. It is not good for the recruit, either as a citizen or as a fighting man, to be separated abruptly and entirely from the activities and sympathies of normal life. Provided there is no interference with the main business, the best officers are desirous that the men under their command should enjoy normal activities and should be made to feel a vivid sense of their unity

with the life of their people. The people at home demand that to the limit of possibility every unnecessary deprivation should be eliminated.

There is only one way to offset the sharp contrast between life in the camp and life in the community—to introduce into the camp such facilities as will enable a man to employ his leisure hours in voluntary activities that suggest something of the variety and freedom of everyday existence and that in content are connected with the home community. To escape from the “system” into a quiet corner where a fellow may read or write or smoke or “chew the rag” is a luxury that only the fighting man truly appreciates. To be free not only from the regulations but from the sense of the regulations, is the desire of all hearts. The wants of men differ just as they differ in civil life: some like to play baseball; some prefer a show; some would rather render “close harmony” than read a book. Everyone on regular rations likes to buy supplementary delicacies. Above all, everyone wants to choose his own recreation. The fundamental character of the need must be realized in order to appreciate the means offered to meet it.

The civilian service offered is one long list of details that may appear petty but it is the sum total of such details that counts. The induction into the camp is a time of great strain and much small annoyance. There are civilian clothes to be sent home, wires telling of safe arrival, perhaps more important messages regarding the winding up of business affairs, insignificant matters that the Army and Navy cannot be bothered with. He who has assisted the newcomer to arrange such matters has, however, considerably softened the break. The period of quarantine is lightened by a little attention to the supply of reading matter and writing paper or some form of entertainment. A little unostentatious comradeship is never out of place in such ill-adjusted groups and small personal services are effective far beyond their appearance. Anything that mitigates the necessary but deadly impersonality of the system tends to make the transition easier.

THE WELFARE TASK

The material undertaking involved in the attempt to provide in the camps some equivalent for the club-room, the theater, the church, the athletic club, the school, and the library was in itself a task of huge proportions for the civilian welfare agencies. That, however,

was only a part of the job. The big thing was to infuse into the activities the real spirit of the best in American life and to make the welfare agency a positive and not merely a passive factor in the life of the camp. All voluntary activities are chosen by the participator and to be chosen they must be attractive. If the community equivalents in the camps are vastly inferior in the manner of their management to their types in the world outside, it is not to be expected that the result will be stimulating to the fighting man. The military authorities assigned to the welfare societies the task of making the camps "home-like"—a very large order. The cooperative post-exchange supplied the "corner-store"; and the chaplains, of course, filled their accustomed place. It was left with the welfare agencies to wrestle with the rest of the problem.

In the American camps, as in every military community, there was going on the inevitable hardening process. The aim of the training was to produce a disciplinary uniformity; the close association of younger men without the restrictions of women, or of children, or of older men tended to create a curious moral uniformity. The excessive profanity and vulgarity of camp life was not due to original depravity but to the effect of an unbalanced human environment. The same conditions obtain in distant lumber-camps and to a certain extent in men's colleges. The problem of the welfare societies was to assist men to reestablish their own individualities, each in his own way, through a program of athletic, entertainment, social, educational and religious features that would prove a real attraction and an actual link with the home community. In its extensive activities the Y M C A endeavored to meet this issue and, besides, to offer the best modern guidance in such activities as group games, social entertainment, and religious education. Throughout the whole effort no opportunity was lost to remind the men of the unity of home-folks and fighting forces in the national cause.

One special activity in the American camps deserves mention in this connection. The visits of relatives and friends to the camps meant much to the citizens in training. The pleasure of such visits has in the past been largely destroyed because of the lack of a place to meet. In the American training camps the want was supplied by the chain of hostess-houses run by the Young Women's Christian Association. The wife, the mother, or the sweetheart of a man in training was enabled thus to meet him in a decent environment where the home atmosphere was maintained by a staff of well-trained workers.

The obvious plan of according relief from the monotony of camp life by more frequent leave to visit nearby cities has, of course, not commended itself to modern military practice. The soldier or sailor on short leave does not thus reestablish touch with normal community life; as a rule, he is faced with the worst features of modern social conditions. The training camps were deliberately located at some distance from the cities and the greatest care was exercised as to the character of the community that was permitted to grow up around them.

The streets of the cities were nevertheless alive with men in uniform on visits or en route from one point to another, and it must be said for America that the citizens of the nation did their best to keep open house for the fighting men. Heroic efforts were made to provide wholesome entertainment and free hospitality on a large scale, while a nation-wide movement went forward to suppress manifest evils. To name all the organizations which conducted welfare service in the cities would be impossible and beyond these are the hundreds of thousands of individuals who worked independently toward the same end. The War Camp Community Service, of course, ran its canteens, rest-rooms, and information bureaus everywhere. As far as possible, this work was coordinated under this organization. The other active national welfare societies, by a proper division of the field, worked primarily in the camps; but the Y M C A and the Knights of Columbus erected huts at central points where it appeared that supplementary service would be appreciated.

No doubt the recreation offered the men varied greatly in attractiveness and in value; but the effort was inspired, in nearly every case, by a genuine desire to be of real service to the boys and to provide them with the best the town had to offer. Entertainments, social rooms, dances held under decent auspices, clean and reasonable canteens, invitations to private homes—the acceptability of such was proved by the flattering patronage. It represented the same kind of friendliness that might be shown to any lonely boy in a strange city. These men freed temporarily from restrictions were looking for fun but by no means all of them wanted to “bat around.” The obvious sincerity of the good feeling of the people served further to bind the fighters to the nation. It was another link in a chain that can never be too long or too strong, for its strength had to be tested in the event in many strange places and under many adverse circumstances.

The local Young Men's Christian Associations by the very nature of their occupation were interested in the casualties in the cities. In most cases independently of the national organization they carried on various useful activities and their doors were always wide open to service men. The Young Women's Christian Associations, also, particularly in the field of social entertainment conducted a program of service that appealed particularly to those men who had already sampled the hospitality of the hostess houses. The cities of America really offered their best to men in uniform during the period of the World War.

Organization

While the worker in immediate contact with soldiers met directly the challenge of such situations and conditions as have been suggested, there was a very considerable volume of work going on to which the general public paid little attention. To coordinate work on such a scale and of such diverse character there was needed of course a competent directing executive with lines of communication to every part of the field. A sort of circulatory system was required to gather from innumerable sources the elements of power, concentrate and distribute them. The contacts, at every point, of welfare work with military units under central governmental control, implied a central representation of welfare work with which the Government could deal with assurance that its wishes or orders would be transmitted and observed everywhere.

All the organizations which eventually shared in welfare work had to meet this need of new or modified organization, and the measures taken by the Y M C A became typical of those which resulted in executive bodies under various names devised to act in the emergency.¹

¹ The war work organizations recognized by the Government were: National War Work Council of Young Men's Christian Associations; National Catholic War Work Council; Jewish Welfare Board; Salvation Army War Board; War Work Council of the National Board of Young Women's Christian Associations; American Library Association; War Camp Community Service (representing the Playground and Recreation Association of America). Their policies and activities were coordinated in two Commissions on Training Camp Activities, one of the War Department, appointed by Secretary of War Newton E. Baker in April, 1917, and one of the Navy Department, appointed by Secretary of the Navy Josephus E. Daniels, in July, 1917. The members of these Commissions were: Army, Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman; Jasper J. Mayer, Secretary; Lee F. Hanmer, Thomas J. Howells, Marc Klaw, Joseph Lee, Joseph E. Raycroft. Navy: Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman; Lieut. Richard E. Byrd, U. S. N., Secretary; Clifford W. Barnes, Walter Camp, Selah Chamberlain, John J. Eagan, Joseph Lee, E. T. Meredith, Barton Myers, Charles P. Neill, Mrs. Helen Ring Robinson, Mrs. Finley J. Shepard, Mrs. Daisy McLaurin Stevens, John S. Tichenor.

The Y M C A is not a centralized institution. Its International Committee is a representative body entrusted with carefully defined executive functions by the local Associations which preserve a strong tradition of independence. These self-governing units have developed initiative capable of assuming responsibility in large enterprises without aid or supervision; such initiative can be fully enlisted in a common undertaking only through genuine participation in the making of plans. With remarkable promptness the International Committee submitted proposals for concerted action and means were found to secure an expression of opinion so widely representative of Association constituencies that, although unofficial, its formal confirmation was certain. A new executive, known as the National War Work Council of Young Men's Christian Associations, was created through which the International Committee and all state and local Associations might operate in war service. On this Council more than 200 leading citizens¹ from all parts of the country gave patient and laborious service, framing and adjusting administrative machinery as the work developed, and coordinating and systematizing the work. The organization aspect was similar to that of any enterprise resting on volunteer workers and contributions and having national or international scope. The outstanding difference lay in the urgent haste and the sudden multiplication of public responsibilities upon the men who must be relied upon for this duty also.

Local service, needed as soon as America entered the war, was rendered by vigilant local Associations. The national organization kept pace with the Government, so that when camps and cantonments were ready to receive soldiers, the representatives of the War Work Council were on hand equipped for service. The early and unexpected movement of troops to France, and the assumption of responsibility for post exchanges there, called for the establishment at home of an extensive service of supply of workers and equipment before the anticipated time. America had to move fast in those crowded early days, if she was to become effective before it should be too late; action repeatedly outran schedules, and all branches of service, civilian and military, found themselves crowding sail in a long stern chase.

There is one peculiarly trying feature of the situation in which Fund Raising all agencies relying on public support find themselves in moments of emergency. Money raising cannot be delegated wholly to subordi-

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 489-494.

nates. However large a force of workers may be employed in spreading the appeal and gathering and transmitting the resulting gifts, the responsible heads of the organization must supervise every step. The reasons are obvious to any who reflect on the magnitude of the sums to be collected, and on the responsibilities involved in becoming trustee for such sums. But the resulting diversion of the time and energy of leaders from the performance of service, in which they as well as the public are primarily interested, to the gathering of the wherewithal of service, is hardly less than tragic. In the early days of the war and later at critical times in the history of welfare work, the practical necessity of the situation forced the General Secretary of the War Work Council and some of his busiest associates to withdraw from other activities and for considerable periods to concentrate their energies on the conduct of financial campaigns. Never before had any organization committed itself to a service of such magnitude, and notwithstanding the generous liberality of the people, the funds required were so large that the maximum of wisdom and of caution were necessary to secure adequate public comprehension of the need without raising expectations of performance beyond the sheer physical limitations of possibility. Considering the self-control required to shut out the imperious summons and to repress the eager inclination to active service, this obligation to devote themselves to financial preliminaries was perhaps the most wearing burden which the leaders were called upon to bear.

The second really serious preliminary to actual service was the selection of workers. Upon the marshalling of men and women of the right personality hinged the decision of failure or success. It is not required that this history should labor the point that the World War was a great contest of moral forces; that has been shown over and over by writers of every complexion. Welfare work itself to be of any real service must be a moral force, a medium for the transmission of spiritual power. Human needs cannot be met by mechanical means except to a very slight degree; if a soldier in France could have shaken a cup of coffee and a sandwich out of an Automat whenever he felt so inclined, he would have secured the food at least; but such service would hardly be to the fighting man a constant reminder of the love and practical sympathy of his people.

The fighting man's needs, as we have sketched them, were needs of the spirit. Companionship on the hard journeys and in the first difficult days in camp, recreation of a clean and vigorous character,

entertainment, spiritual inspiration, education—these are not rule of thumb activities. They are personal engagements whose success depends upon personal characteristics that are not by nature the possession of everyone, and upon personal wisdom that comes only through a varied and sincere experience. Huts and checkers and movies and writing paper must be tools in the hands of persons to be really effective. Of course, there were plenty of self-confident or ignorant people who breezed into the recruiting offices of the civilian agencies with all the assurance of a young salesman trained in ten lessons. But many serious men and women volunteered for service in a spirit of grave question as to the ability of any human being to discharge such a responsibility. They understood that in order to be an ideal medium for the moral and spiritual inspiration of the home community a worker must possess rare qualifications adjusted in delicate balance. Conviction sans intolerance, sympathy sans sentimentality, wholesomeness sans prudery, humility sans hypocrisy, religion sans unctuousness—such are characteristic qualities of spiritual leadership: Who dares to claim their possession? Yet as each worker failed, and no one could ever dream of full success, at some one point, by just so much was the effectiveness of this personal service marred.

Further, every form of specialized work has a technique. Though the welfare enterprise had to fit a thousand new situations, the experience of the past was never wholly set aside. In comparison with the magnitude of the task, there were very few with technical training and experience. Business experience does not always fit a man perfectly for the administration of a social institution; the successful teacher of boys and girls is not necessarily qualified to deal with mature men. Dexterity is always a matter of practice, alike in balancing a table on the forehead or in combating loneliness in a new recruit. While the soldier, the sailor, and the marine spent months in learning his trade, the civilian worker had to face his task with at best a very brief course of training and a sackful of good advice.

There is another point that is easily overlooked. "Soldiering" was a hard experience for the welfare worker, just as it was a hard experience for the fighting man. Though chosen from the group over draft age, he had to be physically fit and to endure, particularly overseas, severe hardship—second only to the actual combat troops and the naval fighters. The strain of overwork, the pressure of the camp atmosphere with its pungent male vulgarity, and the pressure of sharp temptation were all a part of his daily burden, too. His position in

The Technique of
Welfare Work

no sense guaranteed him freedom from human limitations and the demands of that same position very definitely denied him the normal outlet of a good "grouse." Though the American fighting men really appreciated the civilian services, there were many among our forces who viewed the motives of the civilian workers with very pointed suspicion, which on occasions they did not hesitate to express. The feeling is natural; its expression did not lessen the welfare worker's personal burden.

And, most important of all, they were all Americans together, who shared American limitations. The "small town mind" was no exclusive possession of welfare workers; indeed, observant Europeans consider it a national characteristic. The unreflecting zeal with which we tackle all our problems is a potent factor in achievement, though it is frequently productive of friction and general unpleasantness. It breeds intolerance, petty meddling, and irritating paternalism, conflicting sharply with our own strong individualism. Throughout this great social experience of the World War every group of Americans had to work through the difficulties created by our temperament, and the welfare workers could not escape the experience any more than others. Every one learned some tolerance before the end.

In the unbalanced social life of the fighting man the chief abnormality is the lack of the refining influence of women whom he both admires and respects. Whatever the future may develop, in our present American civilization women are the upholders of all the finer distinctions, the keepers of the amenities of daily existence. The traditional relationship between fighting men and women was directly challenged in this war by the women themselves. The soldier and sailor on leave in the cities found innumerable opportunities to enjoy a variety of social recreations in the company of fine American girls who truly reminded them of the best elements of their far-away homes. Thousands of homes within reach of the camps were not only open to soldiers, but reached out to draw them into the friendly circle, and the parties of volunteer entertainers who visited the camps responded to the soldiers' craving for social intercourse. There were undeniable dangers in the relaxation of social conventions, but surely far less than in leaving the entertainment of the men, as heretofore, to the debased elements of the community.

In France there was no considerable number of American women to volunteer such service, and the only way to introduce the much needed feminine element into the life of the men was to include women

in organized welfare service to a much greater extent than was practiced in the home camps. The Association, therefore, with the consent of the national authorities, undertook the original and delicate task of enlisting for overseas thousands of American women to work in every branch of welfare service. It was no light responsibility for any civilian agency to take a large group of women three thousand miles from the shores of America to share in an arduous and exacting task. Many difficulties beset every step of the undertaking; the fighting areas have hitherto been sacred to professional nurses alone. But the plan was highly successful. These women had for protectors hundreds of thousands of American boys who gladly accepted them as comrades in arms and were forever grateful for even their presence in a strange land. Indeed, the women welfare workers were in a sense more cordially received than the men, for no one ever thought of a Y girl as being in a "soft job."

Soldiers going overseas were destined to experiences more varied and more violent than any connected with the initial contrast between the familiar life of civilians and the strangeness of training camps. It may be doubted, however, whether any of the adjustments made after the habit of adjustment had been formed were more trying than that first plunge into an utterly new way of living. No familiar parallel that suggests itself seems quite adequate. The boy leaving home for boarding school or college, the youth exchanging quiet village life for the turmoil and hardness of a great city, the young engineer or missionary following his calling from academic halls to the loneliness of the wilderness or the equal loneliness amid crowds of alien culture—these have been favorite themes of modern literature because of their dramatic interest. Something of each was in the experience of the new recruit, yet there was something more, something that struck deeper.

The Nation's
Solicitude

Few, either observers or sharers, thoroughly understood it; nothing could be farther from the truth than any inference from what has been written that welfare workers entered upon their task with a clear and comprehensive grasp of what was going on in the inner selves of the men they served. The workers did indeed possess opportunities for learning denied to the people at home. They worked under the guidance of leaders who had studied similar situations on a smaller scale. They shared to a large extent in the soldiers' experience, and what they did not share they could observe, at least outwardly, directly before their eyes. They did not think of themselves

as solving psychological problems; rather they were too busy grappling with "the instant need of things" to indulge in analysis. No individual saw it all. Only in retrospect is it possible to gather up fragments of the observation and experience of many men, unconscious revelations, reactions that were so common as to become typical, results of service experiments that confirmed or corrected thoughtful diagnosis. Of such materials it is possible for sympathetic insight to weave a fabric that presents broad intimations, at least, of a consistent pattern, or, to change the figure, to recognize a theme persisting through the infinite variations of a majestic symphony.

The Nation's
Support

But if none understood completely, there were few in America who did not feel intensely that their fellows were passing through an experience which strained physical endurance and searched character to its foundations, and who were not solicitous to mitigate its severity and reinforce those who endured it. Never did a body of men embark on a difficult and dangerous crusade with more tangible evidence of the immediate interest and unfaltering support of the people at home. In spite of necessary haste, the American authorities and the American people exerted themselves to the utmost to make the phase of training as easy as possible. The camps were well planned and well equipped, unquestionably superior to those of any other nation; and the food was luxury compared to the traditional fare of fighting men. The training and the life were hard; it could not be otherwise. But the alleviations were supplied on a scale never before dreamed of. The standards that were set at home resulted in perfectly natural disappointment at the diminished service possible under overseas conditions. Our men deserved it all; they would have had more if the nation had known how to give more.

CHAPTER VI

MORALS AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY

The discussion of the previous chapter has studiously avoided one set of problems upon which the American is habitually reticent. But no serious analysis of the social phenomena of the war can omit elements which, however they might be avoided in speech, were the cause of grave anxiety in many minds and received specific and emphatic attention from those who were responsible not only for the winning of the war but for the future of the nation. It is necessary to look closer, with no less sympathy, but with a more impersonal eye, at certain moral issues that have generally appeared as an accompaniment of war and have forced themselves on the military and naval authorities because of their effect upon fighting efficiency.

These moral issues are significant for our present purpose, because they introduced a definite factor into welfare work both in the home camps and overseas. In approaching the moral problems of the fighting man, the welfare worker must get and keep a clear perception of relative values and of the real purpose of his presence among the men. He is not the keeper of the soldier's conscience; and one indispensable qualification for all manner of comradely helpfulness is the ability to avoid taking either the other fellow's faults or one's own virtues too seriously. Unless he recognizes that his function is not criticism but comradeship—that he is not there to judge the fighting man, but to serve him—the welfare worker is out of place. Nevertheless, in view of the positive attack of the anti-moral forces, the welfare worker must range himself with those who aim to reenforce the soldier's inherent powers of defense.

Three age-old passions of mankind have appeared with white-hot intensity in the fighting forces of the nations down through history—^{The Traditional Situation} gambling, alcoholic intoxication, and sex license. The complex social causes that have kept these passions aflame are even yet only half understood by the sages and rulers of civilization, but the leading reasons for their undue prevalence in wartime are not far to seek. First and foremost, these diverse practices offer, each in its own way, emotional relief from excessive and long endured nervous tension in highly alluring form. It is useless to hold up in horror the hands of

complacent piety. To understand this question in the smallest degree, one must keep tight hold of this solid fact. Bereavement, loss of fortune, prolonged personal irritation, monotonous daily work, accusing conscience—all these have “driven men to drink.” When we say that a discouraged man has gone to the dogs, we mean that he has sought relief from his anguish in “cards, wine, and women.” The life of a fighting man is abnormal in every respect. Always it is a life of repression, repression absolutely necessary for the end to be obtained, but monotonous and wearing just the same. Throughout all the period of training and transport, drilling, marching, or just endless waiting—it is a grind. On active service under modern conditions, week follows week of ghastly horror—mud and vermin all around, and noisy death screeching overhead; hard marching and heavy fighting; shrapnel and high explosive and gas: when a man gets free to seek relief from the nightmare of these experiences, he looks for something vivid enough really to offset the extraordinary horrors of which he has been a victim. A glass of lemonade may be quite adequate after a “good, stiff set of tennis,” but he who has looked death in the eye calls for spirits—neat!

Physical
Relaxation

These practices, however, do not satisfy in the sense that food satisfies hunger; they stimulate the passion to a still greater craving. Whatever leads men first to seek such ambiguous surcease, the tendency grows to indulge increasingly; and the period of strain is balefully illuminated by the promise, not of abstract relief, but of concrete indulgence to come. Personal habit and the custom of the group under such conditions still further reenforce the essential allurements. And because of all this, catering to these passions becomes a highly profitable commercial enterprise—insuring a vigorous campaign of promotion on the part of that strange minority in every community who will do anything that pays. Further, there is a justifiable feeling that the fighting man, who does just about the dirtiest job that a nation asks of any citizen, deserves to have what he wants; and since it has been so generally assumed that these relaxations are what he must have, many citizens, led by a passionate patriotism into paths very strange to their feet, tacitly acquiesce in opening the town wide for the soldiers.

One may feel the very keenest sympathy for the desire of the war-ridden soldier for spicy relaxation, for strong draughts to take the taste of the trenches out of his mouth, without a commitment to the indolent theory that these excesses are natural, instinctive, and

inevitable. When we realize that these are the only diversions at all adequate to the occasion that have in the past been offered to fighting men, that they have been promoted by every art known to the commercial purveyor of amusement, that unreflecting sentimentality has enhanced their allurements immeasurably, and that civilized communities have again and again tacitly justified the practices—when we realize all this, we may perhaps be ready to object to the terms “natural” and “instinctive” as not quite a fair statement of the case and to feel that a higher kind of sympathy might be invoked to lead us to a more rational understanding of the possibilities of service.

It may be that ancient commanders periodically gave their countenance to all forms of dissipation on the ground that otherwise their men went hopelessly stale. Certainly they used with great effect the promise of free loot and rape as a stimulus in the last hard grind of many a campaign. But even in more barbarous times, it was discovered that these practices cut both ways; the allurements of relaxation proved so effective that it was frequently impossible to bring armies again to fighting pitch. For a very long period it has been recognized that gambling, intoxication, and sex license furnish relief from strain at much too high a price. They are recognized today as positive enemies of military efficiency. Gambling unfailingly tends to draw attention from the business at hand, breeds hard feeling in a heterogeneous group, and opens up a rich opportunity for the tricksters who are to be found in every group of men. Alcoholic intoxication, besides its unquestioned effect on personal physical and nervous efficiency, creates a whole series of disturbances that embroil the fighters with civilian populations and generally relax that military control so essential to the consummation of extensive plans. Sex license, from the strictly military point of view, is regarded as a menace primarily because of the spreading of two disabling and highly infectious diseases. In the World War, these practices became more serious because of the nature of the conflict. Men had to be prepared to endure the long-continued strain. Dissipated individuals may give an excellent account of themselves in one brilliant dash; the trouble is that, in modern warfare, there seems to be no way of securing a knockout in one round.

The Military
Dilemma

It is quite natural that punishment should have been the first remedy applied. Military and naval officers shared the prevalent human attitude toward this particular panacea. When our ignorance of the causes of some complex social situation finally drives us to ex-

asperation, we turn to some form of violence as the way out of our troubles. It is applied to maladies of all kinds with pathetic credulity; we have the same faith in it as the country wife has in her bottle of mysterious Indian weed extract that she has purchased from the smooth-tongued faker at the fair. But the change of attitude has come. The American Army and the American Navy in their determined use of constructive means supplemented by proper measures of repression courageously broke away from tradition and sought to deal with causes rather than symptoms. The social intelligence displayed by our leaders in the war might well be copied in civilian life.

Difficulties of this kind are not "solved" as a mathematical problem is solved. We can only hope in each period of effort to gain a little ground and perhaps indicate the general direction for a fresh advance. To the authorities these particular perplexities will always present a very difficult problem involving the maintenance of the very nicest balance between constructive measures and repressive punishment.

Individual
Character

There is, of course, only one sure protection against the temptation to dissipate personal powers in the pursuit of pleasures both physically and morally dangerous: that is, a power of resistance within the man himself that is proof against every allurements. Donald Hankey suggested some of the sources of such strength—devotion to the cause, religion, the love of a woman, loyalty to a personal leader. When it is remembered that real religion inevitably involves devotion to a cause, it is plain that he is pointing out that the most effective moral impulse is derived from a spirit of true loyalty, loyalty to a noble enterprise or to a noble person. A clear realization on the part of every fighting man that he was serving America just as effectively in keeping his powers at their best as in charging an enemy's machine gun nest would put an end to most dissipation. Most of us, of course, are not powerfully appealed to by abstract ideals and our loyalty is caught and held most effectively by a personal affection in which for us the cause is embodied. Men actually fight for their homes—parents, wife, or children—or for the leader in whom they have confidence. Through such they rise to a conception of the national cause.

The difficulty is that these standards do not obtain in our civil life. The duty of the soldier is immediate and very plain, but the duty of the citizen is no less imperative. Surely our obligation to live for our country is quite as certain as our obligation to die for our

country. But we do not realize this in our everyday life, we do not act as if the personal efficiency of every citizen was a matter of supreme importance to society; therefore, we are expecting a great deal of the fighting man if we imagine that it is up to him when he dons a uniform suddenly to rise to the loftiest moral heights. No matter how noble be the aim of the national cause in war, the fighting man's job is, to all except the combative and adventurous few, a mean and distasteful duty to be got out of the way as quickly as possible. It is a mere silly, sentimental dream to expect that such an experience is to transform him into a saint.

The point is that while it is clear that a certain kind of character is the surest protection against temptations to dissipation, such character, especially amid the conditions of war, cannot be created by a wave of the hand. It is attained under the most favorable conditions, by those who are not born saints, only by a long process of training and living experience under social influences bent to such achievement.

Possibly the most repulsive occurrence in the civilized community in war time is the gathering of the blood-suckers. Profiteers buzz around the honey-pot in countless numbers. The general conditions that will obtain are known beforehand; there is an unspoken agreement that the time has come to "clean up"; and while the master minds direct their attention to the larger possibilities of the national treasury, the humbler pilferers see their opportunity in the concentrations of the fighting men.

The purveyors of questionable recreations know their business perfectly. They are much more alive to the effects of fatigue and monotony than are the well-intentioned citizens at home; they know exactly why their wares are likely to prove acceptable, and until very recent years they have been sure of freedom from competition. The enterprise is highly profitable because the demand requires only a very little cultivation and each addict, ten to one, becomes a steady customer. In the early years of the war, these professionals ran riot. On the Mexican Border in 1916, they prepared most promptly for the American troops; where the facilities of prostitution were inadequate, new arrangements were made with a promptness that compared very favorably with the German automatic mobilization. Saloons were run in open defiance of army regulations. In this particular case, the profiteers "got away with murder"; the location of the camps made them feel absolutely secure against competition, so they offered wares

Community
Conditions
in Time
of War

that probably achieved the lowest point of shoddiness in the history of American graft. European countries had their usual troubles. The activities in the communities, except here and there, were such as set themselves against the maintenance of military control and personal efficiency. What the military and naval authorities set up was torn down in periods of leave. In Great Britain, the seriousness of the situation called forth the most earnest protests. There is enough law almost everywhere to curb this kind of profiteering, but it takes an extraordinary amount of nerve to enforce it.

The British
Situation

But the profiteers are only a part of the problem of the civilian community in war time. Particularly as regards sex license, the difficulty lies much deeper. It remains still very much of a puzzle both to the military and naval authorities who try to keep fighting spirit up to the top and to thoughtful civilians who look forward with apprehension to the close of the war period. Let us for the moment consider some of the elements in the British situation, not with any purpose of singling it out for criticism, but because the mental tension there was so much more acute than in America's briefer period of participation.

If we endeavor sympathetically to recreate the situation, we may be able to appreciate in some small measure what it meant for a peace-loving nation with a small army to wake up suddenly in the midst of the death-grapple of Europe. What appeared at first as an expedition in aid of hard-pressed France and outraged Belgium, soon showed as a fight for life. Military events on the continent were discouraging in the extreme. The submarine developed an unexpected efficiency and the shadow of food control fell over the land. The raiders and the airships struck straight at England, violating the impregnable security of centuries. Recruiting by the volunteer method filled the country with the sound of passionate appeal and covered every vacant space with startling posters. Further, Great Britain as well as America was unprepared both mentally and physically for any kind of a war, and thus thrice unprepared for the surprising horrors of the World War. The whole nation stood on the brink of the precipice. Americans always to a large extent regarded their part in the war as participation in a crusade; the British were fighting for their homes.

Circumstances such as these are bound to cause a reversal of values. It is not very illuminating to use such terms as "moral breakdown" and "spiritual decline." Depending largely on the degree to which each one is directly affected by the new conditions, men and

women tacitly accept new standards for the ordering not alone of their conduct but frequently of their very thoughts. The very acceptance of the necessity for wholesale slaughter itself was to most people a complete overturning of the scale. Though others were not ready to acquiesce in a formal abandonment of cherished principles, very few of us escaped the influence of the changed conditions. We did adopt a kind of "ethics of the interim" to serve till the war was over.

The effect on the civilian—noticeable even in America in 1917^{The Materials for Social Explosion} but particularly marked in Great Britain—was to stir up, for the moment at least, an ardent patriotic spirit that dictated a complete sacrifice to the needs of the national cause and a feeling of the deepest reverence for the country's defenders now wearing the uniform of the service. This feeling for those who were facing horror and death was in striking contrast to the ordinary indifference toward the masses of young men in workaday clothes who in times of peace stream backwards and forwards in their discharge of the commonplace tasks of civilized society. How this intense patriotism affected those groups of young women who were placed in more or less unprotected positions, it is not hard to imagine. Girls in domestic or government service, the new army of factory workers, farm workers, women occupying men's positions in the service corporations, even in some cases wives of men at the front—these were all subject to the spirit of the day under conditions new in their experience. It was an adventurous time; every one of them was living on the edge of a most exciting present in a world where thrills were the order of the day. Who knew what would happen on the morrow?

Set over against these groups of women the soldiers and sailors on leave and the large numbers of men concentrated in the industrial plants. They were most of them young, still in the period when physical passion is most easily aroused, and represented under the volunteer system perhaps the most adventurous section of the nation's youth. They were out for quick relaxation; their minds "were fatigued with obligation"; they were off on a moral holiday.¹ Most of them were probably lonely, torn by that demon of isolation that is at its worst in a crowd. Unquestionably they were sick of unrelieved male companionship; day in, day out, they were surrounded by nothing but men, men, men. They were not looking for picture galleries or

¹ *Morale and Its Enemies*, William Ernest Hocking, New Haven, 1918, p. 180.

animals in the zoo, the thought of a classical concert was not thrilling; though agencies of wholesome recreation had been established, they were feeling their way and there was no tradition behind them. Bring men and women together under such circumstances and the result is a social explosion.

Complex
Causes

In a speech in the House of Lords on April 11, 1918, Lord Derby drew attention to the fact that the result of an investigation of one group of venereal cases showed that four-fifths of the men had contracted disease from women outside the class of professional prostitutes. The percentage varied in different places but the total showed conclusively that the professionals were in a minority throughout the land. The wide-spread observance of a temporary pseudo-marriage arrangement indicated very clearly the extraordinary character of the conditions. It is plain to anyone not blinded by intolerance that the situation was one of infinite complexity, demanding something quite different from general condemnation or indiscriminate punishment—a new inquiry into the very nature of our modern society. In this complex of causes leading men and women into extraordinary sex license, to the desire for physical gratification must be added at least the appeal of patriotic sentimentalism, the desire for feminine society, the poignant pain of loneliness, the reversal of ethical standards, and the effect of alcoholic intoxication; and back of it all is the subtle but pervasive pressure of a long tradition that associates the leave period with a “bust.”

American military and social experts studied the difficulties in England with eager and sympathetic intentness, because they realized clearly that America would probably be called upon in its turn to face exactly the same kind of a problem.

The Failure
of the
Civil Community

Civil communities are at a very great disadvantage in dealing with these war conditions because peace-time policies are as a rule hesitating and inconsistent. It is very simple for the critic to talk about “cleaning up”; it is very difficult to accomplish. The persistent reticence on all questions of sex relationship in civilized society positively prevents any wide understanding of these same vital questions. Opposition to the vigorous prosecution of moral measures and to the strict enforcement of laws develops all along the line; it enlists individuals of all groups, from the respectable citizen who believes that repression shows a lack of confidence in the fighting man’s ability to take care of himself to the corrupt official who makes a handsome profit out of the professional side of the trade. Political difficulties

crop up everywhere in the most unexpected quarters. Possibly the most serious obstacle of all is the danger that every reformer runs of being regarded as a busybody reveling in uncleanness, as a fair game for the ridicule of cheap journalistic wits, and even as an enemy of society to be ostracized fully and completely. It is possible only in exceptional cases to rally even moderate public support that will outlast the first lap.

It is very late to begin the campaign in the community after the drums are rolling. There are a million other things to be done and time is short for reshaping public opinion in the very presence of an aggravated situation. The disposition to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the fighting man in his periods of leave is a very proper feeling but it causes some very unfortunate delays. Early failure to secure cooperation between the military and the civil authorities is an inevitable result of general unpreparedness; this alone repeatedly blocked progress in the World War as it has blocked progress before.

As the British people and the British authorities came to realize vividly the extent and character of their problem, united action brought about very large reforms; and the splendid examples of certain communities served as worthy models throughout the nation.

When America entered the war, her leaders had before them not only the lessons of previous history but the experience of all the nations from 1914 to 1917. Statistics of venereal disease were available, including reports purporting to cover accurately the German and Austrian armies.¹ The extent of the disablement due to this cause was, of course, no surprise; but the magnitude of the figures was on the same scale as everything else in the conflict, and the totals were truly startling. One estimate² put the figures for German forces in Belgium alone up to February, 1915, at 30,000 cases. Other authorities dealt with the Allied forces, and in certain units it was reported that the number of men with disease reached as high as fifteen per cent. The correctness of these figures cannot be guaranteed, but this is not an essential point. The general result of the various investigations made it very plain that any fighting force that wished to avoid this heavy casualty would have to take energetic measures.

With the
German and
Austrian Forces

¹ Consult *The General Staff and Its Problems*, Erich von Ludendorff, 2 vols., London, 1920. Vol. I, pp. 131-221.

² *Prevention and Treatment of Venereal Diseases in Time of War*, F. Balzer, in *Social Hygiene*, Vol. IV, pp. 256-258, New York, 1918.

It is no part of this present task to institute comparisons; but the plain facts regarding the attitude of American leaders must be set down clearly, for certain elements in this attitude were unique.

First of all, it appears from the records that our leaders took high ground from the beginning. They did not make any arbitrary division between morals and military efficiency, disclaiming all responsibility for the first and dealing ostensibly only with the second, nor, on the other hand, did they assume that the war problem alone was their concern. At every point the question of dissipation was treated as one of vital importance to national life. It was early assumed, too, that any measure of success would be achieved only through the closest cooperation of the civil and military authorities.

President Wilson's own words are very definite:

"The Federal Government has pledged its word that as far as care and vigilance can accomplish the result, the men committed to its charge will be returned to the homes and communities that so generously gave them with no scars except those won in honorable conflict. The career to which we are calling our young men in defense of democracy must be made an asset to them, not only in strengthened bodies as a result of physical training, not only in minds deepened and enriched by participation in a great heroic enterprise, but in the enhanced spiritual values which come from a full life lived well and wholesomely."

General Pershing in a letter to Lord Milner in May, 1918, speaks in very broad terms of sex license as a

"... menace to the young manhood in the army forces and to the health and future well being of our peoples." He further states in the same letter: "The gravest responsibility rests on those to whom the parents of our soldiers have entrusted their sons for the battle, and we fail if we neglect any effort to safeguard them in every way."

The Secretary of War in power at the time was a man who had had experience in social betterment and in civic administration. He was thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of these difficult moral issues and knew exactly the obstacles to be surmounted in dealing with them. Mr. Baker was not using the language of unthinking enthusiasm when he said, in a private conversation,

"I pledge my word to the mothers of America that their sons shall not be subject to undue temptation either in America or in Europe."¹

¹ Consult *Morals and Morale*, Luther H. Gulick. Introduction by Raymond B. Fosdick, New York, 1919, p. 11.

Such men were certainly not blind to the military efficiency side of the question; that was the leading thought in their waking hours through all the anxious months from April, 1917, to November, 1918. But their statements show that they were thinking of that as a part of something larger—the human efficiency of American citizens and the purity of American life. They plainly regarded all forms of dissipation as unworthy of America and they based their appeal on that high ground. Unless we are much mistaken, this constitutes an advance upon all previous action in war.

The courageous repression undertaken by the American authorities must be judged against the background of the constructive action that they carried on, approved, and stimulated. The
Constructive
Measures

When American troops were mobilized on the Mexican Border, the War Department was faced with a concrete situation. When a deputation representing the American Social Hygiene Association, the New York Bureau of Social Hygiene, and the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations waited upon the Secretary of War they found him working on constructive measures and eager for all the support and help the civilian agencies were willing to give. He selected Raymond B. Fosdick as investigator and advisor and sent him immediately to the Mexican Border. On the basis of Mr. Fosdick's report, Mr. Baker sent recommendations to all commanders with reference to dealing with prostitution. Where these recommendations were acted upon, excellent results followed; traditional views blocked their complete acceptance. In addition to the general welfare activities, the Y M C A was requested to conduct an educational program in the camps. Lecturers toured the military area; 260,000 copies of an approved pamphlet, "Friend or Enemy," by Dr. Max J. Exner, were distributed; and selected books were placed in the Association building libraries. The Y M C A also conducted an investigation several months later, the results of which were published by the American Social Hygiene Association under the title "Prostitution in its Relation to the Army on the Mexican Border." All this work was under the direction of Dr. Max J. Exner of the International Committee.

The constructive activities of the Association were highly approved by the Secretary of War in a letter of August 18, 1916, by Major-General Tasker H. Bliss in a letter of August 21, 1916, and by Major-General Hugh L. Scott in a letter of August 17, 1918. These approvals emphasized the value of the program of activities.

When America joined the world struggle, the constructive program was greatly extended. The Commissions on Training Camp Activities, representing the War and Navy Departments, were appointed in May, 1917, with Raymond B. Fosdick as their chairman and with representatives of various welfare agencies constituting a majority of their members. The important features of the program carried out under the authority of these Commissions may be noted.

Constructive
Measures

1. The regular welfare program of all agencies was recognized as an essential part of an effective campaign against dissipation. Recreation, education, entertainment and religious work were regarded as valuable in maintaining normality of life and promoting wholesome emotional relaxation.

2. The Y M C A was requested to continue its plan of sex education. Lecturers, films, posters, exhibits, pamphlets, and books—all carefully selected—were the methods used. In November, 1917, the Commission organized its own Social Hygiene Instruction Division on the ground that the demonstration of the effectiveness of educational work was conclusive and that attendance on lectures should be made compulsory. Further, the presence of many agencies endeavoring to press into the camps with social hygiene literature appeared to demand coordinating authority. The Y M C A lecturers and literature were officially approved and the Association was requested to continue its work in cooperation with the Social Hygiene Instruction Division. The Association leaders remained in constant touch with military and naval authorities in devising means to meet the situation.

3. On May 26, 1917, Mr. Baker wrote a letter, as Secretary of War and also as chairman of the Council of National Defense, to the governors of all the States in the Union and to all chairmen of State Councils of Defense, asking the cooperation of the civil authorities. The response was encouraging. Later through the War Camp Community Service and other agencies great progress was made not only in cleaning up local communities but in providing recreational and social facilities in all the cities. A definite attempt, which succeeded to a large extent, was made to create a new and wholesome public opinion.

Overseas the same general program was carried out as far as conditions would permit. Special features were added such as the leave areas, and women secretaries were recruited to bring a wholesome home touch into the lives of men far away from home. Recreation and amusement were developed to the limit of the facilities at the

definite request of the military and naval authorities. General Pershing worked for international cooperation in community measures. In the letter to Lord Milner, previously quoted, he pled for a recognition of the international character of the moral obligation and urged that proper measures be taken in cooperation. Bishop Brent, Senior Chaplain of the A E F, also used his full influence in the same direction.

This sketch is far from complete but it is possibly detailed enough to indicate that the American Government placed no absolute reliance upon punishment or repression but committed itself positively to constructive measures developed on a scale transcending all precedent and that the leaders endeavored to enlist all fighting men in a campaign to maintain the highest standards. Welfare work was regarded as the great constructive ally.

Repressive measures enforced as supplementary to constructive measures take on a new character. When adequate substitutes for low amusement are provided there is no ground for just resentment if the low amusements are suppressed with an iron hand. Measures
of Repression
and Prophylaxis

An earnest attempt to make virtue more attractive than vice characterized the efforts of the welfare and community agencies and the success was striking enough to justify a very large extension of such an attempt in the future. Those who smile indulgently upon such simple optimism will do well to remember that the Government, the communities, and the welfare agencies made their gains against a firmly established tradition shared by many within and without the national services. The drawing power of keen competitive sport as against gambling was tested and gained enough adherents to give new heart to everyone. Good entertainments proved effective substitutes for intoxication in carrying a man outside himself and in dissipating loneliness and mental dreariness. First-rate social centers, dominated by the influence of good women, opposed the brothel and loose companionship, and did not have to give ground. The total effect of the constructive appeal unquestionably reenforced character resistance in thousands of men and made them immune to disintegrating influence. Complete success is seldom attained in human affairs, and was not to be expected in the first round against a veteran enemy; but the road to victory is now well marked and wide open.

With courage equal to their vision the leaders of America faced the negative part of their task. The Secretary of War with the assistance of Mr. Fosdick, framed those sections of the Army Bill, approved

by President Wilson on May 18, 1917, which made it unlawful to sell liquor to any man in uniform and which conferred in broad terms upon the Secretary of War the power to suppress prostitution. The letter to governors that has been mentioned called for aid especially in the cleaning up process. Of course, gambling is prohibited by a regulation of the service, which can hardly ever be literally enforced but which may be invoked when necessary. These prohibitions regarding liquor and prostitution were by no means easy to enforce. They were justified both on the grounds of military efficiency and preservation of American ideals. They did not stamp out drunkenness or sex license but they very greatly reduced the prevalence of both because it was no longer possible publicly to promote these forms of dissipation. The pessimistic theory that fighting men will seek out drink and women under any circumstances is entirely belied by investigation and experience. Not only do a large proportion of the red blooded among them respond to the more wholesome recreation but many men whose general tendency is to follow the crowd will make no effort to seek dissipation that is not thrust up in their faces. Dr. Exner's study of the Mexican Border showed in a form far more startling than we would expect from such a limited survey that sharp repression, which does not abolish prostitution but shuts it out from publicity, very greatly decreases this type of dissipation.¹

Overseas our men were not in American communities. Repressive measures were not enforced so vigorously either in France or in Great Britain. The selling of liquor to men in uniform was, of course, permitted. It was not quite possible to make over the principles of these countries as an enthusiastic American uplifter might have desired, but the American military commanders appealed very strongly for united effort. In France the "red light districts" were declared out of bounds for American soldiers and the entrances guarded by military police. Our men were forbidden to buy or accept as a gift anything but "light wines and beer." Great Britain's tardiness in enforcing repressive measures caused great difficulty for American officers in certain parts of the country, while in others the fine spirit of the people and their open-handed hospitality made the experience of our men a wholesome memory which can never be erased.

In meeting the actual disease condition, prophylactic measures were used throughout the American Army and Navy. Men who had

¹ Consult *Morals and Morale*, Luther H. Gulick. Introduction by Raymond B. Fosdick, New York, 1919, p. 34.

exposed themselves to contagion were required to present themselves for treatment within three hours. Punishment for those who failed to observe this precaution was made very severe. From the medical point of view, this treatment proved highly successful. For example, the venereal rate for the American troops in France early in the year 1918 is given as follows: January 17th, .0033 per cent; January 24th, .0037 per cent; January 31st, .0030 per cent; February 7th, .0029 per cent; February 14th, .0027 per cent."¹ This meant that the ineffectives ran less than one out of three hundred men. It is believed that this was the lowest rate ever achieved by any Army. It is lower than that of the civilian population in America. Much has been written about the moral aspect of the prophylaxis. It has been suggested that the comparative immunity from contagion serves to anesthetize the conscience and that the practice in the end will increase sexual immorality in civil life. Opposing comment on this point of view insists that it is not right, apart from military considerations, to withhold from individuals and from society the cure that science has to offer, the protection that should be afforded even in the case of those who are committing a wrong. Still another point of view welcomes the prophylactic treatment as a final blow to that moral teaching which bases its effect on the appeal to fear. It is regarded as a gain that henceforth such teaching will be compelled to dwell on the deeper social consequences in its educational work and appeal for abstinence on the high grounds of social and spiritual efficiency.

The low venereal rate is not necessarily a proof of increased morality. In the first place the original medical inspection weeded out the very large proportion of infected men who presented themselves for service. Then, the prophylactic measures were rigorously enforced. Still, the very low rate coupled with the close observation of many different investigators makes it possible to believe that the American Army and Navy as a whole set a new standard in warfare. General Pershing again and again in public address as well as conversation has expressed his conviction that he sent home the cleanest army in all the history of warfare.

A full discussion of the questions touched upon here may be found in Luther H. Gulick's "Morals and Morale." The present pur-

¹ Consult *Morals and Morale*, Luther H. Gulick. Introduction by Raymond B. Fosdick, New York, 1919, p. 34.

² Dr. M. J. Exner's statements were published in *Social Hygiene*. Note particularly "Prostitution in Its Relation to the Army on the Mexican Border," April, 1917; and "Social Hygiene and the War," April, 1919.

pose has been merely to indicate the character of the problem and the attitude of the American Army and Navy.¹

An endeavor has been made to show that under war conditions, so acute in the modern situation, unless adequate measures are taken, what one observer has called a "sex festival" will be the inevitable result. Denunciation and indiscriminate slashing punishment is no remedy for a complicated social disturbance; sympathy, understanding, and courage must unite in the protection of the highest ideals. It is absolutely necessary that civilians brought up in the dense ignorance arising out of undue reticence should see the whole bearing of the problem. Conditions in war-time are abnormal; they must be reckoned with as such.

Promotion of
Social Morality

Further, the attempt has been made to show how American leaders approached the total difficulty of dissipation. They appealed to the men on the highest grounds, they laid a wholly new stress upon the constructive features of their program; then they applied the strictest repressive measures. There is a distinction between measures in the interests of morality and measures purely directed by the desire to secure military efficiency. America did not observe the distinction. It was assumed that the highest morality is the highest military efficiency and that the duty of the war services no less than the duty of the home government is to promote social morality to the limit of the powers vested in the authorities. The measures undertaken were designed not only for the purpose of beating Germany but also for the purpose of strengthening American citizenship.

Though the setbacks were many, Mr. Fosdick is quite right in saying that a notable success was achieved, and was achieved because

"America has been far-sighted enough, idealistic enough, to undertake to fight an unseen enemy, and win, in the face of tremendous odds, a victory over it as notable, in proportion, as the victory forced from the Central Powers."²

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix X, pp. 573-575, General Orders, No. 135, War Department, Washington, December 23, 1919. Section II—Sex Morality; and consult also Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1920, p. 59, which gives list of organizations and civilians called into the conference of which this order was the result.

² *Morals and Morale*, Luther H. Gulick. Introduction by Raymond B. Fosdick, New York, 1919, p. viii.

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST WINTER IN FRANCE

The transfer of troops from training at home to active service abroad inaugurated the second great change in the experience of the soldier, involving a contrast almost as marked as that between civilian life and the training camp. The change from training to active service is a sharp break under any circumstances; in the case of the Americans, the total environment—military, physical, and social—was completely transformed by the shifting of the scene of operations to a strange land.

Such a change resulted in the appearance of needs unknown before and the problem of meeting those needs was cast in novel forms. The vast everyday resources of America in goods, in transport, in ready helpers, ceased to be available, while the Army, stripping for action, looked to its auxiliaries to act temporarily in fields where they were not ordinarily expected to function. The program of the A E F was subject to the modifications of the stupendous game in which it played its part and for the time being individual initiative and adaptability became relatively more important than the orderly development of organization. For the welfare agencies themselves, the most striking difference was the tightening of military control. It was no longer possible to travel about freely, to pick up material in the most favorable market and to choose the most expeditious route for forwarding. Buying and selling, shipping and railroads, automobiles and trucks, the actual movement of an individual from one place to another—everything was under strict control. Within the range of active operations there was a new world.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

To every American the declaration of war meant that Americans would join the fighting forces in France. Imaginations, uncurbed by even elementary acquaintance with the complicated technique of modern war, pictured our soldiers in the trenches in a few weeks. Responsible directors of the new national enterprise, guided by the experience of the Allies and warned by the terrible casualties inflicted on insufficiently trained troops by the thoroughly prepared

The First
Outlook

enemy, realized that, with utmost speed, months must elapse before an effective fighting force could be sent overseas. Six months' training was considered the minimum sufficient. But before the training could begin, the necessary laws had to be passed, and arrangements made for assimilating volunteers, for registering and selecting draft men, for housing and equipping them, and for training the officers who were to command them. All these, going on simultaneously, were pressed forward with greater speed than was anticipated, but it was August, 1917, before the first members of the new army were mobilized in cantonments. Allowing six months for training, it appeared that not until February of the next year would they be able to start overseas.¹

The Program
for 1919

Meanwhile there were the Regular Army and the National Guard, amounting to 200,000 men. From their commissioned lists only could come the officers who were competent to conduct training operations. These forces too were relied on for guard duty, during the first few months, on the Mexican Border and at numerous points in the United States, and for the nucleus of administrative personnel in the cantonments, until the new recruits had begun to be soldiers. It appeared that relatively small contingents could be sent in the late fall of 1917, that the new army would begin moving toward France in the spring of 1918, be in full flood during the remainder of the year, and, completing their training in France, be ready for effective action in the early summer of 1919, or if possible, by the "first fighting weather" of that year. In April, 1917, this looked like an ambitious program,² and was accepted in Allied circles as the maximum of achievement.³

¹ The War With Germany; A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, Chapters I, II.

² For official statements of the successive programs of the War Department, consult Report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., to the Secretary of War, 1919, pp. 8-11. In the spring of 1917, "in a general way it was contemplated that the capacity of the sixteen National Army Cantonments and the sixteen National Guard camps would enable approximately 1,000,000 men to be in France by the end of the year 1918," p. 8. The 30 Division program of October 7, 1917 "provided for the placing in France by December 31, 1918, of 1,372,399 troops. . . . This was the official approved military program on March 4, 1918," p. 9. "After a study of the entire situation, I came to the conclusion that the war might be brought to an end in 1919, provided we were able to land in France by June 30 of that year eighty American divisions of a strength of 3,360,000 men. On July 18, 1918, I submitted to you a formal memorandum. . . . This was approved by you and by the President of the United States and adopted as our formal military program"; p. 10. "Up to the signing of the Armistice troops were being transported to France in accordance with the program of July 18," p. 11. Consult also Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1919.

³ The First World War, 1914-1918, Lieut.-Col. C. à Court Repington, Boston, 2 vols, 1920. Vol. I, p. 514.

The unpredictable character of war asserted itself by dictating far-reaching modifications of these plans. During the spring of 1917, the uncertainty of the Russian situation threw doubt upon the Allied plan for a general offensive on all fronts. Hindenburg's famous strategic retreat greatly disturbed the calculations for operations on the Western Front. The reaction from hope of an early ending of the war to acceptance of indefinite postponement was discouraging to all, and gave opportunity for renewed activity of defeatist elements, especially in France. Propaganda spread rumors that America's effort would be confined to money and supplies; that she did not intend, and in any event would not be able, to land effective forces in France in time to be of use. Allied Commissions visiting the United States agreed in emphasizing the need of an immediate demonstration of American resolve to participate fully; it would counteract the disappointment over Russia, and restore shaken confidence in the possibility of victory.

The United States Government agreed with their view and determined to send troops at once to give tangible evidence of America's full purpose. The 1st Division was brought up from the Mexican Border with the greatest secrecy and hurried over in the latter part of June. After the parade of a considerable detachment in Paris on July 4th, the division settled down in the Gondrecourt area for intensive combat training. Engineers and pioneer infantry came to push forward dock, warehouse, and railroad construction for the great services of supply that must be set up preliminary to the arrival of any large numbers of fighting men. In September a group of officers graduated from the first officers' training camps arrived overseas.

Meanwhile, the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces reached France late in June. He found that the inconclusive results of the Allied offensive, with the heavy losses incurred, and the rapidly declining hopes of Russia, had produced a situation that called for speedier action by America.¹ A demonstration of sincerity was not enough. Reenforcements of man power were needed. On July

¹ "Discouragement existed not only among the civil population, but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that, although their superiority on the Western Front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be undertaken. . . . Allied resources in man power at home were low and there was little possibility of increasing their armed strength. . . . A review of conditions made it apparent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible." Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 8.

6th, General Pershing cabled: "Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."¹ Within the same month the War Department framed a plan to send 21 divisions of a strength of 20,000 men each, together with some 200,000 auxiliary troops, or a total of 650,000 men, by June 15, 1918.² Beginning in October, the 2d, 26th, 41st and 42d Divisions were transported, bringing the total of Americans in France to about 125,000 men by the end of the year.

In the fall, the outlook grew darker. The disaster at Caporetto in October and the complete disappearance, with the revolution of November, of Russia as an Allied factor made it clear that the Central Powers would be free to concentrate their forces on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, for the greatest offensive of the war. General Pershing, fully recognizing the danger, cabled on December 2d³ and again on December 20th⁴ urging speed. The War Department's schedule, only about half what he had recommended in July, was not being maintained; but a force even larger than he had recommended was absolutely essential to safety. By March 15th, or about the time when it was originally supposed transport could really begin in earnest, the American forces in France numbered about 250,000.⁵

THE ROAD TO FRANCE

The first phase of the modified experience was that of transport—a striking and decisive introduction to a new experience. The very beginning of the movement marked its extraordinary character and the effect upon the men was instantaneous. Entrainment usually took place at night; transfers to embarkation camps and embarkation itself were conducted throughout with the utmost secrecy: everything proclaimed that the soldiers were entering the zone of uncertainty. They were not in the confidence of the War Department. Having learned already more things than civilian imaginations had ever dreamed of, they tended to over-estimate their technical proficiency as

¹ Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 8.

² The same, p. 23.

³ "The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four army corps of twenty-four divisions, in addition to troops for service of the rear. . . . Generals Robertson, Foch and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum to be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of, and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it." The same, p. 23.

⁴ The same, p. 24.

⁵ See Plate II facing p. 136.

fighters, and, discounting the training still to be undergone, pictured themselves entering the trenches of which they had heard so much. The exultant tightening of nerves was like that of athletes, tired of practice exercises, who hear the referee's whistle at last summon them to the field.

A day or two on a transport dulled this keenness somewhat. The ships, hastily remodelled to accommodate men instead of merchandise, were crowded to the limit. Even the minimum opportunities for relaxation and recreation enjoyed by steerage passengers on commercial liners were largely absent, and acute physical discomfort was the rule. Seasickness, a comic malady to all except the sufferer, did not spare the crusaders of a righteous cause. Few of the men had ever taken an ocean voyage. Each mile traveled accentuated the separation from home and friends. For some people the stretches of open sea hold relief and healing; for most, after the first day of wonder, the sight of an unending sweep of restless waves is unspeakably tiresome. But the soldiers had comparatively little deck freedom: the hold of the ship was their prison. The stern regulations designed to frustrate the submarines not only added greatly to the discomfort, but brought home to the men crowded below decks the danger of the concealed enemy who sank ships without warning. Remembrance of lurid descriptions of submarine exploits did not ease the strain. The ability of the submarines to prevent the transport of an American army to France had been loudly boasted by the Germans. They had staked their hopes of victory upon it. If our men were spared the rigors of prolonged trench warfare, they shared with the soldiers of the British overseas dominions the trials of an ocean trip that tested nerves and endurance no less. All honor to the men of the Allied and American navies who made the voyage so safe!

Methods of relief are too obvious to require discussion. Variations of ship fare, in the form of pickles, lemons, and such simple delicacies, occur to any one who has made the voyage. Something to read and the writing of letters will help pass many otherwise empty hours; movies, lectures, concerts, and minor games will serve the same end. Boxing and wrestling furnish welcome physical exercise; and religious services, conducted by men who really understand, calm and uplift the spirit. The program of welfare work, along these lines, seemed simple until it collided with the limitations of the situation. The specific purpose of getting on every fighting man

Transport
Discomforts

that the ship would hold, limited the space for welfare workers and their supplies. Many east-bound ships carried none and never more than two; not always because they were not available. The same limitation affected the activities of the workers who were admitted, and even the use of equipment provided with or without workers. The narrow head room between decks prevented the use of moving picture machines, except in one or two places on a ship, and only a few men could go to those places. Boxers could not shift their feet without treading on men. Long corridors lined on both sides with berths, occupied by sleepers or victims of seasickness, lack certain advantages for the impressive conduct of religious services. Unless crowding was lessened, welfare service was strictly delimited, and it did not lie in the hands of the welfare organizations to diminish crowding.

At this point there came sharply into the light the contrasts that might, and to some extent must, exist between welfare work in the home camps and that with expeditionary troops. Fluctuating physical conditions could not fail to be reflected in fluctuating service. Permanence of equipment could not be relied upon in any area directly affected by military operations; and the supremacy of military considerations was certain to limit more directly all subordinate operations. In place of all sorts of prompt and efficient auxiliaries like railroads, express companies, and postal service, the Y M C A would have to rely largely on its own labors; instead of plenty of supplies and equipment to be obtained by simple commercial methods, it would face scarcity, to be overcome, if at all, only by keen ingenuity and untiring effort. It was moving out from conditions wholly favorable into a region where difficulties would multiply faster than multiplying needs, yet with more work to be done there would be fewer workers. The expectations aroused by the organization in the home camps could not be even approximately fulfilled when the campaign was carried into the zone of actual war. Neither soldiers nor workers foresaw this. To the former the realization came as a shock of disappointment for which they did not see the necessity; on most of the latter it operated as a stirring challenge.

The Stop-Off
in England

About half of our soldiers traveled to France via England and made a brief stopover in that country. A few stayed there for special training, but most remained only long enough for arrangements to be completed for the last short lap across the Channel. It was their first experience of a foreign country, and not a particularly helpful

preparation for what was to come. The people spoke the same language, with amusing differences of dialect and accent. They were much preoccupied and inclined to shake the head of experience over the youthful enthusiasm of these men who had not yet found out what war really meant. Yet they were truly glad the Americans had come and anxious not only to show it, but to make things as easy as possible for them. British weather can be most inhospitable at times. The Americans were still straining for France, and the delays that arose out of the crossing of lines of communication of two great armies were trying to patience. The Channel voyage has been the subject of much comment by travelers. Its brevity is its greatest merit. To the American it seemed the final unpleasantness in a trying experience. When it ended he was at last in France.

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE A E F

For the most part, the Americans came into France as strangers in a very strange land. This genial country presents a smiling aspect to the tourist. Travelers who visited the war zone even in the later months of the war, comment favorably upon the train service and the general treatment received in the rear areas. But, of course, our men did not see the country in just this manner. France could not be prepared for American soldiers as America was prepared for them. On her soil two great armies had been operating for three years, her resources were depleted, and there was nothing to correspond to the eager and generous millions of home folks. The American Army was engaged in hurriedly building up for itself a wholly new military organization in a distant land whose surplus of supplies was exhausted. Under such circumstances the flavor of new and unaccustomed things was not so piquant. The little box cars marked "Chevaux 8, Hommes 40" did not seem so "quaint" viewed from the crowded interior. A strange language was not so much fun when you wanted something very badly. The lack of the usual and familiar cigaret was not so easily borne as under better conditions. France obviously compared very unfavorably with America.

Withal the men of America were at last within range of the fighting armies; and, after all, the strangest elements in their situation were those which grew out of this condition: the differences of custom and language were superficial, the others were fundamental.

The sea ports chosen for the debarkation of Americans soon became seething centers of American life. The men in the Services

Strangers in a
Strange Land

The Ports

of Supply, engaged in the regular activities of receiving and forwarding men and supplies and in expanding the facilities of the ports, constituted a permanent military population. This was augmented by navy men on shore leave, while all the time the masses of the combat divisions streamed through, staying only long enough to permit of their proper disposal elsewhere. Brest, with the neighboring Camp Pontanezen, at times harbored over 60,000 Americans.

In these ports, for reasons that are easily understood, the fighting men faced many demoralizing influences without the offset of the hospitality and goodwill of American folk. The local control, so effective at home, was not entirely in the hands of the American authorities; and the people of France do not handle their affairs in our manner. Europeans have never ceased to wonder at the way in which America, a democracy bordering on the rabid, accepted with hardly a murmur all manner of drastic regulation designed to prevent any dissipation of national energy. At these points the Y M C A was called upon to make up as far as possible the lack of an American environment—canteens dealing in luxuries with American names, entertainment, and social centers with American women as a primary attraction. The American authorities in these ports faced for the first time a real struggle with forces tending to corrupt the effectiveness of the American fighting man. It was inevitable that this should be so in the hasty adaptation of these French communities to the requirements of the huge troop movement.

The Services of Supply moved up along the lines of communication to establish their various enterprises; here a vast locomotive repair shop, there an airplane production station, yonder a motor truck repair and assembling plant. Large camps for special service training, artillery, captive balloon observation, air fighting, were established. Tents gradually gave way to barracks. There was little of the scientific planning of the cantonments at home. Camp buildings might be strung out for five miles along a strip of mud that passed for a road. The infantry of the combat divisions pushed on to the billeting areas.

Whatever pictures of life in France these men had conjured up, it is safe to say that imagination never approached the reality. Certainly nothing they saw looked like anything they had ever seen before. At every step they advanced deeper into what seemed one vast confusion without semblance of rime or reason. Batches of new officers came streaming in, new to each other, new to the country and

its fickle weather, new to the men and to the responsibilities of their work; casuals, stragglers, men who came too late to find their outfits, rare individuals who came too early, motor cyclists, camions, and wretched groups of newly-hatched second lieutenants thronged the roads, all hunting for something or other. The location of a unit could be indicated only by a vague sweep of the arm over the landscape; the men were planted in the villages over the countryside in a complex arrangement to which only the billeting officer held the doubtful key. Since the soldiers billeted in an area outnumbered the civilian population of the area, perhaps five to one, it was necessary to requisition the accommodations of the live stock, chickens, and pigeons, however reluctant the men might be to disturb those worthy creatures. Anything with a sound roof over it meant luxury. When the villages were overloaded, tents were scattered about the muddy meadows. The weather refused to oblige; the people, though courteous and kindly, were frugal and had long since exhausted their supplies of extra comforts like sweets and tobacco; and the French centers of life and activity were a long way off. The soldier who first indicated to his comrade the location of his billet by the direction, "Two manure piles down the left-hand side," exhausted the joke very quickly. The novelty of being in Europe lost any glamor it might have had, and "Sunny France" became a fighting word. Nothing to do, nothing to buy, nowhere to go! Men wondered how anyone had ever complained of their lot in the camps of America.

The separation from home was complete: people, customs, surroundings, manner of life—it was all different and pretty bad to the eyes of homesick boys. To cap the climax the mails were very irregular, especially in the early days. Cut off
from America

Americans do not possess the faculty of sitting quietly in the rain remarking, in a resigned tone: "Ah, well, such is war." They have been trained neither in the dogged endurance of the Russian peasant nor in the philosophic outlook of the Latin races. They were poignantly and clamorously unhappy—not without good reason. The American soldier, for the time being at least, was not conscious of his higher spiritual requirements; his needs were elementary. They represented nothing essentially unlike his needs in the American camps, but how different were the setting and the intensity now! A rallying point of sociability was in France a relief not only from monotony and the grind of work but from positive discomfort. An American magazine or a newspaper or, perhaps, a book—these were each a

pearl of great price, for which a man might sell all he had. The insatiable appetite of normal healthy men was less satisfied than ever with mere abundance. The boys clamored for "something to take the taste of corn willy out of their mouths." Passing in line before the cook shack to have messkits filled, they desired a place where a fellow "could eat like a gentleman." Such needs stood in the foreground.

For the rest, there could not have been a time anywhere when American soldiers abroad did not miss entertainment and recreation, education and spiritual service, the specific character of the want depending of course on the taste of the individual. In this alien atmosphere they particularly missed activities of all kinds bearing the stamp "Made in America." Alike a familiar brand of chocolate, a favorite cigaret, a baseball, a real American canteen girl, or a Broadway comedian helped to bridge a gap between soldiering and home that had now widened to the farthest horizon.

The change in the general character of the American soldier's life was matched by a radical alteration of his uniform and equipment. This alteration was significant of the new conditions under which he was called upon to make war.

His khaki uniform was replaced by one of wool; and in France he was made to wear his coat at all times, for the weather is treacherous. He had to carry gas-masks—two of them, the little French device and the British box respirator. A steel helmet was provided for him. For ordinary duties the campaign hat—a piece of apparel that had appealed particularly to the French—was replaced by the "overseas cap," an Americanized version of the cocky little trench cap of the French Army.

In his actual training his practice did not vary so much from the American methods of the past. Through instruction and experience in practice sectors, he was made familiar with the general principles of trench warfare. But the elaborate new defensive tactics of the British and French were left out. The American officers in command of the first four training divisions faithfully followed the plan laid down by the American General Staff, which, with certain necessary qualifications, entirely ignored this mode of warfare. They practiced great attacks over wide sectors of territory; they took long marches and engaged in open warfare maneuvers in the rain, sleet, and mud of a hard French winter. This training was continued inexorably, in spite of the drudgery it entailed on the men and notwith-

Training in
France

American
Methods





standing the under-current of sarcastic comment it enlisted from the junior officers. For the younger officers, many of them recently trained in French and British staff schools, believed that their superiors refused to study trench warfare because it was too modern. They waxed more and more impatient with the "Indian fighting tactics" that still prepared for fighting battles out in the open, just as if a war of position had not been fought for four years along the greatest battle front the world had ever seen.

But they were wrong. The aggressive, wide-open tactics of the old-fashioned, hard-headed regular officers may not have been the result of profound judgment; but that they were justified a hundred-fold by subsequent events is today an almost universal conclusion. The effect of this decision on the spirit and fighting ability of the Army is thus described by a contemporary historian of the A E F:

Open Warfare
Tactics

"The confidence and ability it (open warfare tactics) gave to those officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 1st, and of all succeeding divisions, in the use of unfamiliar ground, in fighting in the open, in establishing and maintaining contact, and in ever pushing onward, was what enabled the American divisions, green and unused as they were to the tactics of this war, to fill the breach in defense, and then on July 18th, to take up that most glorious unrelenting offensive which never stopped until the Germans asked for peace."¹

But before that day of justification the whole Allied cause was to tremble in the balance, and the Americans were to see their comrades fighting, in the words of Field Marshal Haig's famous despatch, "with their backs to the wall." For on March 21st, the Germans launched the greatest offensive since the Battle of the Marne, and the darkest days of the war began.

NEW WELFARE TASKS OVERSEAS

The American Y M C A was at work in France in cooperation with the Foyers du Soldat and in the effort for prisoners of war when America entered the war. A temporary organization for service with American troops was ready in Paris before the arrival of General Pershing. Arrangements were made for the reception of the 1st Division at the end of June. Troop movements of this kind were not expected; but after the arrival of the 1st Division it was plain that a permanent overseas organization would have to be developed rap-

¹ History of the A E F, Shipley Thomas, New York, 1920, p. 56.

idly. The American Red Cross came into the field with the Y M C A, and on August 26th, 1917, General Orders, No. 26¹ were issued to define in general terms the distinctive functions of these two societies.

From the previous consideration of the situation of our men in France it is plain that the first urgent need was the development of some form of canteen. The American Army had no organized service to meet this need. The post exchange in America is a co-operative enterprise; and as such, it could not have been operated under conditions of active service in France. General Pershing asked² the Y M C A to undertake the management of canteens for the A E F. This function had never been a part of welfare service and was certainly not contemplated by the Association when plans were made for overseas work. Such canteens as were operated by the welfare organizations in America were for supplementary service in local communities, at transfer points, and at the ports. Welfare workers at home felt that their hands were quite full enough without the distraction of canteen operation. But the need overseas was immediate and imperative; the Association accepted the responsibility and set about the establishment of a large business enterprise, involving an extensive organization beginning at the New York headquarters and extending to the furthest point in Europe. Naturally it was planned to make the canteen the welfare center.

Another acute need developed very early out of the situation in France. The problem of the soldiers' leave was a serious one for the American commander. There was no opportunity for the men to go home, as in the case of the French and British; and a general permission to spend leave periods in the French cities, and especially in Paris, meant almost a complete sacrifice of accountability and control in a strange country. The American Army and the Y M C A co-operated in establishing the American leave areas. The first three of these centers, including the world-famous Spa at Aix-les-Bains, were opened in Savoy on February 16, 1918. They were designed to offer the men on leave a comfortable place in which to live and recreation of such a character as would prove a real relief after the

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix II, p. 499.

² "The Army had to be organized and a general staff had to be built up to handle the multitude of details as to plans of operations, supply and transportation. It was in the midst of these preparations that I called up Mr. Carter and asked the Young Men's Christian Association to take charge of the army canteens to follow our troops; he responded promptly and entered upon the work as a duty." General Pershing's Speech, May 10, 1921. See Appendix XV, pp. 627-629. See also Chapter XXX, The Post Exchange.

strain of active service. The Army arranged to pay the soldier's board; the Y M C A took the responsibility for establishment, management, and the conduct of the recreational program. The management of the leave areas represented another extensive feature of work quite outside any previous conception of a welfare society. It must be remembered that, while the business end of the leave areas was a big job, it was nothing as compared to the development of a wholesome program that would fill every hour and satisfy in a reasonable degree men with no duties of any kind and eager for relaxation fit to counteract the strain of soldiering. Picnics and parcheesi do not quite fill the bill. The value of the women workers was particularly plain at this point. They gave the crowning touch and helped immeasurably in demonstrating that relief from the tension of war may actually be secured apart from practices that are essentially degrading.

These two important activities have been referred to as outside the regular welfare program. Such a statement, of course, implies a standard of work such as that developed in the course of history and exhibited on a large scale in the American camps. The Y M C A, however, was in France not to develop a rigid, prearranged program but to do what was necessary to meet the actual needs of the men in the order of their importance. It is not for a welfare society to insist beforehand on the relative urgency of certain needs or to stand on its own interpretation of its proper activities. At the same time it must be remembered that the assumption of these new responsibilities greatly hindered the development of a program tested by experience and not needed less because other things were needed more.

Customary
Activities

The regular program, though the development of many of its features was necessarily deferred, was not abandoned. The foundations were laid at headquarters in Paris; and, as time went on, stealing their way, as it were, up through the manifold operations of the canteen, the familiar welfare activities gradually established themselves. Athletic supplies came tardily but surely. The rusty basketball rings behind Belleau Wood that greeted the Salvage Corps many weeks after the famous battle were silent witnesses of the games played within range of the German guns. The entertainers traveled up and down and to and fro, and more than one performance was halted during a bombing spell. The lecturers and preachers came and went. The faithful movies clicked merrily as long as the films held together. Workers in Paris were busy with an educational program that later became one of the big features of the A E F.

Local
Arrangements

There were certain fixed points, such as the base ports and the leave areas, where it was possible to establish permanent quarters and build up a substantial organization. For the most part, however, the work was carried on in a situation which was changing almost every day. The scattering of a division through thirty or forty villages made it not a very easy task for those endeavoring to establish canteen service. But the chief difficulty was that the division might only remain in that locality for a week and then be shifted by a long march to another situation quite as difficult. These changes could not be foreseen to any extent because the Army itself was compelled to work from day to day. Yet all the time the Y M C A was working under the pressure of a definite responsibility. It was not free simply to plant a canteen wherever the organization found it convenient to do so, but must bend every energy to place these little "corner-stores" wherever Americans might happen to be. The first estimate—for some sort of an estimate had to be made—suggested 1,500 as the number of canteens necessary to maintain a reasonable service. But the counting of canteens under such circumstances is a poser for even the most skilful statistician. Is a Ford that visits a dozen points in a day one or twelve? May you count a center of activity that opens up just in time to see its customers march away?

Control of
Movements

Still another limitation must be noticed in passing. There was a difference between France and America during the War that was hardly comprehended by those who stayed at home. American welfare workers were not permitted to travel about as their fancy or the needs of their work dictated. For every journey the worker required a movement order issued by the local representative of the Provost Marshal General. If his journey was designed to carry him through the French and British zone of operations a permit had to be secured from the headquarters of each those armies. The methods of securing these movement orders were diplomatically correct: it need hardly be added that they were not available at a moment's notice. The Y M C A could not rush workers and equipment to a point where an urgent need threatened: it was obliged to wait until formal, written permission could be secured.

Communication
with America

The Y M C A shared with the Army and all other organizations the great handicap of operating three thousand miles from the home base. A large proportion of necessary supplies as well as all the workers had to come from America, and the final authority for all important action rested with the headquarters in New York.

No matter how large discretion was allowed to the Y M C A officials in France, the final responsibility could not be shifted from the official headquarters. The problem of communication was much more serious than those unfamiliar with the conditions would expect. The mails and cable messages were subject to censorship, which took time; and these services were heavily burdened during 1917 and 1918. Errors occurred frequently, and receipt of messages in a different order from their dispatch caused delay or misunderstanding. There was no remedy; the only course of action was the use of every precaution to minimize the inherent difficulties of the situation.

The problems of the organization have been sketched. There remains to consider the experience of the workers in the field.

In the period which is under particular consideration in this chapter—June, 1917, to April, 1918—the work kept well ahead of the workers. As fast as men and women arrived from New York, they had to be sent out to the field with no training and only a little hastily bolted and quite undigested advice. There was little in the situation to suggest any previous type of experience. The regular work of a welfare secretary in an American camp did not help much as a preparation for strange activities in a strange country, among people who spoke a language stranger than anything else to the man or woman with a smattering of book French. The canteen for the moment overshadowed everything. It proved a fine foundation for other welfare work, but the foundation had to be laid; and with an insufficiency of workers, there were plenty of Y men and women who did not see much above the cellar level for months. The physical director full of group games found dishwashing his major duty; the earnest religious worker spent his days vice-admiraling a Ford. He—or she, as the case might be—had to discover a place and then open a canteen and then wait for requisitioned supplies, or borrow or beg or buy them. There were regular huts at many points but there were many more places where the first dry corner had to serve. Withal, these improvisers were working most of the time far distant from headquarters and with the line of communication very tenuous indeed. The work was disorganized because the situation itself was one huge disorganization.

The maintenance of proper relationships with the officers was an exceedingly important and yet a very delicate undertaking. Like the marriage contract, the General Orders authorizing Y M C A work left much to the imagination. The officers were mostly new to

The Worker on
Active Service

their own work and hard pressed by their many duties; the adjustments between civilians and the military were many and various and tempers were liable to be short in the face of the deep seriousness of the occasion.

Learning
the Trade

The plain truth is that, just as the new Army was learning its trade, the welfare workers were learning theirs in a school where the teachers are not always patient. For all, the situation was highly abnormal; and—as Kipling's famous headmaster, "Prooshian Bates," has put it—abnormal situations have to be met by abnormal means. Canteening on the run is calculated to develop the latent ingenuity.

THE "SHAKING-DOWN" PERIOD

In spite of all the difficulties, the American Army and the welfare service both began to work very definitely out of the confusion in the first months of 1918. Of course, all such statements are comparative, it is a case of more and less; even the Germans could not eliminate confusion. But the main problems had been sized up and the resources at the disposal of America properly evaluated. Whatever were the deeper thoughts of the American high command, preparations were going forward very definitely in the development of an American Zone of Operations; and it was generally believed that Americans would move in to occupy the Toul Sector just as soon as an adequate force had passed through the training period. The gradual improvement in the situation did not particularly affect the combat troops, however; their intensive training in that severe winter was only less hard to bear than actual combat. Time pressed more than any of the onlookers guessed at the moment.

The Y M C A by March, 1918, had also measured its main difficulties. From headquarters in Paris an organization had been extended up toward the front, down in the leave areas, and over the area of the S O S. Looking forward to a fairly compact American area, the plan of organization appeared to be sufficient. The workers in the field had gained much experience; they had mastered a few of the tricks of the trade, they had acquired at least a rudimentary knowledge of military ways, and they had come to understand pretty clearly the limitations under which they would always have to work. Supplies and reinforcements of personnel had come in from America at a rate that encouraged the Paris headquarters to believe that the most urgent needs would be soon overtaken. The task ahead was certainly clearly defined and it did not appear ex-

travagant to hope that a great measure of success might be expected in the persistent development of the lines laid down. The period of organization had been marked by much delay, which the men came in the end only partly to understand, and there was never a time when there were not many deficiencies—who was free from such in France?—but, on the whole, the Y M C A leaders were not unjustified in feeling that they had the situation in hand.

CHAPTER VIII

BEHIND THE LINES IN 1918

America had responded to a serious crisis in Allied affairs by hastening the despatch of regular and national guard divisions to France in the winter of 1917-1918. In March a new and far more serious crisis developed. The German offensive, foreseen and resolutely met, attained a success beyond all anticipations.¹ Britain and France had no more to give. It was up to America.

General Pershing made a hurried visit to General Foch's Headquarters and placed all our combatant forces in France at his disposal. Then cablegram followed cablegram, through April and May, from the Supreme War Council to the United States Government. The American Secretary of War and General Bliss, American Military Representative with the Council, were in France, and with General Pershing shared in all deliberations. We need not recount in detail the measures recommended. The requests increased from a recommendation that priority of transport be given infantry and machine gunners to requests for first 60,000, then 150,000, then 250,000 a month.² How America responded is well known. Having sent 84,889 men in March, the rate leaped to 118,642 in April, and steadily increased to 306,350 in July.³ Our concern is with the effects of these operations upon American soldiers and upon those who were laboring in their behalf.

THE TROOP MOVEMENT OF 1918


Radical changes in all programs were involved. Training in America had to be curtailed and hence intensified as much as possible. A new problem in troop train service had to be solved; it was neces-

¹ "Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilometers. . . . The offensive made such inroads upon French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the most optimistic had dared to hope." Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 25.

² The same, pp. 25-30. The German Offensives of 1918 and Related Allied Agreements.

³ The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 37. See Plate II.

MEN SAILING EACH MONTH TO FRANCE AND HOME †



sary to keep a steady stream of troops moving toward the sea-coast fast enough to fill every available transport, yet not so fast as to congest the embarkation camps with troops waiting for shipment. The facilities of the embarkation camps and ports had to be greatly enlarged and the organization at these points extended. Then came the critical difficulty of shipping. The British had hunted up a few extra ships in February to supplement the rather meager list of American transports, but now extraordinary measures were necessary. The British settled down to the problem. "The Ministry of Shipping combed the seven seas to find suitable vessels for the American troop service. England brought ships from Africa, from India, and from the Antipodes. By the spring of 1918 the Gallipoli expedition had come to an end, and the withdrawal of the British troops had released numerous transports from the line of communications between England and Macedonia. England seized four Russian vessels and placed them in the transatlantic run. She obtained passenger tonnage from Italy, Japan, and other Allies."¹ In all, Great Britain supplied 188 ships making one or more trips with American soldiers and carrying more than half of our troops overseas. France added a quota from her slender resources. Meanwhile American shipyards made a record of launching a ship a day. American plans were based on shipping complete units. But the principal shortage of the Allies was in combat troops—infantry and machine-gunners; it was necessary to tear divisions apart and ship only these. They were crowded on the transports to the very limit. It is well known how the Leviathan, originally designed to carry 5,000 passengers, crossed the ocean again and again carrying 10,000 soldiers on every trip. "Intensive loading"—a less sinister term than the "fifty-per-cent overload plan"—was practiced scientifically, due care being taken to protect the health and safety of the men to the limit of possibilities under the circumstances. The influenza epidemic of the fall of 1918 greatly increased the hazards of the ocean voyage; but, except for the discontinuance of overloading, the flood of transport kept on. By the Armistice over 2,000,000 Americans were in France.

In the meantime, what of that agency upon which Germany had so confidently counted as a sure protection against the landing of an American Army in France? The submarines did their best; some time in August, 1918, they practically abandoned their efforts

¹ The Road to France, Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilson, New Haven, 1921, p. 328.

against cargo steamers and turned their entire attention to the American convoys. But in this enterprise they met the superb defense of the men of the American and British navies. These vigilant heroes of the sea conducted convoy after convoy in complete safety through the danger zones to the landing piers in France. The keeping of the lives of 2,000,000 Americans was in their hands; they did not fail us.

THE OVERSEAS PROBLEM

It requires no military experience to appreciate what a situation was created in France by this flood of new troops. Within four months a million men were poured into the area of action, and the stream kept flowing at full height. The American Army organization in France faced an almost impossible task. With the Germans springing surprises every day, it was urgent that fighting divisions should be prepared as quickly as possible. Such a task was absorbing enough of itself. But in addition the General Staff faced the huge job of receiving and assimilating the mass of infantrymen—not a balanced force, just men, rifles, machine-guns, and necessary stores and munitions—that landed day by day at the ports. There were never enough trucks and motor-cycles, the forces lacked many things usually regarded as necessary. Everything could not be done at once; necessities had to give way to still greater necessities. The long training period, the regular tour in practice sectors, the gradual and steady growth of the American Army in its own area—all this became a dream of the past. The General Staff at Chaumont became a kind of training-school for officers; important as it was to maintain a continuous personnel at General Headquarters, it was more important still to have trained officers for the new divisions.

In all this period American combat troops were serving under French and British command in units ranging from a complete division to a single regiment. These troops were not veterans in the sense that the seasoned fighters of France and Britain were veterans. Their officers had to learn as they went along. To prepare them for the line, arrange their supplies, move them hither and yon as occasion demanded, provide replacements for their heavy casualties, were only a few of the problems with which the staff had to deal. The men who fought know what they endured and achieved: it is for us simply to remember that miracles of body, mind, and spirit were the commonplace of every day.

For incoming troops the minimum limit of training periods simply disappeared. Before the final act units were entering active combat without even a day in so-called "quiet" sectors. Replacement depots were established through which hundreds of thousands of men were sent to fill gaps in fighting divisions. The newcomers found themselves among comrades with a little more experience which they shared as well as they could. All the time General Pershing kept his inflexible purpose of forming an American Army which should operate as a distinct and unified force. Even while his troops were most scattered, arrangements were going forward for drawing them together and systematizing their military existence as a self-contained and self-maintained force. The postponement of that plan and the resulting confusion might easily have wrecked the whole organization of the American Army and rendered it practically useless for many months. It might have seriously impaired its morale. The final result showed that nothing like this happened. That there would be tremendous waste, that equipment would be imperfect and the supply system only fairly up to demands, that the men would themselves have to overcome difficulties which could have been avoided by more complete training—these occurrences were all foreseen, and the conditions frankly accepted. But even the most optimistic of American officers could hardly have conceived that, by September of this great year, the American Commander would be leading the largest American Army of history against a vital point of the German line with no misgivings as to the ability of that Army to measure up to the test. If we managed to arrive long before anyone expected us, it is rather small business to complain that our wagon squeaked.

THE AMERICAN SERVICES OF SUPPLY

So far this record appears to have assumed that American soldiers are fed by the fowls of the air. When we speak of hurrying more than a quarter of a million men to France in a single month, we are so concerned with the triumphant achievement that brought our combat divisions to the fighting line that we easily forget that a whole cityful of men could not be dropped into France and left to rustle their way along till they found a war. Napoleon spoke about an army moving on its stomach; the American Army in France moved over the bent backs of the Services of Supply. More than a quarter of the personnel of the A E F was required for this service

Ports and
Communication

alone. Behind them were the Navy and transport men, and still further back the organization in America.

The American problem of maintenance and supply was, of course, more difficult than that of France or of Great Britain. Though the British had to convey all supplies across the Channel, an operation involving much rehandling of goods, the actual length of their lines of communication was not much greater than that of the French. The difficulties of maintaining forces on other and more distant fronts were naturally very serious, but those forces were comparatively small. For America the supply problem meant assembling materials from various parts of the United States, transporting them across 3,000 miles of ocean, then forwarding them by train from 400 to 500 miles from the ports to the front in Northeastern France. Certain supplies were purchased abroad, but the greater proportion had to come from America. For the moment we are concerned primarily with the handling of supplies in France.

Duties of
the S O S

The steps by which the quartermaster service reached its final stage of reorganization under the title of Services of Supply, on February 16th, 1918, need not be detailed here. It became one huge industrial organization, known as the S O S, under the authority of a commanding general responsible to the Commander-in-Chief through the Fourth Section of the General Staff. Its duties included construction of roads, railroads, buildings, and docks; transportation of men, supplies, and animals; operation of telephone and telegraph lines; hospitalization of sick and wounded; oversight of leave areas and other welfare projects; embarkation of troops returning to America; and final liquidation of the affairs of the A E F. This is only a part of the detailed list. The S O S territory—the whole of France outside the zone of active military operations—was divided into sections. Headquarters stood at Tours. Around each port, finally nine in all, was a base section. In central France was a large area designated as the Intermediate Section. The zone of active military operations was called the Advance Section. The District of Paris constituted a separate administrative area. The base sections fed the Intermediate Section, which was the center of distribution; and the delivery of men and supplies to the Advance Section completed the responsibility of the S O S.

Naturally ports not in use for other purposes were chosen. It was necessary to avoid interference with the heavily burdened lines of communication of the French and British. The ports of Brest,

St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux handled the greater part of the American traffic. Le Havre was used chiefly for the discharge of troops and supplies transported via England. In addition, in France, La Pallice and Marseilles supplemented the others. There was also one port in Italy and later Rotterdam and Antwerp were used. Most of the troops passed through Brest while the freight was diverted to the other ports.

The important base ports were connected with the American front, near Toul, by lines of double-track railroads, which had not become congested by Allied military uses. The American engineers laid switches and side-tracks aggregating 1,000 miles of standard-gauge road. Besides repairing the French equipment, which had deteriorated seriously in the War, it was necessary to import 1,791 locomotives and 26,994 cars from America. These systems were supplemented by light railroads.

The aim of this organization was to keep three months' stock of supplies on hand in France, three months' stock in transit and two or three months' stock ready in America.

The huge activities at the base ports defy brief description. It ^{Base Ports} is possible only to suggest the scale of these operations. At Brest, for example, was constructed a modern military city. Over 900 buildings were erected, an electric lighting system and a water system were installed, thirteen miles of macadam and corduroy roads, and 53 miles of boardwalk were laid down. Camp Pontanezen, in this vicinity, had a local population of 15,000 and an average transient population of 45,000. In Brest itself there were as a rule about 17,000 Americans. The port facilities at all points were improved and enlarged. At St. Nazaire, by the time of the Armistice, 26 ships could be accommodated at once. Fifteen miles from Bordeaux was a great storage depot, Camp St. Sulpice, designed to contain 30 days' supplies for 1,000,000 men; there were 108 warehouses, having 2,500,000 square feet of storage space, 110 miles of railroad, a complete refrigerating plant with a storage capacity of 4,000 tons of meat, all managed by a permanent staff of nearly 12,000 officers and men. The base ports aimed to maintain 45 days' supplies on hand.

In the Intermediate Section it was necessary to establish a large number of depots all along the line to keep up the 30 days' supply in this area. The greatest of these depots was at Gièvres. At this point it was, of course, necessary to concentrate supplies balanced

The Intermediate
Section

in the proportion in which they were normally required by troops in the field—material for the quartermaster, engineering, medical, ordnance, chemical warfare, and signal corps services. This enterprise called for 180 warehouses affording a covered storage of 4,500,000 square feet besides 10,000,000 square feet in the open. A cold storage plant capable of producing 500 tons of ice daily and of storing 6,500 tons of meat was placed here. There was kept here ready for shipment 2,000,000 gallons of gasoline. The Ordnance Section loaded in one day 27,000,000 rounds of small ammunition.

One other link in the supply chain was a necessity in France. In the Advance Section it was impossible to keep the usual two weeks' stock on hand when the divisions were in combat. As a rule a combat division was supplied daily. It was highly undesirable for a division that might be called on at any moment for a rapid movement to be hampered with large reserve stocks; also, if kept close to the front, stocks were in constant danger of destruction or capture. Regulating stations therefore were placed far enough from the lines to be fairly safe yet near enough so that the daily supply might be carried up to the front under cover of darkness. The French facilities in this regard were adequate in most places; the American Army had actually to construct only two regulating stations. The business of these stations was to collect stores from the various depots and get them out daily to the railheads where the divisional transport men came for them. It sounds easy enough. Still each division required approximately twenty-five French freight car loads every day, and during the counter-attack south of Soissons in July, 1918, the 1st Division supplies had to be forwarded to seven different railheads in the course of eight days. Besides the supply work, the regulating station was responsible for the movement of troops to the front or to the rear within its area and for the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the front.

The larger American regulating station was at Is-sur-Tille. At the beginning of August, 1918, this station was furnishing supplies to about 375,000 men and 36,000 animals. By the end of the month it was responsible for nearly 800,000 men and more than 120,000 animals. During this month supplies were sent from Is-sur-Tille to 46 railheads beside 62 other shipping points, and in addition equipment to six divisions in training areas, to 36 non-divisional organizations, and one regiment was equipped for service in Italy. The regulating stations were centers of incessant activity.

It was also necessary to establish manufacturing and service plants in France. At Is-sur-Tille was what is reported to have been the largest single bakery in the world. It produced each day 800,000 pounds of bread. There were chains of salvage depots and repair shops. Great disinfectors were operated continuously, and 66 laundries were in working order at the time of the Armistice. At the St. Pierre des Corps depot alone the output between January, 1918, and March, 1919, was valued at over \$33,875,000. The salvage operations of the Quartermaster Corps up to April, 1919, reached a total of over \$111,515,000, the cost of salvage being 11 per cent of the value recovered. Particular branches of the service operated plants for the production and repair of their own materials. The Ordnance Repair Shops at Mehun-sur-Yèvre employed 4,500, the Air Service Production Center at Romorantin was served by a staff of 13,500. Such industrial undertakings would have been striking enough in any community in the United States in peace time.

The construction work of the A E F was almost entirely in the hands of the Engineer Corps. At the Armistice the personnel of this corps numbered 174,000. Counting the other troops, civilians, and prisoners employed in construction, the total number under the supervision of the Engineers was over 257,000. The activities of this service were legion. Figures can tell only a part of the story. The covered storage space they provided would cover 500 acres. If for any reason the 11,862 barracks they erected had been placed end to end they would have stretched 225 miles. Hospital space for 280,000 beds was provided. They operated seven cement mills and 81 lumber mills. Water service, roads, factories, hospitals—it was all one to the Engineers.

THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE

The attempt has been made to sum up the leading external conditions in France under which, in 1918, nearly a million and a half Americans prepared for combat while nearly a half a million wrestled with the stubborn factors of supply. Special stress has been laid upon them because in their totality they appear to be little understood by the American who stayed at home and not fully comprehended by many of those at the front, whose experience, vivid as it was, was usually narrowed to the particular line of their own service.

America takes special pride in the great achievements of 1918. It is necessary to remember that those achievements were purchased

at a very great price in the experience of the men in the A E F and in the experience of the sailors who guarded the ocean ways. Life on a destroyer, torpedo boat, or submarine chaser is no yachting cruise. The crowded transports were of necessity the very epitome of discomfort. There were plenty of sensitive souls to whom the lack of privacy in the American camps was the most exquisite torture. One wonders how such fared under "intensive loading" when men occupied bunks in shifts. The congestion on the ships was followed by dense overcrowding at every point in France. Fortunately, the French winter was over before the peak of the movement; but this meant the elimination of only one unpleasant element. In view of the dangers of air attacks, the method of housing in France could not be radically altered, and the over-crowding increased every difficulty. Traffic congestion everywhere made each journey an almost unbearable experience. Only an officer high in command would have dared to call the A E F a "pell-mell of unregulated humanity"; but under the conditions imposed, the characterization is probably quite accurate if used in a sympathetic spirit. The officers of the force were new. Only a very few men in any social group are born with gifts of true leadership; for the rest of those called upon in emergencies to positions of leadership, much can be done by long training: but this was denied most of these officers of our citizen army. The officers themselves suffered keenly, and the men under their command suffered too. Together they faced the impossible conditions bravely, but they did not escape the pain. The earlier arrivals also knew what lack of certain essentials of equipment meant in daily life. These points are dwelt upon only to recall the fact that every difficulty faced by the American General Staff was reflected in the experience of the individual fighter. When transport fails in time of battle, the general may lose the engagement: the soldier doesn't eat. When the billeting officer miscalculates the loading capacity of a French village, it is the soldier who sleeps with the pigs.

The job of the S O S was a stiff one. It meant excessively hard work continuing without any let-up day in, day out; there was little excitement and no glory. Essential as was every element in the work, there is no doubt that the men in the S O S received less than a due share of credit both from the people at home and from some of the combat troops at the front. The fact that the men who fight the battles on land and on sea are in constant danger, that it is they who face death in the service, inevitably and justly places them first in the

hearts of the people. That they may at times be far better off than their comrades at the rear does not alter the situation. The soldier in the S O S, like the welfare worker, must count on suffering to a certain degree from comparison with his fighting comrades in the Army and Navy; but when all is said and done, his faithfulness and energy play nearly as large a part in winning battles as the dash and nerve of the men at the front. The S O S, upon which all the emergencies of the war cast these colossal and casually imposed burdens, rose to the call of the crisis and performed their new and difficult job in a manner of which America can justly afford to be proud. Their failure would have resulted most disastrously for the men in action. Their success meant to themselves day after day and week after week of the hardest and most monotonous labor.

It is in such periods probably that the soldier, whether in combat or labor unit, faces the most serious moral dangers of military life. These have been depicted so often at first-hand that no attempt need be made to summarize them here. From the hard struggle of winter training in Lorraine down to the miserable situation of a company set to guard German prisoners at work in some out-of-the-way hole, from stevedores racing against time in the holds of ships to foresters cut off from every human contact, the life is all essentially an unfit existence put up with in the face of grim necessity.¹ The men had few new needs; they had the old familiar needs a thousand times intensified. As the tide of official provision ebbed from the maximum of peace to the minimum of active war, the responsibilities of the auxiliary organizations followed, reducing of necessity the service that could be dispensed with in order to meet needs that were vital.

WELFARE PROBLEMS IN THE GREAT CRISIS

The A E F-Y M C A in the first months of 1918 had begun to feel at least a touch of a sense of security. Its affairs were progressing about as well as those of the rest of the A E F. The original Army plans appeared to lend themselves to a straightforward development of the organization, and workers were settling to their jobs. How did the great military transformation affect the requirements and possibilities of welfare work?

¹ Such a book as *Three Soldiers*, John Dos Passos, New York, 1921, while it may present a dismal and one-sided picture of human character, yet in the opinion of many thoughtful soldiers, is not untrue in its presentation of the character of the negative forces actively at work.

The direct impact of the situation was on the canteen. It was as simple as an example in arithmetic. If you multiply the number of men to be served by ten, by how much must you multiply the quantity of supplies they will consume, and the number of workers to serve them? If your unit of men is 25,000, and your unit of supplies is 200 tons, your total comes out in terms of shiploads. And the one thing above all others that the Allies did not have in plenty was ships.

In the summer of 1917 the Y M C A submitted to General Pershing estimates of tonnage needed to bring supplies from America to supplement the insufficient quantities obtainable in France. The estimates were based on minimum individual needs—one half pound of smoking tobacco per month per man and one cup of chocolate per day per man, for example—and included only articles that might be regarded, by the most conservative, as necessities. It worked out at 208 tons, net weight, per month for every 25,000 men.¹ Not because he felt that the estimate was excessive, but because the tonnage could not be spared, the American Commander cut the allowance to 100 tons, gross weight, per month per 25,000 men. But even this could not be allowed after March, 1918. In that month the Y M C A received 64 per cent of its estimate of the soldiers' requirements. The rate fell steadily until in August barely 20 per cent was coming in. Altogether, the Y M C A received about 46,000 tons instead of its estimated requirement of 166,000 tons. About 8,000 tons additional were carried on commercial ships not under Allied shipping control. The Army Supply Service shipped 7,500,000 tons overseas. Of this, all the welfare organizations together received only about 1.5 per cent.² No one was to blame. There was no space to spare. The soldiers were the direct sufferers. They were deprived of comforts which they regarded as their unquestionable right. But they did not say, resignedly, "*C'est la guerre!*"

Trying to get around the barrier it could not remove, the Y M C A undertook the thankless task of running factories in France. It made maximum use of the ship space allowed by importing flour and sugar instead of cookies, fruit pulp and sheet tin instead of canned preserves. Factories do not run themselves even in peace time. Everybody who could work was working in France. To secure and manage an operating force meant diversion of secretaries from direct service to soldiers to management and commercial activities.

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix V, pp. 545-549.

² See Plate VIII facing p. 290.

Supplies have to be distributed to be useful. The transportation systems of France were overloaded before the Americans came, and the American Army as we have seen built up its own system. Who would transport goods for welfare work? The Army could move some, if and when its own requirements would permit. But, as it turned out, the periods when the soldiers most wanted canteen goods were the very periods when the Army could not spare space from munitions and rations. Foreseeing this, the Association undertook to build up a motor transport system of its own. This meant buying trucks, touring cars, and motor cycles, opening garages, and repair shops, providing gasoline, tires, and spare parts. For all these things the Army itself had needs never adequately supplied; their purchase and use were under strict control. The Association bought trucks in England only to have them commandeered on the dock at Le Havre. It bought discarded wrecks, and its mechanics putting together serviceable parts of different cars, made new ones worthy of the motto "E pluribus unum." Somehow cars—but never enough—were secured. Even these were not securely held. The exigencies of the Army had an indisputable claim. Therefore, not infrequently, the Y M C A car was taken over temporarily for emergency service, perhaps of the Quartermaster, perhaps of the Medical Corps. Under such circumstances, the equipment was serving soldiers, but at the sacrifice of the service expected by the soldiers.

Land
Transport

Men were found, too, to drive the cars. But the drain on the working forces, the diversion of secretaries from direct to indirect service, was heartbreaking. Not only chauffeurs and mechanics, but traffic men to handle goods at the docks and trace lost shipments, warehousemen at base and divisional points, accountants, all had to be drawn from the meager staff of secretaries.

Originally, the Y M C A had hoped for one man or woman in France to every 170 soldiers. This estimate of June, 1917, in the face of necessities was reduced in July, 1918, to one to every 217 soldiers. It must be remembered that even in the combat divisions there is, on an average, one officer to twenty-seven men.¹ On March 1, 1918, the force of 1,269 workers represented a proportion about midway between these two estimates.

Personnel

Then the rapid flow of troops began. More soldiers in France meant more secretaries. The home organization successfully acceler-

¹ The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 25.

ated recruiting, but it could not send its forces forward. The difficulties in securing transport were overcome; but passports were not forthcoming from Washington.¹ The Government had its own serious and delicate problems, and the situation was beyond the control of any civilian agency. Thus through the summer of 1918, the Y M C A in France, distracted by problems difficult enough had the supply been adequate, watched the proportion of secretaries to troops fall until, on August 1, instead of its full complement of 7,600 workers there were only 2,600 men and women in its service in France. Even on the reduced estimate, the number should have been over 5,900. With all the new conditions, with all the flood of soldiers into the country, the Y M C A force was only about one-third of what it should have been. It should be remembered, too, that the estimate referred to,² took no account of the operation of the canteen, motor transport, or entertainers.

The reaction of such conditions upon the activities which had developed in the home camps into a standard program, may seem a foregone conclusion. But, although unavoidably reduced, they were far from complete disappearance. Other needs were greater; the need for these did not cease; indeed, some of the most serious needs could be and were met by methods which, theoretically, might seem inapplicable. The activities departments at Paris Headquarters were slow in developing because of the sheer impossibility of holding back workers from the field where they were so needed. Their operation, as departments, was hampered by lack of special supplies and transportation. But the situation in the field made hopeless the systematic carrying out of any standard program. It called for individual alertness and ingenuity in making the most of whatever opportunities might present themselves. A very small proportion of the workers enlisted for overseas were assigned before leaving America to specific tasks. They were plainly told that they would be expected to do whatever might be most useful at any moment or place and they went in that spirit. A very large proportion, however, had abilities or aptitudes for special work—athletic, educational, religious—and as specialists in direct contact with the situation, they saw both the benefit their gifts might yield and the ways, even amid the perplexing circumstances, in which they might function. There were few

¹ See Chapter XXVII.

² See Plate XII facing p. 484.

service points in France in which secretaries, giving the principal part of their time to the canteen, did not promote some or all features of the familiar program. Sporadically, by the seizing of occasions, a considerable volume of work was done in all the standard lines. The experience confirmed the judgment that, for workers with an army in the field, adaptability and initiative are qualifications of primary importance.

What has been said about the problem of supplies applies in essence to the problem of organization. A system that can handle service to 200,000 men needs extraordinary expansion to deal with ten times that number. When a fairly definite and permanent distribution gives place to frequent shifting, and when the size of units to be served is subject to violent fluctuation without warning, radical modification becomes necessary in the system. Organization Problems

The first plan of organization, in which every divisional staff reported direct to Paris, seemed to meet the requirements and to be so set up that the work could be easily expanded to cover the American Front. The first uncertain movements of divisions were part of the surprise of war and simply entailed ordinary watchfulness and extra pressure. When the division went into the trenches in the Toul Sector, the Y M C A advanced with it and opened canteens close to the front and put on its program many weeks before the quartermaster's store appeared. In the early days this was the usual experience with the combat divisions. Of course, it was frequently impossible to clear the way for specialties; and athletic, entertainment, or religious directors had to turn to the humdrum tasks of operating canteens or driving trucks.

The German offensive altered all this. There was a flood of new men in the rear areas and there was no American Front. The American forces were moved about by divisions or smaller units wherever the need occurred, in the most unexpected manner; and while other difficulties were pressing, the Y M C A throughout those anxious months were forced to meet this fluid situation with an organization quite unprepared for operations over the extended area. Radical decentralization was the only cure. During May and June, dealing always with clamoring demands from the field for daily necessities, the executives formulated a thorough reorganization, by which regional headquarters were set up at strategic points. Authority and responsibility were delegated to regional executive staffs, so that a very large proportion of operations could be supervised and cleared

without resort to Paris. The general headquarters was readjusted to deal with the field through these regional staffs. Although regional boundaries had to be altered six times in order to conform to modified troop distribution and Army organization, the regional plan proved to be an advance of permanent value.

A brief study of this organization reveals the extraordinary extension of the scope of welfare work made necessary by accompanying an expeditionary force into the zone of combat. Could a Y M C A secretary, in the year 1910, have had a full chart put before him, he would have rubbed his eyes in amazement at the mere names of bureaus and departments whose relation to Y M C A work as he knew it would hardly be guessable. Movement order, post exchange, traffic, warehouse, motor transport, leave area, lost baggage—these were but a few of those with which nothing in home service, even during the war, corresponded. Yet every activity at home was also present overseas. There was also the duty of caring for the welfare workers themselves. Their reception in France, training, outfitting, housing, care in sickness, even the burial of the dead, and care for their effects were matters for which the organization was responsible and which absorbed the time and strength of many workers. There was responsibility too for a large number of women, far from home under the most abnormal conditions. The scarcity of workers made it imperative to conserve in every possible way the effectiveness of those in service.

The Expansion
of Welfare Work

The welfare organization which offers service to an army undertakes an unlimited contract and assumes responsibilities which can be defined only as the unforeseeable developments of modern warfare unfold. No experience could better illustrate the elasticity of the conception of welfare work than that which has been outlined in the preceding pages. Two distinct types of expansion are indicated, while resources underwent unavoidable restriction. The scope of the program was widened, and its magnitude was multiplied.

Added
Features

Under the conditions that must be expected with any expeditionary force, the Army found itself obliged, in the interest of primary needs, to reduce its provision for secondary needs of the men. The transfer of responsibility for canteen service showed that both Army and Y M C A were willing that the latter should move in to occupy a part of the field temporarily vacated by the former. But new needs appeared which do not exist while the soldier is in his own land. There, when he is granted leave, the Army dismisses him from

attention until he is due to return. It takes no responsibility for his movements or his conduct. Such indifference was impossible in France. While granting the maximum freedom permissible in the circumstances, the Army was obliged to exercise supervision, and to assume responsibility. It looked instinctively to the Association to heighten the attractions of the limited freedom, thus delegating a concentrated responsibility upon the discharge of which hinged the failure or success of the whole leave plan of the A E F. The remittance of funds for soldiers constituted a function ordinarily performed neither by Army nor Y M C A, but by strictly commercial agencies. It was assumed because the commercial methods of France were both strange and expensive, and it not only saved money and trouble to the thrifty but promoted thrift in men who were careless in the matter.

These were additions to service which took no account of the numbers to be served. Simultaneously there was an increase in the size of the forces which, both in extent and suddenness, made pre-arrangement of service impossible. Need for service overseas appeared before any organization for service was created; it grew faster than organization could grow. Instead of orderly expansion, abrupt re-organizations became successively necessary. The correspondence between the Allied Supreme Council and the American Government reveals that the expansion of the A E F was forced by the unexpected successes of the enemy; it was no part of any official plan, and if not foreseen by military observers with the most complete resources of information, it certainly could not be foreseen by civilians. As performed by American energy, it commanded the unstinted praise of her Allies; an achievement not only unprecedented but believed to be impossible.

The same considerations that forced this double expansion, cut down the resources which the Y M C A could assemble in France. There were plenty of men and supplies in America, but they had to travel the same road as the soldiers and their supplies, and the Army had priority. It was absolutely correct that it should be so, but the logic of the situation did not solve the problem for the Y M C A. The detailed story of the efforts made to overcome this handicap will reveal that intelligence and energy representing the best that America affords were concentrated on this phase of the task. The result might have been more satisfactory to the soldiers, but only through interference with interests more vital to the Army and to the nation.

CHAPTER IX

IN COMBAT


An army is measured, of course, by its power in the field; it must pass the acid test of battle. Those who appreciated most the splendid effort of America in enlisting, training, and transporting to France hundreds of thousands of men watched with the keenest anxiety the first active operations of the American infantry. The moral effect of America's whole-hearted commitment to the Allied cause and of the presence of her men in such large numbers behind the fighting line was of incalculable benefit to the Allies; but the enemy, in the early summer of 1918, gave no indication of a tendency to quit in the face of mere display. The great unanswered question was, Will these American troops be of real service in the line? No one doubted the courage of our men. Perhaps, in one sense, the certainty of that courage was the source of the gravest concern; for not infrequently in the war had headlong dash carried detachments to a fatal end and disrupted the order of battle. The demands of modern war are complex. Vigor in attack must be held in leash to exactly defined objectives and supplemented by skill in organizing a new position and firmness in holding it against reckless counter-attacks. On the extensive battle-fields of the World War coordination of a very exacting type was absolutely essential. To what extent the green American combat divisions and their staffs could combine restraint and firmness with daring, no one knew.

The Germans professed to believe that the Americans would not be able to put up much of a fight. They advertised widely small reverses such as the well-planned German raid near Seicheprey, in April, 1918, and possibly thus somewhat shook the faith of the Allied soldiers. Whether or not the German General Staff believed the reports they were circulating there is no means of determining. Still it is quite probable that they did not expect the Americans to conduct any major operations.


The records of history recount that the American divisions first entering battle acquitted themselves with distinction. Later, the American First Army did conduct independently operations of no

German Opinion
of the American
Army

LEGEND



TIME FROM ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS TO ENTERING LINES



inconsiderable magnitude and carried them to successful conclusions. In spite of abbreviation of the training of both men and officers, the American forces met the demands of modern warfare and crowned the total achievement of America by a memorable victory in the field.

THE FIGHTING AMERICANS

The fighting was difficult when the Americans really came to take a hand in it. It was April 25th when the 1st Division relieved two French divisions in a sector before Cantigny, and on May 28th they took the town and held it against desperate counter attacks.¹ This town was in the southerly of the two salients driven into the line by the Germans in 1918. It is stated that the French officers in handing over the position said: "We are not turning over to you a sector, but a good place to make a sector."² These words suggest the conditions of the period of open fighting. Within a few weeks the drive between Soissons and Rheims was on; and as the great battles developed on a scale of ever-increasing severity, more and more Americans came into action. This open warfare—with its marching and counter-marching, its exceedingly difficult supply problem, and its severe field fighting—laid a very heavy burden upon inexperienced troops. Fortunately, by the foresight of the American Commander the Americans had been trained for just such an emergency. They remained cool and alert through all the changing situations of the most critical campaign of all history.

On May 30, 1918, General Foch clearly perceived developments On the Marne for a German attack on the Marne and ordered the 2d and 3d American Divisions to move into the threatened region. The order to the Americans was a surprise. Contrary to general belief in America there was no serious gap in the Allied line at this point. The French at Château-Thierry and on both sides of the town were falling back in order. On May 31st, the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3d Division entered Château-Thierry. Together with a battalion of French Colonial Infantry, the machine gunners conducted the determined defense of the town. By June 3d, the American 3d Division,

¹ "The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new position and counter-attack succeeded counter-attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans give the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved." Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 32.

² The History of the A E F, Shipley Thomas, New York, 1920, p. 70.

which had never been in even a practice sector, had relieved the French and was holding solidly a position in the front line.

Meanwhile, the 2d Division, including the famous Marine Brigade, relieved the French on June 4th to the west of Château-Thierry and opposite the places soon to be famous in American history—Bouresches, Belleau, Torchy, and Bussièrès. The details of the following operations need not concern us. A lenient censor let through the name of the Marines so that 6,000 men received the credit for the accomplishments of 120,000 American infantry and all the French infantry who fought through the long succeeding battle. But the result was there. The Americans were in the forefront in the capture of Bouresches, Belleau Wood, and Vaux just when the Allies, stunned by the German successes, needed to know whether their friends from across the seas were tin-soldiers or not. The Marines justified the publicity, too. For did not the French, as a fitting tribute to two of the finest regiments in the A E F, rechristen Belleau Wood, "Le Bois de la Brigade de Marine"?¹

By the middle of June, the 26th Division had relieved the 2d, and the 42d was behind the French line east of Rheims. Five other divisions were in practice sectors.

The American fighters had proved their mettle. They had kept their heads under punishing artillery fire. Though they were green, indeed, as compared with the veterans around and before them, they had braved the fearful effect of the enemy's machine guns in their successful attacks and like old hands had turned their captured positions into delicately sensitized parts of their own lines in time to hold them against crushing counter attacks. The German superiority in man-power was gone, and the new army was trained in the very style of tactics that the Germans had themselves forced in their great offensives. The Americans were, of course, too eager. The French were horror-stricken at their reckless disregard of life in attacking machine-gun positions. Fortunately, the Germans were also shocked at these practices. The truth is that everyone from the Commander down to the last buck-private was anxious to finish up the War and get home again. In spite of all that the officers could do, this trait led the men into many a useless sacrifice of life, and might have led to serious results if it had been a question of facing a long struggle. But the "Treat 'em rough" spirit kept the fighting morale

¹ Consult The History of the A E F, Shipley Thomas, New York, 1920, p. 84.

of the American Army tuned to its best pitch; and when all is said and done, it suited the last months of conflict with an enemy by no means tender of heart.

From the judgment of Marshal Foch there can be no appeal. When he picked his troops for the historic counter-attack of July 18, 1918, in the Marne salient, he chose the famous French 1st Moroccan Division, which included the Foreign Legion, and the 1st and 2d American Divisions. In this proud position, these divisions struck the first blow in the long series of attacks that ended the career of the German Empire.

These assurances removed all doubt as to capacity of the American fighting divisions, but it is evident that Foch only reluctantly agreed to the organization of an American Army. There was every reason for his reluctance. The French and British staffs were highly experienced and the plan was working well. Why not let well enough alone? But the American Commander had agreed only to postpone not to abandon the plan for an American Army. The American Services of Supply had through these months been preparing the way by taking over the rear area in the Toul Sector. It was fitting that the American forces, having proved their mettle, should fight as soon as possible under American command.

Organizing the
American Army

The point was conceded at a conference at General Foch's Headquarters on September 2d, and an American Army entered the line for the St. Mihiel operation. This was a sort of curtain raiser; it demonstrated the ability of the American Staff, further exhibited the dash and resolution of our men, and raised their morale to the highest pitch. They attained their objective with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for heavy fighting in a new theater of operations.¹ On the second day of the attack reserve divisions and artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne to join the troops concentrating before that front. The disappointment caused by the first phase of that battle was soon swept away by the subsequent success and the Armistice found our men ready to cut the great artery on which the life of the German Army depended. The operations of American divisions with Allied armies at various other points were not discontinued, even during the days when the First and Second Armies were acting as distinct forces.

¹ Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, p. 43.

Led by the heroic 1st and 2d Divisions—fighting units as formidable as any that ever trod a field of battle—twenty-nine American divisions fought in the line, drawing their replacements from twelve reserve divisions, and showed in the end a casualty list of over 50,000 men killed and over 200,000 wounded.

MEN IN ACTION

Frequent reference has been made to the strain and stress of active combat under the conditions of modern war. Many individual soldiers have given us vivid glimpses of the trenches in France, of the sands of the East, or the snows of North Russia. As is always the case with human experience, the "horrors" of war appeared in a different light to different minds.

Individual Reactions

What Sevastopol did to the soul of Tolstoy we know well. No other has pictured upon paper more living scenes. Those in the Crimea knew the terrible suffering; no one better than he. His pain bursts out in such words as these: "It is not the suffering and mutilation and death of man's body that most needs to be diminished, —but it is the mutilation and death of his soul. Not the *Red Cross* is needed but the simple Cross of Christ to destroy falsehood and deception."¹ The calm yet enthusiastic faith of Donald Hankey² is the response of an essentially noble-minded youth who never suffered from the troubled doubts of the great Russian. Alan Seeger, in that motley crowd of campaigners known as the French Foreign Legion, marches joyously to his "Rendezvous with Death," while the careful writer of "Under Fire,"³ with the amazing sense of reality characteristic of his race, tears down with deliberate hand the veil of romance, crumples it, and flings it to the ground beneath his feet. Yet others came through the ordeal as untouched and smiling as Stephen Leacock's hero whose recollections were all of the baseball opportunities in training, then at the front and at the hospital. To analyze and classify all reactions to a shattering experience requires knowledge and insight beyond the range of human power, for on no two men in a million fighters would the effects of combat be the same.⁴

¹ Preface to the English version of Leo Tolstoy's *Sevastopol*, quoted in Leo Tolstoy, Aylmer Maude. Vol. 1, p. 136.

² *A Student in Arms*, Donald Hankey, London, 12th Ed., 1917.

³ Henri Barbusse.

⁴ The tragic romance, *Three Soldiers*, John Dos Passos, New York, 1921, must not be overlooked in this connection.

For our present purpose we are concerned only with those direct physical, mental, and moral effects that are the common experience of many men—those which depend less upon the character of the individual than upon the conditions which inevitably touch all. Even so we can only sketch these elements in their relation to the need for welfare work.

The climax of the whole abnormal human experience in war is ^{In} the battlefield. The strain of training, the fatigue of long marches ^{Combat} and the monotony of long delays, the discomfort of transports, the distasteful drudgery of kitchen police duty, the deadly weariness of the never-ending toil on the lines of communication, the danger of exposure to temptation and exploitation, the maddening irritation of continued subservience—these are all part of a hard abnormal experience. But the real task of the soldier is combat, and in combat in modern war is found a real hideousness that nothing can palliate. Only the stern call of duty can ever drive a high-minded courageous man into this final débâcle. Some sort of case may be made out for the rest of it; plausible arguers may show that general hardship is good for a man: but the business of wounding and being wounded, of killing and being killed, is always a brutal and horrible undertaking. History, which is written when the cries of the wounded and the moans of the dying are no longer in our ears, finds some glory in it; but war itself dispels the mirage. The reticence of those who know the truth is deeply significant. In some respects the actual fighting part of the World War was less horrible than in previous wars. Even allowing for the atrocities practiced by the enemy, on the whole there was less of the old gratuitous cruelty. Modern medical science and hospital organization have made the ghastly experiences of the Crimean sick and wounded things of the past. New instruments of torture were brought out for a trial of human endurance; but the balance sank the other way for all that. The submarine, the airplane, modern artillery, the perfected machine-gun, poison gas—these and other scientific devices helped to create terrible conditions of prolonged strain. It is out of this strain that the most immediate and appealing needs of fighting men arise.

In the actual hours of combat the able soldier is fully engaged ^{Before and} with his particular business of the moment. There is little place for ^{after} the welfare worker; only the wounded are the proper objects of his attention. It was in the periods just before entering action, and in those following that his services were needed.

When the time for an attack was fixed the soldier had much to do. Each infantryman was not, of course, immediately informed of the day and hour by a personal letter from the Commander-in-Chief; but after a day or two, it was never hard to read the signs. Long night marches are not held for their constitutional value. The men knew what was coming. They looked for someone to whom they could entrust what valuables they carried for safe keeping, or for delivery at home if they should not return. Many wanted to send messages which might be their last. Many were glad if the familiar message of religion could be renewed, or some sacrament administered. A cup of hot chocolate, taken perhaps as the men marched by a truck, a few pieces of chocolate and cigarets were welcome. It was good to have the sense of a greeting from home however disguised.

It was after men had been withdrawn for rest and recuperation that the great need of service arose.¹ Not forgetting that moods vary with individual temperaments, the general disposition of men who have passed through a period of fighting and slaughter seems to be a dull, grim apathy and aloofness amounting almost to a dazed condition. It is long past "grousing," there is nothing of irritation left; the man just wants to be let alone. Physical and nervous exhaustion—the product of exertion, strained watching, and the uninterrupted hideous noise—is overlaid by the memory of the scenes of death and the brutal acts of conflict; it sobers even the most callous, it hangs over the sensitive like a terrible nightmare. There are stories of people driven insane by the sight of some single deed of violence; these men have lived for days with violence, they have seen their friends and companions drop at their side. A welfare worker in a prison camp once stepped forward to welcome a small group of Allied officers. They had come direct in the crowded prison-trains from an engagement of superlative horror. Though they showed no physical wounds beyond scratches, not one was able to give his own name. They moved about like men in a dream—that is what they were, men in the grip of a ghastly dream. After an engagement men might be seen sitting listless, dejected, their eyes fixed in morbid

¹"It is observed that the functioning of these (welfare) organizations throughout the entire sector while the Division is in the line has resulted in their inability to furnish adequately supplies and recreation to the personnel of the Division when the Division is in a rest area, and the personnel can best realize and appreciate the efforts of these organizations." Memorandum No. 173. Headquarters First Division, A E F, France, October 25, 1918.

brooding. They needed sleep, but memory would not let them sleep. They needed abundant food and with nourishment for the body they needed also relaxation, inspiration, amusement, fun—anything that would arouse them and restore balance. When words failed, the automatic reflex of catching a ball thrown without warning, or some similar simple device, would serve to break the inhibitions that held them fast.

It was not a question of “nursing” them, for when the stimulus and the method were there, when the opportunity was provided, these men were amply able to take care of themselves. Did they not play basket-ball in the “Bois de la Brigade de Marine”? From either the military or the humanitarian point of view, the most intense need for proper welfare work is just at this time of greatest strain. Did not Ludendorff, the master of efficiency, lay special stress on relaxation at the very moment when his men had their backs to the wall? Of all the appeals made to the welfare organizations by company and regimental officers in behalf of their men, none were more earnest, even poignant, than those which came out of such situations.

The
Culminating
Point

WELFARE WORK IN OPEN WARFARE

There was no phase of welfare work about which both organization and workers had more to learn than this. American Y M C A service for combat divisions was conducted almost entirely under conditions of open warfare; yet it was a new enterprise and the whole experience was completed within five months.

Before the date which marks the high tide of the German offensives of 1918, no large-scale welfare work had ever been attempted by civilian agencies for troops in warfare of movement. On distant fronts where the British Army was operating there had been much fighting in the old style in the earlier months of the war, and the Red Triangle had marched with the troops everywhere; but these operations were on a small scale as compared with the battles in France and Flanders, and the welfare workers carried no such burden of responsibility for results to be achieved as was the case in the West. The British Associations followed up local attacks in France; but these, of course, resulted simply in the establishment of new positions. The methods and equipment of these workers reflected the more favorable conditions of the fixed front. It must not be supposed that even in warfare of position welfare work is easily managed in the front lines or that anything approaching complete service

could be conducted in advanced positions. But, notwithstanding all the difficulties, the British Associations recorded many striking achievements and made great progress in developing a technique. The Canadian Y M C A actually succeeded in establishing a canteen on Vimy Ridge before the position had been consolidated.¹

The first period of open warfare did not materially alter the welfare experience; because between the opening of the German attack in March and the end of the Aisne-Marne battle in the middle of July, the Allies were in retreat. The forces were "backing up" on their bases of supply and on their welfare posts. The heavy losses of equipment suffered by the British Associations in these retirements, however, did teach the welfare agencies something of the hazards involved in field movements.²

When the Allies finally assumed the initiative, welfare work for combat troops passed into a new phase.

Combat
Conditions

The conditions that obtained in the American combat divisions are quite familiar to the fighting man; they are not always clear to the civilian.

The combat divisions were incessantly on the move. Their disposition was based on the needs of a fluid situation: decisions were taken suddenly, the greatest care was exercised to guard information as to destination, and important movements were as far as possible carried out at night. An American division is as large as the population of a small American city.³ It is a big job to move such an organization under any conditions; to move it promptly and in an orderly manner with limited transportation facilities along crowded roads which other troop movements are continually crossing and recrossing is the day's work of a giant. The operation that brought a million and a quarter Americans on the line in the Argonne—involving the gathering of scattered divisions, the turning over of their positions to other troops, the transfer of the forces from St. Mihiel to the new area, and the advance of others from the S O S—illustrates to perfection the exceedingly complex character of the problem. The chart of the journeyings of the 1st Division⁴ indicates just how far

¹ It is evident that the completely militarized Canadian Y M C A organization had a distinct advantage under the conditions of combat.

² Through the American Y M C A, the American people made up these losses to the British Y M C A.

³ At full strength about 28,000 men.

⁴ See Plate IV.



1st DIVISION
TRAVEL DIARY
June 27, 1917-August



KEY

JOURNEY	DATE	DESTINATION	OPERATION	DISTANCE TRAVELED
1	JULY 13, 1917	GONDRECOURT	TRAINING INF	620 KILOS
2	AUG 18, 1917	VALDAHON	TRAINING ART	690
	OCT 19, 1917	ST. NICHOLAS	LUNEVILLE FRANCE INF	70
			ART	180
3	DEC 5, 1917	GONDRECOURT	TRAINING	70
4	JAN 15, 1918	TOUL	TOUL FRONT	40
5	APR 5-7, 1918	CHAUMONT-en-VEXIN	MONTDIDIER FRONT	325
6	APR 16-18, 1918	BRETEUIL	MONTDIDIER FRONT	26
7	JULY 6, 1918	LA NEUVILLE-en-HEZ	REST	35
8	JULY 13, 1918	MOUSSY-le-VIEUX	SOISSONS FRONT	50
9	JULY 17, 1918	CUTRY	SOISSONS FRONT	65
10	JULY 23, 1918	MOUSSY-le-VIEUX	REST	65
11	JULY 29, 1918	TOUL	TOUL FRONT	250
12	AUG 24, 1918	VAUCOULEURS	REST	45
13	SEPT 2, 1918	TOUL	ST MIHIEL PREP	45
14	SEPT 11, 1918	BEAUMONT	ST MIHIEL OFF	20
15	SEPT 21, 1918	BELRAIN	ARGONNE PREP	55
16	SEPT 24, 1918	JOUY-en-ARGONNE	1st ARGONNE OFF	25
17	SEPT 29, 1918	CHEPPY	1st ARGONNE OFF	20
18	OCT 14, 1918	BAR-le-DUC	REST	45
19	OCT 28, 1918	BUZANCY	2nd ARGONNE OFF	85
20-21	NOV 11-DEC 14	MONTABAUER, GERMANY	MARCH into GERMANY	430
22	JULY 20, 1919	NEUWIED, GERMANY	RELIEVING 2nd DIV	30
23-24	AUG 15, 1919	BREST	RETURNING to U.S.A.	1200

..AEF.
GRAM
t 20, 1919

one fighting unit may travel in a comparatively brief period of active service.

On the field of battle, of course, the complexity increases ten-fold. The issues of life and death hang upon the promptness with which orders are executed. There is much less of rule-of-thumb about the whole business than the uninitiated suppose. War is a game of character and dexterity with skilful players behind the scenes endeavoring to checkmate each other. Broadly speaking, the pieces in their game are the combat divisions.

Not only was experience lacking in service to moving troops, but the whole organization was established on a stabilized basis. While no American front sector had been set apart, the whole disposition of the Services of Supply and the location of the American billeting areas had pointed to the so-called Toul Sector as likely to be the scene of principal American operations. When the 1st Division went into the line for practice in this sector, it was not a difficult matter to accompany them. But with the departure of the same division to the Cantigny region, the new problem appeared and never ceased to grow more perplexing until the end.

Organization of
Combat Division
Service

Since the fighting unit was a division, the plain necessity was to create a divisional welfare organization which should not have a geographical determination, as formerly, but should be attached to the combat unit and accompany its movements. Instead of being attached to a building or an area, its job was to keep up with its own outfit—indeed, except in battle, to keep ahead of its outfit. This, it soon appeared, was not entirely simple.

First of all, it was very hard to secure information regarding new moves. There were several reasons for this. There was no regular and recognized manner of conveying this information promptly to the welfare workers. Frequently, the commanding officer had only very short notice. Plans were very often changed. In the busy moments before the departure of a division the officers had their hands full; and, of course, only certain officers were permitted to make communications of this kind. Only by a process of experience could this procedure be worked out, and this took time. The Canadian Y M C A experience in the last advance of the Allies is interesting because of its bearing on this point. This welfare organization was so closely tied up to the military organization that the right of the leader of welfare work in a division to full knowledge of the military program was recognized. Trucks for its use were

set aside by the Army. The actual truck ration was meager, but the Association secretaries were usually able to increase this by a little judicious "wangling." In the drive of August 8, 1918, near Amiens, the Canadian Y M C A was furnished with the program for the day. Their trucks were able to follow on the heels of the advance. In one case, British pickets stopped an advancing train of Y equipment; when the Y workers indicated their destination, the pickets suggested that it might be advisable to wait until the town had been taken from the enemy before establishing a canteen there. The town was taken and the canteen established in due course.

The second fundamental problem of the American divisional welfare units was the maintenance of equipment. The difficulty of keeping an adequate number of trucks and cars in working condition was serious enough of itself. But any or all of such equipment might at any time—and quite properly, too—be requisitioned for military purposes. Such requisitioning helped to win the war: it did not improve welfare service.

The Problem
of Supply

Of course, it was necessary to have some means of supply for the divisional organizations. Divisional warehouses had been established on the same lines as the Services of Supply. Now American welfare units had to be supplied over a very wide area. By the middle of July, 1918, the regional plan of organization was established; on this scheme, a number of regional centers were set up and each divisional unit looked for supplies to the headquarters of the region in which it happened to be at any time.

The amount of supplies was inadequate and there was great difficulty in forwarding these promptly to points where they could be picked up by the divisional units. Information as to movements was even harder to get than in the divisions. All shipments by rail depended upon the allocation of cars by the Army, and of these there was always a limited supply. Without its independent motor transport the Y M C A could have made little headway, but even this useful service could not fill all the needs.¹

The shortage of supplies particularly hampered the regional organizations while the American divisions were moving up and down the front, and this period really lasted till the opening of the Argonne campaign at the end of September. Had it been possible to pile up a surplus at regional headquarters, emergencies could have been met

¹ See Chapter XXIX.

more effectively. An unexpected movement of divisions into any region would not then have been so disconcerting. But supplies had to be dealt out sparingly and in the end every busy region suffered.

The handling of personnel in the combat divisions proved to be a delicate matter. The procedure adopted was cumbersome though correct in principle. It was natural that the American General Staff should be conservative as regards the inclusion of civilian workers in the organization of a combat division. The military task of the divisional commander and his staff is exceedingly complicated, and they must not be burdened with any unnecessary responsibility. In July the procedure was established. Each divisional commander was required to make a request to G H Q for the number of welfare workers desired to be attached to his division. Only so many were permitted by the Provost Marshal General to proceed from Paris to that division. These requests were forgotten in the pressure of business and workers needed on the field were held up in Paris. Further, the system did not at first recognize the need for replacements. As all the new workers were required to report in Paris, the Y M C A was, of course, tied to this rigid procedure. The "pushing" man, the "go-getter," may ignore the regulations once or twice; but this is only a stunt, the regular work must follow the rules of the game. Much patience was required to work out this puzzle of personnel.¹

A brief comparison between the conditions in the home camps or fixed positions in France and those in the fighting zone illuminates the situation which confronted the Y M C A. In the first place, the special building and equipment common in the rear, was lacking at the front. The service point was a cellar beneath the débris of a demolished house, a corner in a courtyard partly protected from shell splinters, or a truck drawn out on the side of the road. The buildings in fixed areas which were erected so promptly and so admirably fulfilled their functions represented the product of long experience. Those who enjoyed the activities in them, and those who conducted the activities did not realize that, if the facilities at their disposal did not equal those of a city club, they nevertheless made possible a definite technique which could be quickly taught; there was little need for improvisation. In the combat areas everything had to be improvised, from an arrangement to heat water to patching together some kind of a roof to keep the rain off supplies.

Mobile and
Stabilized
Service

¹ See Chapter XXVII.

In the second place, the worker at home did not have to worry about supplies; he had no canteen to operate, and if equipment was delayed, he wrote to headquarters or to the express company, complaining of slow service. In the combat area, the main supplies needed were canteen goods and they were consumed at an enormous rate. The secretary who faced unending lines of men calling for cigarets and chewing gum had to find his own supplies. Often the transport service did not know where he was, or could not get to him. He closed his canteen, got the loan of a truck from the Army transport officer, or walked to some point or other where he hoped he might find something. There was no "lights out" bugle call to send everybody to bed. Movements took place at night, and at whatever time he might be forced by sheer fatigue to sleep, someone with a right to service would be disappointed.

The lack of information about movements did not affect the home secretary. Men went and others came; he stayed at his post. It was a vital factor at the front. This was but a part of the military control which was tightened to the last notch. The secretary was subject not only to the general regulations of the A E F, but was under the direct control of the divisional commander. The responsibility of such commanders is very great; no excuse could palliate a failure to be, with effective forces, at the point which the strategist has designated and at the appointed time. Their authority over every detail of the life of their forces and everybody within their area of activity must be supreme. The great military truck trains moved unceasingly back and forth. The Y M C A truck could not dodge in; it must be assigned a place and keep it. The secretary could not go here and there as his business called him; he must get a pass. He could not even serve every uniformed man who applied. He was responsible for service to a particular group and if refusal brought down resentment from the outsider, giving to others what his own men felt belonged to them brought greater resentment from them, not to speak of curtailment of privileges by their officers. The idea that all Americans were brothers in France was a beautiful illusion of the home folks. As against a Frenchman or Britisher they stood together; but no regiment or battalion proposed to share its meager allotment of smokes with another outfit.

Behind these problems of the individual worker at the front were the problems of the organization, and behind them the whole problem of a fighting expeditionary force. All were feeling their way through

a set of totally strange conditions. The progress of time and the recognition that, after all, it was one great problem, gradually smoothed out the most awkward difficulties. But when the Y M C A, with the aid of Army officials, had worked out through experience a technique that seemed fairly adequate, suddenly the need for it vanished.

THE END OF THE FIGHTING

On November 11, 1918, a strange quiet settled over the armed forces of the nations. The victory was won; the fighting was over.

The Effect of
the Armistice

Through months of preparation the American nation and a great American Army had been steadily brought up to fighting pitch. This Army had fought one brief but strenuous campaign. From the time when the first of these men had been working peacefully in office, factory, or school till the day when as veterans they stood facing Sedan, barely eighteen months had elapsed. The moment before the firing ceased they stood there, backed by their comrades in the S O S, as the stern answer of America to the contemptuous challenge of Germany. Before the day was over they were a crowd of American boys, marooned in a strange land, whose diverse wants were all summed up in one single desire—"to get back to God's country." This way of ending a war had in it much that was new. The firing ceased while the greatest armies of history faced each other on the field. The tremendous tension was loosened all at a given hour. Every year tourists spend millions of dollars to visit the places whither the soldiers had journeyed at the expense of their government, but it is safe to assume that the greater part of the A E F had lost the taste for foreign travel. Every phase of the overseas experience, culminating in the ordeal of battle, but intensified the desire to leave. The leaders of the A E F understood well that perhaps the severest test of character was still before our men.

CHAPTER X

AFTER THE ARMISTICE

The Armistice brought the last great transformation of the human situation. Mentally the men turned right about face. They had been looking toward Germany; now they looked toward America. The job they had undertaken was finished. They wanted to go home.

It was disappointing to discover that several things stood in the way of immediate departure. An armistice is not, it gradually appeared, the same thing as a final peace. The victors must stand on guard lest the defeated resume operations. A very considerable body of troops was to occupy strategic sections of German territory, and not far in their rear, reserve force must be ready to support them at a moment's notice. This meant that lines of communication and services of supply must be maintained in good working order. There was duty here for a very large number of men.

The Delays
of Repatriation

Moreover, those who were not needed for this post-combat service could not start for home at once. They were distributed over a large territory in a manner determined by fighting strategy, but not at all adapted to orderly and speedy repatriation. Divisions were split up and scattered, and detachments ranging from squads to battalions were separated from their units on various minor assignments. These had to be drawn together, sorted out, and assembled in more or less homogeneous groups. Service records must be brought up to date and put in orderly form. The personal equipment of the men was in a state of the most varied disrepair and incompleteness. Re-outfitting was a necessity, and, incidentally, the cleansing of men from vermin. Altogether, getting ready to go home was no small or speedy task.

Finally there was the question of transport. By the help of British tonnage, Americans had been carried to Europe at a rate regarded by experienced men as marvelous. For seven months the stream had flowed at freshet height. Even if the same resources were available, the west-bound movement of the A E F could hardly be completed in a shorter period. But now the British ships were withdrawn. They had their own soldiers to bring home from Greece and Egypt and Palestine and half a dozen other fronts. Either substitute tonnage

must be found for the Americans or some men would be obliged to wait a long time for their turns to embark. From whatever angle the facts were approached, their inescapable significance was the same—delay.

MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS

One week after the Armistice the armies of occupation started for Germany. On the left of the American Third Army was the French Fifth Army: on the right the French Tenth Army. They kept close on the heels of the retiring Germans, ready to go into action promptly if need should arise. Ahead of the main body went the engineers, inspecting and repairing roads and bridges and examining wells and streams for poison. On a front sixty miles wide they approached the Rhine, battalions of infantry preceding the main body to maintain order in the interval between the departure of the German troops and the arrival of the occupying force.

This march began through country devastated by war. There were ruins everywhere, but already refugees were returning to their homes and released prisoners were straggling back from Germany. The troops were received with enthusiastic emotion, as victorious liberators. The next stage was Luxemburg. The small body of troops which passed through the city was reviewed by the Grand Duchess and General Pershing from a balcony of the palace. The Army of Luxemburg, in full force of 150 men, was drawn up to receive the Americans. The American commander pronounced the little state free from German domination and announced the terms of the temporary American occupation, and the inhabitants made a rousing demonstration.

After a brief rest, at Thanksgiving time, on the borders of Germany, the frontier was crossed on December 1st, and on the 17th, thirty days after the departure from France, American headquarters were established in Coblenz, Gen. Joseph T. Dickman in command. More than 250,000 Americans were billeted in the Coblenz Bridgehead, a semicircular area of approximately 600 square miles in a radius of about 19 miles, with the Rhine as its base diameter. In the German towns and villages the troops were received with stolid silence, unmarked by either enthusiasm or obvious hostility.

There were other men, besides those who stood guard in Germany, who could not look for a quick return to America. The United States Government had an immense amount of property in France.

The Army
of Occupation

Salvage
Groups

Buildings, railroad and manufacturing equipment, motor trucks, munitions, clothing, food—the value ran into the hundreds of millions. It was scattered wherever American troops had been. Someone must collect it and dispose of it or arrange for its return to America. The job fell to the Salvage Corps of the Services of Supply.

There were casualties, too, men in hospital with wounds or disease. Not all these were in condition to travel, and hospital service must be maintained until the last man was fit for the voyage. Buried where they fell, more than 50,000 American soldiers lay beneath the soil of France. To the Graves Registration Service was assigned the duty of searching them out and removing their bodies to the American Cemetery at Romagne. So long as Americans remained in France or Germany, the Services of Supply must stick to its task.

Four days after the Armistice, General Pershing made recommendations concerning the repatriation of troops and on December 21st the War Department authorized a policy of sending home the American forces as rapidly as possible. Besides the ten divisions in the Army of Occupation, twenty divisions were to remain in the zone of the Armies until April 1st; from then to May 1st, fifteen divisions, and from that date to the signing of the Peace Treaty, ten divisions. All other combat troops were released for immediate return. More ships than had been anticipated were found, and events made possible an acceleration of the movement. By May 19, 1919, all combat divisions, except five in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to proceed to the ports of embarkation.¹ On January 1, 1919, there were more than 1,800,000 men overseas; the number was a little over a million on May 1st and by August 1st it was reduced to 133,000. During May and June all previous records for ocean transport, even those of 1918, were smashed. The bulk of the force of 2,000,000 which had come over in eighteen months was returned in about seven months.²

Sentimental considerations would have given first place on the voyage home to those who had been longest away. Practical considerations forced exactly the opposite procedure. The latest arrivals were in the best condition for return. They were nearest the ports which must be kept clear for the stream to flow unhindered. They were therefore the first to embark. The units scattered in the combat area were moved back to the old billeting areas to wait their turn. Two

¹ Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, pp. 57-59.

² The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 15.

great embarkation centers were established, Le Mans for combat troops and St. Aignan for casuals. Le Mans was selected because of its convenient situation on railroad lines leading to all ports. It had previously been occupied as a replacement depot by one or two divisions. Now accommodations had to be provided for a quarter of a million men instead of 50,000. Here the men were passed through a delousing plant, medically examined, and completely re-outfitted. Their papers were brought up-to-date for the purpose of rating them on a uniform system and making possible a speedy discharge on arrival in America. St. Aignan, providing for a continuous population of about 50,000, had the same general purpose and organization.

At the ports there was comparatively little to be done beyond general renovation. At Brest the housing and living conditions had deteriorated to a state little short of scandalous, and there was a big job of repairs and general improvement to be done. Other ports needed only such changes as would alter them from points of debarkation to points of embarkation. Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal ports for American service, Marseilles and Le Havre being added later in order to utilize Italian and French liners. The largest ships had to be handled at Brest where the least shelter was available.¹

All these arrangements, which obviously included an immense amount of building and other construction work, were made under the handicap of unusually severe winter weather. As completed, they constituted a broad channel through which the stream of men could flow, fed in from innumerable villages and towns scattered over north-eastern France. Nevertheless, the movement could not start at once, and when it started, the various processes to be passed through took time. Seen as a complete achievement, the evacuation of France was marvelously efficient and rapid. Viewed from the standpoint of the individual soldier chafing for return, it was filled with incomprehensible and exasperating delays.

The soldiers and sailors in training in the home camps were discharged and transported to their homes with very little delay. Then the stream began to pour in from overseas. They proceeded from the ports to the debarkation camps where they were reclassified and grouped into contingents to be forwarded to demobilization camps. The plan was to send each man for discharge to the camp nearest his home. Once more the troop trains began speeding through the land,

¹ Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, Washington, 1919, pp. 57-59.

this time west and north and south instead of east, and happy crowds gathered at the station to cheer the men as they passed through or welcome them as they piled out upon the platform. By the fall of 1919, the time when it had been expected the American Army would be a going concern in France, the whole show was over and the boys were at home.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE ARMISTICE

The ways of the diplomats and of the high command are not clearly understood by the man in the ranks. Among them they arranged what we call "the Armistice." The Army was not quite sure what this might mean. The fighting had stopped, but what was to happen next?

When the first few days of uncertainty were followed by the orders which sent ten divisions into Germany and the rest back to billeting areas, the reaction appeared in characteristic American fashion. These men had enlisted to accomplish a definite purpose. Not only had their muscles been hardened by training, but their minds and wills had been wrought to a high pitch of resolve. Their entire forces had been concentrated for a supreme effort, and just at the instant of impact, the resistance vanished. The breath-taking suddenness of surprise at the Armistice was at first disconcerting. They were bursting with energy, physical and moral, and there was nothing left upon which to exert it.

The *raison d'être* of most soldier occupations was gone. Wisely the officers rejected the historic method of occupying their men with intensive drill; it might have been submitted to, but not without resentment. Plainly and flatly, the men had no further interest in military exercises. They were intensely conscious that they were American citizens who had been faithful to their duty as citizens. They had become soldiers in the emergency, but they had no intention whatever of adopting the military career. There is only one excuse that can justify the kind of life they had led—the high national purpose. It was the consciousness of the cause—stimulated, let us remember, by every possible means—that made the grind tolerable. When the end had been achieved, the grind became intolerable—that is all there is to it. Their common sense rejected the futility of teaching and practice that had no significance except in connection with a job they had finished. Now that the affair was over, they wanted to go home, right away, and they saw no reason for delay. Besides, they

were exceedingly uncomfortable. It so happened that the winter weather outdid itself even for northern France. During the continuous succession of cold, rainy days, with mud ankle-deep everywhere, the country appeared to little advantage; it compared more unfavorably than ever with their own land. Their quarters, never luxurious, appeared worse than ever.

Some safe and sane outlet for all this pent-up energy must be found; failing that it would "blow the lid off." All military men know that an idle army is infinitely troublesome and that the physical dangers of the battlefield are replaced by new moral dangers. The moral dangers are not all conventional ones; they include a tendency to all sorts of petty meannesses and to a type of wrangling whose effects are very persistent. Denied freedom to express openly their dissatisfaction with their superiors, men find cause of quarrel with their comrades, or anyone else within range. It was in this period that the Allied forces had time to work up a good deal of dislike for each other. Such a thing may be only a phase, but it may result very seriously. We do not know yet how the bitter feeling of those days may affect future international relationships. The building of a new world demands such an unlimited amount of friendliness and enthusiasm that anything which cools ardor in even a slight degree may cause disproportionate damage.

International
Asperities

The relaxation of effort and the feeling of impatience and uncertainty made the first few weeks very trying both for officers and men. The officers wished no less fervently than the soldiers that a wave of some magic wand would disperse the forces and waft every one to his home. It is little wonder that there occurred a noticeable increase of restlessness and discontent and a good deal of carping, participated in by all ranks, on all subjects that lay to hand. Given the situation, the most casual psychologist could picture the consequences. In fact, if this crowd of hearty young Americans had sat down with folded hands to watch the rain fall, saying, "We are perfectly contented here and will behave nicely; just get us home when it is convenient for the second lieutenants"—then the people at home might well have said, "The doctor ought to see those boys; they must be sick."

Although no one knew when the moment would come, this sudden revulsion of feeling had been foreseen both by the high command and the Y M C A. The leaders of that organization had not forgotten the demobilization period following the Spanish War, and had been preparing for a similar situation. Briefly stated the proposition was to

Response of the
Welfare
Organizations

provide plentiful occupation for body and mind, which should be either immediately congenial or ultimately profitable—if possible, both—and which should offer “something doing every minute.” To this end every activity department had prepared plans and submitted them to the General Staff, and on the very eve of the Armistice the programs of education, entertainment, and athletics had been authorized by General Pershing in General Orders. It only remained to reverse the machinery and direct it to the new task. Where the emphasis had been chiefly on the canteen, activities now were to take first place.

One thing was very clear to all who had the wider outlook—the vital need of welfare work was now to leap to maximum importance. Whatever had been the deprivations of individuals during training and fighting, they had been overshadowed by the constant presence of possibilities and actualities of far deeper significance, and they were endured with moderate “grousing” that concealed essential patience. No one had set a limit to the sacrifices he would make for the national cause. If separation from home and interrupted careers and possible wounds and death could be faced, irritations were not worth serious complaint. Even if irritation became acute there was always the thought of duty, of the necessity of keeping fit, to reenforce self-control. There were few men in the A E F with whom it was not a point of honor to “be in at the death.” The mere realization that a course of action, superficially attractive, might expose a man to the shame of being absent when his comrades came to grips with the enemy, was sufficient restraint.

All that was changed by the Armistice. The one great motive maintaining morale ceased to function. There were other motives, but they could not instantly assert themselves. Careers were to be resumed; the man who would make up lost time must be as fit as the man whose ambition had been to break up a machine gun nest. Friends and families, wives and sweethearts were to be rejoined; the returning hero would not be unclean. Deepest of all, but perhaps as hard to realize by victorious soldiers as by homestaying civilians, the nation that had depended upon them for defense against an alien enemy must still depend upon them for the character and energy required to build up what had been destroyed. For Americans and for America as well as for the world, there were still deeds to be done, difficulties to be overcome, dangers to be repelled, that called for strong bodies, clear heads, clean hearts.

It could not be expected that these motives would instantly leap forward to fill the vacancy that victory had created. When one has climbed a long and difficult hill, the instinct to pause and breathe is legitimate. The first consciousness was that the opportunity to relax had come. Relaxation was needed, but it could go too far and in unsafe directions. Fundamentally the task of the welfare organizations was to provide relaxation that would be genuinely restorative and to cultivate in the men themselves the motives which would impel them to be as good citizens of the new America as they had been soldiers in her defense. This was the objective that determined and inspired the post-Armistice program, and put new vigor into the workers.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE ARMISTICE

Armistice Day found the Y M C A facing the same way as the Army—towards the front. Regional and divisional arrangements had been modified to adapt them to service of moving troops. Service staffs in the S O S had been drawn upon for extra workers with combat divisions, and everyone who had a hand in the forwarding of supplies was concentrating attention on improving ways and means of getting them into the fighting zone.

The Situation of
the Y M C A

While the Supreme Council and the various Allied General Staffs were planning the arrangements for occupation of German territory and for settling the remaining troops in such comfort as was possible pending repatriation or demobilization, there was a brief period of waiting. Service went on as before, but everyone was watching for the first signs of the arrangements of the new régime. Meanwhile such preparations as were possible were made for return to stabilized service.

The first revelation concerned the Army of Occupation. A scouting party of executives got through to Coblenz almost as soon as the earliest representatives of the General Staff, and began to frame plans for an entirely new organization in that area. Secretaries with divisions designated to march to Germany packed up what supplies they could move and marched with their units. At Paris selection of secretaries for the Army of Occupation went forward, but it was several weeks before lines of communication were sufficiently adjusted to military requirements to allow any movement of welfare workers or equipment.

For the troops in France, the various activities departments began to set up the arrangements for carrying forward their programs.

These had only recently been officially approved. Until the Germans actually asked for an armistice there had been no intimation that the programs for the post-Armistice period would be called for until after the spring of 1919. It had been expected that winter would diminish combat activities and leave the men with more idle time on their hands, and some increase of activities had been foreseen and provided for. The need of the moment was for workers and equipment to carry out the plans on a larger scale than had been immediately anticipated.

On the resources of the Y M C A the Armistice had a tremendous effect. The passport barrier was lifted in America and the workers so sorely needed began to pour into France. On November 1st the working force was barely one-third the minimum estimated need. Between that date and April 1, 1919, it increased from 4,281 to 6,357. Supplies also began to move freely. Eastbound ships were no longer overloaded. Very soon it was the problem of space on west-bound ships that was to keep welfare executives from sleeping. Still more welcome was the assistance which the Army was able to give directly.

The first need of the organization was for men to arrange and guide activities. More or less doubtfully those responsible for educational, athletic, and religious work had seen their picked men absorbed by the canteens. If they were to meet their new responsibilities, these workers must be drawn back to their intended duties. The Army made this possible by detailing soldiers to assist in the canteens. The Chief Secretary promptly called the attention of the Commander to the fact that the conditions which had led to the acceptance of responsibility for canteens no longer existed. In fact the Army, so far from lacking officers and men for its primary purposes, now had difficulty in finding occupation to keep all from idleness. His request that the Army should relieve the Y M C A of the canteens was granted; but it was four months before the Quartermaster Corps could complete arrangements for taking them over.

Similarly in the field of the various activities the Army had thousands of men and officers with special experience that could be drawn upon. There were teachers, athletes, musicians, and professional and amateur entertainers galore. In every unit, athletic, entertainment, and educational officers were detailed to cooperate with the corresponding representatives of the welfare organizations, and the program of activities was extended to fill all needs.

As time went on the Army picked up more and more of the load. The educational program, laid out and put into operation by the Y M C A, drew in such large numbers of men, as students, teachers, and administrative officers, that in April it was taken over entirely, and the Y M C A Educational Commission was absorbed bodily into the Army Educational Corps. In athletics cooperation continued to the end, through the A E F championships series to the climax in the Inter-Allied Games in the Pershing Stadium at Paris, where the American Army played host to their allies and the A E F-Y M C A Physical Director was given the honor of acting as Director of the Games.

The entertainers brought from the United States with the assistance in recruiting of the Over There Theater League, were supplemented by thousands of soldier entertainers, whose productions were staged, costumed, and rehearsed in the Y M C A "play-factories." So too between the chaplains and the religious work secretaries there was earnest and effective cooperation, which owed much to the broad vision and energy of Bishop Brent, Senior Chaplain of the A E F, who had gone to France in Y M C A uniform.

Just as the level of official military provision for the men had sunk under the pressure of war, so now it rose instantly when the pressure was released. Nor did it stop at any high-water mark previously registered. The demonstrations of the preceding eighteen months had shown the determination of the American people that the fact that citizens were in the Army should not be a justification for depriving them of civilian privileges but a compelling reason for supplying those privileges at any cost of money or effort. The soldiers themselves showed clearly that while they could get along with minimum service in emergencies, they felt that the maximum possible was their right. There could be no question of the beneficial effects upon discipline and morale, and both the high command and the War and Navy Departments accepted with approval the new standards in this field. Indeed, when demobilization of the World War Army was well toward completion in the fall of 1919, the Government recognized the situation which had developed, by creating special divisions in the Regular Army and Navy to conduct welfare work along the lines established during the War, and officially assumed entire responsibility. The Y M C A turned over all its equipment in America, except that in its permanent buildings, but was requested to continue service for troops still remaining overseas.¹

The War and
Navy Departments
Take Over the
Welfare Work

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix XIII, pp. 601-621.

Special
Problems

The carrying through of the enlarged program involved continued effort at high speed. The increase in workers, teachers, physical directors, entertainers, and especially the large increase in the number of women workers, threw a heavy strain on the organization departments responsible for their care and management. All new workers had still to go to Paris for militarization and assignment. The gathering of the Peace Conference there created a difficult housing problem and the Army authorities pressed the Y M C A to get its personnel out of Paris, without, however, shortening the official processes that were responsible for their presence. Attempts to secure hotels outside Paris failed through refusal by French authorities of permission to use the only place where adequate accommodations could be found, and the congestion remained an unsolved problem until the workers left for America.

Certain special conditions of the troops called for special emphasis and intensity in the work. In Germany, where the Americans were in the midst of a hostile population, very strict regulations were in force. Relations with civilians were formally restricted to matters of necessary business and a special bureau of civilian affairs was established in each unit. The public mind in America exaggerated the dangers from fraternizing. Fraternization, however, is a very broad term, and the rules against the practice could not be enforced in the strictest sense. The fighting was over, the men were well-housed and well-fed, the march into Germany had proved a severe trial to many from which they were glad to be released; so altogether this period of peaceful occupation created a cheerful disposition. It is a matter of history, also, that fighting men cherish few grudges, and there is no tradition of hate in America. It was in a spirit of sheer friendliness that the soldiers played with the children and flirted with the women.

The German
Attitude

The Germans, whose motives are difficult of analysis, unquestionably tried to put the best face on the affair and to act as if they were not in any sense a conquered nation. There was something pathetic about their constant effort to impress their enemies. An American who saw the German forces march out of Coblenz described the scene as one of great enthusiasm.¹ It is not surprising that those who could cheer a beaten army to the echo could also imagine that something might be wheedled out of the invading enemy. However, when the Americans were kept aloof by the continued enforcement

¹ Canteening Overseas, Marian Baldwin, New York, 1920, p. 184.

of the regulations, many Germans dropped their disguise of friendliness. While they realized the danger of open hostility, they sometimes were betrayed into resisting necessary requisitions and into furnishing poor quarters for American officers and men.

There was, of course, another side to this decidedly unpleasant picture. The war was over for the anxious mother, sister, sweetheart, and wife. Preparations for Christmas were in full tide when the Americans arrived. The Americans were just boys. The terms of occupation were very lenient; no one was mistreated or robbed, everyone paid and paid royally. So the harshness was softened and the American soldiers again and again felt the touch of genuine friendliness.

As time went on the American attitude against fraternization became more pronounced. This attitude was quite definite; while the authorities proposed to treat the Germans with absolute justice meted out in the friendliest spirit, they insisted that the civilian population go its own way as much as possible and that the troops and the civilians should be kept apart. As a writer in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, March 19, 1919, wrote,¹ this was quite different from the attitude of the French in Germany and from that of the Germans previously in occupied regions. The Americans were not exultant like the French and appeared to cherish no bitterness against the Germans, but the orders of the day were for them to keep to themselves.

The American
Attitude

This separation of the soldiers from the people among whom they were living made necessary, of course, complete provision within their own circle of occupation for their abundant leisure time. They needed, of course, only opportunity and material to organize affairs of their own; they ran a big horse show at Coblenz, published a paper called the *Amaroc News*, and developed elaborate soldier shows. All the welfare organizations were there eager to help, and the program of education, entertainment, athletics, and religious work was elaborate and intensive.

In France, on the other hand, there appeared danger of undesirable friction, both with French troops and with civilians. To counteract this, special effort was made to acquaint Americans with the beauties of France and the best qualities of French life. Sight-seeing trips to places famous or interesting were organized on a large scale. Inter-Allied athletic contests were promoted everywhere. The in-

¹ Consult *America's Part in the World War*, Richard J. Beamish and Francis A. March, Philadelphia, 1919, pp. 506-508.

creasing number of Americans to be found in Paris and other cities created a demand for hotel accommodations, and the Y M C A found itself in the hotel and restaurant business on a large scale. Many new leave areas were opened and activities in them were multiplied. Americans entered French universities and studios as students. At every point possible, contacts were promoted which would result in mutual liking and appreciation.

Human
Moods

Each step of this huge military and naval enterprise of America seems to have had a human mood to go with it; none was more distinct than that which absorbed the men in an embarkation center. An elaborate treatise might be written on the psychology of Le Mans. The forces were, as has been noted, held in convenient locations behind the lines for the first weeks. When a division received orders to proceed to an embarkation area, they could see already the torch of the Statue of Liberty rising above the horizon. Then they arrived at Le Mans. The accommodations at this point were not palatial—how could they be other than rough?—but even if they had been quite up to standard, nothing could have satisfied those who expected that Le Mans meant only a quick transfer from one train to another. As it happened certain units were compelled to stay a long time in the embarkation area, and it was never possible to tell them just when their turn would come. It was not a happy situation. To serve men in crowds like this is easier than when they are scattered, but it called for a large staff and equipment. It was necessary practically to create a new Y organization at Le Mans, to undertake a piece of work for which there was no exact precedent. At one time 250 Y workers were assigned there. The port work again received special emphasis; and personnel and supplies had to be provided for the returning transports until an order in June, 1919, removed all welfare secretaries from the government transports.

The Y M C A had troubles of its own in carrying out repatriation of its workers. This came later than the Army movement because the peak in volume of welfare service was reached some months after the Armistice. When the time came for closing up, it was arranged that the welfare workers should go home at a rate proportional to that of the military evacuation. It proved very difficult to get all these civilians properly set on the homeward track. Since the welfare insignia guarantees no immunity from the weakness to which man is heir, they too grumbled at the delays. The returning ships were crowded and the Army had first call, so for a while things went hard

for the waiting secretaries. Finally, at General Pershing's urgent request, space was allotted on each transport for some of the returning staff. During June and July, 4,200 workers were brought home and by September there were only 150 left to close up affairs and to care for the Army of Occupation.

As all these different tasks and rearrangements came up, it was seen that important changes in the headquarters organization were needed to meet them. Responsibility for the efficient and economical use of the funds given by the American people was gravely felt. In the spring of 1919 a special commission, headed by George W. Perkins and including men of the largest business and executive experience, visited France and after studying conditions, framed an organization which coordinated all activities and ensured sound procedure.

Although in this rapid survey, attention has been concentrated on Americans in France, it should not be forgotten that the American Y M C A was on duty in many other places. The American share in the Foyers du Soldat had expanded suddenly in the summer of 1917 and continued to grow until long after the Armistice. Several hundred secretaries, women as well as men, were furnished. The suggestion of inter-Allied athletic competitions met enthusiastic response from the French, and American physical directors were in demand as coaches for their various teams. One of the results was the official introduction of athletic games as a feature of French Army life along the lines that became familiar in the A E F. The Foyers, too, were seen to have a peace time value, in industrial centers and in the devastated regions, and American help was given in building up this development of the war. The French Government decided to perpetuate welfare service in its armies and requested the Union Franco-Américaine Y M C A to continue its assistance.

There was no inconsiderable number of Americans in the British Isles, and navy men were constantly ashore there. The service of these men presented its own peculiar problems and was promoted by an enthusiastic staff. Efforts to serve Russian soldiers, rendered impossible after the Allied intervention in Russia, were diverted to the Czechoslovak Legion, whose adventures in Siberia deserve a volume to themselves, and to American and Allied soldiers who penetrated Siberia through Vladivostok. This service continued well into 1920. There were expeditionary forces in the Archangel and Murmansk regions also and the Y M C A was with them. Distance and difficulties of communication hampered this service greatly.

The Wider
Circle

Welfare work started very late in the Italian Army, but during 1918 it had intensive development. During the later fighting the American Y M C A established Case del Soldato at many points close up to the front, and continued its work in various cities until after the Peace Conference had completed its labors. There were American sailors ashore at various points along the Adriatic, and the Y M C A never forgot that the Navy's claims were equal to the Army's, that all were soldiers—on sea as well as on land.

When the Poles and Czechoslovaks who had been with the Allies in France returned to their homes, they asked the Y M C A to accompany them. Here in these re-born nations, there was combat service for many months. More interesting and significant was the constructive work that was going on. Long held under alien domination, the people had much to learn of self-government, and their leaders found the assistance of Americans both inspiring and instructive. The many lessons that had been learned by the Y M C A in the war were profited by in the building of an organization, and repeatedly the promptness, energy, and efficiency of the Americans were commended to the people as models by their leaders.

Some of the service alluded to in the previous section was directed through the A E F-Y M C A organization. The larger part was a direct responsibility of the New York Headquarters. From that point all service lines radiated, and here were gathered the funds and workers for distribution. The day carefully prepared for as the beginning of the United War Work Drive for funds, proved to be the day on which the Armistice went into effect. Enthusiastic celebration seemed to breed an optimism at home equal to the first optimism of the A E F as to the matter of supreme interest—when would the boys get home? One might have been excused for inferring, from things said everywhere, that the returning transports could already be seen from the Battery. Instantaneous and nation-wide publicity was used to drive home the truth that months must elapse before they would all return and in the meantime their need of service would be greater than ever before. The response of the people seemed like a national offering of thanksgiving.

The home organization was also bringing to a close its widespread activities. The very extensive work in the Students' Army Training Corps Camps located in the colleges had been in operation only a few weeks when these camps were disbanded. Large orders for supplies had to be countermanded and the shrinking process so common at this

time had to be lived through after the excitement was all over. There were large preparations to be made for the returning men at the ports and in all the camps. A large number of the workers, too, were anxious to get back to their regular occupations again and adjustments had to be made all along the line.

As the men came back to America, the Y M C A recognized the same general needs as were present from the beginning. There was one other consideration, which had inspired much of the later work in France, to which particular attention was now paid.

These boys had been drawn out of American life and sent to the Army and to the Navy to serve in a great cause. They had been a part of a national unity never before achieved in our history. In spite of those who appear eager to maintain that America went into the war really to save her own hide, this was not the spirit of the people or the fighting men in 1917 and 1918. The appeal was responded to in an unselfish spirit.

In the new seriousness that caught up all thoughtful people in the country during those critical years, the idea arose that some way should be found to suggest to the men who had fought so bravely for America, that our land needed their services in peace quite as much as in war. With the full consent and approval of the authorities, various educational means were adopted in the endeavor to secure the careful attention of the men about to be demobilized to their great opportunity as citizens and the urgent needs of the growing democracy of which they were an important part. Such an effort was in full accordance with the conception of our citizen forces that obtained throughout the high leadership in Army, Navy, and Government; it was a definite appeal, to those who had helped effectively to save democracy, for their continued service in making that democracy wholesome and productive.

A further duty was imposed upon the welfare agencies. The Educational Service records in the selective draft revealed an alarming number of uneducated or undereducated men. It was not possible to educate everyone on the run, but much was done overseas and in America to make up educational deficiencies. Many men realized that a little more training would enable them to take a higher place in the life of their home communities and were eager to follow up what they had begun. Most of these men had given up two years of their lives to military and naval service, so it appeared that society owed them an opportunity to place themselves in better positions. To meet this demand,

the Y M C A and other welfare agencies prepared a large scheme of educational scholarships for returned soldiers. The men availed themselves of this opportunity very widely with the most encouraging results.

Throughout America service on troop trains was continued on the return journeys. As the first contact with the Y for many men was the secretary on the train going to camp, so the last contact for many was the secretary on the final happy journey home. As a crowning service the local Young Men's Christian Associations throughout the country offered a free three months' membership to all returned soldiers and sailors, which was fully appreciated by grateful ex-service men.

THE HURDLE RACE

It seems probable that the studies of future historians will confirm the judgment of the time as to the outstanding element of America's contribution to Allied victory. American pride in the fighting qualities displayed from Cantigny to the Argonne is well founded, but judicious minds will refrain from national comparisons so long as they remember Gallipoli, Monte Grappa, Verdun and Chemin des Dames, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, and Zeebrugge. Weighing the comparative values of total national contributions to the final result is likewise a futile speculation when one remembers that nations poured out blood and treasure until the possibility of their very continuance as nations came into serious question. But the speed of America's development of her fighting power fixed the admiring attention of the world. The words of a British Major General with forty years' service experience seem to express a common agreement: "There is only one word to express what you have done—that word is 'miracle.' When you entered the war, we who know what is involved in making an army knew—it was not opinion but demonstrated fact—that you could not assemble, equip, train, and transport an effective fighting force in less than two years. And now in fifteen months [he was speaking in July, 1918] you have made your army, transported it to France—with our assistance—and it has given an exhibition of fighting ability which commands the respect of every veteran. When the war is ended, we shall have to rewrite our military textbooks on the training of armies in the light of what America has done."¹

¹ Recorded by a Y M C A secretary immediately after a private conversation.

From April 6, 1917, until the final discharge of the main body of her citizen soldiers, America swept on from one high point of emergency to another. Always, until July, 1918, the enemy set the hurdles, and America, letting out notch after notch, cleared every one. Then the Allies swept into the stretch in the lead, and America never lagged, even relieving war-weary France of the burden of the no-longer needed presence of our soldiers at a rate swifter than they had come. Americans have been accused of boasting about their speed; so long as that anxious question, "Can America get here in time?" which was on all Allied lips for a year, is remembered with its answer in deeds, not words, it will be agreed that the boast was not an empty one.

The preceding chapters have had, as their primary purpose, the singling out of the principal crises or emergencies and their determining influence on welfare work with American soldiers. If the analysis has been correct, it is clear that the welfare organizations, and especially the Y M C A which was the only such organization¹ that was on the field from the first day to the last, faced not one problem but a series of rapidly changing problems. These were of two broadly different types. One set was defined by the soldiers' experience as they moved forward by successive steps from civilian life to the fighting front and back to civilian life again. They consisted of diagnosis of the soldier's needs—what forms of service would most benefit him? The second set was defined by national conditions and military orders. What could be accomplished toward the desired ends with the resources available and under the limitations prescribed by each temporary situation? Both sets of problems were imposed by the succeeding events of the war and the same factors acted and interacted in all.

The first task consisted in meeting the needs of civilians suddenly thrown into military communities. It involved the mobilization of men and equipment in the midst of a nation mobilizing to fight. The second was to give service to men hurried to a foreign land several months before they were expected. It involved service in the field simultaneously with the creation of an organization to direct and support service. At this point the program was expanded to include forms of service utterly strange to the Y M C A and ordinarily performed by the Army itself. Then came a tremendous increase in the magnitude of the task—it was multiplied by ten in six months. The increase in military needs of the A E F automatically cut down the

¹ The distinction between welfare and relief is here in mind.

resources available for welfare work. Suddenly the character of the fighting changed from the fixed conditions of trench warfare to warfare of movement. The Americans, instead of spending months in comparatively stable training areas, were thrown into desperate fighting and moved hither and yon without warning. A system of service adapted to the former condition had to be radically modified to fit the new. Finally, with the same suddenness that had marked every change, the Armistice revolutionized the psychological state of the Army, almost overnight. The whole trend and emphasis of welfare work had to be correspondingly changed. Through it all there were the perennial necessities of securing funds and of administering activities by no means limited to the American forces but spread literally all over the world.

Without in any sense minimizing the share of other organizations, it is beyond question that the greatest part of this task rested upon the American Young Men's Christian Associations.¹ Their national organization was selected at the beginning to perform the entire welfare service as the Red Cross was charged with entire responsibility in its field. While other organizations were admitted to the field at later periods, it was the Y M C A alone which was held officially responsible for service at all points by the national and military authorities. A brief study of the organization, with a view to the discovery of those traits and characteristics which fitted it to grapple with problems of the types outlined, will complete our preparation for the detailed story of its multiplied efforts and accomplishments.

¹ "In the field of education, athletics and recreation after the Armistice, the Young Men's Christian Association took the lead, without any sort of question, and as a matter of fact about nine-tenths of the welfare work that was carried on in the A E F was carried on under the direction and guidance of the Young Men's Christian Association."—General Pershing's Speech, May 10, 1921. See Vol. II. Appendix XV, pp. 627-629.

CHAPTER XI

THE TRAINING OF THE Y M C A

The Red Cross grew up as a civilian response to war conditions; it has been shaped as a centralized institution designed for operation in conjunction with governments and with their naval and military establishments. The military contacts of the Young Men's Christian Association—a federation of independent units—were incidental to the development of its central purpose. It is quite proper, therefore, to ask and seek an answer to the question: To what degree was the regular work of the Association a preparation for meeting welfare needs in war?

THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF THE Y M C A

The first Association was founded in London in 1844 by George Williams, a clerk in a drapery house; its original object was "the improvement of the spiritual condition of young men in the drapery and other trades, by the introduction of religious services among them." The idea was that mutual encouragement in personal faith was the surest method of counteracting the increasing moral perils of city life. Visitors from America saw this Association at work in its first quarters, and recognized it as a definite attempt to solve a problem which was perplexing the leaders of Protestant Christianity in America; for here, as well as in Europe, the drift of young men to the cities was increasing steadily. In 1851, two Associations, one in Montreal and the other in Boston, sprang up quite independently of each other.¹ In the next nine years, 240 local Associations were organized in the United States and Canada. These were loosely federated through a Convention which created a Central Committee as its executive agent. These Associations in this period were somewhat informal organizations: they had no salaried officers and held practically no property, and they were not primarily societies of younger men. Their activities were evangelistic and inspirational, practically an extension of church activities.

The London
Association

The
Establishment
in America

¹ A Society of the same type was organized in Cincinnati in 1848 and in 1853 became a Young Men's Christian Association.

THE BUILDING OF THE ASSOCIATION PROGRAM IN AMERICA

The Civil War put an end to most of the large number of young men's societies that had been established in the busy organizing period of the middle of the century; but 60 Associations, in feeble condition, did survive the catastrophe.

The Discovery of
the Association's
Mission

In the new development which followed there were two marked changes in the program: it was broadened to include a variety of activities, and it was directed specifically in the interests of *young* men. The organization began to feel a distinctive mission embodied, for example, in the New York building, which was designed for "the improvement of the spiritual, mental, social, and physical conditions of young men"—the four-fold program. Employed officers of the type of the lay counsellor and administrator were secured. The inevitable result of the development of these various activities was the conception of the all-round man. The triangle emblem, officially adopted in 1891, was intended to embody the true ideal of Christian manhood, symmetrical development of body, mind, and spirit. As frequently pointed out by its originator, Dr. Luther H. Gulick, the emblem emphasizes not separate "faculties" but the unity of powers in mature personality. Through the expansion of this four-fold program the Association found a place among the religious forces of the nation.

The Concrete
Program

The separate activities have all been developed in response to concrete needs. The whole range of physical work—system, equipment, and trained leadership—for a long period represented the only active effort in this field, where the Association has set the standards. Education has been of a supplementary character especially arranged for those who have missed the opportunity of the regular schools. The Association building, with its dormitories, was erected to provide a decent residence and a wholesome social life for the boy alone in the city. The religious program emphasizes the needs of men and boys and the training of lay leadership. There is no need to go through the whole range of activities: they were all designed to make up some clear lack in the life of the young man. This one organization can provide for only a small fraction of all young men, but its work has served as a model in all departments.

There is always a tendency to take for granted such things as the Association program. We shall note later how certain features which are so familiar in this country as to pass unnoticed were nothing short of a revelation to some of the foreign nations.

TAKING MEN WHERE THEY ARE

The Y M C A was city-bred. The commercial groups in the city still furnish the solid support and central constituency of the organization. This is the same source from which has sprung both Protestant evangelicalism and that militant individualism which has played such a large part in the life of English-speaking peoples. But the Association in America has not confined its efforts to these groups; it has branched out in every direction, attracted in every case by the peculiar needs of the group to which it has addressed itself. There is no desire to emphasize social cleavage; but the Association is convinced that its special function is to seek men where they are in their ordinary contacts of life. A Student Association and a Railroad Y may have little external resemblance, yet each is an example of the same desire—to meet the needs of men in their actual situation.

Among students little societies for mutual encouragement grew up spontaneously as early as 1858. In 1877, they joined forces with the Y M C A. Aided by the national agents of the Association, they spread rapidly over the United States and Canada; till now there is a Y in practically every institution of higher learning on the continent. Through American initiative in the main, such societies have been extended over the whole world; and the World's Student Christian Federation, founded in 1895, draws these units together in an international federation including women students as well as men.¹

In the earlier phases of industrial development the railroad employes emerged as a group with a distinct solidarity and a special need at lay-over points not unlike that of the country boy in the city. In 1868, railroad work was inaugurated. These Associations are highly characteristic of the men they serve. Specialized work for industrial workers has been featured since 1900 wherever such men can be reached in their own communities or in the plants themselves. This work, both railroad and industrial, represents a conscious effort of the Association to extend its field of service. The first approach has usually been made through the employers, and they and other generous individuals have usually supplied the funds; but the members themselves are brought into the active management of their own Associations. Without in any sense ignoring the reality of

New Groups
Enlisted

¹ The local Student Associations or Unions are not in every country a part of the Y M C A; and, of course, women students are included either as members of such independent student movements or as members of Student Young Women's Christian Associations.

the conflict between capital and labor, the Y M C A is convinced that its peculiar service requires that as far as possible it avoid all social, political, and industrial entanglements.

In the rural work, begun in 1873, an entirely different type of organization is required in the face of the conditions. This service is organized by counties and includes many more general community features than does city work. The emphasis is not upon buildings and equipment but upon stimulating established community agencies to give special attention to the needs of men and boys.

Special service for immigrant groups and separate Associations for colored men and for North American Indians indicate the Association's recognition of the racial problem. The Y M C A in its general practice aims to be and is a unifying agency; but accepting the situation as it is, it begins its effort where the men are.

Boys' Work

As already noticed, work for men in general was succeeded by a special emphasis on work for young men. About 1870 there began an extension of service for boys. This developed rapidly; and out of experience came a steadily growing sense of its importance. Local Associations have made larger and larger provision for boys' work features in the erection of buildings, and in some cases the boys far outnumber the men in the membership. The whole aim of this branch of work has been to keep the leadership in the hands of the boys and of young men just a little older than the boys. Boys are organized as far as possible in their natural groupings in order that the needs which arise in their lives may be met directly. The Association makes no claim that such a method should exclude all others; it recognizes clearly that there is great value, for example, in such church activities as transcend these groupings; but it is convinced that its distinctive mission is best fulfilled by considering the boy within his ordinary circle. The lower age limit for the Association has been set at twelve years on the ground that younger boys ought to be cared for elsewhere.

A Logical Method

When the principle of Association effort is understood, it is seen that the Y M C A is not the "hit-or-miss" institution that it has appeared to some of its critics. It is bent on achieving certain very definite ends. The leaders of this work have never dreamed that it was sufficient for everything; it is a specialized society aiming to secure specialized results. If it occasionally oversteps its proper limits, that is not so much its fault as it is a result of the general lack of definition within the whole social-religious field.

THE DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

The character of the Y M C A organization in America is unique, and a failure to understand it involves an inevitable misconception of its methods of procedure. As briefly as possible the essential features of its administration will be here explained.

What is referred to in general terms as "the Y M C A" is a Self-Governing Associations cooperative group of autonomous units. Every local Association is an independent entity "answerable" to no one but itself. In most cases it is a corporation. There is no supreme authority in the world that can issue a fiat to a local association. From the very beginning these societies have been self-governing units.

After the Civil War the Association met in Convention for the The International Committee purpose of forwarding common aims. This Convention, made up of representatives of local organizations, took two important steps: first, it fixed the basis of representation in future conventions, thus determining the qualifications of any institution desiring to assume the name; and second, it constituted its Central Committee into an effective executive agent to which certain powers were delegated. This Central Committee, which in 1879 was officially named the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations, is the authoritative agent of the local Associations of the United States and Canada, entrusted with "the supervision and extension" of work. The powers of this Committee are derived from the Convention and may be withdrawn or modified by the Convention. The International Committee—representing only the United States and Canada—is now a corporation under the laws of the State of New York. One of its functions is to issue a call for the assembling of the Convention not less than once every three years. The International Committee, elected by the Convention, employs its administrators and specialists to carry out the mandates of the Convention.

The local Associations have also constituted state committees in the United States and provincial committees in Canada for the purpose of "supervision and extension" in these limited areas. They are not answerable to the International Committee; their separate functions have been determined by definite Convention action. There is now a Canadian National Council for the purpose of acting in strictly local affairs, answerable only to Canadian Associations.

The function of these so-called supervisory agencies is to assist the local associations in an advisory capacity and to carry out such special mandates as are laid upon them. Thus, the Associations can act "as a whole," but there is no small centralized group that can claim "to act for the Y M C A" or to impose its will upon the local organizations. The local Associations realized the need for a central agency if they are to have united action; but in establishing it they did not surrender a particle of their own autonomy.¹

In the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations, formed in 1855, the local Associations are represented through their national organizations. The alliance has its executive agent, the World's Committee, established in 1878.

The basis of representation in the International Convention was defined by the Portland Convention of 1869. Slight modifications made later do not alter the basic principle. The control of the local Association is placed definitely in the hands of members of "evangelical churches." Associate membership in America is open to any man of good moral character irrespective of his church membership, and there is no restriction of privileges.

The basis of representation in the World's Alliance was defined in the Paris Convention of 1855.²

The national and international organizations are based on sound democratic principles, and the local organizations are constituted as self-governing institutions whose active membership theoretically holds the authority. The founders of the movement decidedly intended that the work should be not a "charity" but an enterprise of men, for men, carried on by the men themselves.

THE INTERNATIONAL SPIRIT

The Y M C A has always had an international vision. The first world conference was held in Paris in 1855 when the Association was represented in each country only by a very loose federation of local units. At that first gathering there were present delegates from Great Britain, the United States and Canada, Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium, and Holland. The World's Alliance which was then formed now includes the Association movements of 40 countries

¹ Consult *The History of the North American Young Men's Christian Associations*, Richard C. Morse, New York, 1913, in the various sections dealing with the supervisory agencies.

² Consult the same work, pp. 16 and 40, for details regarding basis of membership.

and 6 territorial divisions, working under 31 National and International Committees.

The World's Committee,¹ located in Geneva, Switzerland, by 1914 had contacts touching the world at its most vital points. The Y M C A was truly international before it had come to a position of power in any single country.

The organization of the national movements is practically the same as that which obtains in America. They are independent and are directed in every case by their own national committees. In such countries as China, Japan, and India, though the movement was initiated in connection with missionary enterprises, every effort has been made from the very beginning to train national leadership and to turn over the management to native laymen and secretaries. The policy is not a mere ideal for the future but has been realized to a very large degree. And not only is native leadership measuring up but a large amount of support is contributed in each field. It is not impossible to foresee the day when the Y M C A in the so-called "mission lands" will be able to stand entirely upon its own feet.

The Y M C A in America has enjoyed prosperity far above that of any other country; this constituency had a great advantage in the unusual resources at its command. This surplus power could well be employed. By authorization of the International Convention, in 1889, the Foreign Work Department of the International Committee was established, and the International Committee was empowered to raise funds and secure secretaries for work outside America. Through its efforts the American Associations have played a large part in extending the Y M C A over all the world.

The American movement in projecting its foreign enterprises has worked closely with the World's Committee and has entered new fields in non-Christian countries only on the invitation of the missionary agencies established in those fields. As soon as possible, national agencies have been created and American help has been rendered through those agencies. Secretaries have been loaned, buildings have been erected, and funds for general work furnished in a manner aimed to strengthen the hands of the national leaders.

¹The Y M C A National and International Committees associated in the World's Committee (1921) are: Africa, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China and Korea, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, Wales and Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ceylon and Burma, Italy, Japan and Korea, New Zealand, North America, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Scotland, South America, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey.

The total American contribution to work in other lands, exclusive of that carried on in Europe by the Trustees of the National War Work Council, is represented today by a yearly expenditure of over a million and a quarter of dollars.

The total influence of such an institution is in the direction of producing a better feeling among the nations and its widespread connections have been of inestimable value in assisting the furtherance of all worthy international movements.

THE AMERICAN YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION'S PREPARATION FOR WAR WORK

The direct relation of the Association to soldiers, sailors, and marines has been dealt with at length. It may now be seen that this institution has made no sharp distinction between civilian and fighting men. The men under arms were approached by the Y M C A in a thoroughly typical manner.

It is true that the Association thought very little of the military significance of its service. At the time of the Spanish-American War, it saw in the men of the services a new group with well-defined needs that might welcome its help. It took up the burden of permanent work in America, when there was no popular enthusiasm for the enterprise, just as it took up any other department of work. The Canadian Y M C A followed its men to South Africa and the secretaries in Japan marched in Manchuria under the stimulus only of the modest hope that some service might be rendered to these special groups of men. At the outbreak of the World War, the Association, possessed of highly sensitized international nerves, was immediately stirred in every part of the globe. Its constituency was being drawn into the conflict, into an environment full of moral peril, of hideous suffering, and of tragic death. Was it conceivable that the Y M C A should hesitate?

Thus it was that through the years of gradual growth and slow but steady development this civilian organization, unconsciously, and unsuspectingly, was fitting itself for the tremendous task to come. Its democratic form of administration had made it an organization of the people, by the people, for the people. It had no "star chamber," no dominant "Headquarters." It had no subtle plans, no far-reaching schemes. Its seventy successful years had given it a fund of invaluable experience in work with young men. It had dealt with all sorts of groups, racial, industrial, social; the old and the young alike

had come within its range. It had spread all over the world; a common interest and a common motive bound together as fellow workers men from every nation. No people, no age, no class was foreign to it. Its work was already established with soldiers and sailors; it knew something of their special problems, and had experimented in that special field. When the World War came and armies gathered in young men by millions it was perhaps inevitable that upon this young men's association should fall the main burden of that unforeseen, tremendous, vitally important task of guarding and maintaining the welfare of the body, mind, and spirit of the youth of the world as it fought to death or victory.¹

¹ In 1921 the Y M C A throughout the world comprised 9,070 self-governing local associations; the membership totaled 1,485,855, directed by 5,987 employed officers; the net value of Association property throughout the world amounted to \$143,407,595. The local associations in the United States number 2,009; the membership 821,756; officers, 4,280; the net property value is estimated at \$117,473,200.

PART II

SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER XII

THE FIELD AND BACKGROUND OF SERVICE

With the acceptance by the Government of the Y M C A's offer to continue and expand its service in the war emergency, its field became the entire citizenship of the nation gathered for war purposes in the Army, Navy, or in war industries. Its responsibilities began as soon as the men boarded train for the journey to camp, and in some cases even earlier; they did not end until the men reached their homes after discharge, and in many cases even later. Whether men found themselves in populous cantonments or in lonely guard posts, in city or in forest lumber camp, their right to service was unquestioned. Not merely in self-chosen centers where spectacular success might be achieved, but in remote and isolated spots where there were few to be served and where war conditions predestined the most laborious efforts to inadequacy or failure, the presence of men in the uniform laid its obligation upon the Y.

On the day war was declared, there were under arms in the United States 200,000 men; two-thirds of these were Regulars and one-third National Guardsmen, who had been called into the Federal Service for duty along the Mexican Border. There were in addition some 70,000 men of all ranks in the Navy. Recruiting began immediately for all branches of the service. Enlistments grew steadily until they exceeded one thousand men per day. By July 31, 1917, more than 1,000,000 men had offered themselves and of these 559,000 had been accepted for service. Of this number the Regular Army received 164,000, the National Guard 145,000, the Officers' Training Camps 35,000, and the Navy 69,000. Early in September the men drafted under the Selective Service Act began to report to camp and by the end of November the first half million had been inducted into the service, swelling the ranks of the entire Army to more than a million men. Increase by enlistment and draft continued throughout the succeeding year, till, on the day when the Armistice was signed, the total armed forces of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps numbered over 4,000,000 men, while a total of 4,800,000 had served.

Not all of these men served in the United States at one time. Before the Armistice the passage of troops to Europe kept the num-

Extent of the
Field

ber well within two millions, and after the Armistice demobilization produced the same result. Quarterly reports of the Army¹ in the United States give the strength on April 1, 1917, as 200,000; July 30th, 480,000; October 1st, 883,000; April 1, 1918, 1,476,000; July 1st, 1,384,000; and October 1st, 1,590,000. The maximum strength was reached on December 1, 1918, when it totaled 1,679,000 men. During the succeeding months of demobilization the decrease in troops was even more rapid than the increase during the war period. By January 1, 1919, the total had been reduced to 1,163,000; by April 1st to 680,000; by July 1st to 579,000; and by October 1st to approximately 200,000. To these figures must be added the strength of the Navy and Marine Corps, which grew from 70,000 in April, 1917, to 538,000 in November of the succeeding year, and which was gradually reduced to 125,000 during 1919.²

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Mobilization
and Training
in the U. S.

The combat unit of the American Army is the division composed of about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. While auxiliary units were used, by far the largest proportion of the men mobilized were put into divisions and received at least their initial training as combat troops. In all, 58 divisions were mobilized in the United States. Before the signing of the Armistice 42 divisions, after an average of six months' training at home, had been sent overseas. The training of twelve more was well advanced on November 11, 1918, and four others were being organized. These divisions fell originally into three classes: the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army. Of the overseas divisions, eight were Regular Army, seventeen National Guard, and seventeen National Army. The twelve divisions in training when hostilities ceased were organized as Regular Army units. They were built, however, on a skeleton of the old units and were composed chiefly of drafted troops. The four divisions in process of organization were National Army units.

The distinction between the three branches of the Army just named tended to break down under the unifying influences of the war. After the adoption of the principle of conscription, it seemed logical to fill the ranks of the Regular Army and the National Guard with drafted men, and this was done except when local recruiting speedily

¹ The War with Germany, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 15.

² Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1918.

served the purpose. The constant shifting of troops from camp to camp, the breaking up and re-formation of units, and the necessity of drawing on all resources to replace losses at the front, rendered increasingly difficult the observance of geographical lines and service traditions in the composition of military organizations, and finally, in August, 1918, even the terminology was officially abandoned. In the earlier months of the training period, however, it represented a real difference, and in order to make clear certain variations of the welfare service it is necessary to sketch the distinction here.

The regiments making up the National Guard divisions were old organizations, many of them dating back to the Civil War, the majority of them had been mobilized on the Mexican Border during 1916. As a class they were distinct both from the Regular and the National Army units. They were generally a homogeneous group, made up of young men with military inclinations. In times of peace, they were very often military clubs. The National Guard

Two considerations led to some discontent on the part of the guardsmen. One was the matter-of-fact way in which the public and the Government seemed to accept their service. They felt that their change from a peace to a war status was considered merely as the fulfillment of an obligation and that public recognition was reserved largely for the men of the National Army. The indifference of which they complained was more apparent than real, but the attitude was a factor in morale and bore an important relation to welfare work. The other dissatisfaction arose from the conditions of their training. As so many of these already trained regiments had seen service on the Mexican Border, it was anticipated that three months' training as divisions would be sufficient to fit them for overseas service, and their training camps were accordingly located in the South, where they were housed in tents which ordinarily would have afforded adequate shelter from the mild weather of the early winter in that region. Detained in this country, however, by the necessity of reorganization and expansion, they found themselves living month after month in quarters which proved inadequate in the face of an unusually early and severe winter. The mess halls, although of wooden construction, were loosely built and adapted only to a very mild climate; moreover, their use as a common gathering place was often restricted by the military authorities on grounds of cleanliness and sanitation. This situation created a great need for welfare service.

The National
Army

While the National Guard was characterized by a certain homogeneity, the National Army was heterogeneous. The personnel composing it was a cross section of American manhood. Sons of wealthy families, professional men, clerks, and laborers were included in each division. Those units drawn from the industrial sections of the East included a large proportion of foreign born, many of whom were unable to speak English, and a large number of illiterates. There was a greater degree of illiteracy in the National Army than in either the National Guard or the Regular Army. Although contingents were drawn by geographical divisions, it was seldom that there was any large acquaintance among the members of the organizations. Unlike the Guardsmen, very few of the men had had any military experience. They were "rookies" in every sense of the word, and for each one of them the first few weeks in camp proved a period of physical and psychological readjustment. Welfare needs were greater than in the National Guard, because of the wider range of society from which the personnel was called, and because previous organization was entirely lacking.

The very fact that these organizations had to be constructed of absolutely raw material held certain advantages for the men. They were placed in semi-permanent cantonments, built to withstand the rigors of winter. They were given at least six months for training, and the welfare service both of the Army and the Y M C A was based on that forecast. From the beginning these National Army cantonments had an aspect of permanency. The Y M C A established there an elaborate program to meet the social needs of the new recruits.

The Regular
Army

The Regular Army divisions constituted the third distinct class which made up the American Army. The 1st and 2d Divisions were composed largely of the old Regular Army, augmented by volunteers for the period of the war and by draft contingents. They were organized in France, and do not, therefore, enter into this section. Six other divisions were organized in the fall and winter of 1917. These were built on the skeletons of old Regular Army units, but were composed mostly of volunteers and drafted men. They were similar in many respects to the National Guard, yet lacked the solidarity of that group. As divisions they were composed of units organized and trained in various small posts and camps throughout the country during the spring and summer of 1917.

The basic tradition was that of the professional soldier, and the young recruits readily absorbed this spirit. They were assembled in

camp along with the National Guard for a period of only about four months before being transported to France. The story of the welfare work rendered them is largely like the story of the National Guard camps.

DISTRIBUTION

The largest and best known part of the work of the Y M C A for men in the United States was done in the 32 great training centers established for the army divisions where the majority of the men were assembled. Approximately seven-ninths of the troops called into service spent in these centers all or a part of their training period in this country. They fell into two main classes, those in which the men were quartered in tents, technically known as *camps*, and those in which the men were housed in barracks, technically known as *cantonments*. Camps and Cantonments

The camps, as we have seen, were designed for the use of the already organized units of the Regular Army and the National Guard while perfecting their training preparatory to overseas service, and were located in the South because of its milder climate. The typical camp was laid out in the form of a horseshoe, in the center of which were the drill field, parade grounds, administration building, post office, and quarters of the division staff. Around the rim were row after row of company mess halls, and directly in the rear orderly arrays of army tents which served as quarters for the men. In close vicinity were located the buildings and quarters of the auxiliary arms, such as base hospital and sanitary corps, quartermaster and ordnance troops, and at some distance the buildings, stables, and yards of the remount station. A journey around the horseshoe would measure at least five or six miles, and from side to side from one end to the other a half to two miles. The total reservation included an area of from eight to ten square miles, or five thousand to seven thousand acres.

The cantonments, on the other hand, with their more substantial equipment, were designed primarily for the new units of the National Army, which required a longer period of training, and were located principally in the East and Middle West, with two units in the South and Southwest and one on the Pacific Coast. A typical cantonment covered an area of five thousand acres or over eight square miles. To cover the entire length of the reservation would require a walk of five miles. The barracks were generally arranged in a great arc along a paved highway known as the Service Road. These barracks

were two stories in height and accommodated some 250 men. In the average cantonment approximately 330 barracks were built. The officers of each regiment were quartered in separate buildings, ordinarily just across the road from the barracks of their command. In addition to these buildings, there were many others employed for operation incident to the common life of the camp, such as headquarters buildings, post office, telephone station, hospitals, warehouses, stables, garages, theaters, and welfare buildings. By the time of the Armistice, the average cantonment contained more than 1,500 buildings erected for military purposes, and generally, in addition, various farm houses and other permanent buildings previously existing within the reservation. While the average population was about 40,000, some of the camps accommodated eventually as many as 80,000 men.

The troops spent in the camps and cantonments periods of training ranging from three to thirteen months, the average time for Regular Army divisions being about five months, for National Guard divisions about seven and a half months, and for the National Army about eight and a half months. After the original divisions mobilized in the fall of 1917 were moved to France, only 16 of the 32 camps and cantonments were utilized as divisional training centers, the remaining 16 being filled with men who were trained in depot brigades to be used as replacements in divisions already overseas, or being utilized as embarkation camps and transfer centers.

Although the main volume of Y M C A service was rendered at these chief centers of concentration, it touched the lives of soldiers and sailors at hundreds of other points and in a wide variety of situations. The service at the divisional training centers was duplicated in its essential features at other large camps where troops were located. Within a few weeks after the declaration of war there was instituted a series of Officers' Training Camps, at which men were trained for commissions in a three months' course. In serving these men the Y M C A gained experience valuable for later work during the war. The permanent army posts, almost immediately after the declaration of war, were filled to capacity with recruits, and large camps were constructed about many of them for the purpose of increasing housing and training facilities. Special camps were established by particular branches of the Army for the specialized training of their own recruits, such as artillery, aviation, engineering corps, chemical warfare, tank corps, and quartermaster corps. In the vicin-

ity of New York and Newport News were great embarkation camps where troops proceeding overseas remained for short periods, and where, on their return, after the Armistice, they were again detained for a few days, before proceeding to their former training centers, which were now utilized as demobilization camps from which the men returned home or to points where they had enlisted.

Nor were the interests of smaller groups overlooked, which for one reason or another found themselves temporarily or permanently out of the main military currents. Such were the posts along the Mexican Border, where men who had enlisted with the hope of fighting in France spent monotonous months doing guard duty in the desert. Garrisons had to be maintained at important points along the coast line, as well as in the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, the Canal Zone, and Porto Rico. Soldiers were sent into the forests of Maine and the Pacific Slope to accelerate the supply of spruce for aeroplanes. In the early days of the war especially, detachments were assigned to special guard duty in cities and elsewhere for the protection of railroad terminals, reservoirs, and other public works. A Students' Army Training Corps was organized, with small detachments at many educational institutions, for the purpose of maintaining the supply of commissioned officers.

Added to these points of need in the Army were those in the Navy, with its personnel of 538,000 men. As in the case of the Army, the permanent stations of the Navy were largely expanded to afford training facilities, and in addition special training camps were built, the largest of which was equal in size to one of the great Army cantonments. At these the Association maintained organizations and services similar to those in the Army camps. Owing to naval regulations, it was not possible to place welfare workers on the vessels of the Fleet, but certain equipment was provided for the use of the men on those vessels, and regular service was maintained at the operating bases of the thirteen naval districts, for men permanently stationed in the navy yards, stations, and bases, and for the men of ships' crews when ashore, as well as at scores of other points touched occasionally by patrol boats but not used as permanent quarters. The Marines received the benefit of the Association's service, both at their training camps and in the West Indies, where a force of them were in occupation before and during the War.¹

¹ For details of Navy posts, see Chapter XXIV.


In all there were 541 separate posts, camps, or depots in the United States where troops were stationed, besides about 50 permanent or semi-permanent camps, yards, stations, and bases of the Navy and Marine Corps. This does not include the temporary outposts and camps operated in connection with permanent stations, such as those in the spruce district and along the Mexican Border, nor the points touched by naval patrol boats but not used as permanent quarters. For general administrative purposes, the War Department had already divided the country into six military departments and sixteen districts, to which a seventh department covering Insular Possessions, Canal Zone, etc., was later added. The map (Plate V) shows the boundaries of these departments, and the service points for army and navy work, as well as the previously existing city Associations.

The men who made up the population of these camps and posts came from every city, town, and village in the United States. Gathered at convenient railroad points, they traveled in thousands of trains converging from every direction upon the various camps. At junctions and transfer points they were often delayed for hours. Again they journeyed from camp and cantonment to embarkation ports, and crossed the Atlantic, to retrace in time every stage of the journey back to their homes. Throughout all their travels the Y M C A sought to render the maximum service suitable to the situation and permitted by the authorities. Where delays normally occurred in railway journeys, at transfer centers and junction points, special provision was made, with comforts, such as baths, sight-seeing auto rides around the neighborhood, and entertainment for the few hours to be passed in waiting.

War Industries

Outside the regular Army and Navy organization there were thousands of civilians engaged in war industries. Some of these worked in towns or cities where existing industries were expanded enormously, requiring men in such numbers as far outran the possible expansion of the housing, sanitation, recreation, entertainment, and religious facilities of the local community. Others were in newly created plants, as for example, Hog Island, which in September, 1917, was a marsh overgrown with reeds and rushes, and within a year had become a shipyard employing 30,000 men. There were 5 arsenals, 5 navy yards, and 34 shipyards, besides 14 munition plants, in each of which from 5,000 to 20,000 civilians were employed. In the spruce forests of Washington and Oregon, 110,000 civilians and 30,000





CENTERS
THROUGH WHICH
The YMCA RENDERED SERVICE
TO
SOLDIERS & SAILORS IN THE U.S.A.

KEY		
	NUMBER	SYMBOL
CITY ASSOCIATIONS	1979	•
"Y" HUTS	952	•
TOTAL	2931	

soldiers were rushing lumber operations at nearly 300 points scattered over 8,000 square miles.

Finally there were men registered but not called in almost every town and city, and men on leave or traveling as individuals to whom casual service could be rendered. Local Associations offered them lodgings, and baths, entertainment, and all the privileges of their buildings, conducted information bureaus and lectures on topics connected with the war or military life.

The story of the main body of Association work in the United States falls naturally into four periods, determined largely by military conditions.

The first period, extending from the American declaration of war on April 6, 1917, to the opening of the great training centers in the autumn of that year, was a period occupied largely by organization and preparation on the part of both the Government and the welfare societies.

First Period:
Preparation

During the second period, extending from the autumn of 1917 to the beginning of April, 1918, the 42 divisions which were sent to France were mobilized and trained. The period began with the mobilization of the National Guard, the National Army, and Regular Army divisions. The camps filled rapidly, and from November, 1917, until the end of the period their aggregate population was practically constant, although there was a certain amount of shifting of troops from one to another.

Second Period:
Mobilization and
Training

The third period extended from the spring of 1918, to the signing of the Armistice. In April, a great troop movement to France began. During that month three divisions broke camp and during the three succeeding months 21 divisions sailed. The remaining thirteen divisions followed during August, September, and October. In all, some 1,686,000 troops sailed for France during this period, while 2,044,000 new recruits, an average of 292,000 per month, were mustered in. As soon as a division left camp, new troops, composed almost entirely of drafted men, were called in to take their place. The military organization of the camps fell into two main categories: first, divisional, and second, replacement camps, fifteen being filled with new divisions, fifteen used as replacement camps, and two as embarkation centers. The divisional camps presented no new features, but the replacement camps presented quite different characteristics of organization and training program. In these camps the troops were organized into depot brigades, the purpose of which

Third Period:
Troop Movements
and Replacements

was to give each man a short period of intensive training, generally of only thirty days' duration, after which he was sent to France, not in an organized unit, but as a casual, and there used as a replacement in a division already organized. These military arrangements necessitated readjustments of the welfare program.

The closing months of this period were darkened by the influenza epidemic, which invaded the camps with a suddenness that was demoralizing in its effect, at a time when their personnel was in the worst possible situation to resist it. A large proportion of the men who had just been called into service and had not yet been conditioned to endure the rigors of army life became the easy victims of the disease. With the exception of Camp Wheeler, every one of the camps and cantonments reported more than 2,000 cases of influenza. The total number in the camps was 338,257, greater by 100,000 than the total number of men who served with the colors during the Spanish-American War. The terrible toll of life exacted by the disease cannot be recorded precisely, because mortality reports did not classify deaths by causes; it was not far from 17,000.

Fourth Period:
Demobilization

The last period was that of demobilization, and extended from the signing of the Armistice to the time when welfare work was taken over by the Army and Navy.

The demobilization of an army of 4,000,000 men in less than a year's time was one of the greatest achievements of the War Department. Each soldier's record of service with various units had to be complete in every detail, also his personal record, including such matters as insurance, allotment, bond payments, back pay, and prospective employment. He was given so many physical examinations that he automatically began to say "ah" whenever he met a medical officer. His rifle, clothing, and equipment had to be checked in, piece by piece. When his final pay and \$60 bonus was handed to him he went forth, labeled, tagged, and pigeon-holed as to every aspect of his being. Such an undertaking as this could not be done in a day. More than a year elapsed before the entire citizen army had been demobilized.

The camps and cantonments bore the brunt of demobilization. The first task was to discharge the latest draft contingents who were at that time in training, and within six weeks after the signing of the Armistice 623,000 men were discharged. While this was about half the capacity of the thirty-two camps and cantonments, it does not mean that the camps were immediately depopulated. Troops began

arriving from overseas and were distributed to the camps nearest to their point of enlistment. Simultaneously troops from far-away American camps had to be gathered for discharge in some camp within 350 miles of their home. The effect on life in the camp was similar to that in the preceding period, when troops were going to France in large numbers, and thousands of new men went through each month.

Every branch of the service was represented in each camp. Aviators from overseas were among the first to be discharged. Then came various Coast and Field Artillery Regiments; then division after division. At times they came as whole regiments, in regular formation, with bands and colors. At other times they came in "casual companies," train loads at a time, representing hundreds and thousands of different outfits, all mixed up, and with them came the motor mechanics and gas men from home camps and shops, the Spruce Division from the woods of Maine and Washington, men from the border, and lads from the Gulf States and California. No men were more easily pleased nor more disposed to take life happily. It was their last stop; the next station was home. In contrast to these men were the five or ten thousand soldiers constituting the permanent detachments of each demobilization center. They faced the prospect of many weary months of military routine, while many thousands of their more fortunate comrades were returning to their homes. Considering the temper of the times, their lot was not enviable.

PRE-WORLD-WAR SERVICE

The declaration of war on April 6, 1917, was the occasion not for instituting but for expanding welfare service. For eighteen years the Y M C A had been in direct contact with the Army and Navy. Organized in 1899, after active service in the Spanish War, the Army and Navy Department of the Y M C A was granted by Congress, in 1902, the right to establish service buildings at Army and Navy stations. By 1917 there were permanent buildings at 23 Army posts and ten naval stations,¹ of a total value, including equip-

Army and
Navy Posts

¹ The permanent military posts at which the Y M C A was serving in 1916 were: Army—San Francisco, Washington, D. C., Fort Leavenworth, Fort McKinley, Boston (City Branch, Forts Andrew, Strong, Warren), Minneapolis, Sandy Hook, Brooklyn (Forts Hamilton, Totten), New York (City Branch, Forts Jay, Slocum, Wadsworth, Wood), Newport, R. I. (Forts Adams, Greble), Charleston, S. C., Philippine Islands (General Supervision, Fort William McKinley). Navy—Boston, Bremerton, Wash., Brooklyn, Mare Island, Newport, R. I., Norfolk, Va., Philadelphia, San Francisco, Olongapo, P. I., Shanghai, China

ment and special endowment, aggregating two and a quarter millions of dollars. During 1916, these Associations, which were similar to ordinary city Associations, reported an average daily attendance at the buildings of 9,640 men. The Navy buildings, designed to serve sailors and marines on shore leave, were equipped with living accommodations. They reported an average of 852 men lodged nightly and a total of 188,000 meals served.

Mexican
Border

In addition to this work at the permanent posts and stations of the Army and Navy, the Association was, at the beginning of the war, maintaining special service at seventeen points for men of the Regular Army and National Guard units stationed along the Mexican Border. This was the remainder of a much larger work which, beginning in the Border patrol of 1911, had continued with the exception of one year until it reached its greatest extent in 1916. Immediately upon the order of the President mobilizing the National Guard, in July, 1916, the services of the Association had been offered to the Government, for those units also, and local, state, and International organizations cooperated in meeting the needs of the men, under the direction of the Army and Navy Department, which appealed to Association members. Rough buildings were erected at the larger camps for the service at a cost of half a million dollars. By August 10th, 36 buildings had been completed and equipped in eighteen camps, in which 116,000 men were being served by 130 secretaries.

Traveling
Y M C A's

Before the year was over the buildings had increased to 42 besides six tents. Two "Traveling Y M C A's" as they were called, were in constant motion—Ford trucks with trailers, manned by two secretaries, equipped with a small dynamo for motion picture lighting, and loaded with stationery, games, athletic material, reading matter and supplies. These visited the outposts, some of which were 80 miles or more from a railroad. During the eight months of the border service of the National Guard the Association enlisted as its representatives more than 300 secretaries, clergymen, and business men, of whom an average of 160 were at work during the greater part of the time. Total attendance at buildings was nearly 8,000,000. The provision of free stationery and writing facilities made possible the sending of more than 5,000,000 letters from Association centers. Recreational activities and educational work were promoted. Entertainments were attended by an estimated total of 2,851,000. A constructive program of religious work was carried out, including Bible classes and religious meetings, at which attend-

ance was estimated at 681,000. The Association buildings were used by chaplains for regimental services. By March 1, 1917, the National Guard units were ordered home, leaving 40,000 regulars to guard the Border. Many buildings were closed, and the service reduced.

Theodore Roosevelt, in a letter dated July 27, 1916, speaking of the Association's representatives then on the Border said:

"Their presence will aid the officers to preserve the morale of the camps. . . . I have had first hand knowledge of the kind of work that your Committee is doing both in the Army and Navy, and I heartily believe in it. What the Y M C A has been doing recently in Europe has been really remarkable; and now our citizens should aid them to do the work of the same type for our own troops."

From the point of view of this book, the greatest value of the work on the Mexican Border in 1916 was its demonstration of the adaptability of the Association's program and its great value in camp conditions. Raymond B. Fosdick, after visiting the Border officially in the summer of 1916, wrote in a letter dated August 8th:

The Y M C A
Program on
the Border

"I came to the conclusion, after a thorough inspection of the camps, that the Y M C A is the best organized thing on the whole frontier. The buildings are crowded night and day, in fact they are the club houses of the regiments and are used as such continually. General Funston and his associated commanding officers spoke in the highest terms of the influence of the organization on the army, even bringing up the subject voluntarily, although I was down there on no errand relating to the Y M C A work. The efficiency of the Y M C A was what particularly appealed to General Funston and his aides. They were impressed with the generalship under which the whole machine was put together in such a short space of time. Briefly, I came back in a most enthusiastic frame of mind about the work you are doing and its almost infinite possibilities, and I cannot resist telling you what a profound influence it is having on the thousands of men crowded along the Border."

WORK IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION

Soon after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany in February, 1917, the Government took elaborate precautions for national defense. There were many sensitive spots where an enemy sympathizer furnished with explosives might interrupt the movement of men and munitions, or by destroying a reservoir or lighting plant, throw a whole city into confusion. Soldiers of the Regular Army and the National Guard were detailed for guard duty at

strategic points on the railways, waterways, munition plants, and arsenals, throughout the country. Not waiting for the national organization of the forces of the Association, state and local Y M C A's immediately gave service to these men.

Service to
Moving
Troops

As soon as American troops began to be mobilized after the declaration of war, the City Associations and others seized the opportunity to serve the large number of enlisted men passing through their cities en route to camp, visiting in town during leave periods, or quartered nearby. These Associations threw their doors wide open and expanded their regular activities on a tremendous scale. They freely provided for the men of the service these features: entertainments with music, moving pictures, and theatrical talent at the Association buildings; dinner parties and social functions in private homes opened to enlisted men at the instance of the Association; inspirational features such as religious meetings, interviews with Christian men for counsel, and public addresses to uniformed or registered men regarding the issues of the war; creature comforts, such as refreshments, shower baths, swimming pools, and gymnasiums; the latter were in numberless cases transformed at night to serve as dormitories filled with cots for enlisted men. Six hundred and forty-five of the City and many of the Railroad and Industrial Associations during the war offered full membership without charge to the men in the service.

At the same time the Army and Navy Y M C A was expanding its normal peace-time activities to meet the new situation. As soon as recruiting began, the population of the Regular Army posts doubled and trebled within a period of a few weeks, while outpost duty on the Border was again extended to most of the places which had been occupied during mobilization in 1916. Through this service was developed the form of regional supervision which proved to be so effective during the war.

Service in the
Officers' Training
Camps

With the opening of the Officers' Training Camps, the Association improved the opportunity to serve the 35,000 men there concentrated. The activities of the four-fold program were carried on in these camps largely along experimental lines. While the Association had the benefit of its experience in previous wars and on the Border, it had still to develop a body of methods adaptable to modern military conditions and to a task incomparably greater than anything it had hitherto attempted. From the point of view of the readaptation of tried plans and methods to meet the new situation and the crystalliza-

tion of the Association's forces into a real war instrument, the results of the work in the Officers' Training Camps were so significant that its different features will be described in some detail in the various chapters on activities in the United States.¹

On August 14, 1917, the first Officers' Training Camp closed. Three weeks later the first contingent of men drafted under the Selective Service Act were called to the colors, and the National Guard and Regular Army units which had been rapidly mobilized during this period were ordered to the camps which had been made ready for them. Thus ended the initial period of mobilization, organization, and expansion both for the Army and for the Y M C A.

As the Association adapted itself to the military needs, these activities were standardized into a weekly program which was followed as closely as local conditions warranted. This program consisted of two evenings of movies, one evening each for special entertainment, educational lectures, and athletic stunts, and two evenings for religious meetings. In addition, an extensive program of education and recreation on the company streets and fields was planned and carried out. Local factors, however, always conditioned the execution of this program. At Embarkation Camps, for instance, the short stay and varied needs of the men called for modification of the program as carried out in the more permanent camps. Express, money order, foreign exchange, and mail business of these camps was greatly expanded. Educational features were limited to lectures and informal talks. In National Army camps where the illiteracy rate was high, special stress was laid upon elementary education. Among those units which anticipated an early departure for France the study of French was generally encouraged. In camps where a long stay was anticipated an elaborate program of competitive athletics would be carried out. Yet, despite these local variations, a composite picture of the Association's activities everywhere, presents the outstanding characteristics of religion, entertainment, athletics, and education, and the sociability and convenience of a club.

Character of the
Service

The existing organization of the Y M C A provided many elements that could be quickly adapted and coordinated into the headquarters and field organization needed to institute and conduct this varied service, and secure and distribute the necessary funds, workers, and equipment.

¹ Chapters XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.

CHAPTER XIII
MILITARIZING THE Y M C A

The General Secretary of the International Committee was John R. Mott.¹ As a sophomore at Cornell University he had become President of the student Y M C A. He was a delegate to the first national student conference in 1886 at Mt. Hermon, Mass., and there committed himself to Christian service to the young men of the entire world as his life work. Upon graduation, in 1888, he was appointed Student Secretary of the International Committee. At the student conference at Northfield that summer, the Student Volunteer Movement was formally organized, with Mott as Chairman. In 1895 he was one of the founders of the World's Student Christian Federation, which united all national student movements or societies throughout the world, and of which he was chosen General Secretary. In 1901 he added to the duties of these positions, those of Associate General Secretary of the International Committee for Foreign Work. In 1910 he presided at the World's Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, and became Chairman of its Continuation Committee. In his leadership of these closely related movements he made repeated tours, visiting all parts of the world. He became General Secretary of the entire work of the International Committee in 1915, a position which brought him into an intimate administrative relation to the work of upbuilding and furthering the service of men of all walks and stations of life.

Thus at the helm of the American Y M C A in the great world crisis stood a man whose whole life had been dominated by devotion to the service of all classes of young men throughout the world. To this consecration was added unique experience and knowledge. No man foresaw the huge proportions, or the sudden bewildering turns that the task eventually presented, but it is probable that there did not live in America, or indeed in the world, one whose experience had yielded so broad perceptions or so deep and sympathetic insight into the nature of the conditions which the soldiers of world armies were

¹ Dr. Mott holds the following honorary degrees: M.A. (Yale, 1899), LL.D. (Edinburgh, 1910), and LL.D. (Princeton, 1911).

about to enter. Finally, his long accepted leadership of world Christian movements had established for him personal and official relationships throughout the nations on both sides of the conflict, and had developed a natural ability for executive direction which had been recognized by invitations to enter the field of statesmanship.

The International Committee is the body authorized to act for ^{The First Steps} the International Convention in emergencies arising between sessions. On the day President Wilson proclaimed a state of war between the United States and Germany, the General Secretary, without waiting to call a meeting of the Committee, but "knowing its mind as interpreted by its practice," telegraphed the President offering the service of the Associations in whatever ways might be found useful. Recognizing further the essentially democratic nature of the Associations, which, to be effective, must speak with one voice, he called a conference, to which were invited leaders as widely representative of Association agencies and of the different sections of the country as could be promptly assembled. The conference met at Garden City, N. Y., on April 10th, and as the result of an all-day discussion of the various phases of the situation, adopted a series of resolutions¹ recommending assumption by the Association of full responsibility for the patriotic duty laid upon it, and the creation of a War Work Council as the instrument through which the will of the entire Brotherhood might find expression. On the following day these resolutions were considered in detail by the sub-committee of the International Committee responsible for its work in the Regular Army and the Navy, which in turn, on April 12th, presented its recommendations to the International Committee, at a largely attended meeting. Their judgment was embodied in two resolutions as follows:

1. That the International Committee appoint a War Work Council of at least 100 men which shall formulate and carry out plans for the service to be rendered by the Association Movement among the men in the American Army and Navy and likewise deal with other important phases of the Association opportunity and responsibility in America occasioned by the War. This Council shall be directly responsible to the International Committee and report to it from month to month.

2. That the War Work Council be instructed to make an effort to secure in the near future a fund of at least \$3,000,000 for the carrying out of its purposes and plans for the year 1917.

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 487, 488.

A third resolution named as members of the new War Work Council 104 prominent business and professional men and Association leaders, representing every part of the country. Of these 100 accepted appointment, and subsequent additions brought the number to 208.¹ Within six days of the declaration of war the Y M C A had created a national agency representing all its affiliations.

The President's
Authorization

On April 27th, the Chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities communicated President Wilson's acceptance of the offer on behalf of the Y M C A as follows:

Washington, D. C., April 27, 1917.

John R. Mott, Esq.,

124 East 28th St., New York City.

My Dear Dr. Mott:

The President this afternoon signed the following Executive Order:

"The Young Men's Christian Association has, in the present emergency, as under similar circumstances in the past, tendered its services for the benefit of enlisted men in both arms of the service. This organization is prepared by experience, approved methods and assured resources, to serve especially the troops in camp and field. It seems best for the interest of the Service that it shall continue as a voluntary civilian organization; however, the results obtained are so beneficial and bear such a direct relation to efficiency, inasmuch as the Association provision contributes to the happiness, content, and morale of the personnel, that in order to unify the civilian betterment activities in the Army, and further the work of the organization that has demonstrated its ability to render a service desired by both officers and men, official recognition is hereby given the Young Men's Christian Association as a valuable adjunct and asset to the service. Officers are enjoined to render the fullest practicable assistance and cooperation in the maintenance and extension of the Association, both at permanent posts and stations and in camp and field. To this end attention of officers is called to the precedent and policy already established in

1. An Act approved May 31, 1902, giving authority to the Secretary of War to grant permission by revocable license for the erection and maintenance of Association buildings on military reservations for the promotion of the social, physical, intellectual and moral welfare of enlisted men.
2. An Act of Congress making appropriation for the Army for the fiscal year ending June 13, 1911, and referred to in General Order No. 54, wherein the furnishing of heat and light for the above mentioned buildings was authorized.

¹ For full list of members of the Council, see Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 489-495.

3. General Orders No. 39 wherein commanding officers were enjoined (a) to provide all proper facilities practicable to aid the Association; (b) to assign suitable sites; (c) to supply transportation for Association tentage and equipment; (d) to care for and police Association tents and grounds; (e) to accord accredited secretaries the privilege of the purchase of supplies from the Quartermaster's Department; (f) to furnish where practicable tentage for shelter."

The other matter which you suggested to the President, to wit, the status of Y M C A representatives in relation to service in the Army was not considered by our Commission, inasmuch as we felt that it did not come within our proper scope. I understand from Secretary Baker, however, that it is to form the subject of a separate Executive Order.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) RAYMOND B. FOSDICK

The War Work Council (or the National War Work Council of the Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States, as it was officially designated a few days later) met for the first time on April 28th, at 25 Madison Avenue, New York City, and was called to order by William Sloane, for sixteen years Chairman of the Army and Navy Department of the International Committee. At this meeting plans were laid for raising the \$3,000,000 fund, an organization was set up for carrying on work among the soldiers and sailors in the United States, Executive and Finance Committees were constituted, and the following officers elected: Chairman, William Sloane; Vice-Chairman, William Fellowes Morgan; Treasurer, Cleveland H. Dodge; Recording Secretary, Walter T. Diack; General Secretary, John R. Mott; Associate General Secretaries, Fletcher S. Brockman, John S. Tichenor, Charles R. Towson. These officers served throughout the entire period of the Council's existence, and their number was afterwards increased by the election of an additional Vice-Chairman, John Sherman Hoyt, and an additional Associate General Secretary, C. V. Hibbard. From its appointment to February 10, 1921, the National War Work Council held nine meetings, all but one in New York City, at intervals of from three to eight months.

Under the terms of its appointment, the War Work Council was the creation of the International Committee, from which it drew authority and to which it was expected to report. These terms were very loosely interpreted, however, and in practice the Council functioned as an independent body, electing additional members as the

The National
War Work
Council

demands of the work required, entering into cooperative arrangements with the International Committee on equal terms, and coming in the course of the war to deal with men in numbers and to control expenditures of money in amounts far beyond the normal operations not only of the International Committee but of all other American Association agencies combined. Yet the War Work Council was never given separate corporate existence. In the early stages, contracts, leases, and titles were made and held by individuals for the Council, but later an agreement was reached whereby these legal arrangements were entered into in the name of the International Committee, which was protected by the Council against any liability incurred through them. When the time came to close up its affairs, the question of its legal status was raised in connection with the titles to its property in Europe. Its legal advisers expressed the opinion that liquidation and dissolution could be effected only by action of the International Committee as an incorporated body.

Executive and
Finance
Committees

Immediate oversight and control of affairs was lodged in the Executive Committee, a body of men of the largest and most successful business experience. This committee met once a fortnight through the entire period of active operations, and its members, although bearing many and heavy responsibilities, private and public, attended with a regularity and constancy that evidenced their recognition of the high importance of this factor of the national enterprise. About thirty-five different individuals served on this committee.¹ William Sloane served as chairman. The Finance Committee, of which George W. Perkins was Chairman and which like the Executive Committee, was composed of citizens of outstanding ability and character,² also held frequent meetings and exercised close supervision over the financial operations of the Council. Beginning with June, 1919, the Executive and Finance Committees met jointly, and in April, 1920, the two were officially merged into one Executive Committee.

The General
Secretary

Acting under the authority of the Executive Committee, the chief executive officer of the War Work Council was the General Secretary. In addition to the general executive supervision of the work of the various committees, bureaus, and departments, he was charged with special responsibility for conducting negotiations with the President of the United States and with the War and Navy Departments; for serving as a member of the Commissions on Training Camp Activi-

¹ For full list of members of the Executive Committee, see Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 492, 493.

² For members of the Finance Committee, Appendix I, pp. 493, 494.

ties, and for reporting to the International Committee on the Work of the Council. In the performance of these functions he was assisted by the Associate General Secretaries, all of whom had long administrative experience.

Fletcher S. Brockman, graduated from Vanderbilt University in 1891, had served the International Committee as a secretary in the Student Department for seven years, then as National Secretary for China for seventeen years. In 1915 he had been appointed Associate General Secretary of the International Committee. He sustained a general relationship to the war work administration, acting for Dr. Mott in his absence, and was specially charged with supervision of personnel, publicity, and religious work.

The Associate
General
Secretaries

John S. Tichenor, after completing his studies at Cornell University, had served seven years as General Secretary of the Montclair, N. J., Y M C A. He then entered the Army and Navy Department of the International Committee. For two and a half years he was National Secretary for South Africa, then returned to the Army and Navy Department of the International Committee as Senior Secretary in 1911. He acted as Dr. Mott's associate or alternate in negotiations with the War and Navy Departments and on the Commissions on Training Camp Activities, and had supervision of Supplies and of Physical and Educational Work. Charles R. Towson, Senior Secretary of the Industrial Department of the International Committee, supervised the industrial work of the War Work Council. Later, these arrangements were altered somewhat. Mr. Hibbard was appointed with special responsibility for the work overseas, and still later Mr. Tichenor was designated as sustaining a similar relation to all the work in the United States.

ORGANIZATION FOR WORK IN THE UNITED STATES


At the time the National War Work Council was organized, the Government did not anticipate that there would be any considerable number of Americans overseas until the end of 1917 at the earliest. Indeed, within a few days after the appointment of Dr. Mott as General Secretary, President Wilson requested him to serve as a member of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia under the leadership of Elihu Root, and during those critical weeks between May and August, while the war work was in process of initiation and organization, its chief executive was necessarily more or less out of touch with developments. Before his departure, however, he had laid out plans which

could be put into operation if the need should arise. It was not contemplated to bring under the Council's jurisdiction, for the present at least, the war work which the International Committee had already inaugurated in the armies and prison camps of Europe. The \$3,000,000 fund which was authorized at the first meeting was intended to cover the expenses of the work for Americans in training at home. The task of organization at the beginning, therefore, was conceived to be that of providing machinery for carrying on the war work in the United States. With this object in view, the organization was effected along two broad general lines: at headquarters, bureaus were set up for the purpose of developing particular activities; in the field, departments were established to give direction to all activities within certain geographical limits.


The
Bureaus

Seven bureaus were established at the outset; Finance, for securing pledges and collecting contributions and for the conduct of financial operations; Personnel, for the recruiting, training, and supplying of workers; Matériel, in two divisions, one for the construction and maintenance of buildings, the other for the purchase of equipment and supplies for all purposes; Publicity, for giving currency to information regarding the war work; and Religious Work, Educational Work, and Physical Work, for the purposes indicated by these names. Of these, in the course of time, the Finance Bureau gradually surrendered its functions to the offices of the Treasurer and Comptroller and to the special organizations set up for the great financial campaigns; the Personnel Bureau, under the stimulus of an enormous task, expanded into a War Personnel Board, organized on a much larger scale; and the two divisions of the Matériel Bureau established themselves as separate bureaus—the Bureau of Construction and the Bureau of Equipment and Supplies. As new needs developed, other bureaus were added: Transportation, to provide service for men on troop trains and transports; War Work in Cities, to cooperate with local City Associations in their work for soldiers and sailors; Students' Army Training Corps, to bring to the members of that military organization the facilities of the Association; with the unanticipated call from overseas for women workers, a relatively independent Women's Bureau, for the special recruiting, training, and outfitting of women; Music, to afford leadership in mass singing; Salvage, to dispose of unserviceable equipment; and a Committee on Work in War Industries, functioning in the same manner as a Bureau, to promote the Association's program among workmen in munition plants,

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* TYPICAL ORGANIZATION IN DEPARTMENT



ship-yards, lumber camps, and other industries engaged in production of war materials.

At the beginning of 1918, in order to unify the approach of the bureaus to the Executive Committee, the War Work Council appointed from its own membership an Activities Committee, to receive the reports of the bureaus, pass on their proposals and requests for new appropriations and changes in the budgets, and report to the Executive or the Finance Committees, with recommendations for suitable action. The chairman of the Activities Committee was John Sherman Hoyt.

The Departments represented the geographical divisions of the war work in the United States. Of these there were at the beginning six, Northeastern, Eastern, Southeastern, Central, Southern, and Western, coinciding approximately in territorial limits with the corresponding Departments of the Army, and having departmental headquarters located respectively at Boston, New York, Atlanta, Chicago, San Antonio and San Francisco.¹ In 1918, a seventh department was added, whose territory consisted of the Insular Possessions of the United States, including the Canal Zone and Alaska.

Each department was under the direction of an executive secretary,² who was the general representative of the War Work Council in his field.

The Department Secretary assembled at his headquarters such a staff as the character and volume of his work demanded. At first the departmental staffs were small; later, as the work expanded, a larger number of men were needed for this supervisory function. In January, 1918, the standard departmental staff was described, though this represented the ideal rather than the practice of most of the departments, as including the following secretaries: a department executive secretary; an activities secretary, who should have associated with him one secretary each for religious work, entertainment, educational, and physical work; an office secretary; a personnel secretary, who should have associated with him one secretary each for recruiting, placement, and office details; a business manager, having under him

¹ See Plate V facing p. 204.

² The Executive Secretaries for the six departments in the United States, 1917-1920, were: Eastern Department, A. G. Knebel, succeeded by Herbert P. Lansdale, succeeded by William F. Hirsch; Northeastern Department, E. W. Hearne, succeeded by Arthur E. Hoffmire; Southeastern Department, S. A. Ackley, succeeded by R. H. King; Southern Department, W. E. Adams, succeeded by H. H. Simmons, succeeded by Charles Kurtzhaltz; Western Department, F. A. McCarl; Central Department, A. H. Lichty, succeeded by Geo. B. Landis.

a chief accountant and a supplies secretary; a department supervisor of construction.

Cantonment
Staff

The standardized staff for the great cantonments was defined as including the following: a camp general secretary, a religious work secretary, an educational work secretary, a physical work secretary, a business secretary, with two assistants, one for supplies and one for accounts, a secretary for music, an editor of *Trench and Camp*, a chief motion picture operator, a camp building superintendent, and a custodian and a physical director for the auditorium.

Building
Staff

For each building, again, there was a small staff, proportionate to its size and location and the number of men served. For the E-type building, designed to serve from 3,600 to 8,000 men, the standard staff included six men, as follows: a building general secretary, one secretary each for religious, educational and physical work, and two assistant secretaries, one for social work and one for business and records. It was the intention that, so far as possible, among these six men there should be one able to lead singing, one able to play the piano, one who could operate the motion pictures, and one to act as custodian of property for the building. The requirements seem simple enough. The task of selecting suitable personnel, however, as explained in Chapter XXVII was by no means simple.

Relationship of
Bureaus and
Departments

The relationships between the bureaus and the departments and their respective functions in the camps, were matters that had to be worked out in experience. In military terminology, they have been compared to the Staff and the Line of an Army. It was understood that in the administration of their policies and activities the bureaus should approach the camps through the departmental organizations as represented by the Executive Secretary or his associates. The assignment of personnel to particular positions, such as religious or educational work, was made by the departments, but only on nomination or with the approval of the bureau concerned. In general, it might be said that the bureaus, by reason of their concentration on one particular kind of work and their knowledge of the conditions and needs of the whole field with respect to that kind of work, came to function in the way of formulating programs and methods, giving expert counsel as to the meeting of problems, and furnishing trained workers and special equipment; the departments, because of their more detailed knowledge of the local field and their local contacts, constructed the composite service of which the elements were supplied by the bureaus.

ORGANIZATION FOR WORK OVERSEAS

In spite of the expectation at first that no work for Americans overseas would be required for some months, it was but a few days after the Council's organization when the first call for overseas service came. Communications from Association representatives in Europe urged the necessity for making immediate preparations if the future responsibility to the A E F was to be met. The visits of the Allied Missions led to the dispatch of troops and the early materialization of that opportunity and its attendant demands, and on June 8th the Executive Committee authorized the first appropriations for the A E F in France and England.

But this was not the only call from overseas. At the end of June came an urgent cablegram from Paris for expansion of the service being rendered the French Army, a work which had been inaugurated in 1915.¹ As a result of this appeal the Executive Committee on July 13th requested the International Committee greatly to enlarge this work and agreed to provide the necessary financial resources from additional funds to be raised. On August 31st, in consequence of the recommendations of a deputation which had visited Italy at the request of the Italian Government, the Executive Committee approved the extension of the work to that field. A week earlier Dr. Mott had returned from Russia, bringing word of a unique opportunity for patriotic and humanitarian service, and at the meeting of the War Work Council on September 14th provision was made for a beginning there. These extensive additions necessitated the provision of administrative machinery at headquarters through which the War Work Council might maintain supervision of the activities of its agents abroad.

The Urgent
Appeal from
Europe

A beginning had already been made in that direction. Within a few months after the war began in 1914, work had been undertaken by the International Committee, in cooperation with the World's Committee, with a view to ameliorating the unhappy lot of prisoners of war in European countries on both sides of the conflict. It had also cooperated in the work being done by the Association movements of certain of the warring nations on behalf of their soldiers and sailors, by supplying funds and workers.

From first to last these two branches of the overseas work were kept distinct. The work for the American Army and Navy at home

¹ Consult Chapter LIV.

Committee on
Work for Allied
Armies and
Prisoners of War

and overseas was regarded as the province of the National War Work Council, which had been created by the American Associations expressly for that purpose. The work in the prison camps and among the men of the Allied Armies, on the other hand, had been inaugurated by the International Committee before the beginning of American participation in the war, and the funds with which it was carried on during these years had been contributed to the International Committee for that specific purpose. When the appeal for the enlarged support of the work in the French Army was put by General Pershing on a patriotic basis,¹ the War Work Council undertook to support it financially, but it remained officially under the direction of the International Committee. The common interest in this work thus established between the two organizations resulted at the beginning of 1918 in the formation of a common agency for its management. This was known at the time as the Committee of Nine, but its membership was later increased to fourteen and it came to be known more specifically as the Committee on Work for Allied Armies and Prisoners of War. This Committee was appointed jointly by the Chairmen of the International Committee and of the National War Work Council; all its members were also members of both these bodies, and to both bodies it was responsible. Its own treasurer handled the funds required for its work, although the Executive Committee of the War Work Council determined the extent of appropriations made toward its work from funds raised by the Council and also designated the objects to which those appropriations were devoted. William Sloane served as Chairman of this important committee.

Committee on
the A E F

Early in 1918, a Committee on the A E F was constituted by the War Work Council, to perform for the work in the A E F functions somewhat similar to those performed for the home work by the Activities Committee. Its primary duty was to represent in New York the overseas organization and in every possible way facilitate and expedite its work, reporting with recommendations to the Executive and Finance Committees. The approach of the home bureaus to the overseas organization was through this committee. It was intended that its membership should be composed chiefly of those who had visited or been engaged in the work in the A E F and could represent as far as possible the various activities carried on there. John Sherman Hoyt was Chairman of this Committee on the A E F as well as of the Activities Committee.

¹ Consult Chapter LIV.

Administration of this work in New York was through the Overseas Department, headed by C. V. Hibbard, whose experience specifically fitted him for his duties. After graduation in 1900 from the University of Wisconsin, where he was a member of the Phi Beta Kappa and had been treasurer and president of the University Y M C A, he served two years as student Y M C A secretary at Northwestern University. In 1902 he began twelve years of foreign service, which included three years as student secretary in Tokyo, Japan, two years as field secretary with the Japanese Army in Manchuria during the Japanese-Russian War, and five years as Associate General Secretary of the National Committee of the Japanese Y M C A for work in Manchuria and Korea. Two furloughs spent in the United States had maintained his contact with conditions at home. In 1915 he was sent to Europe to inaugurate the work of the International Committee for prisoners of war and for Allied Armies, and upon his return directed that work from New York Headquarters. In 1917 he was appointed Associate General Secretary of the War Work Council in administrative charge of all its activities in Europe.

The Overseas Department sustained a double relation—to the work in the A E F under authority of the National War Work Council, and to the work in prisoner-of-war camps and in the Armies of the Allies, under authority at first of the International Committee and later of the Committee on Work for Allied Armies and Prisoners of War as a joint committee of the International Committee and the War Work Council. The needs of both at the hands of the home base, however, were much the same—a steady stream of workers, supplies, and money—and they were served largely by the same office organization. In cooperation with the Personnel Bureau and later the War Personnel Board, the Overseas Department devised means and methods, gradually becoming more efficient, for the passing of recruits through the various stages of physical examination, approval by the Government, training, outfitting, and transportation. For the purpose of dealing with one phase of the personnel problem, that of the supplying of entertainers to the overseas forces, an Overseas Entertainment Bureau was set up. An Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau, likewise, purchased canteen and other equipment and supplies and struggled with the very difficult problem of securing shipping space.¹

¹ Consult Chapters XXVIII, XXIX, XXX.

EFFECT ON REGULAR ASSOCIATION WORK

The great enterprise connected with the war in no way relieved the Associations of their responsibilities to civilian communities. Business, social, and political life went on, and into American cities and towns the disturbances of the war brought their own unsettling influences. It was no time for influences for the building of character and for maintaining ideals to be weakened. Indeed, some parts of Association work, that for boys, for example, took on increased importance. It was the duty of national as well as local leaders to protect the regular activities from neglect because of the universal absorption in the war.

Depletion of
Regular Staff

While the machinery set up by the Y M C A for carrying on the war work was an entirely new structure, and while its appeal to the patriotic motive brought financial support and personal service from many elements in our national life to which it had previously been a stranger, nevertheless it drew much of its vitality from the sources which contribute to the strength of its regular work. The National War Work Council represented the whole American Association Movement united as never before in support of a single purpose, and into its service for the soldiers and sailors went a vast amount of the time and energy of its leaders. Not only did the International Committee contribute almost the entire time of its General Secretary and a greater or less proportion of that of many other members of its staff, but state committees and local Associations all over the country released some of their ablest secretaries for periods of service under the National War Work Council, in many cases continuing to pay their salaries. Still further depletion was brought about by enlistment of secretaries as soldiers, for the Association is a young men's organization and many of its leaders are young men. Nor did the reductions in local service because of the enlistment of a large proportion of the members of the Associations counteract the effect of the loss in secretarial leadership, for every local Association welcomed to its facilities any man in the uniform of the Army or the Navy, and in many communities the demands on local Associations were not diminished but increased by the large numbers of soldiers and sailors brought in by war conditions. Moreover, the predominant claims of war work for financial support led to the subordination of the needs of the permanent agencies for their regular work. At a meeting of the department executive secretaries in January, 1918,

one of the regional secretaries of the International Committee reported that in his field about 50 per cent of the regular secretarial staff were engaged in war work, and that those beyond draft age still remaining were inclined to regard themselves as slackers notwithstanding the large services they were constantly rendering to service men.

The difficulties thus created were particularly acute in the earlier months of the war, for it was natural that the first call for recruits for war work should be made on the ranks of the Association's own staff. As time went on and wider support was enlisted, the permanent agencies and the War Work Council were able better to adjust themselves to the situation. The Personnel Bureau was instructed to "protect the present status of the Association work in North America by cooperating with local, state, and International departments and sub-committees in conserving as far as possible the secretarial efficiency in these organizations." Arrangements were made whereby secretaries were released for short periods, of three to six months, so that they might make their contribution to the war-time needs of the nation without weakening unduly the regular activities of the Association. In many local Associations the places of the absent secretaries were filled temporarily by leading men among the members, some of whom were known even to give up their business that they might thus make possible a direct contribution to the winning of the war. In cases like these, apparent disadvantage was turned to a good end, for the wider distribution of responsibilities and duties resulted in an intensification of interest on the part of the membership.

Adjustment of
Early
Difficulties

DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL WAR WORK COUNCIL

War-time activities requiring the attention of the Council continued throughout 1919 and a part of 1920, while responsibility for the use of an unexpected balance of war work funds constituted an obligation which kept it in existence until the end of the latter year. On December 15, 1920, the Executive Committee, satisfied that its work was done, adopted plans for the use of the unexpended balance and for the administration of such parts of its work as remained unfinished.¹ These plans were approved on December 29th by the Council, and by it referred, with a request for its own dissolution, to the International Committee, which in turn ratified them on Febru-

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix XIV, pp. 622-625.

ary 10, 1921. Legal formalities connected with the dissolution were completed March 8, 1921. Thus passed out of existence the National War Work Council, which, under the remarkable leadership and wise guidance of its Chairman, William Sloane, by the generous cooperation of the American people who contributed \$167,000,000 for the purpose, and by the aid of 25,926 devoted men and women who bore the sign of the Red Triangle, had been enabled, during its brief career, to carry its helpful service to millions of men in the armies of nations engaged in the world struggle which called it forth.

CHAPTER XIV

FINANCING THE WELFARE WORK

The vote which created the National War Work Council carried "instructions" to "make an effort to secure in the near future a fund of at least \$3,000,000 for the carrying out of its purposes and plans for the year 1917." Before its work was done, the Council received from public contributions \$167,118,181.25. Comparisons between the pre-war civilian enterprise of the Associations and their war undertakings are illuminating. The membership of the American Associations, at the time America entered the war, was somewhat less than three-quarters of a million men; during the war the Council extended service to 4,800,000 men of the American forces as well as to millions more in the Allied Armies. During the year preceding the entrance of the United States into the war, Association agencies in this country expended for all purposes the sum of \$21,105,046, of which \$965,319 was for the work of the International Committee. Entirely apart from the continuation of these normal activities the War Work Council expended \$152,170,108.¹ The wider range of this service created a wider constituency, and not only from North and South America but from the Allied nations throughout the world, came liberal contributions. Through generous cooperation, in service and facilities, by organizations, individuals, and the press; and through skilful administration, the campaign expenses, including publicity, amounted to less than one per cent of the sum collected, a record seldom if ever excelled in the history of benevolence. The story of what was accomplished with the money thus entrusted to the Association constitutes the theme of this book; the present chapter describes briefly how the funds were raised and administered.

Supervision of the financial affairs of the National War Work Council was entrusted to the Finance Committee, whose members, all leading business men of this country, ranged in number from ten to seventeen at different times.² These men devoted a large amount of

Financial
Organization

¹ For Audited Financial Statement, March 7, 1921, see Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540. After the dissolution of the Council, management of unexpended war work funds was transferred to a Board of Trustees.

² For list of members, see Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 493, 494.

time to the responsibilities accepted, meeting as a rule every week for discharging their large responsibility. George W. Perkins served as Chairman through the whole period of the Committee's existence. At its initial meeting on April 28, 1917, the War Work Council also provided for the organization of a Finance Bureau, which, acting under direction of the Finance Committee, was charged with responsibility: (1) for promotion of nation-wide campaigns for funds; (2) for supervision of the collection and forwarding of funds; and (3) for conduct and control of financial operations as represented by disbursements and records. The first two of these duties were assigned to the Director of the Finance Bureau, A. H. Whitford, the third to the Comptroller, the latter office being filled successively by Halsey Hammond, Frank L. Van Wie, H. W. Wilmot and R. P. Brainard. The Finance Bureau operated on this basis during the period of the two campaigns conducted by the Y M C A independently, but with the advent of the united campaign, the requirements of the situation were changed, and the money-raising functions of the bureau were merged into the organization of the United War Work Campaign.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

At the time of its organization, the War Work Council laid its plans on the basis of an immediate \$3,000,000 budget for the expenses of welfare work in the United States until the end of 1917. The determination to raise this amount represented the united judgment of the whole American Association movement, and plans for its solicitation were on foot even before the Council itself had met for organization. Although the appeal was made to a far wider public than the Association's ordinary constituency, it was natural that the Council, especially in those early days, should seek funds through established Association channels. A tentative apportionment of the whole fund among the various states, in proportion to their apparent resources, was made by the Finance Bureau, and each State Committee was asked to undertake the responsibility of raising within its field the amount allotted to it. In nearly all cases this definite responsibility was accepted, and every state organization took part in the campaign. Time was lacking for the preparation of a concerted effort, and each state was left free to choose its own time and methods. In some, special organizations were set up for the occasion; in others, the State Committees themselves assumed direct control. Local Associations played a large part in the promotion of the campaign in their own

communities; churches, clubs and other organizations cooperated and were the prime factors in many places where there were no local Associations. The campaign went on, in different parts of the country, all through the summer. On June 8th, the Director reported \$3,000,000 pledged and was authorized to advance the goal to \$4,000,000. By the end of August, \$5,000,000 had been subscribed, of which about \$3,500,000 had been collected, and there was ultimately realized from this initial effort a total of \$5,114,183.09.

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN

Meanwhile commitments in connection with the war work vastly increased. Anticipating that expeditionary forces would not be sent to Europe for several months, the Finance Bureau in April had tentatively estimated only \$300,000 for preliminary arrangements overseas. In June the 1st Division sailed, to be followed rapidly by other troops, and the Council's representatives in Europe outlined, in July, a budget contemplating an expenditure of \$5,000,000 for the A E F before the end of that calendar year. Plans were also adopted for work with the French and Italian Armies with initial requirements of \$2,000,000. Dr. Mott, from Russia, where he was serving with the Special American Mission, headed by Elihu Root, cabled recommending that service be undertaken for Russian soldiers, in addition to the work for prisoners already under way in that country. Costs of everything required were advancing rapidly. "With coal at \$60 a ton it will cost \$750,000 to heat the American Y huts in France this winter." "In this country 500 Army buildings costing from \$5,000 to \$8,000 each will be erected as compared with the April estimate of 200 buildings at \$3,000 each. Twenty-five hundred Army secretaries will be in the field by the end of the year instead of 1,000 as estimated in April."¹

As a result of these facts the War Work Council found itself confronted with a serious financial situation. It was evident that available resources would be altogether inadequate to cover the period for which they were intended, and yet it was impossible, in justice to the men of the service and in view of the assurance which the Association had given the Government and the country, to curtail the service already inaugurated or to deny the enlargements demanded by the new conditions. The necessity for getting maximum results

¹ Campaign circular of the War Work Council, September, 1917.

from every dollar expended was urged upon war workers everywhere in the field, but in spite of every effort it became necessary in the early autumn to borrow large sums to provide for immediate needs. This was made possible by the generous action of individual members of the Finance Committee who pledged their personal credit on the Council's notes.

Upon his return from Russia, the General Secretary gave his first attention to these problems. A conference of leaders was held on September 13th, followed on the 21st by a meeting of the entire Council attended by more than one hundred members representing all sections of the country. The Budget Committee recommended to the Council a budget covering the period from October 1, 1917, to June 1, 1918, which was unanimously adopted after careful consideration of the whole field. Briefly summarized, it was as follows:

Work for the Army and Navy in the United States	\$11,120,000
Work for the American Expeditionary Forces in France and England.....	11,994,000
Work for the French Army.....	2,649,000
Work for the Russian Army.....	3,305,000
Work for the Italian Army.....	1,000,000
Work for Prisoners of War.....	1,000,000
For Emergency Needs and Expansion.....	3,932,000
Total.....	<u>\$35,000,000</u>

The Council voted to appeal again to the American people in a nation-wide campaign, for which careful plans, designed to reach every section and every friend of the soldiers and sailors of whatever affiliations, had been prepared by a Campaign Committee.

After five months' operation the Council was now well established as a working body and prepared to organize the second campaign more systematically and conduct it more intensively than had been possible in the earlier effort. The magnitude of the amount asked for and the multiplying of drives for war purposes of various kinds, made it necessary to appeal to the entire nation and to make known by widespread publicity the exact nature of the work and the results it was aimed to accomplish. Publicity and methods were carefully prepared at headquarters and distributed throughout the country by a well-planned, decentralized organization. The Headquarters Committee dealt directly with a campaign committee in each of the six military departments. These again radiated to a state

committee in each state included in the department, and these to county and city committees, which further subdivided responsibility with town and district committees. A system of interlocking memberships gave each committee representatives on the larger and smaller committees with which it was directly related. Maximum use was made of the state and local Associations with their intimate permeations of the communities. Upon them all leading men representative of all groups were invited to serve, regardless of any previous affiliation with the Y M C A, and such men entered into the effort with enthusiasm.

To avoid conflict with the drives for the Liberty Loan, the Hoover Fund, the Young Men's Hebrew Association Fund, and the Red Cross, all of which were scheduled from October to January, the week between November 11th and 19th was appointed. This limitation of time, in contrast with the continuing solicitation for the first fund, which had gone on for several months, emphasized the need for intensive work. A department conference at the headquarters city of each department was scheduled to be held between September 25th and October 15th. Following these, state conferences between October 5th and October 20th were to arrange district conferences. Thus the standardized plans would be disseminated throughout the nation, and modifications to meet local conditions could be worked out in discussion in advance of the campaign week. Quotas were allotted on the basis of population and apparent resources. The goal proposed was that the number of contributors in a state should equal one per cent of its population; for a city, five per cent; for a town, ten per cent. Outside of the cities, there were 2,925 county and 31,661 town committees. In nearly all cases, quotas whether for department, state, county or town, were accepted without demur, and determined efforts made to "go over the top."

In addition to the general effort, two special group campaigns were carried on simultaneously; the Student Y M C A's of the country undertook to raise, by contributions from students and members of faculties of colleges and universities, a Students' Friendship War Fund, to be devoted primarily to the needs of students in the Armies and prison camps of Europe; and an "Earn and Give Campaign" was instituted among boys of high school age, of which the object was to lead as many such boys as possible to earn and give to the fund one dollar a month for ten months.¹

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, p. 511.

The ground had been well prepared for campaign workers by the Publicity Bureau under the guidance of the Publicity Committee of the War Work Council. This committee had been constituted early in May, 1917, with the following as members: Bruce Barton, editor of *Every Week*, Chairman; Nolan R. Best, editor of the *Continent*; Charles Hanson Towne, managing editor of *McClure's Magazine*; Frank Presbrey, formerly publisher of *Public Opinion* and *The Forum*; and J. D. Deavitt. Later William Boyd, of the Curtis Publishing Company, was added to the committee. The Publicity Bureau was directed by S. Wirt Wiley, General Secretary of the Minneapolis Y M C A, until March 1, 1918, when he was succeeded by Thomas R. Shipp, President of the Thomas R. Shipp Publicity Bureau, Washington. All these men represented the best in the profession.

The Association had no previous tradition or policy of general publicity. Relying upon its own members and friends for support of undertakings in which they were spontaneously interested, it communicated information direct to them through its organization channels and publications. Y M C A appeals to the public had been local in character almost exclusively in connection with building or maintenance funds. In these local undertakings it had brought to a high degree of development the method which was to become so well known as the "drive"—an intensive campaign of personal solicitation by members of the community concerned, limited to a brief period, and based solidly upon a convincing presentation of the community value of the proposed service. For such a presentation, the news and editorial columns of local papers were freely open, because of the news value. The war work was conceived in a similar manner, with the nation instead of a single city as the interested community.

It was of course obvious that the war work was a subject of nation wide interest. There was a very real and general anxiety among the people as to the conditions into which the soldiers and sailors were entering. For three years the public had been fed by the press on human interest stories of the fighting in Europe, and in 1917 it suddenly dawned upon the American people that all they had been reading was now to be the lot of their own soldiers. There could be no better reassurance than the fullest possible reports of what the Y M C A was doing; the Government Bureau of Information collected and distributed large amounts of material on the subject, and the press in general welcomed it as news for which their readers were eager.

The gathering, preparation, and distribution of news matter has become a highly technical profession, a fact recognized by the War Work Council in its delegation of the work to a group of men all eminent in the profession. Their policy, from the first, was to handle publicity primarily as news. The sources were the camps themselves. Information as to what was actually being done, largely in the form of incidents and events in the lives of soldiers and of secretaries, was gathered by well known writers who visited the camps, and was sent in by workers. These were put into the hands of experienced news writers who prepared them in form acceptable to the various types of publication for which they were intended. The Associated Press, United Press, and practically all the news and feature syndicates supplying "mat" service to local papers, gave enormous distribution without cost to the War Work funds, and magazines of nation wide circulation published occasional articles or allotted definite space in every issue. The writers who helped in this work were far too many to be named. The list included Bruce Barton, Reginald Wright Kaufman, Christopher Morley, Maude Radford Warren, Katherine Mayo, William Allen White, Booth Tarkington, Ellis Parker Butler, and many others upon whom the public has learned to rely for accuracy and truthfulness. So prominent a feature as the Y M C A huts and activities attracted the attention of the multitudes of free lance writers and correspondents who found copy in the camps; for these, however, the Y M C A could, in no wise, be responsible.

With the approach of the \$35,000,000 campaign, special publicity directed towards the stimulating of contributions was prepared by the Publicity Bureau. This was not released until October 27th, after the Liberty Loan drive and only two weeks before the Y M C A drive. Then there were distributed 600,000 posters, 200,000 articles with illustrations to 7,000 country papers, and 50,000 manuals of instruction to local campaign managers. A portfolio of news articles, poems, cartoons, and fillers was sent to each local publicity director for use by local papers. *Association Men*, the Y M C A periodical, published a special campaign number which had a circulation of 200,000. Circulars and pamphlets containing letters of endorsement by government and military leaders, and a collection of letters by financial and industrial leaders of the War Work Council, such as George W. Perkins and Cyrus H. McCormick, explaining why the Council was asking for so large a sum, were especially effective.

This publicity was especially noteworthy for two characteristics. It was informative throughout, and it gave exceptionally even emphasis to all phases of Y M C A work. The printed budget¹ showed that approximately one-third of the total sum asked for was destined for service to American soldiers and sailors in the home camps, one-third for Americans overseas, about one-fourth for prisoners and Allied forces, and the balance for emergency needs and expansion. Religious, athletic, educational, and social activities and their purposes were described in considerable detail. The dominant note through all was the maintenance in camps of the typical influences of the home communities. The emotional appeal was positive—it emphasized the high character of the men of the new forces, the unprecedented care of the Government for the suppression of evils in their environment,² and the character of welfare work as an aid to the men themselves in overcoming unavoidable dangers and difficulties in their new life. As only the 1st Division had then arrived overseas and work with them in the training area was just beginning, the work that had been and was being done with Allied soldiers on the various fronts, for which public support was now asked for the first time, was described both as an important feature of service actually rendered and as typical of what was planned for Americans when they should reach the combat zone. At that time fighting troops everywhere were in trenches. The trench dugouts of the British Y M C A furnished the true picture of advanced area service. When Americans got into action, trench warfare had given place to warfare of movement, and the earlier description no longer applied. If Americans who read the publicity of the first year did not find Y M C A dugouts in the St. Mihiel and Argonne areas in the autumn of 1918, neither did they find the trench life or the strategic situation which had made the dugout necessary. Advanced area service had been confronted with a sudden necessity to change its form entirely.³ Even when the United Campaign was in preparation, in the autumn of 1918, censorship restrictions prevented the use of descriptions of actual front line conditions. As representing not only actual conditions and activities at the time of publication but also the spirit and

¹ Compare, p. 230.

² Neither the hardships nor the social evils can be dismissed as products of welfare workers' imagination by anyone who acquaints himself with official utterances and documents on the subject. Consult Chapter VI for indications of official recognition of the facts.

³ Consult Chapter IX.

character of welfare service to troops in all situations, the publicity was comprehensive and accurate.¹

When the period of actual solicitation arrived, the results of the widespread information and thoroughly organized canvass exceeded the highest expectations. By November 20th subscriptions were reported amounting to more than \$50,000,000; the final total subscription was \$54,538,859, of which \$53,337,767.53 or 97.8 per cent was actually paid in.² To this total the Students' Friendship War Fund contributed \$1,013,124 and the Earn and Give Campaign \$1,171,088. The number of subscribers exceeded 2,000,000; the number of volunteer campaign workers 400,000. Forty-four states secured beyond the allotment accepted, 23 exceeding their quotas by more than 50 per cent.

Results of the
Second Campaign

The soundness of the methods of the Publicity Bureau was strikingly confirmed by the results of the campaign. In the spring of 1918 the bureau was strengthened and enlarged, and similar bureaus already begun in London and Paris were developed to meet the growing interest as Americans in large numbers reached Europe. As in most of the departments overseas, there were numerous changes in staff, and the accomplishment of the bureau was a composite of the skill and industry of many workers. The functions of the overseas publicity bureaus were several. They became sources of news to the European papers and to the correspondents of American papers. They cooperated with the Press Divisions of the A E F in arranging tours for visiting writers, the policy being to facilitate these in seeing the facts for themselves without interference with their independence in writing their observations and conclusions. They collected material from all sources to be sent by cable, letter, or courier, to the United States for distribution by the New York Publicity Bureau. Through the *Red Triangle Overseas* published weekly after August, 1918, information was distributed to workers. It was not until late in the war that anything like an adequate staff could be spared from direct service to the work of the Bureau.

Development of
Publicity Bureau

The substantial oversubscription of the second campaign led to the hope that the additional contributions might provide sufficient resources for carrying on the work during a longer period than that

The Movement
Toward
Cooperation

¹ This editorial judgment is based upon a careful examination of the many scrap books filled with clippings, posters, circulars, etc., preserved by the Publicity and Finance Bureaus, which are open to inspection.

² Audited Financial Statement, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

originally contemplated. But the unforeseen military events of the spring of 1918, resulting in unprecedented acceleration in the movement of troops across the Atlantic and enormous expansion in America's participation in the war, augmented correspondingly the volume and the cost of the task undertaken by the Y M C A. These events were only well begun when it was realized that the meeting of the demands imposed by the changing circumstances would necessitate the securing of financial resources beyond anything yet attempted. A new campaign, to be conducted in October, was authorized by the War Work Council at its meeting on June 3d, on the basis of the following adopted budget, covering the period from May 1, 1918, to October 31, 1919.

Work for U. S. Army and Navy in this country	\$ 34,122,792.64
Work for U. S. Army and Navy overseas....	44,864,614.70
Work for the French Army.....	9,815,248.00
Work for the Italian Army.....	2,420,660.00
Work for other Allied Armies and Prisoners of War	4,000,000.00
Work in Russia.....	1,647,100.00
Expansion and unforeseen emergencies....	3,129,584.66
Total.....	<hr/> \$100,000,000.00

Before the time came for the new campaign, the conditions which were operating to effect large increases in the war work made it necessary again, as in the autumn of 1917, to borrow large sums of money.

Profiting by its experience in the two earlier campaigns and by that of other organizations whose methods it studied, the War Work Council early laid careful plans for this third great effort. During the month of June, preparatory conferences, attended by the Chairman of the Finance Committee and by the General Secretary, were held in each of the six departments, for such purposes as explaining the new needs to leading men in all sections of the country, setting up departmental machinery for the campaign, and agreeing upon quotas for the various states. Plans for the campaign were going forward upon the basis of conclusions reached at these conferences, when in the summer a new element entered into the situation.

For some months there had been a growing sentiment throughout the country in favor of a reduction in the number of appeals for financial contributions to war purposes. This sentiment had found

expression in a number of cities and counties in the foundation of War Chests, which should make a single annual appeal to the citizens and apportion the fund so gathered among all causes claiming their support. The War Work Council itself, in view of the similarity in aims and principles of the war work of the Young Women's Christian Association, had authorized, June 3d, a combined campaign with that organization. Other welfare societies that had early campaigns in contemplation now interested themselves in the proposed cooperative arrangement, and as a result of conferences of representatives of the various organizations concerned and of the War Department, an agreement was reached on August 13th, whereby the War Camp Community Service and the American Library Association would unite with the Y M C A and the Y W C A and conduct a joint campaign during the week of November 11th. But the movement thus begun did not stop at this point. On September 3d, President Wilson addressed to Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities, a letter requesting that he invite the seven recognized welfare agencies to unite in a common appeal for the work of all.¹ The President's expressed wish overcame any remaining hesitation on the part of any of the organizations, and the following day their representatives assembled and arranged the basic details of the United War Work Campaign.

THE UNITED WAR WORK CAMPAIGN²

In the history of mankind the largest sum ever provided through voluntary offerings for an altruistic cause was the great fund given in November, 1918, in the United War Work Campaign. In the period beginning November 11th, a day forever memorable as the one on which hostilities ceased in the Great World War, the entire American people—the rich and the poor, the members of all parties, races and religious faiths—united their gifts and sacrifices rolling up in subscriptions the vast sum of over \$200,000,000. This fact alone, as an illuminating triumph of spiritual over material forces, would give the campaign unique distinction.

When the unfavorable circumstances which attended this great effort are borne in mind, it becomes all the more remarkable.

¹ See Report of the United War Work Campaign, September 30, 1921. Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 513-521.

² The substance of this section is reproduced from a pamphlet, "The Largest Voluntary Offering in History," by John R. Mott, Director General of the United War Work Campaign.

The Largest
Voluntary
Offering in
History

Difficulties

To begin with, the time for preparation was all too brief, having been confined to only two months, owing to the long delays and uncertainty occasioned by the series of merger discussions and negotiations, involving, as they did for certain of the organizations, a three-fold scrapping of the machinery, reorganization of the forces and changing of the publicity program. Even the scant two months left for this purpose was cut into for three weeks by the Fourth Liberty Loan and, near the threshold of the campaign itself, by a general Congressional election.

More serious still was the nation wide spread of the deadly influenza epidemic, which had a death-toll of twice as many lives as America laid down in the War. The speaking program had virtually to be abandoned. Literally tens of thousands of speakers who had prepared themselves to help in the campaign could not be used. In some states not a single meeting could be held. All their churches, schools, and theaters were entirely closed. No meetings, luncheons, parades, nor community singing were permitted. In one state which went over the top, 40 per cent of the members of teams and committees were confined to their beds by the epidemic during the week of the campaign itself.

The false peace report which set the entire land ablaze came on the day when thousands of communities had planned to have their preparatory dinners or meetings for the final coaching of their working staff and for striking the key-note of the campaign; and the genuine peace report, which even more thrilled and absolutely absorbed the minds and hearts of the people, claimed the initial day of the campaign with its spontaneous celebrations in every city and hamlet of the land. In addition, certain states devoted the following day to a peace holiday. The confused or conflicting statements regarding the policy of demobilization as given out near the close of the campaign undoubtedly constituted another handicap, notwithstanding the clear and satisfying deliverances on the subject which were made by the War Department. Almost every community experienced real difficulty in connection with its publicity. The greatest world news of modern times, coming right in the very week of the campaign, necessarily commanded the first pages and often the entire space of the papers.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the high taxation prevented as large participation on the part of the wealthy and well-to-do classes in this campaign as in previous war drives. With few exceptions,

The Effects
of the
Influenza
Epidemic

Other
Conflicting
Conditions

they were not able to give so much relatively as they gave, for example, in the Red Cross and Association campaigns, notwithstanding the fact that they were equally interested. It was also undoubtedly true that owing to the merger arrangement, none of the seven organizations was able to set forth the claims of its work with the same freedom, fullness and compelling force which had naturally characterized it in its previous individual financial drives. This was inevitable and from the best of motives, because the leaders of all the cooperative societies were anxious not to do anything which might seem to the others like exploiting their particular agencies. It must be admitted also in fairness that in every community there were some who were unable to favor the joint campaign and who therefore could not conscientiously devote to it their time and resources.

This generous offering put all of the seven cooperating organizations in a position to render a larger and better service to the men of the American Army and Navy and of the forces of our Allies and to other men as well as women seriously affected by war conditions. This was most fortunate, because the history of all wars shows that the period following the cessation of hostilities is the period of greatest danger. Our men were now face to face with the three gravest tests—the test of victory, the test of demobilization, and the test of readjustment.

The United War Work Campaign furnished the most impressive example thus far afforded of religious unity and cooperation. The leaders and the many millions of followers of the Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish religious bodies of a great nation joined forces for the accomplishment of a common unselfish object. In doing this no one of them obscured, minimized or apologized for that which is most distinctive in its life and work. The campaign generated in many a community an atmosphere of truer understanding—an atmosphere in which, as has been pointed out, men come to loathe differences and determine to understand.

The campaign was a great experience for all of the seven cooperating organizations. It afforded each a boundless opportunity to serve the others through placing at their disposal its experience, its organization and its working force. The campaign gave each agency thousands of new contacts in every section and one might almost say in every state. Men and women were thus ushered into countless new friendships and into a wider and richer fellowship; their opportunity to bear witness to that which each most valued was greatly widened.

Timely
Resources

A Triumph of
Cooperation

The spirit of true tolerance and of sympathetic appreciation was developed and men's souls expanded.

The great triumph was due to the large-minded and large-hearted cooperation of all elements in our national life. President Wilson, through his two messages, one at the beginning and one near the close of the campaign, ensured the responsive confidence of the entire nation. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Director General of Railroads, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, the Comptroller of the Currency and other leaders of the Government gave the weight of their influence and the force of their influential advocacy to the campaign.¹ The telegrams of endorsement from General Pershing, Marshal Foch, and other great commanders did much to stimulate the gifts of the people. The Army and Navy Commissions on Training Camp Activities, the Committee on Public Information, the Council of National Defense, and the corresponding bodies in the various states and in thousands of communities placed themselves solidly behind the drive, as did also the governors of virtually all of the states. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Taft and many of our other statesmen and political leaders by addresses and articles rendered invaluable cooperation. The American Red Cross, called upon all of its workers and chapters to do all in their power to ensure the success of the campaign. The Protestant pastors, the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and the rabbis in all parts of the land mobilized their religious forces in the interest of this notable effort on behalf of our soldiers and sailors.

Foreign
Cooperation

The remarkable cooperation of other countries should also be borne in mind. As the opening date of the campaign drew near, cablegrams were sent to several nations primarily with the thought of enlisting the interest of Americans resident in those lands. By the time the campaign closed over two million dollars had been subscribed in these neighboring and distant countries, the natives of the countries as well as the Americans and other nationals joining in the giving. Porto Rico subscribed over \$100,000, although their offering came right on the heels of the disastrous earthquake. In Cuba \$275,000 was subscribed, \$100,000 being given by the National Government and the President of the Republic serving as Honorary Chairman of the Campaign Committee. In the various larger cities of Mexico all nationalities united under the leadership of the American Ambassador in providing over \$100,000 for the fund. The citizens of

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 511-521.

Hawaii gave the sum of \$330,000, thus establishing a new record. The cablegram to the Philippines suggested that they raise \$100,000 for the cause, but they replied that they would give \$250,000. In Japan the Foreign Minister organized a committee with Prince Tokugawa as its chairman and the sum of \$360,000 was raised as an expression of sympathy for America in the war. In China the governments in the North and in the South vied with each other in generous offerings to the fund. The meeting launching this cooperative effort was held in the Winter Palace and was attended by the members of the Cabinet, the leading members of Parliament and the foreign Ambassadors. The Chihli Provincial Assembly subscribed \$100,000. Each of six cities gave \$100,000 or more. In all, China gave more than \$1,400,000. The Russian merchants in Harbin contributed 1,200,000 rubles.

Never before had foundations, corporations, companies, banks, industries, and the rural population of America participated so generally and so generously in a great popular subscription. It would be difficult to overstate the highly-multiplying power of the notable gifts of the Rockefeller Foundation, of the United States Steel Corporation, and of such discerning and generous citizens as Cleveland H. Dodge, Arthur Curtiss James, Julius Rosenwald, Cyrus H. McCormick, and a host of others in all parts of the land. The activity of the Women's Cooperating Committee under the leadership of Mrs. Arthur Curtiss James also had a great influence on the wonderful response secured from the women of America. The marvelous manifestation of real sacrificial giving on the part of multitudes of workmen and of others of slender means was also most impressive.¹

The testimony of all concerned in the campaign is unanimous in affirming the sincerity with which all submerged their separate interests beneath the one absorbing purpose of serving the fighting men. Dr. John R. Mott, General Secretary of the Y M C A War Work Council, was chosen Director General, on motion of John G. Agar, representing the National Catholic War Council, seconded by Mortimer L. Schiff, representing the Jewish Welfare Board. The Y M C A War Work Council assigned a floor of its office space as national headquarters of the United Campaign. In a speech at an Archdiocesan

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 513-521. See also Preliminary Report to Subscribers, March, 1919, for detailed budgets of all organizations, letters of approval by Secretaries of War and Navy, and significant agreements of representatives of cooperating organizations.

Conference in New York, Bishop P. J. Muldoon, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Roman Catholic Church, said:

"I have not received in the New York office one single criticism from any Bishop or priest in the United States. I have not had a word of friction with any of the other campaign managers. When Mr. Mott was selected Director General, he said: 'From this hour I am no longer a Young Men's Christian Association man. I have taken off the habit. I have become Campaign Manager for the United Drive.' He took down every sign in his office which might indicate that it was the headquarters of the Young Men's Christian Association. Everything there now indicates that he is a representative of the United War Work Campaign."¹

Association
Plans of Campaign
Adopted

Because the machinery set up first in anticipation of a Y M C A drive, and later of a united campaign of four organizations, was in working order on a nation wide scale, it was unanimously adopted.

"The difficulties in the way of full Catholic participation were greater than those which confronted practically every one of the other bodies cooperating in the campaign. There had been no advance preparation whatever for the drive. The Catholics were without headquarters, instruments, and personnel. The other organizations, particularly the Y M C A, had considerable organization held over from previous campaigns. Their plans for this campaign had progressed over a period of several months. Their printed matter had been designed, written, and was on the presses.² Organizing personnel had been practically absorbed and the pace set by the calendar was such as to almost dishearten the organizations which came into the merger so late. The most serious difficulty of all lay in the fact that the united campaign organization had been set up by military divisions, States, intra-state districts, and counties (geographical) while Catholic organization for the 'gear-in' was by fourteen provinces, one hundred and two dioceses, and approximately ten thousand parishes, the geographical boundaries of which did not coincide with the United organization. . . . With nothing like 'divisions, States, or intra-state districts' of its own, the (Catholic) Council was, nevertheless, asked and necessarily had to be asked to 'name its men on all these bodies.' The Young Men's Christian Association extended special courtesy to the National Catholic War Council by offering office space at 124 West 28th Street, New York City"³

¹ Consult *American Catholics in the War*, Michael Williams, New York, 1921, p. 201.

² This printed matter was, of course, not used. All publicity distributed for the campaign was prepared by the Publicity Committee made up of representatives of the seven cooperating organizations, with the exception of a limited amount of special matter approved by the United Publicity Committee before distribution.

³ Consult *American Catholics in the War*, Michael Williams, New York, 1921, pp. 210-211.

The sudden ending of the fighting imposed a colossal task upon the campaign managers in the last hours before solicitation was to begin. The appeal had been based upon the anticipation of continuance of the war until some time in the spring of 1919. The service for which contributions were to be asked had been described in terms of the conditions prevailing in the summer of 1918, and instructions to speakers had emphasized these features. To make sure that none gave under false impressions, it was obligatory to make clear to every intending giver that funds were now sought for service under conditions of demobilization. Moreover, there was grave danger that, through misapprehensions as to the rapidity of demobilization, the people would think that service was no longer needed or that smaller gifts would suffice. As a matter of fact, the period of demobilization presented greater needs and greater dangers, from the point of view of national welfare, than even the period of combat. Demobilization might easily become demoralization. In the last three days, the telegraph wires, which throughout the campaign had been at the disposal of the committee, without charge, were loaded with messages to the thousands of workers throughout the country, instructing them to give the widest publicity to the new needs. So effectively was this done, that there was slight possibility that any made contributions without understanding the situation.

In spite of the influenza epidemic, of the absorption of press and people in the celebration of victory, the campaign was a striking success. Whereas \$170,500,000 had been asked for, the people subscribed approximately \$203,000,000, of which practically \$190,000,000¹ was collected; exceeding the proposed amount by 11 per cent. Of this total the Y M C A received 58.65 per cent, amounting to \$108,509,500.²

CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES

Thus the Y M C A received, from successive campaigns and from other sources for its war work, funds aggregating more than \$170,000,000. It was no small task to spend this sum wisely and economically and in accordance with the spirit in which it was given.

¹ Report of the United War Work Campaign, Inc., September 30, 1921, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 513-521.

² Audited Financial Statement National War Work Council Y M C A, March 7, 1921, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

NOTE.—Subsequent to the dissolution of the National War Work Council, additional payments were made to the Trustees of the Council from undistributed funds of the United Campaign.

One of the first rules adopted to keep a check on expenditures was the requirement that each bureau and department should submit monthly, in advance, for consideration by the Finance Committee, an itemized budget estimate. In the case of the departments, a detailed estimate for each building was required. Administrative and operating expenses were covered by appropriations based on these monthly budgets, expenditures being made upon approval by a specified officer in each bureau and department. Proposed construction was also included in them, but the erection of new buildings and the opening of new units could only be undertaken upon specific authorization by the Executive Committee in each case, in addition to the general approval of the budget by the Finance Committee. After a few months, it was found advisable, in the interest of coordination, to refer operating budgets and requests for authorization of new construction to the General Secretary and his Associates, before submission to the Executive Committee. In addition to these two classes of appropriations, particular objects not coming within the province of either were sometimes financed by special action of the Finance or Executive Committee.

Accounting and
Auditing

Some difficulties in the handling of accounts were experienced in the early days by reason of the conditions under which the work in the field was done. Points of activity were located often hundreds or thousands of miles from headquarters, intercommunication and official action involved unavoidable delay, staffs were undermanned, and men were more interested in the accomplishment of pressing tasks at hand than in standardization of accounts or strict adherence to prescribed procedure. In one case of very urgent need for troops in transit, request for authorization of a new building was wired to New York and in due time granted, but the building was wired, equipped, and open for service within twenty-four hours after the original request was made. Nevertheless, such departures from sound business procedure were recognized and reluctantly acquiesced in only under service pressure, and as time went on and conditions became more stabilized the administration was greatly strengthened. A secretary was placed on the headquarters staff of each department and, so far as possible, of each camp, to have charge of business administration. In some cases business men of wide experience and ability contributed their services for this purpose. The central authority of the Comptroller in matters of accounting and business policy was established, and department business secretaries were made responsible to him

rather than to the department executives, but cooperation was promoted by frequent conferences in the field and at Headquarters.

F. H. Hurdman, of Hurdman and Cranstoun, certified public accountants, New York City, undertook supervision of the accounting of the War Work Council at an early date. When service to the A E F came into prominence, that firm was not in a position to extend its responsibility overseas, and early in December the Executive Committee invited the firm of Price, Waterhouse and Company to undertake the supervision and auditing of accounts in France and England. The firm accepted the invitation, offering the services of one of its members without charge, even for his personal expenses, and all other work at actual cost. William E. Seatree was selected as the firm's representative. He was at the time acting as Chief of the Bureau of Research and Investigation of the Priorities Committee of the War Industries Board of the Council of National Defense. Within two weeks Mr. Seatree's release from that important office was secured, and he was at work selecting a staff of assistants, and setting up at New York Headquarters a system of accounting corresponding to that he proposed to use overseas. He sailed from New York about March 10, 1918. The desirability of having unified supervision and auditing for all accounts, at home and overseas, was obvious, and on March 1st, Mr. Hurdman voluntarily withdrew and Price, Waterhouse and Company undertook the entire task.¹

The Armistice and the events of the demobilization period affected the financial situation of the War Work Council profoundly, as it did other aspects of its work. Even the great fund which had been raised in the days immediately following the Armistice seemed scarcely sufficient to meet the needs, because new demands came with the utterly changed conditions and because it was the general expectation of those in a position to know the facts, Army and Navy officials as well as others, that the process of demobilization would be spread over a period of many months. In the readjustments which followed the Armistice, therefore, plans were laid for future work on such a scale as financial resources distributed over a long period would permit. But new and unexpected factors entered into the situation. The military and naval forces were demobilized much more rapidly than was originally contemplated. The educational work in France was transferred to the Army, the Government reimbursing the As-

The Unexpended
Balance

¹ For Audited Financial Statement, see Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

sociation for the large amount of money expended by it on textbooks and assuming the support of many educational workers. Salvage operations were remarkably successful, bringing a return from some of the funds of the earlier campaigns expended for buildings and equipment. The French and American Governments remitted certain charges in connection with railway and motor transportation in France and ocean freight carried on Government transports. Finally, toward the end of 1919, the War and Navy Departments took into their own hands the welfare work for soldiers and sailors within camps and stations. As a result of these and other circumstances, the financial resources which had seemed inadequate proved to be more than sufficient, and on December 31, 1919, the Comptroller's financial statement showed the National War Work Council to be in possession of an unexpended and unappropriated balance of approximately \$18,500,000.

Additional
Service

There were still, however, services to be rendered to the American Forces in Germany, and the Council was requested to assist in various ways the new welfare undertakings of the Army and Navy. There were also commitments, financial and otherwise, which could not be quickly closed up. During 1920 the proper disposition of unexpended funds was studied with great care. A budget was adopted for the liquidation of liabilities and the continuation of certain phases of work through 1921. On December 15, 1920, a special committee reported a plan by which the administration of the budget should be placed in the hands of a Liquidation Committee, and the unallocated balance in the hands of a Board of Trustees.¹ This was approved by the War Work Council at its final meeting, December 29, 1920, and by the International Committee, February 10, 1921. The Audited Financial Statement by Price, Waterhouse & Company, brought the accounts to March 7, 1921, when the net assets amounting to \$18,503,805.54 were turned over to the Trustees. Of this sum, \$9,081,560.42 was required for the budget entrusted to the Liquidation Committee, and the balance of \$9,422,245.08 was divided, half for the erection, equipment and maintenance of buildings for soldiers and sailors, and half as a reserve to meet the needs of soldiers and sailors in any national emergency that might arise.² At the present writing (September, 1922), the Trustees and committees are still active in the performance of their duties.

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix XIV, pp. 622-625, Dissolution of National War Work Council.

² See Audited Financial Statement, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

The reflection inevitably occurs that in such a nation wide undertaking for a national purpose, the provision and administration of such immense sums should be in the hands of official public agencies. Through taxation the obligations of each citizen would be determined, and the burden equitably distributed, while expenditures would be directed by elected representatives of the people. But the political and economic aspects of this service were, in fact, secondary to their human aspect. The provision of funds was not a burden; it was a privilege. The solicitation was not importunate; it was informative. There was a deep desire universally prevalent, which could be satisfied only by voluntary giving. The people were determined to have a direct share in the service of uniformed men; the thing they did had always the character of a friendly act personally performed. Such service loses its flavor when it becomes official. The soldiers and sailors, too, craved that personal touch. Accustomed to a highly individualized life, they chafed under the officialdom which had taken complete possession of them. They were not men who had chosen military tasks as one chooses an occupation. They were citizens performing a disagreeable but necessary and unpaid duty of citizenship, and they took a human pleasure in the expression of appreciation and sympathy by their fellow citizens which the most liberal treatment by their officers and government could not replace. Deeper still was the sense that intermingled with ministry to the body was a ministry to the spirit, the sense of concern which is permissible only to friends, and which becomes offensive and intrusive when it assumes an official character. The very fact that the friends at home could not reach the men directly made it essential that the intermediaries should be men and women whose service was voluntary and without material compensation. The profound difference between a professional peacetime army and an army composed of citizens arrayed for the defense of their homes and their ideals has here one of its most subtle yet most vital expressions, a reality which theory may not ignore or change but to which it must conform.

CHAPTER XV

MOBILIZING THE WELFARE ARMY

In human service, personality outweighs all else. No array of material equipment can be a substitute for it, nor can lack of material aids defeat it. For welfare work with soldiers, the greatest asset was the personality of the workers. True, material aids were needed, books and films, baseballs and boxing gloves, cigarets and stationery and phonographs. But important as these were, and many and difficult as were the problems encountered in securing and distributing them, these problems invariably resolved themselves into human problems.

Numbers
Engaged in
Welfare Work

Only a small proportion of the enormous number of men and women who had a share in welfare work can be made the subject of historical record. Not only were there thousands who found individual channels of service to the men, but under the guidance of the principal organizations there were hundreds of thousands who gave unpaid, part-time service in small or large measure. The American Red Cross estimates that 70,000 women served as volunteers in canteens at railway stations and in cities. The War Camp Community Service had thousands more. In the Second Financial Campaign of the Y M C A, 400,000 volunteers were enrolled as workers. When the men and women who gave invaluable service in raising funds, and workers, in entertainment, hospitality, and the like, are remembered, the only just statement possible is that the whole American people regarded the welfare of American soldiers as their peculiar and welcome responsibility, and directly and indirectly promoted and shared in it to the limit of their opportunities and abilities.

A fairly definite summarization and classification of regularly engaged, paid Y M C A workers¹ is possible. This shows a total of

¹Tables, drawn from the records of the Y M C A, showing workers classified as to residence, previous occupation and service assignments, will be found in Appendix II, pp. 504-506. The personnel figures of other civilian agencies are published by them as follows: Work of the American Red Cross During the War, Washington, D. C., 1919, p. 47; Knights of Columbus in Peace and War, M. F. Egan and J. B. Kennedy, New Haven, Conn., 1920, Vol. II, pp. 363, 379; The War Romance of the Salvation Army, Booth and Hill, Philadelphia, 1919, pp. 86, 107; Report of National War Work Council of Y W C A, New York, 1919, p. 41; Jewish Welfare Board, U. S. Army and Navy, New York, 1919, p. 41; Report of War Service Committee of American Library Association, Albany, N. Y., 1919, p. 41.

25,926, equally divided between home and overseas service. Not all these were at work at any one time. Many were able to give a year's service who could not volunteer for the period of the war. The graph (Problem of Personnel) Plate XII facing p. 484, shows the expansion and contraction of the Y M C A forces overseas.

Upon the personnel departments was imposed the task of supply-
 ing this large force of men and women. The War Personnel Board estimated¹ that more than 200,000 candidates were sifted to secure its 25,926 workers. Besides discovering candidates, and testing their qualifications, they were responsible for training, equipment, assignment, and transport to posts of service. At every stage and phase the regulations of the Government, prevailing transport and market conditions, and successive military exigencies operated to direct, modify, and limit their course. Before entering upon an account of the organization developed by the Y M C A to perform these functions, a survey of the personnel problem in general will throw light on methods and policies.

The requisite qualifications of workers need but brief reference. They ranged from personal character to nationality, from financial resources to religious faith. For obvious reasons the first and last named were the most important. Reputation was not enough. In view of the utterly new and untried conditions into which they were going, where all customary social aids and restraints ceased to operate, it was necessary that the springs of rectitude should be within each man and woman. The few cases of lapse from high standards confirmed and emphasized this rule and justified the scrutiny of recommendations and the thorough research made into the private lives of candidates.

This was applied to all without exception. Religious profession and activity were regarded as highly desirable but not sufficient evidence. The Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, and Salvation Army, naturally chose their workers exclusively from the religious groups with which they are identified. The Y M C A, as an organization composed of members of evangelical churches, sought preferably recruits from that group. As the organization held primarily responsible by the Government for the administration of work supported by nation wide contributions, it also recruited men and

¹ No report was made to the War Personnel Board of applicants rejected by local personnel committees because of technical disqualifications, or physical unfitness. The number so ineligible was very large.

women of Christian character who professed no connection with churches popularly characterized as evangelical. In different sections of the country, the religious test was variously emphasized. Inasmuch as every welfare organization working overseas, except the American Library Association, had a specifically religious character and was so recognized by the soldiers, it was both natural and wise that God-fearing and God-loving men should represent them. Doubt or denial of religious principle, expressed in work or act, was an incongruity in wearers of any welfare uniform that could have only a damaging effect even on frankly irreligious soldiers. It was only necessary that religious profession be not regarded as a substitute for evidence of personal character.

Practical
Considerations

Next to Christian character, resourcefulness and adaptability were requisite. For a comparatively few duties, technical experience could be found. Thus in accounting, professional experts were recruited by the well-known firm of public accountants that had entire charge of all accounting overseas. Entertainers were drawn almost wholly from the theatrical and musical professions. Shipping and traffic men with experience in railroad and marine transport were found to take charge of freight on docks and in transit. Motor mechanics and chauffeurs, and some other workers, were chosen so far as possible from among technically trained groups. But all, in the turmoil of war, found themselves frequently in unprecedented situations where only native wit and ingenuity could win through. For the great majority of welfare workers, the task was wholly novel and every day brought demands and set puzzles which no one had ever faced before. This characteristic of army welfare work was speedily recognized, and evidence of ability to deal with the unexpected was constantly sought in candidates. Temperamental adaptability, an elusive quality, was highly valuable and eagerly sought for; because in all work of this nature, personal relationships are necessarily close and frequently irritating, yet nothing so hinders success as does yielding to temper.

Liability to
Military Service

The recruiting field was limited to men free from military liability. The effort to observe this rule scrupulously was hampered by uncertainty as to the definition of military liability which Congress would adopt. When the United States declared war, the Y M C A had a considerable number of young men working with prisoners of war and with the British and Colonial Associations for Allied soldiers. Before the first draft law was passed, many of these transferred to the

A E F-Y M C A service, and other young men were recruited, with the authorization of Secretary Baker.¹ As soon as the first draft law was passed, the welfare organizations ceased to accept recruits under 31 years of age and accelerated the transfer to military service of all not exempt for personal reasons. When the second draft law fixed new age limits, there were in the A E F-Y M C A about 1,100 men between the ages of 31 and 45. The Chief Secretary promptly applied to the Commander-in-Chief for instructions as to those men. He pointed out that if they were dismissed at once, it would be necessary to abandon a considerable number of established huts and to postpone the opening of new huts urgently requested by commanding officers. General Pershing replied:

"In view of the military importance of the Y M C A with the A E F and with other Allied Armies, I believe that your personnel should continue for the present in the service of the Y M C A unless they are specifically called by the Government for military duty of another kind."

Advice of
General Pershing

Almost simultaneously a conference was held in Washington by representatives of the War Department, the Commission on Training Camp Activities, and the relief and welfare organizations. On September 19th, the following telegram was sent to the personnel secretaries of the six military departments of the United States:

"Fosdick Commission including representatives of Association, Catholic National War Council, War Camp Community Service, and Red Cross, after prolonged consideration of Selective Service Act and in consultation with the War Department unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

April 28, 1917.

¹ My dear Dr. Mott:

The President has directed my attention to your suggestion that there is a large number of young men at present engaged in work of the Y M C A in behalf of the Army and Navy of the United States, and also in the work of the Association on behalf of the men of the armies of the Allied countries and in the Prisoners of War Camps of the various belligerents. Undoubtedly these young men are doing service for their country and their country's cause of a high order and I would be very glad to have it made known through the publicity agencies of the Association that this Department recognizes all such work as being of service to the Government of the United States.

Whether or not exemption from military service shall automatically be made in favor of any such young men cannot now be determined, but, pending their actual call to the colors, this Department will recognize their service as directly in aid of the men in our own Army.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) NEWTON T. BAKER.

Secretary of War.

N. B. This letter was written because the Y M C A secretaries in France at the time of the Declaration of War inquired as to their military standing.

First resolution. That every overseas service organization affiliated with the Commission on Training Camp Activities and the Commission itself will appoint only men who are not in Class 1, and who were thirty-seven years of age or over on September 12, 1918. Men under that age may be appointed if they are disqualified for military service by obvious physical defects. The War Department will be requested to call for registration and classification men within draft age who are already in work overseas with these organizations.

Second resolution. That for service in America no exemption will be asked for men of Class 1. Men of other classes will be used until such classes are called for military service.

We recommend immediate enforcing of these resolutions, and that special consideration be given to placing in domestic service men preparing for overseas who are eliminated by resolution 1."

The Question
of Slackers

The organizations scrupulously observed this agreement. Some difficulty arose, however, through confusion of instructions to draft boards as to granting permits to leave the country which were required to accompany passport applications for men under forty-five who were not in Class 1. In spite of hasty generalizations based upon appearances, the record is clear that in their employment of workers the welfare organizations acted in this matter always with the advice and according to the instructions of the military authorities. Their records will stand the most unfriendly comparison with munition, shipbuilding, and industrial corporations which were allowed to request exemption for employees, a request never made in behalf of welfare workers. No slacker entered the service of any welfare organization with the knowledge of any responsible person.

The obvious propriety of this rule under the conditions prevailing in 1917 and 1918, should not be permitted to conceal the difficulties it imposed on the welfare organizations and the injury to their service. The number was very great of men above draft age eager to serve, but unfit to bear the physical hardships and dangers of the service. The elimination of these and of the physically fit who were prevented by domestic or other responsibilities from volunteering drastically reduced the number of available men. There were also numerous men whose special qualifications would have rendered them exceedingly valuable to the nation as welfare workers but who were unavailable because their age and physical fitness placed them in the Army.

Two other principal qualifications should be noticed, loyalty and relative financial independence. The first may better be considered in connection with the measures taken to exclude any whose loyalty was even open to question.

Compensation

The service of the welfare organizations offered no financial temp-
tation. It was a sacrificial service. In the United States the Associa-
tion paid unmarried secretaries \$1,000 a year and married men \$1,200
to \$1,500. Executives were paid on a scale corresponding to the pay
of Army officers with corresponding responsibilities up to the rank of
major at \$3,000. In overseas service each secretary received a living
allowance accurately calculated to meet the cost of maintenance at his
post of service, ranging from \$60 a month in camps to \$120 in con-
gested cities like Paris where rent and food were high. In addition,
a family allowance, ranging from \$50 to \$200 a month, was granted
where needed. No allowance exceeding \$100 a month could be made
except by vote of the War Personnel Board in New York, and only
upon demonstration of actual need. The Association, during the
first year, paid the excess war risk premium on \$5,000 insurance for
each secretary going overseas, the regular premium being paid by the
secretary. In the summer of 1918, the entire personnel was insured
for \$3,500 each under a group policy paid for by the Association. A
group indemnity or liability policy, providing \$20 a week for 100
weeks for any secretary totally incapacitated in service was also
bought by the Association. Any claims for compensation for acci-
dent, sickness, or death were thus provided for. As will be seen, the
Association, though freed from legal responsibility, gave generous
consideration to incapacitated individuals whose needs were not suffi-
ciently met by this insurance. Traveling expenses, and special equip-
ment not required in civilian life, costing about \$250 per secretary,
were provided by the Association, the latter being returnable on com-
pletion of service.

Salaries of
Association
Secretaries

It is evident that the service ought to have been undertaken only
by those possessed of financial resources upon which they were able
and willing to draw for the support of their families, and who were
so firmly established that withdrawal from gainful occupations for a
year or more would not be attended by too serious risks for the future.
Nevertheless many, in their enthusiasm for the cause, enlisted with no
security for their families beyond the meager insurance, only half
what the Government provided for soldiers. Their patriotism was
beyond praise. Many others, who would gladly have risked personally
the dangers of war, were restrained by their obligations to wife and
children. The military age prescriptions limited the welfare organ-
izations to that group in which men with growing families are most
numerous—men whom the selective service laws excluded from the

Army. From the idealistic point of view, it was proper that the work should be one of sacrificial devotion, without the inducement of profit. But from the point of view of social intelligence, the alternative consequences of limiting the service to men of comparative wealth or accepting others at risks to be borne by women and children, merit careful reflection.

Recruiting
Organization and
Methods

In its Secretarial Bureau, the International Committee had an agency ready to undertake recruiting. The Secretarial Bureau was instituted by the International Committee in 1881 to insure a steady supply of trained Association secretaries for the local Y M C A's throughout America and for the foreign work. It was the repository of information as to the number, distribution, and abilities of employed secretaries and the sources from which additional ones might be drawn. One of the first acts of the National War Work Council was to reconstitute the Secretarial Bureau as a Bureau of Personnel charged with the duty of selecting and assigning the men needed for war work. R. P. Kaighn was appointed Director.

As has been pointed out, the War Department's original plan was to mobilize and train an army in America. Except for one or two divisions of the Regular Army to be sent to France for effect on Allied morale as a demonstration that America was really in the war, it was not expected that an expeditionary force of any considerable size would be dispatched before winter. The program appeared to call for gradual expansion, ultimately to a very large scale, of work then being carried on by the Association's Army and Navy Department through regularly trained secretaries. The Bureau of Personnel therefore sought for workers principally among employed secretaries and members of local Associations experienced in peace-time work with young men, and among ministers, teachers, and men known to have the necessary qualifications for such work. Leading men and organizations like Chambers of Commerce throughout the country were asked to recommend men whom they regarded as suitable. In all cases, the Bureau of Personnel entered into direct correspondence with the prospective candidates, and in due course invited them to New York for personal interviews and engagement.

This method proved adequate so far as home camps were concerned. The Army recruiting service sent volunteers to permanent Army posts or to National Guard Camps, where Association service was established. This increase called simply for a gradual enlargement of welfare staffs. The Government's plans were made known

nearly six months before the great cantonments were ready for the reception of men, and the interval allowed ample time for devising a well organized staff plan, and securing the necessary men.

Recruiting for overseas presented a different situation. The War Department's change of plan called for a supply of workers overseas several months before the anticipated time. Moreover, the Chief Secretary overseas and his associates tried desperately to build up an executive organization in advance of the foreseen demand, and called for men of executive ability in numbers much greater than the estimated service requirements. As shown in the graph (Problem of Personnel) p. 484, the number sent overseas during the fall and winter of 1917, corresponded closely to that estimate. It did not, however, come near to filling the constantly increasing requisitions from Paris. When the Caporetto disaster, followed by the collapse of Russia, gave warning that American expeditionary forces must be hurried over ahead of schedule, it became clear that a method of recruiting must be adopted that would give quicker results and draw from a larger field. The ranks of employed secretaries and ministers could not furnish enough men for hut workers. They must be supplemented by every available man of strong and friendly personality. In addition, many men of technical experience, chauffeurs, accountants, builders, and business men, were needed. The Personnel Bureau intensified its efforts, sending appeals through the country for suggestions and recommendations of men whose character and experience gave promise of fitness for any share in the work.

The situation dictated that the Y M C A must be considered not as a reservoir of workers to be drawn upon, but as a channel through which the Christian manhood of America should be directed to the work. A centralized process of recruiting, such as that in operation, was inadequate. In December, 1917, plans were made for a reorganization which took effect in January, 1918, effecting radical decentralization. A War Personnel Board was established, with Lucien T. Warner as Chairman and A. G. Knebel as Executive Secretary. This Board created a Personnel Committee in each of the six Military Departments, each Departmental Committee interlocking with the Board by one member common to both. From the Departmental Committees there radiated state committees and from them local committees in cities or rural districts. The responsibility for finding recruits was laid upon the local committees and for final acceptance upon the War Personnel Board. Estimates of the number of recruits needed

War Personnel
Board

were made and state and local quotas assigned. Carefully directed publicity carried the appeal to selected groups, and well known speakers, many with personal experience overseas, were furnished by the Board for state or district "drives" for workers.

This procedure had great advantages. Knowledge of the need of workers was directly diffused throughout the country. Local committees were composed of representative community leaders who picked men personally known to them as possessing the required ability and character. Just as in all war drives for funds, a sense of local responsibility was stimulated and the appeal to outstanding men became direct and personal.

A further advantage was the thoroughness of investigation which became possible. All candidates, including those who offered themselves direct to Headquarters, appeared first before the committee in their own community. Thus they and their recommendations came at once under the scrutiny of men in the best position to determine their qualifications. Fully half the applicants were at once found to be disqualified by technical rules prescribed by the Government or by medical examination revealing physical weaknesses rendering it unwise for them to be exposed to war conditions in the field. Having been passed by the local committee, applications were sent to the state committee, who scrutinized all recommendations and credentials. Finding these satisfactory, the state committee invited the candidate to appear before them. If passed, the same procedure was followed by the department committee. At every stage, the men who recommended candidates were urged, under pledge of strict confidence and appeal to patriotic duty, to give the fullest and frankest information to the committee, and pains were taken to get statements from persons who knew the candidate, but were not named by him as references. In the case of recruits for home service the Department Committee made appointments, subject to formal approval by the War Personnel Board. Overseas candidates were recommended to the Board, and summoned to New York, where they were unobtrusively observed during the period that might elapse before sailing, appointment not becoming final until all was ready for departure.

This system was evidently well adapted to select from a large number of candidates only those showing positive promise of usefulness and free from discoverable unfitness. A few unhappy experiences with men whose reputation was unblemished but whose character broke under the strain of war conditions in foreign cities, were

the cause of the apparent severity of scrutiny. Undoubtedly some desirable recruits, men who knew themselves sound, resented the indignity of subjection to such a process of repeated investigation and withdrew their applications. On the other hand, the process itself proved a valuable and unanticipated test. In their work, especially in France, secretaries had to struggle daily with obstacles which were the more exasperating because they seemed wholly unnecessary. Military and official red tape was constantly entangling their movements. Men who could not keep their temper when loss of temper would be justified, men who could not struggle patiently forward when hampered by invisible fetters, were of little use in the camps. Not a few promising recruits unconsciously eliminated themselves by their impatience and intemperate speech regarding delays, some of them imposed by the United States Government, which Association officials were forbidden to explain.

In spite of the apparent emphasis on elimination of the unsuitable, the predominating purpose was positive—to secure the finest, strongest, most devoted men America could furnish. As experience of success and occasional failure accumulated, the challenge of the work to the best of American manhood became increasingly clear and convincing. What constituted the best was, necessarily, variously interpreted by the scattered local and state committees. In some places the formal religious or denominational test was given possibly too much weight; in others striking ability blinded the committees to indications of unstable principles, resulting in the rejection of some highly desirable men, and acceptance of others whose later conduct proved them undesirable. The inevitable difficulties and mistakes of the Personnel Committees will be readily comprehended by any one with practical experience in choosing men for responsible positions in industry, government, or church. Out of more than 200,000 volunteers, about 26,000 were selected, under pressure of urgent haste. A critic of the welfare personnel will do well to compare the work of the Personnel Board with that of any great industry's employment department or of the school board of any great city, or of other important altruistic organizations.

In the late summer of 1917, a few women were chosen for overseas service at the request of the Paris office. The evident usefulness of women in the British Y M C A, and the immediate success of American women recruited in Paris, led to a request from overseas in August for a limited number of women from America. This was

The Challenge
to American
Manhood

Recruiting
Women

followed by further requests for larger numbers. By November, 1917, a corps of volunteers was busy in New York, under the direction of Mrs. F. Louis Slade, selecting candidates from among those who volunteered in person or by letter. As the news spread that women workers were needed, the number of candidates greatly increased. By April, 1918, applications were coming in at the rate of 300 a week, and by July they reached 1,200 a week. At that time, decentralization similar to that of the War Personnel Board took place. Departmental Committees were established, and the organization of the Women's Division of the War Personnel Board was recognized by the National War Work Council.

Method of
Selection

The method of selection from volunteer applicants was soon supplemented by a more positive process. Mrs. Slade brought the matter before the alumnae associations of the women's colleges, and they undertook to present the need to selected graduates. Six of these associations organized units to represent them and paid their expenses. The president of the Junior League recruited selected workers of that organization and the Intercollegiate Committee, already assisting the Red Cross in a similar way, undertook to help the Y M C A. The Federation of Women's Clubs organized and financed a unit consisting of two women from each state in the Union. All these recruits were subject of course to the approval of the Y M C A Women's Division.

With the development of the Headquarters organization overseas, there came a need for office workers in large numbers. About 100 were recruited, and sent to France in July, 1918, as a business women's unit. These were followed by 42 in September, 22 in October, and in November came a call for at least 125 more. For work with colored troops a small group of colored women were recruited in the summer of 1918. Their services were so satisfactory that eighteen more were sent after the Armistice.

The majority of the women were recruited as canteen workers, but before the work ended they were engaged in almost if not quite as varied service as the men. Altogether about 3,500 participated in the work, most of them recruited in America. The rest were Americans resident abroad, and American women who had gone abroad as Red Cross workers or in the service of relief organizations such as the American Fund for French Wounded.

The War Department set the minimum age limit for women workers at 25, lowering it to 23 after the Armistice. No maximum

Special Eligibility
Rules

age limit was fixed; some women of 50 were accepted and stood hardships well. As sufficient recruits who had no dependents were found, a rule was adopted to accept only those who needed no home allowance, and a considerable number who desired to go at their own expense contributed direct to the War Work funds for that purpose. It was found desirable that all women overseas should be on the same financial basis, receiving the standard allowances from the Y M C A. Many desirable recruits were rendered ineligible by a ruling of the War Department that no woman having father, husband, son or brother in the Army might go overseas. After earnest representations to the Government, this rule was partially rescinded in August, 1918, and women with brothers in the service were allowed to go, under their signed pledge to make no attempt to see their brothers, sick or well, and not to marry while overseas. Women were of course subject to the investigation of the War Department, and to the same rules as to nationality and loyalty as men.

The period of engagement whether for men or women varied. Duration of the war was desired, but one year was accepted. Particularly desirable men were taken for six months if they refused a longer commitment, and a few specifically summoned for special work had even shorter engagements. The secretary undertook to work faithfully at the post and duties that might be assigned to him. In the home work, each recruit was assigned to the department in which he resided and had been enlisted, and to prearranged duties. Such assignment was, of course, impossible in the case of overseas workers.

This introduced a difficulty in overseas recruiting. The conditions could not be adequately realized except through personal experience. Outstanding men and women, the type most sought, were often reluctant to commit themselves without a definite knowledge of the work they were to do. Almost invariably they were already engaged in work of importance, often connected with the war, and involved in serious responsibilities. They felt that they alone could judge whether the specific work they were to do for the Y M C A was of sufficient importance to justify relinquishing the work they were doing. The dean of a woman's college, for example, could not feel justified in abandoning her duties with the possibility of being set to wash dishes in a canteen. A bank president did not necessarily lack humility if he hesitated to pledge himself to drive an automobile or do clerical work if ordered.

Terms and
Assignment
to Duty

To overcome this reluctance the overseas executives repeatedly emphasized the fact that positions that seemed of minor importance when seen from this side really required men of the highest ability, and offered opportunities of service to the common cause greater than any position at home. This was usually acknowledged by the biggest men after a short experience in France. To a man who offered to go if he could be assured of a sufficiently important post, Governor Everett Lake, at work in France, sent the message that "the littlest job in the Association in France is bigger than any job he has ever held in his life." In an urgent appeal to a member of the War Personnel Board, the Chief Secretary wrote:

"What I am trying to say is that we must try to make men and women in America realize that under the strange conditions of war, no presidency of bank or railway or university or great city pulpit offers anywhere near so vital an opportunity of national service as does the most humble post in this enterprise in France."

The number of college presidents, bankers, lawyers, corporation executives, and prominent ministers on the roster indicates that these appeals were eventually successful. In fact, when the War Personnel Board had swung into full operation in the spring of 1918, recruits were enlisted at a much faster rate than they could be sent to France.

At first, secretaries for home service were sent for short courses of training to the Association Training Colleges at Springfield, Mass., and Chicago, where a standard war work course was repeated every four weeks. Soon after the general decentralization, training schools were established in thirty of the larger camps, where the same standard course, with minor local modifications, was given simultaneously with the beginning of work. Still later, when recruiting requirements were being met more adequately, departmental schools were established, and all secretaries were required to attend one of these schools and qualify in the various courses before final acceptance and assignment to camp duty.

The courses included:

The Historical Background of the War.

Army and Navy Customs and Etiquette.

Y M C A War Work Methods.

Personal Problems of the Secretary.

Specialized Study in Religious, Physical, Educational, and other phases of the work.

In schools located near camps, observation and directed service.

The hurried call for overseas workers permitted very little specific training. There was no time for it, and since assignment to duty was postponed until arrival in France, there was no way of determining for what duties a man should be trained. So far as the needs at home permitted, experienced men from the cantonments were drawn out for overseas service. For the rest, all that could be done and all that was attempted was to give information and a point of view that would be helpful in entering upon work in a foreign country under a military régime.

The interval between the arrival of the secretary in New York and his embarkation, and for a short period, the time spent on the voyage, was utilized for this purpose. In the early stages, when passports were being granted promptly, the time spent in New York was very brief, and was well occupied in securing equipment and attending to necessary formalities. Instruction in French was provided for those who could find time to take it. On the afternoon or evening before embarkation, the sailing party was called together for inspection, wearing their new uniforms for the first time. An army officer gave a brief talk on military rules and etiquette. If available, a man who had been overseas spoke of the work there, and an inspirational address was given. On shipboard lectures were given by members of the party on Association history and principles, methods of work as developed in home camps, historical background of the war, and classes in French were conducted. Usually a physical director would conduct setting-up drills and give instruction in camp hygiene and physical exercise. If, as rarely happened, there were no other passengers, a rather ambitious program might be attempted. Usually, however, the common rooms and decks of the ship could not be used to the exclusion of other passengers. In one or two instances, ill-advised attempts to monopolize the facilities of the ship brought severe criticism. It was found that the vicissitudes of the voyage, the general conditions of excited anticipation and the lack of leaders who knew by experience the conditions in France, constituted such serious handicaps to shipboard training, that it was abandoned.

In the spring of 1918 arrangements were made for training overseas recruits at Princeton University. Instruction was given by the faculty and by men from overseas. The course was intensive, lasting a week, and repeated for new groups for several weeks. Practical lessons in French, Italian, or Portuguese conversation gave a useful stock of words and phrases to men who did not know the languages,

Training
in Transit

and enabled others to brush up their earlier acquirements. Lectures on the history and characteristics of the Allied peoples, on the causes and aims of the war, and on Association history, principles, and methods, were varied by daily drills and practice in mass games.

In the early summer, the Government located an Aviation Training School at Princeton, absorbing all living accommodations, and the conferences were transferred to Columbia University. At the same time conferences for women workers were instituted at Barnard College, some meetings being held for men and women together. Only two groups received special training. All physical directors, however experienced, were required to attend a two weeks' intensive course at the Y M C A college at Chicago or at Springfield, for instruction in methods of conducting mass play and recreational games for soldiers. Chauffeurs and motor mechanics worked for a time in the Y M C A garage to ensure familiarity with all types of cars and trucks being used in France.

Personnel
Requirements

A problem of obvious importance was the determination of the number of workers required. This was comparatively simple for the home work. The unit was a hut serving 5,000 men with a staff of five to ten men. The number of huts in a camp was determined by the size of the camp, and a camp secretary with an executive staff supervised and directed all.

For overseas, the problem was exceedingly difficult. Very soon after his arrival in France, the Chief Secretary submitted to General Pershing an estimate calling for one worker to 170 soldiers. This was based upon British Y M C A experience in the preceding three years. It included Headquarters staff and supply and transport workers, but did not contemplate the operation of the post exchanges, leave areas, or soldiers' remittances, which had not then been made a part of the Association task. No official action was ever taken on this estimate. A year later General Pershing requested a revised estimate, which he directed should be an absolute minimum, owing to insufficiency of ocean transport and the necessity of limiting the number of civilians at military points.

On July 20, 1918, a revised estimate was submitted in a letter to Col. J. A. Logan of the General Staff. This called for one worker to 217 soldiers. As this estimate was worked out in detail as the result of experience with the British forces in India and Europe and with the A E F, and as it furnishes a definite starting point for a scientific study of the personnel problem, it is given in full.

A E F—Y M C A
PARIS

July 20, 1918.

From: E. C. Carter, Chief Secretary, Paris
To: Col. J. A. Logan, G. H. Q. American E. F.
Subject: Number of workers needed in Y M C A Service.

Attached hereto please find a detailed report covering the number of American workers, men and women, which we consider indispensable in order to carry out our full service program, including the operation of the post exchange. This estimate is based on one million and a half men.

Scientific
Estimate of
Personnel
Required
Overseas

On July 17 the Y M C A had 2,356 workers in France as per strength report sent G. H. Q., copy attached hereto. Assuming that there will be the equivalent of 60 divisions in France on or about September first, we ought on the basis of the attached statement to have 6,917 workers actually here in order to take care of the arrival of troops, instead of 2,356. This shortage accounts for the number of army divisions, isolated regiments and other units to which small, and in some cases no, service at all is being rendered.

At the present time there are 1,500 workers passed by the Y M C A recruiting committee and the Intelligence Section awaiting passports. To facilitate their prompt sailing we request that the War Department be cabled to issue them passports and also to permit additional workers up to 3,061 to embark for France for service with the Y M C A. When this number of workers has actually reached here, we will again take up the question of further passports for additional recruits.

Y M C A PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS PER COMBAT DIVISION
ARMY UNITS TO BE SERVED

INFANTRY			
Battalions	12		
Regimental Headquarters Companies	4		
Brigade Headquarters	2	18	
ARTILLERY			
Regiments (scattered Batteries)	3		
Horse Lines	3		
Brigade Headquarters	1	7	
ENGINEERS—Battalions		3	
DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN Battalion		1	
SIGNAL CORPS		1	
MILITARY POLICE		1	
SUPPLY TRAIN		1	
AMBULANCES AND FIELD HOSPITALS		3	
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS		1	
		36	

HUT WORKERS

2 workers per Unit for 36 Units (see above)			72
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DIVISIONAL OFFICE STAFF

Divisional Secretary	1		
Accountant	1		
Business Secretary	1		
Cashier	1		
Bookkeeper and Stenographer	1		
Interpreter, Buyer and Mess Sergeant	1		6

SPECIAL WORKERS ON ACTIVITIES

Athletic Directors—Divisional Director	1		
Regimental Directors	4	5	
Religious, Cinema, Entertainments, Programs		4	9

SPECIAL WORKERS ON EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

TRANSPORTATION

Chief	1		
Mechanics	2		
Drivers for five trucks	5		
Strikers for five trucks	5		
Drivers for five camionettes	5		
Drivers for two staff cars	2	20	

WAREHOUSE

Chief	1		
Helper	1	2	

HUT CONSTRUCTION

Equipment	1		
	1	2	24

Minimum Personnel per Combat Division			111
For Reserve and Replacement			9

Maximum personnel per Combat Division			120
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Note: The above personnel per Division will be able to take care of the corps troops attached to each army corps and also the special units attached to each Army.

TRAINING, BASE AND CASUAL CAMPS

DIVISIONAL OFFICE STAFF

Divisional Secretary	1		
Business Secretary	1		
Accountant	1		
Cashier	1		
Bookkeeper and Stenographer	1		
Interpreter, Buyer and Mess Sergeant	1		6

TRANSPORTATION

Chief	1	
Mechanics	2	
Drivers for three trucks	3	
Strikers for three trucks	3	
Drivers for camionettes	2	
Drivers for two staff cars	2	13
	<hr/>	

WAREHOUSE

Chief	1	
Helper	1	2
	<hr/>	

ATHLETICS

Director	1	
Assistants	4	5
	<hr/>	

RELIGIOUS

Cinema, Entertainment, Programs		3
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CONSTRUCTION 1

EQUIPMENT 1 2

HUT SECRETARIES: 25,000 men—25 units, two workers per unit ... 50

Total 81

CORPS SCHOOLS

DIVISIONAL OFFICE STAFF

Divisional Secretary	1	
Business Secretary	1	
Bookkeeper and Stenographer	1	
Accountant and Cashier	1	
Interpreters, Buyer and Mess Sergeant	1	5
	<hr/>	

TRANSPORTATION

Chief	1	
Mechanic	1	
Driver for truck	1	
Driver for camionette	1	
Driver for staff car	1	5
	<hr/>	

RELIGIOUS: Cinema, Entertainment, Programs 3

ATHLETICS

Director	1	
Assistants	2	3
	<hr/>	

WAREHOUSE 1

HUT SECRETARIES: For 10,000 men—10 units, two workers
per unit 20

CONSTRUCTION 1

EQUIPMENT 1 39

SERVICE WITH FIGHTING MEN

Y M C A—A E F HEADQUARTERS

PARIS

Present A E F estimated at 1,500,000—requiring as per schedule 6,452 Y M C A workers. The A H Q staff to supervise this force is estimated as follows:

Executive Department and Staff	25	
Comptrollers and Accountants	30	
Treasurers' Department	20	
Association Activities	75	
Religious		
Educational		
Entertainment		
Physical		
Social		
Personnel, movement orders, intelligence, etc.	35	
Motion Picture	50	
Post Exchange	50	
Purchasing Department	15	
Construction Department	20	
Equipment Department	10	
Motor Transport Department	100	
Postal, Telegraph and Parcel Post Department	25	
Medical Department	10	
		<hr/>
		465

REGIONAL OFFICES

STAFFS

Regional Secretary	1	
Religious Secretary	1	
Supplies and Transport Secretary	1	
Activities Secretary	1	
Physical Director	1	
Woman Secretary	1	
Stenographer	1	
Clerks	2	9
		<hr/>
Staff car driver and mechanic	1	
Staff cars (two)	2	3
		<hr/>
Total		12
Eight Regional offices at 12 each		96

LEAVE AREAS, OF 10,000 MEN

STAFF

Leave Area Chief Secretary	1	
Business Secretary	1	
Religious Secretary	1	
Religious, Cinema and Entertainment	4	
Supplies and Transport Secretary	2	
Activities Secretaries	3	
Athletic Directors	5	
Woman Secretary	1	
Stenographer	1	
Clerks	2	
Staff car driver and mechanic	1	
Staff cars (two)	2	24
Three workers required for each 1,000 men—Estimate		
10,000 men on leave continually in each area		30

TRANSPORTATION

10 Motor cars with drivers	10	
Total	64	
Army Minimum 40,000 men on leave constantly—pos-		
sibly 80,000, i.e.—4 x 64		256

RECEIVING AND FORWARDING SUPPLIES AT DOCKS

Le Havre	3	
Brest	5	
Nantes	2	
St. Nazaire	5	
Bordeaux	5	
La Pallice	1	
La Rochelle	1	
Marseilles	5	27

BASE AND DISTRIBUTING WAREHOUSES

Gièvres	20	
Paris	10	
Le Havre	3	
La Ferte	10	43

A E F—Y M C A PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

RECAPITULATION

DISTRIBUTION OF A E F

Estimating 50% troops to be in combat areas requiring Y M C A		
workers per 25,000 men	120	
Estimating 50% in base, training and casual camps requiring...	81	
Total	201	
The average number of Y M C A workers per 25,000		
men in both areas will be		100.5

Estimating September 1st, approximately 60 units of 25,000 men in France—we will require the following staff of Y M C A workers:

Field workers at 100.5 per unit—60 units of 25,000 men	6,030
Regional Headquarters	96
Y M C A-A E F Headquarters	465
Leave Areas—based on Army minimum estimate of 40,000 soldiers continuously on leave	256
Docks—receiving and forwarding supplies	27
Base and distributing warehouses	43
	<hr/>
	6,917

It should be noted that in Base Camps, Training Camps, Casual Camps and Corps Schools, we estimate one-fourth of our Staff to be women workers.

In Combat Areas, we estimate one-fifth of our Staff to be women workers.

Conservative
Estimate

That this estimate was exceedingly conservative appears from brief analysis of the principal item of "Hut Workers with Combat Divisions." If there were only one hut or service station for each of the 36 units in a division, the allowance of two men per unit required theoretically that each secretary should be on duty alone twelve hours in each twenty-four, since legitimate calls for service might be and actually were made at every hour of the day and night. It meant that these two men must be responsible not only for the canteen, but for the entire program of activities with the unit, religious, educational, athletic, entertainment, etc. Usually, however, a combat division was scattered over a large territory in numerous small groups and thus presented far more than the estimated 36 points for service. For example, on December 27, 1918, a Divisional Secretary wrote:

"This Division arrived in this area December 6th from the Argonne. It occupies nearly eighty little villages situated in a territory forty miles by twenty miles. The operating transportation provided by the Y M C A consists of one Ford touring car and one camionette. Troops are not permitted to walk from one village to another. The battalions are not yet permanently settled, changes of location taking place daily in the effort to make living conditions a little better."

Under such conditions the seventy-two hut secretaries called for in the minimum estimate would have been pathetically inadequate.

It should be noticed that in the important field of entertainment, this estimate made provision only for directors, and an addition

should be allowed for the traveling entertainers, lecturers and religious speakers who were not attached to any military unit. There were 1,064 entertainers and lecturers sent to France during the war, besides 300 French theatrical and musical artists engaged there, and after the Armistice 15,000 soldiers entertained in the soldier shows. The estimate may justly be regarded, therefore, as below a proper minimum.

Even this minimum was unattainable. The situation is shown in graph, p. 484. The curves showing original and minimum estimated requirements are based on the number of soldiers in France on the first of each month, as officially published.¹ The actual strength curve shows the number of secretaries in France according to Y M C A personnel records. The striking deficiencies must be interpreted in terms not only of inadequate service but of overstrain on men and women pluckily trying to do the work of twice or three times their number. Inquiry into the causes of shortage of personnel leads into a study of the Government investigation of recruits which was made independently of and parallel to the War Personnel Board's investigation.

It was an obvious necessity to exclude from the military area all whose loyalty to the nation and to the Allied cause was even questionable. In every war spies resort to the use of the military uniform. It was almost a certainty that enemy agents would attempt to make use of the welfare worker's uniform and opportunities for espionage. Both the French and British government and military authorities felt that the presence of large numbers of civilians in the camps and along the lines of communication was a source of serious danger. Moreover, as morale promotion was a prime object of welfare work, the influence on soldiers of men not in full sympathy with the military enterprise was regarded as objectionable.

The technical restrictions prescribed by the Government, such as that no person of enemy nationality or parentage or having relatives in enemy countries, should be accepted, were of course observed by the local committees, which promptly rejected the applications of such men. Men of pacifist and similar opinions, critics of the Government or its conduct of the war, and men cherishing hostility to any of the Allies for causes unconnected with the war, were also eliminated by the local committees who were in the best position to discover such mental attitudes. At every stage of the recruiting process, however,

¹ The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919, p. 15.

these matters were investigated afresh, and the thoroughness of the War Personnel Board's search into the lives of candidates was evidenced by the fact that in only a negligible number of cases did the Government raise objection to men accepted by the Association.

Government
Responsibility

Nevertheless, the responsibility rested upon the Government and was so grave that it could not properly be delegated to any civilian organization. By ruling that the Department of State would issue passports to welfare workers only upon the permission of the Military Intelligence Bureau, and that the Bureau should make an independent investigation of every applicant before granting clearance, a strict and effective control was maintained. At first only candidates already accepted by the Association were investigated. Early in 1918, however, the War Personnel Board was notified that names of all candidates should be sent to the Bureau as soon as received, even though the candidates were rejected by the local committees. As approximately only one out of eight applicants was accepted, this of course greatly increased the labor. Applications for passports for accepted recruits accumulated faster than the Military Intelligence Bureau was able to deal with them. With the speeding up of expeditionary troops which began in April, 1918, urgent calls for more workers came from the overseas field. The War Personnel Board adjusted itself to the new demands and produced a sufficient number of well qualified recruits. In spite of difficulties the Director of Transportation secured sailing accommodations as fast as workers were released. Passports were forthcoming very slowly, however. On July 1, 1918, 905 passport applications for workers accepted by the Y M C A were on file with the Military Intelligence Bureau. On July 31st the number had reached 2,381. Between July 22d¹ and August 31st, 3,227 passport applications were filed but only 2,280 clearances were granted and 1,896 passports issued. On August 21st, 3,424 accepted recruits were waiting for passports. During this period the Association established an office in Washington to assist in hastening action, and with the consent of the War Department furnished and paid a number of additional clerks in the Military Intelligence Bureau. But the utmost efforts of both Government officials and Association representatives were insufficient to alter the situation until after the Armistice. Then the Bureau's separate investigation was abandoned, and pass-

¹ On this date M. G. Filler assumed charge of the Washington office of the War Work Council and arrangements were made for him to have direct access to the Military Intelligence Bureau.

ports were issued to all workers vouched for by the War Personnel Board.

This experience was probably unavoidable under the conditions that existed. The exact status to be assigned to welfare workers was a matter that had not been worked out in advance, and could not be worked out under the pressure of more urgent affairs. In the home camps, apparently, the problem never arose. Welfare workers were provided by the War Personnel Board with proper introductions and credentials to camp commanders, who issued camp passes to them as civilians. Overseas, the completely different conditions forced a partial militarization, which involved serious delays and much labor. If from the start a definite military status had been fixed, the investigation of workers could have been precisely the same and conducted by the same agency as in the case of applicants for military commissions. The necessary personnel, in due proportion to troops, could have automatically accompanied expeditionary units, without passports or civilian papers and the consequences of delay and shortage, which fell ultimately and most heavily on the soldiers, could have been wholly escaped. The problem of the status of welfare workers with troops is one calling for early and thorough study, with a view to future possibilities.

Once in possession of his passport the worker was promptly embarked for France or England. Transportation was under the charge of a special bureau, directed successively by two men who had been for many years connected with a well-known firm of tourist agents.

Transportation
of Overseas
Workers

Transportation facilities were of course extremely limited. Space in Government transports was reserved exclusively for the Army. Most of the commercial shipping was under control of the Government, which reserved the accommodations for officers' use. Frequently some of these would be released a short time before sailing. Upon notification of these releases, which were vigilantly watched for, the Director of Transportation hurried parties of men to secure the vacant places. On sailing days, fifty to two hundred secretaries, in complete uniform with baggage packed and papers in order, were held at Headquarters ready to race to Hoboken for embarkation if space should become available.

The Bureau exercised constant alertness for the discovery of sailing opportunities. Several parties were placed on liners from South America which unexpectedly put in at Newport News for coal. By courtesy of the British Ministry of Shipping, one ship, the *Burma*,

with a capacity of 1,200, sailing from Montreal in September, 1918, was put at the disposal of the Association. In spite of desperate appeals to the Military Intelligence Bureau and a direct appeal to the President, who gave prompt and sympathetic consideration, only 316 passports could be obtained in time to catch the ship, although the full number of workers was ready to start. From time to time, parties were sent to Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and other ports where there were prospects.

The spirit of the secretaries was well displayed in this situation. Many of the ships lacked sufficient service staffs, and secretaries volunteered to give dining saloon and state room service, and even to do scullion's work in the galley, for the sake of getting across. The experiences of Atlantic voyagers during the war have frequently been described. They were fully shared by the welfare personnel. One ship carrying 75 secretaries was torpedoed and sank in twelve minutes. Thanks to good discipline and the drills that had been held, the passengers and all but three of the crew were rescued, losing, however, all their baggage. But these were the common hazards of war and were so accepted.

Welfare workers were only human, and the strain of separation from their families was no less than that felt by soldiers. After their departure the War Work Council served as the human link between. It telegraphed to their homes the news of their safe arrival as soon as the cable flashed it across the sea. It made sure that family allowances were regularly paid. When illness occurred at home, it cabled news to the absent secretary and if necessary arranged for his return. Some were seriously ill in the field. Ninety-two secretaries died, 128 were wounded and five were taken prisoner overseas, and 58 died in the home camps. The Council did all in its power to serve in such emergencies. Effects and affairs of the deceased were cared for until they could be transferred to the proper persons. In brief, it sought to relieve the natural anxieties at both ends of the long lines stretching from home to huts, by practical and sympathetic service as occasion arose.

Even during the period of recruiting, secretaries were completing their terms of service and returning from the field. The numbers to be demobilized gradually increased from month to month, with a corresponding increase in the demobilization staff. The abruptly turning and descending curve of Actual Strength Overseas¹ indicates

¹ See Plate XII facing p. 484.

the sudden reversal in the task of the Personnel Board. One episode in the demobilization process demands special mention. The announcement of the Armistice found a large number of secretaries in New York ready to sail or waiting for final arrangements to be completed. The sudden change overseas upset the recruiting plans completely, since only a few of this number were the specialists now needed, and the larger part had to be denied the privilege of service. Like the soldiers in the new army, who, just called, never got further towards the front than the home camps, so these secretaries, caught in the circumstances of war, found themselves homeward bound even before they were fairly started away. Filled with zeal and enthusiasm they had given up their positions or business, broken loose from home and family, and were on the verge of departure for France when the blow fell. No more tragic disappointment can be conceived, save that of soldiers eager to get to the front, than that of these earnest volunteers, when they learned that they were faced with the inevitable necessity of sacrificing their cherished hopes and plans, and of retracing their steps homeward at once. The Association did whatever it could in justice to them in this sudden derangement of all their plans, in the way of assistance both personal and financial; but nothing could repay the loss of the opportunity which they had so keenly anticipated and so eagerly desired.

At this same time the number of secretaries returning from overseas began to increase; and the Personnel Board hardly had time to draw breath after the completion of recruiting when this demobilization began to assume immense proportions. From May 1st to September 1st, more than 6,000 returned, an average of 50 a day. Arriving in New York they reported to the War Personnel Board for settlement of business matters, physical examination, delivery of equipment and final discharge. Certificates of honorable service and service pins were issued to all whose records were clear. In spite of the volume of the work, and the haste made necessary by the eagerness of every man to rejoin his family after the trying separation, the Board sought full expression from all of their reactions to the experiences of service. A responsible representative interviewed each secretary, inviting suggestions or criticisms, listening to grievances if they existed, and seeking the fullest possible information on all phases of the work done. The compilation and organization of the results in the Bureau of Demobilized Personnel constitute a wealth of information of incalculable value should renewed need arise.

Returning
Secretaries

CHAPTER XVI

HOUSING AND EQUIPMENT

Next in importance to the workers was the material equipment for their work—shelters to work in, instruments to work with, and supplies for soldier consumption.

“Hut” is a lowly term that pointedly suggests the informal and democratic manner in which activities were carried on within its walls. In form its range extended from a candle-lighted cellar to the “lordly pleasure domes” of noted French resorts, from a tent to a château. In established camps where troops were housed in barracks, wooden buildings especially designed as social centers for the military community were erected. In cities, existing structures were usually adapted, although the Eagle Hut in London, and the Victory and Eagle Huts in New York were representative of numerous temporary city huts. It grew to be universal usage to call the welfare center a hut, whether it was a specially erected building or a hotel, château, theater, or tent.

Equipment included a confusing variety of articles. Uniforms for men and women, touring cars, trucks, and motor cycles, stoves and dishes, tables and benches, pianos, phonographs, baseballs, and boxing gloves were but principal items in a list whose mere enumeration would fill pages. Every item was needed in thousands and some in hundreds of thousands.

Supplies for consumption were equally varied. They ranged from flour and sugar, bought by hundreds of tons for the manufacture of cakes and chocolate bars, to sheet tin for the manufacture of jam cans; from combs, brushes, razors, and tooth paste, to shoelaces and corn plasters. Letter paper and envelopes were used by the hundred million. Cigarets, cigars, tobacco, and matches ran a close second. For the A E F especially, the Y M C A canteen took the place of a general store, and although all that could be secured overseas was bought or manufactured by the General Supply Division, heavy drafts were made upon the United States.

Market conditions were widely different from those to be dealt with by a business enterprise launched during time of peace. The Government had already started its policy which was ultimately to de-

velop to the point of putting practically all vital industries and every form of transportation, warehouses, docks, and wharves under direct Government control. At the same time the fundamental law which governs business enterprises, the law of supply and demand, was upset. The demand was ever-present and ever-increasing until long after hostilities ceased. Normally the supply of commodities will automatically increase as the demand increases, but this principle did not hold good even approximately during the war. It was evident that former standards of efficiency in business management could not properly be expected to meet the emergencies arising out of this abnormal situation.

This was realized by the National War Work Council when, early in April, 1917, it created the Matériel Bureau, and appointed, to supervise its activities, a committee consisting of Messrs. John Sherman Hoyt, Chairman, F. Louis Slade, Geo. W. Perkins, W. V. S. Thorne, and William Sloane, all business men of unusual ability and members of the Executive Committee of the War Work Council. Upon these men and the assisting staff eventually built up rested the responsibility, always with the caution obligatory upon administrators of trust funds, for purchase of immense quantities of merchandise and distribution practically throughout the world. As the magnitude of the undertaking grew, the Bureau of Matériel was divided into two independent bureaus, Hut Construction and Equipment and Supplies.

HUT CONSTRUCTION

As in the Secretarial Bureau the International Committee had the nucleus of an organ for recruiting, so in its Building Bureau there were men familiar with the architectural problems associated with typical Y M C A activities. This had been organized in 1915 as an agency to collect and study plans of existing Y M C A buildings, and to advise and assist local Associations in the planning of new buildings. On the morning after war was declared, the officers of the Building Bureau under the leadership of Neil McMillan, Senior Secretary, met in the drafting rooms of that department and drew up plans for the first war huts to be constructed in Officers' Training Camps. When the National War Work Council met and developed its plan for the organization of work for the American armies, the Building Bureau was chosen as the agency to carry out the construction program of the Council. The staff of the Bureau kept up constant study of developing activities with a view to providing the most convenient and

Hut
Design

adequate housing and evolved the type of building which proved so well adapted to the situation.


The "hut" idea dates back to the Civil War, during which the United States Christian Commission carried on welfare work with Federal armies. Following the troops into the field where no ready made structures were available, the delegates were forced to provide housing for their activities. They put up in various camps large canvas tents and later, in the more permanent ones, chapels of hewn logs. These structures were equipped with tables, benches, and writing material and were decorated with flowers and evergreens. In the National Guard State Camps, after 1880, and in the Spanish-American War, activities were housed in large tents. During the Mexican Border operations, wooden buildings began to appear. These were plain and simple, designed with a strictly utilitarian purpose, to provide a gathering place for the men in leisure hours. During the earlier years of the World War, the idea was transplanted to India and to the Flanders front by the British and Canadian Y M C A's, and various adaptations to existing conditions were devised.

Extension of the
Hut Idea


In the United States, free from the shifting conditions of the battle zone, a more permanent construction was desirable. From the beginning, also, a greater variety of activities was contemplated, although experience proved that the program must be still more highly developed. The first building was erected at the Officers' Training Camp at Plattsburg, N. Y., in May, 1917. It consisted of an auditorium measuring 38 x 115 feet, with an office wing projecting at right angles. This hut was designed with two purposes besides the principal one of furnishing a social center: to provide space for writing letters and facilities for cinema shows. As varied activities developed it became necessary to elaborate the design. For religious and educational work small, quiet rooms were necessary. Dramatic performances called for an adequate stage with dressing rooms. Books and magazines poured into the camp from all over the country; space must be allowed and shelves and racks constructed to accommodate them. Architects familiar with the Association's four-fold program, grappled with the problem; and when troops began to mobilize in the various camps, the Y M C A had already passed the initial stage of experimentation and was ready to welcome the incoming soldiers in a building designed for an extensive social program.

Cost necessarily entered as a factor in design of buildings. The Mexican Border huts cost about \$2,000, but they were of temporary

· TYPICAL
· YMCA ·



L · HUTS · in · USA ·



TYPE F 3

design and eventually required extensive repairs. On this basis, with knowledge of the building experience of the British Association, it was estimated that a satisfactory building of a more permanent type could be constructed for about \$3,000, and the Plattsburg hut, known as Type A, was planned, with this idea. When completed, the cost was found to be \$5,700. This led to a new plan, known as the B type, smaller than the Plattsburg. The B type was rectangular, measuring 36 x 96 feet, whereas the A type, as already stated, measured 38 x 115 feet and had an office wing. Experience soon showed that the B type hut was not at all adequate, and that an arbitrary cost figure could not be allowed to determine the size or plan of the huts. Prices varied greatly in different parts of the country, and the prime essential was to provide accommodations for the wide range of activities that were proving useful. Recognizing the situation, the Executive Committee instructed the Building Bureau to meet the actual need.

There were developed, therefore, plans for larger and more serviceable buildings, the E type which grew out of the former A, and the F type which grew out of the former B.¹ Of these, the E type was adopted as the standard building for camps and cantonments. About 80 per cent of the service buildings constructed were of this type. It consisted of a main auditorium 35 x 100 feet with a stage, dressing room, class room and living quarters for the secretaries. A wing 24 x 60 feet was built on one side for a social hall and this was connected to the main auditorium by an enclosed passage-way which held the store room, office and service counter.

The Larger
Types of Huts

Owing to the feeling that there should be buildings in which large meetings could be held, plans were drawn for an auditorium. As finally developed, these buildings measured 106 feet wide by 132 feet long, and was capable of seating 2,800 men. Adhering to the policy of multiple use of space, the auditoriums were also arranged for moving picture shows, athletics, and games.

There were also certain types planned for the aviation fields, National Guard camps, naval bases, embarkation camps, etc. All of these types were modified during the progress of the war. They were all constructed on the same general lines as the ordinary service buildings with the modifications that were necessary to fit the demands of the local situation.

When the National Guard were mobilized in the tent cities in the South, the War Department planned to keep them there for a period

Building Program
in Camps and
Cantonments

¹ See Plate VII.

of about three months, after which they were to be sent to France. No attempt was made at the outset either by the Government or the Y M C A to provide permanent buildings. In view of the mildness of the southern climate and the temporary nature of the camps, tents were thought to be adequate. The initial plan was to provide an Association tent for each regiment. When it appeared that the troops were to be kept there for an indefinite period, it was decided to provide wooden structures to replace the tents. Beginning in December, 1917, and for a period of two or three months, locally planned and constructed huts rapidly replaced the tents in the National Guard camps. From five to ten such buildings were erected in each camp.

It was known from the beginning that the National Army cantonments were to be of permanent character and structures planned by the Army were designed to last four or five years with only moderate repairs. The entire Y M C A building program in the National Army cantonments kept pace with government construction. Through an efficient organization and by unceasing efforts, the Association was able to have completed huts at the disposal of the drafted troops, as soon as they arrived at camp.

In the large camp centers, the Association buildings were distributed so that they would serve units or groups approximately equal in numbers. A regiment was regarded as the largest number of men a building should serve, but the financial situation during the construction period made it necessary to keep down the number of buildings. A unit of five thousand men, corresponding closely to the size of a brigade, was therefore adopted. The camp plots were secured from the War Department, and the buildings located according to this principle. In a typical cantonment there would be an auditorium and administrative building, from five to nine service buildings, generally Type E, a garage, and possibly a special hut for the Base Hospital. The huts were usually located on the service road used by the enlisted men.

For service in embarkation centers on the Atlantic seaboard, the Bureau of Construction planned and erected special huts. The largest was at Hoboken, and was known as the Hudson Hut.¹

Buildings of similar nature were built in other cities near the embarkation camps. These huts were of the same type of construction as those in camps and cantonments, but had in addition a cafeteria where meals and light lunches could be served. Two of these huts

¹ Consult Chapter XXI, p. 376.

were built in New York City, and were known as the Eagle and Victory Huts. In Washington, D. C., the Y M C A took over the Billy Sunday tabernacle, and modified it to serve as a dormitory with auditorium, billiard room, reading and writing rooms attached. After being remodelled, it was christened the Liberty Hut.

New naval bases and training stations sprang up along the coast and the Great Lakes. A special problem was presented by the Navy's policy of quarantine. Recruits were divided into groups of fifty and kept in separate enclosures for a period of three weeks. In order to provide social and recreation facilities for the men during the period of confinement, barrack space was secured when possible; otherwise the Building Bureau erected small shacks within the enclosures. For permanent service, huts similar to those used in Army camps were erected. The Navy was likewise welcomed on even terms with the Army, in the huts erected at embarkation ports.

The Government established Student Army Training Corps in various institutions throughout the country. The concentration of so many young men strained the building accommodations of these institutions so that in certain larger universities it was found necessary to furnish a typical service building. These were generally F type and in every respect similar to the cantonment buildings.

About the time the Bureau of Construction had standardized its plans for Army and Navy work, the Executive Committee of the War Work Council undertook to care for workers in war industries, and authorized expenditures for buildings for that purpose. The concentration of these men, with or without families sometimes quadrupled the population of factory towns, and swamped the permanent local religious, social, and entertainment facilities. Buildings were erected in the various munition, shipbuilding, and lumber camps throughout the country, similar to those in the military camps with suitable modifications.

In comfort, the huts were superior to barracks and mess halls and far pleasanter. Their simple lines and proportions lent themselves to pleasing and inexpensive decorative schemes. In size and arrangement they proved adequate to routine service needs imposed by a wide variety of activities. Larger units would have been unwieldy. In the cantonments, the supplementary auditoriums met extreme occasional requirements, such as mass meetings or exceptionally popular entertainments. From the point of view of economy, the hut conformed to standard dimensions of lumber so that they could be erected

with minimum waste of material and labor. Barring unforeseen possible developments and radical modifications of the welfare program, a permanent solution, tested by experience, has been found for the housing problems of welfare service, and should the need again arise, the huts of the World War can be reproduced with certainty of satisfaction.

By the fall of 1917, more than 40 major camps had been planned by the War Department and many of them were ready for occupancy. Sixteen cities of tents were erected in the South and West to accommodate the federalized National Guard numbering some 300,000 men. An equal number of wooden cantonments were constructed to provide for a like number of draft troops that were to form the new National Army. These latter cantonments were distributed one in each of the sixteen military districts into which the War Department had divided the country. Four special embarkation camps were established on the Atlantic seaboard. Other special camps were located, principally in the southern states. For all these the Y M C A furnished buildings or tents; but as has been seen the program extended to Naval training stations, workers in the war industries, and Students' Army Training Corps. Altogether 952 huts were eventually erected.

Time and scarcity of men and materials were the difficult elements in the undertaking. The huts must be ready when the recruits arrived. The Government was putting through a vastly greater building enterprise with unprecedented speed. It, of course, had prior claims on material and labor. It was not only taking four million men out of industry to form its Army, but it was conscripting, through great contracting organizations, another army of mechanics to erect the forty major cantonments and scores of smaller posts throughout the country. The Y M C A had to glean workmen and materials where the Government had overlooked or passed them by.

In order to meet the problem outlined above, a complete and efficient business organization was necessary. The leaders early recognized the importance of placing authority as close to the scene of action as possible. The Bureau of Construction led the way in the general decentralization by placing a supervisor of construction in each of the six military departments. These men were empowered to negotiate contracts and to push construction as rapidly as the National War Work Council Executive Committee authorized the necessary appropriations. As the task of keeping huts in repair arose, the

department supervisors were instructed to appoint camp mechanics in each of the large cantonments. Later a building custodian or a building secretary was appointed for each important building in a camp. Within the larger departments, where a great deal of construction was going on simultaneously, separate districts were set up and a district head of construction was appointed to take charge of all the construction work in the entire district and in some cases these supervisors maintained their own building organization. The majority of the men secured to fill these positions were contractors and business men who entered the Y M C A to contribute their expert knowledge to this form of war work.

The organization, therefore, of the Bureau of Construction consisted of an Executive Department at New York City, where were located the director and associate director with their drafting room forces; the department supervisors of construction located in departmental offices in Boston, New York, Atlanta, San Antonio, San Francisco and Chicago; district superintendents of construction, at certain points, as in the Tidewater District in the Eastern Department, under the direction of the department supervisors; camp mechanics in each camp, building custodians in each building. The organization made it possible to start work in any part of the country as soon as the authorization was given by the Executive Committee of the War Work Council.

The headquarters staff in addition to general direction of the supervisors of construction, prepared standard plans and specifications and contracted for the wholesale purchase of paints, stains, roofing, electrical material, and the like, kept the national construction records, and negotiated with the Construction Divisions of the War and Navy Departments. The department supervisors of construction carried out the work in the field. They made surveys of each cantonment within their department, secured building permits from the military and naval authorities, determined upon the sites for the huts, let contracts, furnished materials for the buildings and supervised their erection. The camp mechanic was responsible for the maintenance and repair of the buildings within his camp and such authorized alterations as were necessary. The building custodians had direct, personal charge of the huts to which they were appointed. It was their duty to see that the huts were properly cared for from day to day, kept constantly in repair, and not misused, by the crowds of service men who filled them daily.

Function of
the Staff

War conditions governed the market. Prices were rising by leaps and bounds. To maintain complete control of construction, the War Department ruled that all building should be done by one contractor in each camp. This put the Association at the mercy of the firms employed by the Government both in respect to time and form of contract. Consequently, the Construction Bureau was obliged to use the "cost plus" type of contract which had been adopted by the Army, since these contractors would undertake to erect buildings on no other basis. The cost was partially safe-guarded by agreeing on a fixed instead of a percentage profit so that there would be no incentive to the contractor to increase the cost of the work. These conditions were not satisfactory, however. The nature of the work required by the Y M C A was far different from that of the Army. The Government was forced to erect entire wooden cities in the space of a few months. Only the largest building firms were qualified to undertake this work. The Association, on the other hand, required only a few buildings in any single locality. Small contractors and local markets were sufficient for its needs, and were more available. The Bureau succeeded in securing permission from the Government to let contracts independently of the Army. Arrangements were made whereby the contractor undertook to erect a building for an agreed sum, known as the upset price, which included his commission. In case the contract went over the cost agreed upon, the contractor bore the loss. If the actual cost of the building proved less than the upset price, the contractor was entitled to 25 per cent and the Y M C A 75 per cent of the amount saved. In certain departments the Bureau of Construction through its supervisor did its own building. This method was the most economical. In these ways the Association built at lower costs than the Government, a fact which became evident when the Bureau was forced to let contracts to concerns employed by the War Department. In some cases, the Government contractors asked double the price for inferior work. The total cost of the Y buildings, considering the conditions, was remarkably low.¹

¹ DEPARTMENTS	BUILDINGS (1920 figures)	Approximate total cost
Northeastern	50	\$ 528,607.85
Eastern	228	2,529,546.34
Southeastern	205	1,207,450.21
Central	176	1,708,669.33
Southern	219	1,000,663.33
Western	74	724,047.69
	952	\$7,698,984.75

The Bureau of Construction, of course, undertook to recover as much money as possible from the buildings no longer needed when the Army was demobilized. As rapidly as buildings were released from activity, the supervisors in each of the departments took them over and held the material for salvage.

Demobilization
and Salvage

Three methods were followed. First, to sell the building outright; second, to tear down the building, store selected material and sell the rest; and third, to get permission to hold the building intact until a market could be found.

These operations proceeded at a satisfactory pace until January 1, 1920, when the War and Navy Departments decided to take over the voluntary civilian welfare work. Upon the request of the Naval and Military authorities, the War Work Council turned over the remaining recreation buildings and equipment to them with the understanding that when no longer needed for educational and recreational purposes they would be turned back to the International Committee for salvage.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

All the functions of the Bureau of Materiel, additional to the building program, were centered in the Purchasing Department under the purchasing agent of the International Committee, P. F. Jerome, who served throughout the war. When purchases for the Overseas service came into prominence, an Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Department was formed as part of the Bureau; this department acted to a large extent independently, especially in dealing with the transportation problem.

The largest purchases for the Home Camps took place between the early fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918, while the camps were under construction. The limited amounts of money at the disposal of the War Work Council up to that time had made it impossible to take advantage of the comparatively cheap and plentiful market during the first months of the war by buying and storing supplies for future use.

Purchases for the
Home Camps

Based on the experience of the Army and Navy Department of the International Committee on the Mexican Border, an equipment standard was adopted on the basis of serving about 3,000 men from each hut or tent. Each of the 952 huts was equipped with a piano, a phonograph and records, a motion picture machine, office furniture and supplies, theatrical equipment, stoves, and similar necessary ar-

ticles. More than a hundred different kinds of goods, from Testaments to record cards, and from curtains to wrestling mats were included. The cost of this equipment averaged from \$800 to \$1,000 and as many as 100 sets of equipment were bought at a time.

There was also a steady demand for personal equipment for the workers, who numbered nearly 26,000. This included uniform and wearing apparel, blankets, cots, mess-kits, locker trunks, and a large variety of similar items. In the larger camps and in areas supervised from a single center, automobiles and trucks were necessary for transportation of workers and supplies. Motor service led to the establishment of garages and repair shops.

In addition to this service equipment the Association provided a constant stream of supplies for the use of the men served by the huts. During the fall of 1918, more than 1,500,000 sheets of letter paper were used daily, besides envelopes, and other writing material, books and magazines, wrapping paper and twine, athletic goods, and many other articles. Beginning with January, 1919, purchases for the transportation service were handled by the Bureau, including, in addition to the usual equipment for huts, the articles for free distribution to returning troops, such as food supplies, gift materials, cigarets, and candies. The purchases for all the headquarters bureaus were made by this Bureau and covered the necessary office equipment for more than 800 workers. The establishment of the Department of Insular Possessions led to the purchasing of equipment for nearly 50 points in the West Indies and the Canal Zone.

Prices

The Bureau bought at very reasonable prices, because great care was taken to obtain competitive bids; and also in many cases because it bought for the Y M C A. Paper manufacturers, for instance, generally made no profits on the Association orders. The Association was able to furnish secretaries with most articles of personal equipment at prices lower than those charged by the Army and Navy Cooperative Stores. In a few cases the quality was not satisfactory, as for instance in the case of uniforms for service overseas. When complaints of these came into evidence the uniforms were made of whipcord and the complaints ceased.

Warehousing

Merchandise was either shipped directly by the manufacturers to the camps, as in the case of such bulky items as pianos and motion picture machinery, or sent to the New York warehouse. In order to obtain any articles from the warehouse a department requisition was required so that the goods could be charged against the camp for which

they were intended. At headquarters a file was kept of quotations from all manufacturers interested in supplying any kind of article in use. In some cases it was impossible to ship equipment from headquarters on account of embargoes, and local purchasing was authorized.

The first warehouse, located at 120 East 28th Street, New York, and measuring 20 x 60 feet, was soon outgrown and space in the Madison Square Garden was provided by the New York Life Insurance Company until October, 1917, when it had to be vacated for the annual horse show. In October the warehouse was established in its permanent location at 136 West 23d Street, where a four story building, 100 by 150 feet in size, was placed at the disposal of the War Work Council through the courtesy of the McAlpin Estate.

The imposition of freight and express embargoes on less than carload lots and of complete embargoes against certain camps led to the establishment of six departmental warehouses: at Boston for the Northeastern, at New York City for the Eastern, at Atlanta for the Southeastern, at San Antonio for the Southern, at Chicago for the Central, and at San Francisco for the Western Department. In each of the Departments a secretary was assigned to local purchasing. This decentralization did much to facilitate deliveries to the various camps.

Early in 1918 a further step was taken to relieve the Bureau of responsibility. The War Work Council reorganized the Comptroller's office and set up in connection with this a Stores Control Department which undertook the distribution to the field, thus permitting the Equipment Bureau to devote itself exclusively to purchasing.

In the meantime a great business enterprise had developed in connection with the purchase of supplies for use overseas. The materials bought for this purpose were quite different in character from those needed in the home camps and consisted chiefly of food stuffs and canteen supplies. About 90 per cent of the material purchased by the Y M C A for use overseas was designed for the Post Exchanges. It consisted largely of articles for creature comfort, such as chocolate, candy, cigarets, cigars, smoking and chewing tobacco, chewing gum, jam and biscuits. All these were exactly the things which could be obtained only in small quantities or not at all in Europe. The General Supply Division in Paris lost no time in making an exhaustive search all over Western Europe to ascertain what could be obtained, but the results were not encouraging.

Overseas
Purchasing and
Shipping

Overseas
Purchasing
Bureau

In order, therefore, to supplement overseas purchases with supplies from America, an organization was set up in New York for procuring supplies in this country and forwarding them to Europe. At first this functioned as a division of the Bureau of Equipment and Supplies, but as time went on its duties were so specialized that it came to act virtually as an independent bureau, devoting all its energies to the interests of the overseas work. Its Chairman was F. Louis Slade and its Director T. W. D. Turner, of Buffalo, N. Y. The members of the Matériel Committee gave much time and attention to the oversight and assistance of the work of this bureau, as did also the Chairman and other members of the Executive Committee of the National War Work Council, and a number of experienced business men, several of whom served at a dollar a year.

Business
Conditions

From the very outset the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau was confronted with a number of extremely difficult problems. Not only was it obliged to meet the abnormal conditions of a market laboring under the strain of a world war, but at every turn these natural difficulties were increased by artificial restrictions imposed upon government-regulated industries and materials. New regulations and restrictions without precedent in this country were established and enforced. Competition between rival manufacturers, merchants and transportation lines no longer existed. The use of certain raw materials, such as metals, necessarily entering into the manufacture of supplies for the post exchanges and for equipment, was restricted and placed under close Government control, as was also all transportation by land and sea.

Government
Control of
Purchases

The difficulties of the Bureau arising from this source began as soon as it undertook to place orders. In buying condensed milk, flour and candy, for example, it was compelled to satisfy the requirements of the Division of Coordination of Purchases of the Food Administration, which controlled and limited the sales of such commodities. The War Industries Board for Priority Orders, again, required proof that merchandise orders were essential to winning the war, before they would permit the use of steel, aluminum, copper, and other material of like nature. The Bureau, moreover, was not allowed to use its own discretion in choosing the concerns from which it should buy supplies, but application had to be made to the Division of Coordination of Purchases, which in due course would designate the firms with which the orders should be placed and determine the terms and conditions of the transactions.

The moving of the finished products from the factories to New York also caused much worry. The United States Railroad Administration controlled the movement of freight trains and a permit was necessary before any freight cars could be placed on a siding for loading. As there was always considerable congestion and a severe shortage of railroad equipment, permits were seldom issued promptly and were frequently refused on account of labor troubles either on the railroads or at the port of New York. Railroad
Transport

Reference has already been made to the shortage of warehouse facilities in New York. The warehouse in 23d Street relieved conditions for a time but, as equipment for the home field also was stored there, the space soon became inadequate and an additional warehouse was obtained in Weehawken, N. J. Even these added facilities soon became insufficient. As practically all the warehouses adjacent to the waterfront were commandeered by the Army, it was utterly impossible to secure suitable storage for supplies. Appeals were repeatedly made to the War Department to allot space in the Bush Terminal Warehouses. Only after many months was the War Department able to grant this favor. Additional
Warehousing

The most serious delays were encountered, however, in connection with the actual exporting of the supplies. First there was the problem of securing an export license from the Bureau of Exports. The following extract from a letter from the War Trade Board makes plain the delay caused by this procedure: Government
Control of
Exports

"Whenever the Y M C A desires to purchase any articles specified in Schedule A, it will file with the War Industries Board an application of approval. If the War Industries Board approves of the application, it will send a note of its approval to the Bureau of Exports, which will issue to the Y M C A a T. L. license after the matter has been passed upon by the Property Officers of the War Trade Board. Our notice of approval will be given a serial number by the War Industries Board, which will subsequently become the serial number of export licenses."

After repeated efforts the Association in December, 1918, was granted a general export license, thus eliminating the necessity for repetition of application each time goods were to be exported.

The greatest difficulty of all was the shortage of ocean tonnage, and with this the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau at home and the General Supply Division overseas wrestled unsuccessfully until the Armistice changed the whole situation. For the bulk of its Ocean
Tonnage

shipping space the Association necessarily depended upon the Government, but, as we shall see in a moment, its allotment fell far short of its requirements. Through the American Shipping Control Committee, permission was secured from the French High Commissioner to ship certain amounts of Y M C A material on steamers allotted to the French Government, but the French authorities were not always able to fulfill the promise and the arrangement was of little avail. It became necessary, therefore, for the Association to enter the open market in the effort to secure tonnage for goods which could not find room in government-controlled ships. During 1917 this was still reasonably possible, but the united action in 1918 by all the Allied Powers, commandeering not only their own, but also the larger portion of neutral ships, almost eliminated free competition in the shipping market. Moreover, in cases where it was possible to secure the use of privately operated boats, delays of months were often involved, because contracts had generally to be made several trips in advance, and prices were so high as to be almost prohibitive. During 1917 the Association had been able to contract for cargoes at rates of \$40 to \$60 per ton, but in 1918 freight rates steadily went up, with the result that the Association was forced to pay as much as \$160 per ton, which for many articles meant more than doubling of the price f.o.b. New York. During 1917 and 1918 a total of 8,121 tons were shipped on boats obtained in the open market. Although some commercial lines gave space to the Y M C A free of charge, the total freight paid on these shipments exceeded \$800,000.

While the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Department used its own initiative in order to secure commercial tonnage, its control of goods ceased in reality when they arrived at the docks. Within these the military authorities could not be hampered by the presence of civilians, and a request from the Y M C A to be allowed to appoint an inspector at the docks in New York to protect the goods, which suffered badly from breakages, had to be refused.

The tendency of private shipping had been anticipated by the Chief Secretary in France, who from the beginning of negotiations had urged that "the same amount of land and ocean transport be available to the Post Exchange Department of the Y M C A as would be available for the (Army) Post Exchange." On December 1, 1917, an estimate of required tonnage was submitted to General Pershing, according to which the Association required a minimum of 208.83 short tons net weight monthly for each 25,000 troops in France, plus

an additional eight tons of equipment (in order to carry on the other activities of the Y M C A) once for all, for each unit of 25,000 men arriving overseas.¹ It was requested that this tonnage should be authorized and provided for Y M C A supplies. On January 13, 1918, the Quartermaster replied to the effect that General Pershing recommended:

"Allotment to the Y M C A on automatic basis, 100 space tons per month in transports coming from America for canteen supplies for each 25,000 men of Expeditionary Forces, shipments to commence for month of January, 1918. Necessary to hold down allotment indicated."

Thereafter the shipping space at the disposal of the Association each month on Government controlled vessels was determined by the War Department on the basis of the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief of the A E F.

Although this promise evidently was based on the maximum which the Army could afford to give the Y M C A, it practically destroyed the hope of giving full service. In order to realize this disappointment, it must be remembered that against a minimum requirement of 208 net weight tons (approximately 250 gross weight tons) was set a promise of 100 space tons, or only approximately 55 gross weight tons. The allotment thus covered only some 20 per cent of the requirements.

The situation, however, did not develop quite as badly as the Quartermaster's reply gave reason to fear. The Army from the start based its tonnage allotment, not on 100 space tons but on 100 weight tons, for each 25,000 men. On the other hand, the allotments were made still more inadequate by the fact that the Commanding General based his recommendations on the number of troops in France in the month preceding each allotment, although it had been pointed out to him that the allotment for each month should if possible be based on the number of troops expected to be in France two months after the date on which the allotment was issued, because goods would not be available for actual distribution in a shorter period. This disproportion became especially pronounced during the summer of 1918 when troops were rushed to France at the rate of 300,000 men a month, which practically meant that between the date of allotment and the arrival of the goods at the front, the number of men to be served had doubled. Matters were made still worse because the Army was forced temporarily to curtail tonnage to even less than the 100 space tons

Tonnage
Secured

¹ See Plate VIII facing p. 290.

originally allotted to the Y M C A, when the volume of material essential for carrying on the actual warfare underwent a violent increase after the start of the German offensives in 1918. The Chief Secretary repeatedly urged an increase in the allotment, and pointed out that, at the rate at which goods were brought over, it would be utterly impossible to meet the demands of the troops. It was not until September, 1918, that the Army was able to afford some relief to this precarious condition.

Cooperation with
Quartermaster


Under date of September 12, 1918, General Pershing intimated that serious efforts would be made to bring the allotment of the Y M C A up to 100 weight tons again. Further, the General Supply Division during this month succeeded in obtaining 2,840 tons of sugar and flour from the Quartermaster's stores. During July an agreement had been negotiated with the Quartermaster according to which the latter promised to furnish monthly from his stores in France 15 tons of tobacco for each 25,000 men, the Y M C A agreeing to release the same amount of allotted tonnage. From September on these 15 tons were transferred without the obligation to release tonnage. The tobacco arrangement with the Quartermaster had proved very satisfactory, mainly because the agreement meant in practice that tobacco in France was released against material still in America or in transit. Negotiations were opened in order to get this arrangement established for all the canteen supplies and an agreement to this effect was reached a few days before the Armistice was signed.

Shortage of
Motor Transport

A fact which seriously affected the service overseas should also be mentioned here. Few boats had accommodations for motor cars and the thousands of army trucks and motor cars of course had priority. The result was that the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Department succeeded in getting only 160 motor vehicles to France before the Armistice. It also happened that provisions, notably sugar and flour, purchased for the Y M C A overseas were commandeered or diverted and used for other purposes.

The Armistice relieved the situation almost at once. New York cabled Paris that plenty of tonnage now was available. The agreement with the Quartermaster was extended to meet in full the requirements of the General Supply Division, which in turn released to the former such canteen supplies as it might have on the way. This agreement went into effect January 1, 1919, two days before the last shipment of canteen articles from the Overseas Purchasing Department took place.

THE PROBLEM OF OCEAN TRANSPORT



[†]MINIMUM ESTIMATE WAS ON A NET WEIGHT BASIS OF 208.83 TONS FOR CURRENT SUPPLIES PER MONTH FOR EACH 25000 MEN IN SERVICE, PLUS ONE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE OF 8 TONS FOR EQUIPMENT FOR EACH 25000 MEN ARRIVING IN FRANCE. FOR PURPOSE OF COMPARISON WITH OTHER TONNAGE, FIGURES AS GIVEN INCLUDE 15% FOR TARE.

*"ARMY TRANSPORT TONNAGE PROMISED" WAS ON BASIS OF 100 TONS, GROSS WEIGHT, PER 25000 MEN. IN SEPT. 1918 THIS WAS INCREASED BY 15 TONS, PER 25000 MEN, FROM QUARTERMASTER'S SUPPLIES.

INCLUDES 2840 TONS OF SUGAR AND FLOUR BOUGHT FROM Q.M.'S STORES IN FRANCE.

During the first months of 1919, the Association made liberal use of the army transports, on which plenty of space was available after the ceasing of hostilities, in order to facilitate its normal activities. More than 14,000 tons of books, athletic supplies, motor cars, etc., were received in France during January and February.

Goods valued at more than \$25,000,000¹ were shipped to France, ^{Quantities Shipped} as recorded by the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau, during the whole war period. The weight records in New York were segregated with reference to each special commodity, but are not quite complete because some articles were shipped as personal baggage of secretaries. The prices quoted are f.o.b. New York. A fairly accurate weight record was finally compiled of shipments received at the French ports, however. This record furnishes the basis for Plate XIV facing p. 566 which clearly shows the crises the General Supply Division and the Army were subject to in their effort to keep supplies up to the demands.

The Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau functioned for a long time after the repatriation of the last contingent of troops from France, supplying American military and naval units in Siberia, the Adriatic, Constantinople and elsewhere.² In April, 1920, it was merged with the Purchasing Division of the International Committee.

¹ COMMODITY	WEIGHT (short tons)	VALUE (dollars)
Athletic supplies	835	\$ 1,640,000
Beverages	1,415	398,000
Building materials	175	143,000
Confections	2,450	1,365,000
Dry goods	170	519,000
Entertainment equipment	455	854,000
Foodstuffs	6,040	1,356,000
Furnishings	390	370,000
Motor equipment	2,025	1,506,000
Office supplies	1,370	431,000
Printed matter	1,601,000
Supplies for manufacture (principally sugar and flour)	23,790	3,032,000
Tobacco products	12,150	11,644,000
Toilet articles	500	470,000
Miscellaneous	120	97,000

Total \$25,426,000

² During the existence of the Overseas Purchasing and Shipping Bureau goods to the total value of \$28,637,322 were shipped to the following countries and organizations:

France	\$25,424,537
Coblentz	5,494
United Kingdom	345,412
Italy	785,032

In January, 1919, the Bureau of Equipment and Supplies, with exception of the Overseas Bureau which now had become fully independent, was transformed into the Salvage Bureau. A salvage secretary was appointed for each of the military departments with a representative in each camp. A large volume of salvage was also effected through the New York headquarters.

The sales did not assume really large proportions before May. In the first few months no principles were laid down for the sales; everything was sold in the open market at the best price obtainable. In October, price lists were prepared for all articles in question, fixing the minimum which should be secured for the various kinds of equipment according to the amount of use.

In November, 1919, large amounts of athletic supplies and books were returned to New York from overseas. The books had little sales value and were sold at a great sacrifice. The athletic supplies, even though these articles made for export were not up to the quality of equipment for home consumption and though they had been subject to long storage, were disposed of at 70 per cent of the purchase price. The salvage warehouse was closed in March, 1920, but small lots of goods were still disposed of in the following months until the Bureau ceased to exist in September of the same year.

The total amount derived from the salvage operations up to March 31, 1920, was \$2,097,184.03. The sales for the following months amounted to approximately \$75,000, making a grand total of \$2,172,000.

Czechoslovakia	\$ 2,642
Egypt	4,047
Foyers du Soldat.....	318,265
Greece	16,926
Insular Possessions	19,250
Poland	204,472
Prisoners of War.....	74,619
Rumania	5
Siberia	1,143,314
Switzerland	3,301
Turkey	52,512
U. S. Naval Base, No. 1 (Gibraltar)	48,748
White Sea (Russia).....	188,746
Total	<u>\$28,637,322</u>

CHAPTER XVII

THE MINISTRY OF RELIGION

In the preceding chapters the broad foundations for service laid by the Y M C A have been briefly surveyed. Behind the necessarily summary narrative of each division lie masses of detail, records of which constitute invaluable material for the student of practical organization of similar work on a large scale.

With a strong organization at the center, with financial resources assured, with an enthusiastic corps of volunteers assembling week by week, with buildings, comfortable if not luxurious, equipped with the necessary material means of service, and with supplies moving toward all the widely scattered service stations, the forms of activity due to the special war service started, grew and flourished.

These activities now to be described began and progressed simultaneously, no one waiting for another. Yet since the fundamental impulse of the Association is religious, the dominant motive underlying all forms of service was the same; and in the development of the religious work with soldiers will be found much to illuminate the subsequent accounts of athletics, entertainment and education.

To one who knew America it was a foregone conclusion that religious activities should be promoted in the camps. The men to be served came from communities where universally the spiritual life found channels of expression and received stimulus and nurture in common worship. Not every village and town had club, theater, and athletic field, but every one had its church. If the fundamental duty of the welfare organization—to supply in the camps the essential features of American community life—were to be discharged, the universally familiar characteristic typified by the “templed hills” of “America” could not be omitted. Whether men were consciously religious or not—and great numbers were—the absence of religious influences, spoken or silent, would have constituted a break with their accustomed environment which few fail to notice and regret. Many, pondering the new experiences they anticipated, for the first time asked, with curiosity if not definite expectation, what contribution religion had to make to the solution of their new problems, and the conflicting complexities of life.

Religious
Background of
American Life

The Y M C A a
Religious
Institution

The religious work of the Y M C A was the natural outcome of its history and of the challenge of the war. As in peace it sought to train the body, educate the mind and stimulate the spirit, so in war it continued its full program as its fitting contribution to the men and to the cause. In its threefold purpose, spirit is basic. From its earliest origin, all phases of its activity sprang from religious motivation, and accumulating experience but deepened its conviction that cultivation of Christian purpose is the key to useful service to men. As abundantly indicated in preceding pages, this conviction determined its approach to army work from Civil War days on, and was recognized in the orders officially admitting it to military and naval posts after the Spanish War by an explicit reference to the work of the Christian Commission.¹ Just as the Army and Navy provide chaplains as well as surgeons, so the President and his advisers turned to the Red Cross and the Y M C A as complementary institutions fitted by their established character to minister to the whole range of needs that included, at one extreme, relief of physical suffering and at the other, the fostering of a steady burning flame of moral enthusiasm. The Government's acceptance of the Y M C A offer of service was a pledge to millions of supporters in the churches that the spiritual needs of the men would be met.

The War
Department's
Ruling

So concerned were the leaders of the many religious groups and organizations in the country, lest their adherents should suffer from the absence of accustomed forms of worship and of faith, and so urgent their representations to the Government on that score, that the Secretary of War found it necessary in October, 1917, to issue a statement explaining the action taken by the Government.²

"I have received a large number of communications from various societies and fraternal organizations in all parts of the country, protesting against an alleged discrimination by the War Department in allowing the Young Men's Christian Association and the Knights of Columbus to erect recreation buildings inside the lines of the cantonments and National Guard Training Camps, while forbidding other societies the same privilege. These letters and protests have become so numerous that I have decided to make a public statement to clear away the misunderstanding which apparently exists.

"Ever since the plans for the cantonments and training camps were first made, the War Department has been flooded with requests from all sorts of organizations to erect special buildings inside the military reservations. Various religious denominations, a large

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 488, 489.

² Camp Bulletin VII, Oct. 20, 1917.

number of lodges and fraternities, and many athletic and recreational clubs have petitioned us, each seeking to minister exclusively to its own membership inside the camps. To say nothing of the confusion which the admission of these various societies and orders would involve, it would, of course, be physically impossible from the standpoint of available space to allow all of them to erect buildings within the camps. It seemed, therefore, a fair and reasonable solution of the problem to admit the two organizations which had already been identified with recreational work within military camps; to wit: The Young Men's Christian Association and the Knights of Columbus. Both organizations served the soldiers along social lines on the Mexican border last summer, without regard to any question of membership. On this condition, therefore, that they would not limit their activities to a particular constituency, and that their buildings would at all times and for all meetings be open to the entire camp, they were allowed admission to the military reservations. The Young Men's Christian Association represents the Protestant denominations, which will constitute roughly 60 per cent of our new army; the work of this organization in all military camps both in Canada and abroad is too well known to require comment. The Knights of Columbus represent the Catholic denomination, which will constitute perhaps 25 per cent of the new army. While this society is a fraternal organization, it will sustain exactly the same relation to the camps as is sustained by the Young Men's Christian Association, and will hold no meetings to which all the troops in the camp are not invited, regardless of religious or other preference. The Young Men's Hebrew Association in its recreational work has identified itself with the Young Men's Christian Association, and it seems to me that this task of ministering to the social needs of the soldiers within the camps has been met fully, and in a way which will not needlessly complicate the machinery of camp organization.

"It seems to me, moreover, that the communities near the camps, where the soldiers will undoubtedly spend much of such leisure time as is allowed them, present a genuine opportunity to these various societies and organizations, which have sought admission to the camps. Experience has shown that the instinctive desire of a soldier with an hour of free time is to 'go to town,' if the town is only a cross-roads. For this reason, therefore, the Commission on Training Camp Activities, with my approval and under my direction, has given a great deal of time and thought to the task of organizing these towns and cities along recreational and social lines. Local committees have been appointed in each such community, and the attempt has been made to harness up the lodges, churches, clubs, and other local groups and organizations with the men in the camp. This, it seems to me, is an opportunity for service which cannot wisely be overlooked. Each lodge, church, and fraternity can look out for the needs of its own soldier membership, and where local groups are unable financially to provide adequately for this task, the larger organization

of the church or fraternity, as the case may be, can come to the rescue with more ample means.

"Indeed, there is so large a task before us in surrounding our troops with a healthy environment, and the emergency is so great, that I trust all groups can cooperate in a cordial spirit of loyalty and fellowship, regardless of any difference of race, creed, or affiliation."

With a clear and never shaken recognition of the vital relationship of the Y M C A, as an interdenominational body, to the Protestant Evangelical churches, whose members constitute its active membership, the utmost care was taken to secure the benefits of their counsel. Immediately after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, and in anticipation of the impending decision of the nation, the International Committee's Senior Secretary for Religious Work, at the suggestion of Dr. Mott, took steps to assemble a committee of representatives of leading denominations to consider the broad aspects of the prospective religious work for soldiers and sailors. This committee, known as the Cooperating Committee of the Churches,¹ met and began its deliberations before the National War Work Council was organized, and continued to act in an advisory capacity after the Council had created the Religious Work Bureau. Its chairman was Bishop Luther B. Wilson.

Very soon the General War-Time Commission of the Churches was organized, to unify so far as possible the activities of the various denominations, and to act as a clearing house for information that would avoid duplication of effort. Early in 1918, Congress passed a bill authorizing a large increase in the number of chaplains in the Army and Navy, and assigning to the General War-Time Commission of the Churches the duty and privilege of selecting and recommending ministers for commission as chaplains. Most of the leading denominations also created war work commissions under various names. It was a common occurrence for members of any or all these commissions to be present by invitation at meetings of the Religious Work Committee and to take part in its discussions. In such matters as the distribution of literature, the selecting of speakers to tour the camps, the promotion of mutual understanding between chaplains and secretaries, and occasionally in correcting the effects of excessive sectarianism on the part of individuals, this cooperative relationship was of great value. In April, 1918, the War Work Council appointed

¹For list of members of the Cooperating Committee of the Churches, see Vol. II, Appendix I, p. 494.

a special committee to supervise the operations of the Religious Work Bureau, of which Ralph W. Harbison was chosen Chairman.¹ The Cooperative Committee of the Churches ceased to work as a body, two of its members becoming members of the Religious Work Committee of the Y M C A, Bishop Luther B. Wilson and President J. Ross Stevenson, who had in November, 1917, been relieved from a large part of his duties as President of Princeton Theological Seminary to give his time to the religious work for soldiers.

At its first meeting, April 28th, the War Work Council also established, among other bureaus, the Bureau of Religious Work. The direction of this Bureau fell naturally to Robert P. Wilder, who had been for several years Senior Secretary for Religious Work of the International Committee, and previously General Traveling Secretary for the British Student Movement. He had been one of the leading figures in that conference at Mount Hermon in 1886 out of which sprang the Student Volunteer Movement. It was largely due to his experience and prescience and that of Dr. J. Ross Stevenson, who was closely associated with him, that the program was adequate. As one result of this foresight, the Religious Work Bureau had its program mapped out and its organization effected before the camps were ready for the incoming recruits. Workers in the field were afforded not only a vision to be attained, but a full equipment of means and methods adapted to the ends sought.

The religious purpose of the Y M C A went far beyond a minimum service to needs of which individuals were already conscious. Just as the educational secretaries urged the benefits of study, and the athletic directors promoted games and exercises instead of merely handing out footballs and boxing gloves to those who asked for them, so the religious workers by all legitimate methods made known, to the indifferent as well as the already interested, the power of God to enrich their lives, and sought to reenforce with spiritual energy the devotion of the men to the cause for which they fought. The constant central purpose was to send men forth fit to fight, fit to die, and above all, fit to live. Whether to provide armor of defense from moral perils or to strengthen their fighting arm, the resources of religious faith and principles were to be made known to all men who would hear. This did not mean sectarian propaganda, for as will be clearly seen, Association workers cooperated heartily with workers

¹ For members of Religious Work Committee, see Vol. II, Appendix VI, p. 560.

of all faiths to serve all men. It did mean that none should miss a chance to know and avail themselves of all that religion could give.

The objectives were stated in a letter to camp secretaries by Mr. Wilder, as follows:

1. To lead men to Christ.
2. To keep professing Christians loyal to their Lord.
3. To relate all who come under the Association's influence to the principles and aims of the Kingdom of God.

THE WORKING FORCES

Chaplains

The Association workers constituted one, and probably the largest, group of a considerable number who found early both the necessity and the possibility of hearty cooperation. Primarily responsible for religious work were the chaplains. They alone were officially recognized by the Government as clergymen authorized to administer sacraments in the camps; other ordained men might do so on invitation of the chaplain. Where no chaplains were stationed, it was generally recognized as permissible for ordained men to perform all ministerial functions. The status of civilian religious workers was never officially defined. Such definitions might have cleared the atmosphere in some cases where confusion arose, and facilitated service. In the absence of definition, the situation called for individual adjustment in each instance. The instructions of the War Work Council were explicit and emphatic that secretaries should exercise scrupulous care to respect the prerogatives of chaplains and in all cases make sure that they understood and sanctioned the Y religious program before attempting to introduce it. Almost without exception chaplains welcomed the assistance of religious work secretaries. Many invited ordained clergymen to perform ministerial functions. Both groups grappled earnestly with the problem, not altogether simple in its practical details, of cooperating without friction in a spirit of unity.

Welfare Secretaries

In the more formal activities, the secretaries of the Knights of Columbus and of the Jewish Welfare Board, worked side by side, each for its own group. The former usually had their own buildings; the Jewish workers generally used the Association huts. Where the Y hut was the only one, it was used by all at mutually convenient times. All religious services, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, were announced in the bulletins issued by the Y M C A. The following bulletin from Camp Dix is typical:

SUNDAY SERVICES, CAMP DIX, NOVEMBER 4, 1917

ARMY Y M C A SERVICES

10.00 A.M.—Union Communion Service in the Auditorium, to which all are cordially invited. The Communion will be administered by the following clergymen:

Bishop Luther Wilson, of the Methodist Church.
 Rev. Wm. R. Taylor, D. D., of the Presbyterian Church.
 Rev. Raymond West, D. D., of the Baptist Church.
 Rev. H. A. Stimson, of the Congregational Church.

Note.—Communion Sermon by Bishop Wilson, who has just returned from France, where he made a study of Army life there.

On account of this service, the regular services in all buildings will be omitted for this Sunday.

Building No. 1—Communion Service conducted by Rev. W. W. H. Block, of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

Building No. 3—Communion Service conducted by Rev. J. C. Kuder, of the Lutheran Church.

7.00 P.M.—Religious Services open to men of all denominations.

Building No. 1—Address by Rev. E. A. Loux.

Building No. 2—Address by Rev. S. D. Snowden.

Building No. 3—Address by Rev. Raymond West.

Building No. 4—Address by Rev. H. A. Stimson.

Building No. 5—Address by Rev. Warren S. Stone, Religious Director.

Building No. 6—Address by H. Clark Barber.

Building No. 7—Address by Rev. Horace G. Ogden, Religious Director.

Building No. 8—Address by Rev. William R. Taylor.

Building No. 9—Address by Rev. Robert W. Veach, Religious Director.

3.00 P.M.—Popular Services in the Auditorium. All are invited.

Address by H. Clark Barber, New York City, who has made a special study of Army conditions in Europe.

Music by the 309th Regiment Band. Leader Mr. Fattey. Tenor Solo by Carl Nisita.

Catholic Services

K. of C. Building (Main)—7.30 and 9.00 A.M. and 7.15 P.M. Rev. Jno. F. Walsh.

K. of C. Building No. 2—9.00 A.M. Rev. Jos. McDonald.

Y M C A Building No. 4—6.20 and 9.00 A.M. Rev. George Murphy.

Y M C A Building No. 6—7.30 A.M. Rev. Jos. McDonald.

Y M C A Building No. 8—7.30 and 9.00 A.M. Rev. Edw. Kirk.

Y M C A Building No. 9—7.00 and 9.00 A.M. Rev. John Farrelly.

Protestant Episcopal Service

Episcopal Chapel, Pointsville—10.00 A. M. Rev. W. H. Block.

Jewish Service

Friday, November 2, 1917. Y M C A Building No. 2—6.45 to 7.45 P.M.
 Conducted by Cyrus J. Janover, representing the Jewish Board of Welfare Work.

Issued from Camp Dix Y M C A Headquarters.

Next in order came the camp pastors. These were ministers sent to the camps by denominational agencies, usually with the special purpose of holding services and otherwise ministering spiritually to the men of their own persuasion. Under the ruling of the Secretaries of War and Navy, these workers were without buildings and naturally turned to the Association to supply the lack. There was, in principle, no objection to this, but it sometimes meant, in practice,

Camp
Pastors

the temporary monopolizing of the huts in the interest of small minorities of men. The general and associate secretaries, in conference on the subject with the department executive secretaries, agreed upon the following principles as representing the attitude and position of the Y M C A.

"The secretaries are expected to make the Association buildings in the camps available for the celebration of Holy Communion on such a schedule as is practicable. This privilege should be extended to the various chaplains and to such other denominational representatives as shall have access to the camps through the permission of the proper military authorities.

"As far as it is consistent with other demands on the buildings, the secretaries are expected to make provision in them for gatherings from time to time of denominational groups. In making this statement it must be understood that these buildings are erected on government property by courtesy of the United States Government. This privilege is granted with the understanding that the buildings are open to all enlisted men, irrespective of class or creed, at all times. There would probably be no objection to a small denominational group in a part of the building that was not demanded by the general public at a particular time, but technically the meeting would need to be open to others if they demanded entrance."

As already noted in the quoted statement of Secretary Baker it was generally felt that the best facilities for specifically denominational work were to be found or arranged in the communities adjacent to most camps. Local churches and pastors, often with special aid supplied by their denominational organizations, were zealous in ministering to the men. The secretaries heartily supported invitations extended to the men to attend worship in local churches of their own faith.

To those more or less permanent working forces in the camps were added pastors of local churches, whose services as occasional speakers and as personal workers were utilized as largely as possible, laymen who were enlisted for occasional addresses and as leaders of Bible study groups, and preachers and evangelists of outstanding ability engaged to make more or less extended speaking trips through the camps. Of all these types we shall have further occasion to take notice.

As the war progressed, one thing of lasting significance became increasingly evident—religious workers of all descriptions had a common task which they could approach only in the spirit of brotherhood. This harmonizing spirit grew under the challenge of war and

Occasional
Workers

The Common
Task

blazed a trail for the united advance of the church after the war. The men in the religious work were all men of the church. The majority of them were Christian ministers released from their pastorates for varying periods of time. Naturally these secretaries not only felt themselves but found themselves the "church at work" in the camps. Men who came with their separate notions and diverse ways of working soon discovered that there was but one synthesis of the whole problem. The camp proved the melting pot, not only for the soldiers, but for the secretaries representing all branches of the Christian Church. Out of these experiences men will return to their denominations but never again in the old way to their denominationalism. Because of this, there was a new thrill and a new inspiration as these forces of the church, marching under the One Commander, Jesus Christ, found themselves approximating as never before the Church Invisible.

PERSONALITY OF WORKERS

In the camp religious work the most vital element was personality. The pressing need for immediate action enforced haste in selection from the wide range of volunteers, and many a man found himself catapulted out of a pulpit, schoolroom or office into a situation for which his experience might be supposed to fit him but which in reality was utterly novel. Ingenuity and initiative, backed by the true spirit, were essential. Wanting these, no previous experience proved a match for his intricate and taxing problem. The task of the religious work director appointed for each camp was to secure the cooperation of every available helper, on a program of definite principles whose application varied from moment to moment. This meant that the secretary specifically charged with religious direction was obliged to rally to his support the secretaries assigned to other special tasks, and officers and men who at home had been Bible teachers, workers in men's brotherhoods, or active in any social or religious effort, so that at any point and at any moment they might seize the opportunity for action through which the religious spirit might radiate and make itself known.

The fundamental note in religious work was sounded in early and continuous cultivation of the personal religious life of workers. One clear lesson from human experience in the spiritual life is that only the soul kindled by divine love can kindle other souls. Secretaries were encouraged continually to keep time free daily for prayer

A Basic
Principle

and Bible study. A sort of informal league to "Keep the Morning Watch" sprang up in the summer training school at Springfield, Mass., and extended widely by the simple voluntary pledge of individuals to begin each day with private devotions. In most huts "family" prayers were held each morning, the whole staff attending, and the day ended with evening devotions. There was conscious dependence upon the divine power of which men felt themselves channels or instruments, and a sincere desire to give full sway to the influence in a rich outpouring of its saving grace and inspiration.

Religion through
Service

There were few who did not quickly realize that religious work meant not so much services as service. Public worship in all forms was emphasized, to be sure. But spiritual life overflowed all established channels and sought access to men in ways which were not customarily called religious. One of the first things borne into the souls of men who came for the specific performance of religious work, was that they, of all men, must not only stand ready to perform the lowliest task but must learn to make it the bearer of spiritual power. Many a one learned for the first time the real meaning of the cup of cold water in the Master's name. The purveying of stamps, stationery, money orders and countless incidental services furnished momentary contacts in which the essential spirit of Christianity, friendliness, brotherhood and love, might flash from man to man. The big religious task was to get the forces working as smoothly and with such brotherly regard for all, that every man who came into the hut should feel that these workers had a genuine and sincere friendly interest in him. No better course could be conceived for opening the way to the personal touch that many of the men craved. The performance of a trivial service often opened the door to the deeper thoughts and feelings that men do not expose to any but a proved friend. Perhaps in the forced necessity of practicing their religion before being permitted to talk about it, some ministers found the clue to their own baffled sense of the futility of preaching. At any rate, it would be generally agreed by workers, reflecting on their experience, that at the counter, or in the information booth, had begun a large proportion of the most intimate spiritual contacts with other men that they have ever known. Even where no such experiences developed, the quiet influence of daily duty done simply for the sake of service, made the religious impression far beyond the knowledge of the workers. When they caught the full significance of what they were doing, everyone found himself an adjunct to the religious activities.

Sometimes a secretary found, outside the varied round of accustomed service, a special opportunity to be a modern Samaritan. Returning to camp one day, a religious worker fell in with one of the men, greatly dejected and apparently in deep trouble. Having time then for only a few words, the secretary promised to look him up in the afternoon, and upon doing so, discovered the boy in the guardhouse and there he told his whole story. The young fellow had been granted leave to go home to see his sick mother, and had overstayed his time. He was to be court-martialed. The secretary was convinced of the boy's sincerity; he realized as well that the boy, in his fear and anxiety, had not fully stated the case upon his return. Meanwhile word came of the mother's death. The secretary went immediately to the judge advocate, giving a detailed account of the case and urging that clemency be extended, not only by withholding punishment but by granting a second leave that the boy might go home to attend his mother's funeral—the secretary agreeing to raise funds for the trip. The first reaction of the judge was one of unbelief. "This is but another case where an excuse has been offered by the offender hoping that he may not be disciplined for overstaying his leave," said the judge. But he agreed to listen to the story as told by the boy himself. This resulted in the judge's being so impressed by the boy's sincerity and by the understanding earnestness of the secretary that the boy was granted a second leave to go home, the judge himself subscribing toward his expenses.

Helpful
Sympathy

THE PROGRAM

The Religious Work Bureau had no new devices for promoting spiritual life. Its task was to make available and fruitful the helps which experience has long proved effective. Bible study, Christian literature, services of common worship with music and straightforward preaching, and personal evangelism directed to secure the self commitment of men to the Christian life, were relied upon, all to be confirmed by the life of the workers which would speak louder in conduct than in words.

Bible study was promoted both in private reading and class discussion groups. At first purchasing largely from American and English publishers, the Association received in September, 1917, a generous gift from the American Bible Society of soldiers' Khaki Testaments, of which in the next eight months more than a million copies were given to the men. The demand was not sufficiently met,

Bible
Study

however, and the Association published a Red Triangle Testament for distribution. Arrangements were made with the Jewish Welfare Board to distribute prayer books to such Jewish men as desired them, and Douai Testaments to Roman Catholics in cases when they were not available from the Knights of Columbus. Courses for guidance of daily reading were prepared and bound into many of the testaments. To secure the regular use of the testaments thus given away, the men were asked to sign, not ■ promise, but a declaration of purpose to read every day. The commonest forms were those of the Pocket Testament League and the Comrades with the Book.

Fred S. Goodman, Senior Secretary for Bible Study of the International Committee, was in charge of the promotion of Bible Study groups. He had directed work in this field for many years and his experience and enthusiasm gave it great impetus. The program laid out seemed too stupendous for realization, but the methods that had been worked out in enlisting thousands of men in shop Bible classes throughout the country brought remarkable results.

These Bible classes were organized with leaders from among the men themselves. After securing the consent of the colonel and captain of the company and the cooperation of the chaplain, the Y workers would walk into a mid-day or evening mess. The mess sergeant whistled for attention. Amidst the rush of several hundred hungry men, the clash of aluminum mess kits, the interruption of epithets and good-natured raillery, the secretary would briefly state the plan to form Bible classes in every company throughout the camp. Volunteers were asked to remain. The classes were organized whether two or two hundred were interested. From the men who stayed, a first and second leader, president, and secretary of the class were selected; and a set of special studies was distributed. The worker returned afterward to get the class under way. When no Bible class leader could be found in a company, the men were formed in squads or groups, pledged to read passages of Scripture daily or to get together at stated times for informal discussion. In this manner a whole regiment might be organized in a single day.

These campaigns were intensive drives engineered in nearly all the camps for enrollments in classes. Reporting on November 6, 1917, Mr. Goodman wrote:

"In the six weeks since beginning this task, I have visited all but three of the cantonments and National Guard camps between New York and El Paso, besides other types of army centers. In each

of the large camps conferences have been conducted, attended by from 50 to 90 per cent of the secretaries in camp. . . .

"The soldiers are responding in a remarkable way to the opportunities for religious privileges, especially in Bible classes. In some camps, our standard—"An Organized Bible Class in Every Company, Battery or Squadron"—is actually realized. In one center at Camp Gordon, of 2,375 men in eight barracks 766 were enrolled in seven Bible classes for the opening session, besides other small groups. Hundreds of leaders are in training classes. In some camps more than 50 per cent of the leaders of classes have come from the ranks, where preachers, superintendents of Sunday Schools and teachers are often found. I am stressing this point . . . because the self-propagating Bible class is the only kind which can be transported to France."

A special nation-wide concerted effort was made in "Bible Study Week," January 20 to 27, 1918. Total results were not recorded; Camp Logan reported 27 new classes organized; Camp Lewis, 2,930 men enrolled; Camp Dodge, increase in classes from 45 to 106, and in enrollment from 1,000 to 2,850. At Camp Taylor the secretary presented the plan to a conference of 200 officers of whom 100 signed cards pledging assistance. Each company meeting was called together by one of its own officers who endorsed the project, and 1,200 men were enrolled. Some of the camps enrolled 40 per cent of the total number in camp, either as members of classes or as pledged readers of their testaments. The numbers of signers of the War Roll ran into the thousands in most of the large camps. A careful compilation of activities from April, 1917, to December 31, 1919, shows in the United States alone 134,503 Bible sessions with total attendance of 3,386,000.¹ As a by-product of this Bible study work, volunteers for the ministry, foreign missions and Y M C A work after the war were numerous.

As aids to Bible study, and in furtherance of the religious purpose, large quantities of literature were distributed. Dr. Robert E. Speer was Chairman of the Committee that had general charge of this. The leading Bible Study courses were three: "Jesus as a Friend Saw Him," a series of fifteen studies in the Gospel of Mark; "Thirty Lessons about Jesus," a somewhat more advanced course; and "The Soldier's Spirit," twelve topical lessons in which light from the Bible was thrown upon common problems of the soldier. Other courses were prepared and published from time to time, and standard courses from various sources were used, as well as such books as Fosdick's "Manhood of the Master" and "Meaning of Prayer."

Christian
Literature

¹ Consult Y M C A Year Book, New York, 1920, p. 109.

In addition specially prepared leaflets and pamphlets were placed in racks in all huts where soldiers could help themselves, and selected religious books were placed in hut libraries. A monthly bulletin of available literature was circulated among secretaries and showed lengthening lists of titles. Much of this was published by the Association Press. The number distributed amounted to millions every month.

Music and
Its Influence

The inspiration of song in religious services was a factor not overlooked by the Religious Work Bureau. As early as June, 1917, steps were taken to provide leadership in singing, the secretaries being regarded as assistants to the Religious Work Director. The aim was to have a music director, giving full time to that work, in each large camp; while in each hut there should be at least one secretary capable of leading singing. By December, 1917, music directors were at work in twelve camps.

The function of song, as a unifying and morale building influence in armies, has a much broader usefulness. Observers of the armies on both sides in the earlier years of the war had been deeply impressed by the marching songs and the choruses of the soldiers; thoroughly organized in the German armies and not less hearty, as well as spontaneous, among the Allies. Reports from the other side noted the contrast between them and the "silent" Americans who first appeared in France and England. From many of the wisest leaders in America came expressions of belief that the American Army would benefit by becoming a singing army.

By the end of 1917 the Commissions on Training Camp Activities had placed a few song leaders in the camps, and the War Camp Community Service was promoting community singing in towns and cities. With the appointment in December, 1917, of Marshall M. Bartholomew as Music Director for the Y M C A Religious Work Bureau, the Y M C A program was broadened and the various forces at work coordinated. A conference held in January defined the relation of the Commissions' song leaders and the Y music directors and emphatically affirmed the value of music as a factor in military efficiency. Departmental Y M C A conferences in February developed principles and methods, and established a standard repertoire of about twenty patriotic folk and marching songs, in such a way that the musical development would be uniform throughout the forces; the aim was to make sure that all soldiers should know the same songs

and be accustomed to the same methods, from however many and diverse units they might come together. Recognizing that divisions, brigades, and regiments would be split apart and reorganized in the fighting areas, the company was chosen as the singing unit, and company leaders were selected and trained. General and local orders universally authorized the allotment of time for compulsory or voluntary rehearsal, and competitive sings stimulated interest. In the huts men learned the words and tunes, marking time in marching rhythm as they sang, and found that hiking practice was eased by their own singing. Every music director was impressed with the truth that if the Army was to sing in France it must learn to sing in America.

Meanwhile recruiting of music directors was pushed forward. By the middle of March, 1918, 35 were at work in, as many camps and authorization had been given for twelve more to work as itinerants in the smaller camps. By the end of June, 56 were at work in the home camps, 13 in training and 15 had been sent overseas. In July, a Training School for Overseas Song Leaders was established at Columbia University, under Robert Lawrence; here 215 men were qualified and sent overseas. In five of the department training schools courses for song leaders had been established. About this time the administration of the work was set up as a separate bureau, in close affiliation with the Religious Work Bureau and the Entertainment Bureau. By October 200 music directors were at work in the home camps, besides 65 in industrial communities. A special section of the Bureau attended to the Navy's service.

Recruiting Music
Directors and
Song Leaders

While the Y M C A music directors regularly gave valuable assistance in the religious meetings, they rendered a larger, if not more significant service in organizing and training the company leaders. With only incomplete reports, there were definite records of more than 30,000 soldier song leaders trained by them. It was these men who, on the march or in camp, led the men in entertaining themselves when no other facilities for entertainment could be had.

The popularity of the singing may be judged by the fact that during the year 1918, in Y M C A huts alone, at gatherings where singing was the principal, often the only attraction, the attendance was 37,000,000—a record which leaves out of account the sings conducted by the Commissions' song leaders. In his final report, April, 1920, the Director of the Music Bureau called attention to the fact that attendance in America at public concerts and musical perform-

ances had increased from a pre-war record of two per cent to fifteen per cent of the population of the United States. An interesting development was the promotion of neighborhood singing after the war. In August, and September, 1919, a Singing Wagon with a crew of five men, went through the crowded sections of New York, stopping here and there for a half hour sing. The people, especially the children, joined in with the utmost enthusiasm. Crowds numbering 300 to 3,000 would gather and when the Singing Wagon moved on to its next stop a few blocks distant, many would follow. Variations of the same idea were applied in a number of cities. The urgent requests everywhere to "come again" gave clear evidence of the possibilities of community service by this simple means.

Week Day
Services

If the Religious Work Department had the duty of infusing all service with the religious spirit, it had no less the specific task of providing liberal opportunities for common worship and of presenting the Christian ideal and its claim to loyalty. Its greatest opportunity, as far as numbers were concerned, came in some service where a strong speaker made a telling appeal. The life of the Master presented by men who knew Him was the interpretative clue to the meaning of the service of His followers. At the outset anything but Sunday gatherings seemed almost out of the question, and even those unsatisfactory. From reveille to recall, military duties asserted an imperative claim upon the men. From then till mess, some form of recreation naturally occupied the time. Even from seven to ten activities were so diversified that it was sometimes perplexing to find place for a religious service. A large number of weekly programs, however, show one evening a week entirely devoted to religious services. Others announced a half-hour service one or two evenings a week. In a few huts, a twenty minute vesper service was held at 7 or 7.30 every evening, preceding the entertainment, athletic or movie program, and in many huts the day's activities were regularly ended with brief, informal evening prayers. Singing was a leading feature of all these services, and perhaps the ministry of song attracted the attention of many who would otherwise have remained unimpressed. Scripture readings were brief and selected for direct applicability to the men's lives. Addresses varied from a brief word of explanation and application of Scripture, to a sermon by chaplain, pastor of a nearby church or visiting speaker. Prayers were void of vain repetition. Simplicity and directness were the watch words, the aim being always to "reach the men where they lived," to maintain spiritual

contact with the lives and prayers of the folks at home and to deepen fidelity to God and country. Under the conditions, it was impossible to hold such services except immediately before or after some other feature—moving pictures, boxing or stunts. Yet, spirit as well as body and mind need nourishment, and there could be no healthier or simpler method than to pass naturally from one to the other. Men were not obliged to join in the services, if they did not choose, but were free to go on reading or writing without embarrassment. There were rare cases when tactless secretaries tried to force religion upon the men. The secretary who took advantage of their presence not only failed to render either them or the Association the service intended, but disregarded the instructions of the War Work Council, which directed that religious services should be plainly advertised as such, and that when informal services were held, a cordial invitation to participate should be given in such form and manner that men should feel entirely at ease either in accepting or ignoring it.

Naturally Sundays afforded the most favorable time for religious services. Training activities were usually suspended, but routine duties had to be performed. In spite of the large number of passes issued, many of the men remained in camp. Depending upon military orders for the day, services were arranged for morning, afternoon or evening. Special Jewish services and Catholic confessions were held on Saturdays, and in general, the hut was placed at the disposal of the chaplain on Sunday mornings for such services as he might arrange. The day might begin with mass for Catholics, then Holy Communion administered by an Episcopal chaplain, followed by a service conducted by the religious work secretary especially for men accustomed to attend Protestant churches at home. Three congregations would fill and empty the hut in succession. In the evening, a service designed to be universal in its appeal was held. A regimental band, always very ready to volunteer its splendid assistance, would aid greatly in the singing of familiar home songs. The men were eager for their favorites—"Old Black Joe," "My Old Kentucky Home"—not forgetting songs of the moment like the "Long, Long Trail." By a natural and spontaneous progress they would come to some of the grand old hymns of the church universal. Then the speaker—perhaps come to remain a week in camp—would deliver his message. The man who tried to make a sectarian appeal was rare, and speedily discovered his mistake. Any stressing of sectarian distinctions was tabu, but everywhere men who spoke of the Jesus of the Gospels were

Sunday
Services

given an attentive hearing. If ever the universality and supremacy of the Christ was attested, it was in these camps where caste, creed and color line utterly disappeared.

The response of the men was impressive. Huts were usually crowded to the rafters. One of the surprises was the way in which men flocked to these meetings distinctly advertised as religious. In fact, an analysis of the statistics of attendance at all gatherings in the huts in the home camps, shows that the number at religious services was third in order, being exceeded only by the attendance at theatrical entertainments, including moving pictures, and at lectures. The total number of services held was 97,848, with an aggregate attendance of 17,387,305; religious work directors numbered 1,120, while 2,492 ministers served in the camps in various capacities.

President Stevenson was Chairman of the Bureau's Committee on Religious Meetings, and gave much time to the securing of leading preachers of all denominations to make tours of the camps. To name the few possible in limited space would be unjust to the many who cannot be named. The whole roster of ministers in the United States was available, every man eager to do his part in the extraordinary situation presented by the war. The committee selected men particularly with a view to their ability to deliver a straightforward, virile address upon some theme of real significance, and the high standard maintained became proverbial so that large audiences were sure at every meeting.

Observance of
Special Days

Festal days in the church calendar were marked by special exercises. The program carried out in one of the camps on Christmas Eve is typical. Shortly after sunset, as it was growing dusk, trumpeters, concealed by the pines on a hillside, summoned the men of a whole brigade to an open space which rose gradually from the speakers' stand like some vast amphitheater. In the forefront of the 7,000 soldiers was a circle of a thousand men, comprising a great chorus. Softly from the hillside, trombones started the strains of "Holy Night" which were caught up by the chorus and wafted like a benediction through the air. A general spoke in an impassioned way of Christmas, followed by a chaplain who pled briefly but earnestly for a new vision of the Babe of Bethlehem. As a secretary offered prayer, a hush which could be "heard" fell upon the whole multitude. When the regimental bands struck up "Joy to the World," it sounded like a Hallelujah chorus, for not only the chosen singers but all the men spontaneously broke forth in triumphant song. At the

conclusion of the song the secretary turned on the parti-colored lights of a giant Christmas tree. For a moment the men stood silent, then quietly turned to their tents and barracks as though they had worshipped with the wise men of the East at the shrine of the Child Jesus. Everywhere throughout the camps Christmas and Easter were turned to account in ways like this. There is no question of the deep religious impress made on the great mass of men.

One of the most significant pieces of religious work, that of lay visitation, utilized in many camps, had special prominence at naval stations. By very virtue of the swift coming and going of men some means had to be devised by which large numbers could be reached in a quick and telling way. Dealing with enthusiastic youth, religion had to be enthusiastic to be effective and infectious. Nowhere was this better understood and more utilized than at Great Lakes. Vigorous, successful, enthusiastic Christian business and professional men were brought into the tents and barracks for week-end visitations. Their coming had a three-fold purpose—getting at the hearts of men that they might be lined up for Christ, helping them see the need of reading their Bibles daily, and enlisting them in the service of reaching others. Sometimes as many as six hundred laymen would make a week-end visit, traveling by special train from Chicago to the Great Lakes Camp. After they had gone, many men wrote of their abiding gratitude for the work so splendidly conceived and so sincerely executed by these volunteer religious leaders.

The reason for the special influence of these laymen upon the men is not difficult to discern. The very fact that they were not professional ministers or leaders in religion was calculated to make the appeal stronger. The soldiers instinctively felt that these laymen were just like themselves, facing in some form or other the same temptations in the strain and stress of the same world. If they had found a way out, the men wanted to know of it. Naturally their contribution was the greater on this account.

Literature, music, and meetings were no substitute for direct personal influence. It was in the direct contacts of secretaries with the men, and of Christian men in the ranks with their comrades, that the best opportunities for planting the seeds of religious faith were found. Whenever a life showed the effects of its faith there were some who wanted to know its secret, and Christian men, becoming the confidants of those who were in any trouble or need, were often able to guide them to the source of spiritual power and peace.

Service of
Lay Visitors

Personal
Evangelism

One of the basic problems of all religious workers is the transformation of a momentary impression into a definite and lasting influence. Psychologists are generally agreed that emotion which finds no outlet in action tends to demoralization. The men who preached in the camps had no difficulty in moving men deeply. The chords of sentiment, of patriotism, and devotion to human welfare were waiting to be struck. These soldiers knew that their feet were in the road that led, for many, to death. They were aware of the moral issues in their daily life, and their sober healthy foresight discovered coming problems. No one could ask for more sensitive hearers. But their life was crowded full of immediate and very engrossing influences that tended to obscure and submerge the effect of the half hour of inspiration. It was especially easy here for spiritual impressions to diffuse and vanish. The problem was to find a way to fix once-aroused emotions, to harness them to practical living and to ensure their development to effective strength in crises to come. It was easy, like the sower of the parable, to scatter broadcast the seeds of moral and spiritual power. Could the plant be rooted so firmly as to ensure a full harvest?

The War
Roll

Two solutions were adopted, one organized and directed by the Y M C A alone, the other a cooperative effort of the three leading religious agencies. The first followed the historic method of the evangelical churches, which have found a solution of this problem in the so-called "Christian decision," by which the individual pledges himself, in one form or another, to Christian discipleship. At the close of meetings, an invitation was usually given to those who so desired to remain for personal religious conference with the speaker or secretaries. If, in such conferences, it appeared to the worker that the man was ready for such a step, he was offered the War Roll card, which bore the following:

"I hereby pledge my allegiance to the Lord Jesus Christ as my Saviour and King, and by God's help will fight His battles for the victory of His Kingdom."

The signer retained the stub, which had a copy of the pledge as a reminder. The card was sent to the Religious Work Bureau for record, followed by a letter from the Bureau to the signer and to the pastor of his home church or relatives, with the object of bringing speedily to the man the assurances of Christian fellowship. Secretaries were instructed not to offer the War Roll pledge to audiences nor make public appeal for signatures, nor to urge it upon individuals.

Different workers varied, naturally, in the degree of persuasion they deemed it fitting to employ in such a matter. The Religious Work Bureau recorded 326,311 of these cards signed in the home camps.

The second method was the product of cooperative grappling, by Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish workers, with the complicated problem presented in Camp Upton. Here the majority of the soldiers came from the foreign population of the lower East Side of New York City, and included not only men of widely varied nationality but of various creeds. A census of the camp at one time showed men of sixty-one forms of faith, including Catholics, Jews, Protestants, in that numerical order, followed by a scattering of Free Thinkers, Mormons, Mohammedans, Theosophists, Holy Rollers, Confucianists, and in fact, such a medley that one of the soldiers sending home a bundle of clothes wrote on the tag, "See Acts 2; 9, 10."

This situation existed to some extent in all camps, although it was less striking in the camps in the West and South and the National Guard camps whose population was more homogeneous. In one camp a union communion service, attended by 1,100 men, included adherents of 40 different denominations. Variations and extremes of education also presented themselves, college graduates mingling with illiterates in almost every gathering.

While men of all beliefs can be entertained by the same artist, or play on the same athletic team, it is quite another thing for one man to minister to men of all religions and not transgress upon the tenets of another's faith. As a result of many conferences the Inner Circle, a union of Protestants, Catholics and Jews, was organized to promote clean thinking, clean speech, clean living and character building among soldiers of all creeds. The insignia of the Y M C A, the Knights of Columbus and the Jewish Welfare Board, were all placed at the top of a card, which read as follows:

THE INNER CIRCLE

CAMP UPTON

Jointly Promoted by the

Y M C A

K O F C

JEWISH WELFARE BOARD

Having answered my country's call, and recognizing that an obligation rests on me, as a member of the National Army, to be a strong and efficient soldier, and realizing the need of help in meeting this obligation, I do hereby pledge myself to cooperate with other like-

minded men by forming in my barracks an Inner Circle which will promote the following:

1. Clean Thinking.
2. Clean Speech.
3. Clean Living.
4. Character Building.

(Character is formed through prayer, Bible study, attendance on divine worship, and service for other men.)

The idea spread through other camps; thousands of men signed these cards. Each soldier who signed it became a member of the Inner Circle and had a vote in electing officers of the Circle for his company. In some cases these officers were Catholic, in others Protestants and Jews. The method was that of free discussion. There being no central record of membership in the Inner Circle, it is impossible to make any estimate of the number enrolled. Its significance does not depend on numbers, but upon the demonstration of the ability of religious workers to agree upon the essential objectives of religious work and to cooperate for their attainment. There was mutual admission here that God has many ways to reach the souls of men, and intelligent help and stimulus was offered to every man to find Him by the familiar path of his own faith.

Spirit of the
Workers

Without surrender of its essential convictions each of the three leading religious organizations discovered the common ground on which all could work together. Each administering to its own adherents according to its own forms recognized in practice that those forms were not indispensable. This was the prevailing spirit of religious workers in all camps. The rare exceptions, men who were not averse to proselyting if occasion offered, disappeared from the camps as soon as they revealed their character. In addressing gatherings of soldiers, the speakers uniformly emphasized those fruits of the spirit which are of good report among all men, and in dealing with individuals sought to minister to each in the most helpful way.

Experiences like this cut men loose from traditional anchorages. Circumstances conspired to accentuate the spirit of universal brotherhood. A single cause had summoned multitudes of men to the standard of a new crusade for freedom, justice, and the righting of outrageous wrong. The universality of the nation's response put to shame the narrowness of pride that would admit only one channel by which divine strength might flow into men's souls. Religious workers took their stand upon the reality and universal availability of that strength and labored together to clear all channels that the stream

might flow unhindered. It is beyond question that the rising of religious workers above sectarian divisions to harmonious cooperation was a vital factor in the measure of success they achieved. Almost equally certain is the reaction to come upon the religious life of the nation. Whether immediate results appear or not, the comradeship in service of men of many faiths will not soon cease its unifying influence.

CHAPTER XVIII

PHYSICAL RECREATION

Play is the very antithesis of war. Not only does the urgent demand for concentrated effort seem to stamp as wasteful any diversion of time and energy to games, but the deadly nature of the struggle makes the mere thought of play seem frivolous and unworthy. When throughout the nation men and women were universally dispensing with luxuries in order to loan to the war treasury, when social gatherings without some purpose of war service were frowned upon, when women knitted at church and in the street cars, and college students suspended indefinitely their athletic contests, it seemed the most evident truism that the men actually in the struggle or counting the days of training which separated them from an active share in it, would turn their backs on play. Nevertheless the American Army became a playing as well as a fighting army. They played in the cantonments at home and even under the actual fire of the enemy. When the effect on them was observed by Allied authorities, these sought American assistance in getting their soldiers to play.

The principle was that expressed in the adage, "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." Modern war is not a sudden, strenuous conflict, quickly decided. It is a test of national strength, in which battle is preceded by long preparation which to the individual soldier means day after day and month after month of hard work unrelieved by excitement and quickly stripped of romantic novelty. Unless for daily fatigue there is daily recreation, and unless the load of responsibility and anxiety can be thrown aside from time to time in sheer irresponsible enjoyment, the unrelieved strain will make nervous wrecks of half the men so strenuously trained, before they come near the enemy.

This fact, however clear it may have been to psychologists, was publicly demonstrated to the world in the World War, and constitutes one of the many discoveries of that experience. It proved to be the task of the Physical Work Bureau of the Y M C A to provide a large part of the facilities for play in the Army and to lead in the organization and direction of sports. Although the natural first thought was that the expert physical directors of the Y M C A would be most

useful in aiding in the physical conditioning of the men, Army officers quickly showed that they needed no assistance in this respect. It was recreational athletics for which the military program had not provided, and which became the special function of the physical directors. After a beginning had been made, other organizations, especially the Knights of Columbus, cooperated; and the Commission on Training Camp Activities coordinated the work and gave special attention to the promotion of representative sports such as baseball, football, and boxing. The play that counts most, however, is the play in which men participate rather than watch. The special contribution of the Y M C A Physical Department was the introduction of games in which large numbers of men could participate, without equipment, previous organization, or practice. Alongside the stupendous numbers of men recorded as participating in organized games must be placed the unrecorded millions of hours spent by soldiers in impromptu play, made possible because the Y M C A had athletic equipment of every conceivable kind on hand for issue and because its directors had taught the men games that a dozen or a thousand could start at a moment's notice. Experience proved, too, that this play had a value not only to be recorded in terms of amusement, but equally to be expressed in fighting efficiency and character.

In spite of extraordinary employment of machines and the forces of nature in modern war, that ultimate appeal to force is fundamentally a test of the aggregate physical powers of fighting men. Only strong bodies are fit to meet the shock of hostile troops in battle. Only healthy men can endure the living conditions in camp and trench. The heavy labor involved in construction of transport lines and defensive works, as well as along lines of communication from munition factory to fighting front, calls for men of muscle and staying power. A prime duty of officers, from Commander-in-Chief to sergeants, is watchful and intelligent care of the physical condition of the men they command.

Physical Needs
of Army

On the preventive and remedial side, the Medical Departments of Army and Navy, through their subsidiary sanitary, surgical, medical and dental corps, made an enviable record in the war. Intestinal diseases such as dysentery, the typhoids, cholera and typhus, which caused 85 per cent of all deaths in the Spanish War, were practically eliminated.¹ Deaths from disease in the Spanish War were 26 per

¹ For Army Health Statistics, see *The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary*, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Washington, 1919. Chap. IX.

1,000 men compared to five per 1,000 in battle. In the World War, deaths from disease were 19 per 1,000 compared to 53 per 1,000 in battle. Of all disease deaths, 83.6 per cent were caused by pneumonia, of which more than half resulted from the explosive influenza pandemic which swept every camp in the United States in September and October of 1918, and which was brought under control with extraordinary promptness. Five out of six of all men sent to hospital on account of wounds were cured and returned to duty. In this remarkable record of preventive and remedial efficiency, the auxiliary services of the American Red Cross measured up to the high expectations warranted by its history.

The National
Physical Condition

The need of positive development and improvement of the physical condition and ability of the new army had not been so comprehensively foreseen and prepared for. One of the most astonishing facts brought to light by the operations of the draft boards was the large proportion of Americans in poor physical condition. In New England, New York, Michigan, Colorado, Washington and California, 40 to 50 per cent of registrants were rejected for physical disability. Even in the central agricultural states rejections on physical grounds ran as high as 30 per cent. A very large number barely passed the physical examinations who were far from fit to fight, and the best needed physical improvement. The task of conditioning the new army, foreseen by army authorities as a matter of course, proved bigger than expected.

For the basic building and hardening of muscle, with accompanying development of the habit of automatic response to orders many times rehearsed, the officers and non-coms of the old army were well prepared. The immemorially familiar method of drill—interminable drill, as it seemed to the new recruit—provided the tested means. Hours at the manual of arms, evolutions on the parade ground, long marches under full pack and equipment, bayonet practice and trench digging left men dog-tired at the end of every day yet daily more fit for the strains that awaited them.

Beyond this muscle-building and hardening process, the Army had no definite provision for physical training. Army regulations authorized the appointment of athletic officers, but no program had been established, no standard equipment supplied and the officers detailed varied greatly in experience and enthusiasm. The number available for this detail had been inadequate, and many commanding officers had paid little or no attention to the subject. The value of

athletic sports in stimulating all-round physical development, and in producing alertness and instant physical response to unfamiliar and unexpected situations, had been recognized by some officers. It had not, however, generally permeated the military personnel.

Athletics and sports for their amusement value were, of course, no new thing in the Army and Navy. Boxing, baseball, football, and similar sports were encouraged in pre-war days as healthy pastimes, useful as spectacles for the mass. There was a pronounced tendency to regard them as performances by star players, and little encouragement for the mediocre or inept to participate. Army athletics were in the stage too long characteristic of college athletics, which President Faunce compared to "a revolving barber pole, which has no relation to the work done inside the shop but which does attract the attention of outsiders." Many officers frankly believed that in the grim business of war there was no place for games. The indispensable hardening process, if completed in the shortest possible time, would employ all the energy of the men every day and leave no surplus for play.

Athletics in the
Pre-War
Army

A sounder conception of the value of athletics and games had been developing, principally in two quarters, the colleges and the Y M C A's. Fifty years earlier college sports were unorganized. The students played for fun. Then came the era of commercialized sport. Fields were fenced, admission fees charged, and coaches received higher salaries than professors. The student who could not "make the team" sat on the bleachers and cheered, instead of exercising himself. Meanwhile the perception was growing that games and sports had educational and recreational value for all. They were essential in developing the healthy body which is the only fitting dwelling place for the healthy mind. They produced virility, self-reliance, self-control, team-work, and above all that keen sense of fair play upon which democracy itself is based—qualities essential not only for a few chosen representatives but for all young men in training for life.

Athletic
Developments in
the United
States

In the Y M C A, the commercial stage was omitted in the history of physical work development. Dealing largely with city young men, the physical side of the three-fold program at first contemplated purely physical objectives as elements of all-round individual development. Observation of the tendency of the frequenters of gymnasiums to start competitive games and of the clean healthy fun they got out of them led the more thoughtful physical directors to recognize the

recreational and social values of such games and to find ways to stimulate and develop them. The popular game of basketball was invented by a Y M C A director and led to numerous variations, cage ball, volley ball, push ball, etc. The value of non-equipment games was that they required no previous organization or training, only such instruction as could be given in a few moments before beginning. Numerous games were invented, in which men had to take hard knocks, respond instantly to a touch, cooperate with others as well as compete, and bring into play well coordinated muscles, nerves, and brains. By the time the war broke out, many Y M C A physical directors had become far more interested in developing the abilities of the "dub" than in polishing the skill of the star athlete. The physical director in college, preparatory school, or Y M C A gymnasium who had not become aware that his real task was to get all to "play the game" rather than to produce teams to win spectacular victories before cheering crowds of non-participants, was a second-rate man.

Among the public at large, however, "fans" still far outnumbered players, and the American young man found his athletic recreation in watching his favorite baseball or football team rather than in playing himself. The outstanding skill of professionals and enthusiastic amateurs made him ashamed to exhibit his awkwardness or lack of strength. As a cross-section of the population, the Army at first exhibited the same characteristics, and it was only enthusiasts for the general play idea who dimly apprehended the tremendous significance, from the point of view of military efficiency and morale, of athletic games.

From two directions the influence of this belief began to play early upon the new Army. In the sixteen Officers' Training Camps established in the summer of 1917, were gathered thousands of young college men awake to the higher values of athletics and susceptible to the ideas underlying mass play. The Physical Work Bureau sent to these camps sixteen of the foremost Y M C A physical directors. Just what they could do was not apparent, and no program was formulated in advance. They were pioneers with an idea, thrown on their own resources. But the idea found fertile soil in the men who were preparing to become lieutenants, captains, and majors—the new officers who were to have closest contact with the enlisted men of the new army. By their cooperation as they assumed their new commands, the idea spread, won general recognition and official support, until at the end of the war there were seventy-five million recorded

Factors in
Introducing Play
into the Army

participations in athletic contests, a figure only slightly exceeded by the number of spectators.¹

The perfected fruit of the seed transcended all anticipation. Five distinct major results of the athletic sports of the soldiers may be set down as demonstrated beyond question, ignoring others that few would dispute. Results of
Army Play

First, athletics increased the agility of the men. The ability to leap a trench or a strand of barbed wire without breaking stride meant often a soldier alive at his objective instead of a casualty half way. The habit of instant response to a touch or signal, developed in games whose fun arose out of the element of surprise, had inestimable value in night raids in No-Man's Land or in breaking up machine gun nests.

Second, athletics stimulated the fighting spirit. Boxing, wrestling, running or jumping in the presence and for the triumph of their own squad, company or battalion, developed the determination to win that makes men exceed the powers they believe themselves to possess. Contests so arranged that not the picked men of a group but all the men were matched against all of a similar group, made the least skilled clench his teeth with the resolve to give all that was in him.

Third, these games promoted team-work. Men who had never experienced the advantages of cooperation learned to adjust their movements to others, to rely upon their team-mates, and to feel an intense obligation to do their own part. Individualism yielded to that esprit de corps which enables men to maintain presence of mind in the face of heavy odds because they feel themselves a part of an invincible force.

Fourth, athletics furnished the recreation which all men need and especially those who are undergoing intensive training. The plausible theory that men would be too tired by the day's work to want further exercise was refuted in every camp daily by thousands who found rest from drill and marching in baseball, football, boxing, and innumerable other games. Nothing did more to provide the fun element in their mental diet without which concentrated preparation for a crucial ordeal tends to morbid anxiety.

Fifth, athletics promoted morality in the best sense of that much abused term. It offered congenial occupation for leisure time, which

¹ See Plate VIII facing p. 332.

the great majority of soldiers freely chose in preference to dangerous and harmful indulgence.

These are all elements of civic as well as military efficiency, factors in that morale which is as necessary to a nation in peace as in war. The men themselves, the military authorities and the welfare organizations cooperated in promoting these factors through athletic games and sports, and the beneficial consequences, far from being exhausted in war, are demonstrably increasing in the nation now restored to peace. Further, the demonstration of athletic values in the American Army led to the adoption of American methods, under American leaders, in seven of the Allied Armies and its continuation or initiation after the Armistice in the armies of eight other nations.

The material share of the Y M C A in this achievement is indicated by its expenditure of \$1,818,479 on athletic supplies and salaries of physical directors in the United States alone. The story of the development of athletic work from small beginnings until it became one of the chief Association war activities reflects, in a single aspect, the expansion of ideas and the rallying of forces to meet needs of unanticipated magnitude, which were characteristic of the nation in the World War.

During 1916, a few of the Y M C A secretaries with troops on the Mexican Border had been physical directors. The intense heat, and their absorption in the canteen and other duties, had prevented much athletic activity, but certain significant results had been obtained in a small way. In the Canadian Army, Dr. John Brown, Jr., and his associates had introduced the play motive, including field meets and inter-unit contests. Dr. George J. Fisher, Senior Secretary of the Physical Work Bureau of the International Committee, had kept in personal touch with the Canadian secretaries, and as soon as it became apparent that the United States would enter the war, began planning for similar work with the American Army. The plans met a rather cool reception from Army officers, partly because they involved an innovation, and partly because as presented they seemed to suggest that Y M C A men could help in the physical conditioning of the soldiers, which was a part of the regular duty of officers. The play idea was not strong enough to make its way alone, and even Y M C A men in general showed indifference. Enthusiasm of individuals, however, kept it alive, and secured an opening wedge by the introduction of physical directors in the first series of Officers' Training Camps in the early summer of 1917.

These directors had the general sanction of the Government behind them, but no provision for athletics had been made in the training camp program. Each was armed with about \$200 worth of equipment and whatever initiative and ingenuity he possessed. The first step was to establish relations with the commanding officers. Some of these welcomed them cordially, others were indifferent and some definitely disapproved the idea of games. There was equal variety in the attitude of the embryo officers. In general, interest had to be aroused, and the response of the men proved the surest way to the approval and support of their commanders.

One director began by placing a volley ball net between the barracks on a company street and succeeded in inducing 25 men to play in the presence of a larger group of spectators. After the game five companies requested equipment and presently all available supplies were in use. Inter-company games, arranged by the director, aroused general interest, and the resulting satisfaction and good spirits of the men were instantly perceived by the commander. Thereafter the director was free to develop his work in consistent fashion.

In another camp before the director arrived there had been no sports of any kind except that a handful of men had been playing baseball in a very informal way. Shortly after the commanding officer had approved the program, the equipment included two full-sized baseball diamonds, two indoor baseball diamonds, two outdoor basketball courts, five volley ball courts, one tennis court, space for fifteen quoits games, a gymnasium and four bowling alleys. A river and a beach were utilized for water sports. The plan of organization as actually developed at this camp included the appointment, from the ranks, of one athletic director and five sports managers for each company. Several of these men were physical directors by profession and others had but just laid aside the laurels won in intercollegiate meets. Schedules were quickly worked out and in spite of the fact that the long hours of severe training were highly fatiguing, there were soon in full swing three leagues, including sixteen company baseball teams, fifteen company indoor baseball teams and fifteen basketball teams. There were also track and field sports for companies, swimming lessons, life-saving tests, barge races on the river and boxing, wrestling and gymnastic meets. On Saturday league baseball games were played before more than 2,000 spectators, mostly soldiers.

In several camps the plan of organizing an athletic council was so successful that the commanding officer made it official and ordered

the designated men to report to the Association physical director. In other camps it was not until a holiday came that a program could be systematically organized on lines sufficiently broad to win the approval of the Army officials. In seven of the Officers' Training Camps, Dr. J. E. Raycroft, representing the Commission on Training Camp Activities, placed an additional sports director. The combined efforts of these men and of the Association's physical directors brought the athletic organization of the Officers' Training Camps to its maximum.

Mass Games
in the Officers'
Training Camps

The method first employed in the training camps was to introduce the usual popular sports because such procedure was the surest and easiest way to win the confidence of the military authorities. Gradually, however, there was developed that system of non-equipment athletic promotion which had for its slogan, "Every man in the game"—the system that finally became the Y M C A's chief contribution to the physical welfare of the Army in the United States—the system of mass athletics.

Although the volley ball game already mentioned, in which 25 men were engaged at once, marked the beginning of one kind of mass play, the first important event of this character was the mass pentathlon held on Memorial Day, 1917, at the Officers' Training Camp at Fort Niagara. In this event 25 men from each company, or 375 in all, were engaged in a standing broad jump, a man-carrying relay race, medicine ball putting, a hundred-yard relay, and a tug-of-war. Every man took part in every game. Shortly after this, when the commanding officers allotted a few minutes during the drill period for the athletic director to take entire charge of all the men, it was possible to give an adequate demonstration of the value of mass play.

Method of
Introducing Mass
Play

In mass athletics the principle employed is so flexible that even when several thousand men are on the drill ground at once, all can be playing games with snap and keen enjoyment within a few minutes. One or two officers from each regiment are commanded to come forward, form a group and under the instruction of the Physical Director go through the group game that is to be played. These officers immediately teach the game to similar regimental groups of subalterns, who in turn teach the company non-coms. Men of the rank and file are then formed into groups of appropriate size and the game is "put on." While the soldiers are playing the game, the original group of officers returns to the physical instructor to learn another. So simple were some of the "stunts" that at first some of the officers wanted to know

why they were not asked to teach the men "Tiddly-winks" or "Drop the handkerchief." Later when they found themselves gasping for breath and their tongues hanging out from fatigue, they were willing to admit that the games were more than child's play. Still later, when it was discovered that more than 75 per cent of the recruits did not know how to play, many of the officers began to realize that the inculcation of the spirit of spontaneous play was one of the things most needed in order to develop the alertness and initiative with which the American soldier was already, in the popular view, sufficiently endowed by nature.

No one who has not seen files of thousands of men all over a drill field playing "Pass the Buck" at the same moment can fully appreciate the amount of laughter, hilarity, and relaxation such activities produced. In this game the rear men of two or more files, at signal, come to "attention" with a snap—at the same time striking hard with the open palm of both hands the seats of men in front of them. These men in turn "pass the buck" forward. The file leader on receiving the "buck" commands "about face"; each man obeys, bends his body, receives "the buck" in turn and "passes it back" with redoubled energy.

Types of Mass
Games Played

In games like these many a lad took a sound drubbing without showing yellow. It was soon found, moreover, that after a few minutes' play of this sort, at intervals during drill, the men returned to their regular work refreshed and ready to put some spirit into their humdrum tasks. The methods employed and the psychology on which they were based differed not a whit from the principles underlying the practice of expert physical trainers in the rehabilitation of the tired business man who willingly pays large sums to regain his "pep" through scientifically arranged play. In the most effective fashion, by means of competition and team play, they combine all-round physical development, initiative, fun, relaxation and spontaneity.

The great value of athletic work done by the Association in the Officers' Training Camps was that it demonstrated to the Army officers and to those of the Association's own officials who had been skeptical, the desirability of providing physical directors for all the camps and cantonments of the National Army.

The results already indicated appeared quickly. Moreover, the new officers who had learned the games in the training camps looked to the Y M C A secretaries for equipment and leadership when they

assumed their commands in the cantonments. Such requests, rapidly increasing, proved to the National War Work Council that this was an important field of service and brought the necessary resources, while the military authorities willingly granted the required facilities.

In the summer of 1917 when the Regular Army men and the National Guard went into camp and when special naval training stations were established, the activities of the Physical Work Bureau developed rapidly. Later, when the men of the first draft went into intensive training, the work became still more active. The need for athletics by this time was becoming increasingly evident.

How extensively the Association developed its work to meet the need is probably best indicated by the rapidity with which the number of physical work secretaries in the United States increased. Beginning with the sixteen physical directors sent to the Officers' Training Camps, in June, 1917, by September there were about 300, and in November, 344. In March, 1918 the number had increased to 541 and continued to increase until the Armistice. That the work was well maintained during the demobilization period appears from the fact that the number of physical directors did not drop below 100 until September, 1919.

As already explained the organization of the Y M C A's field work in the United States adapted itself to the six departments established by the Army. For each of these departments a physical work director was appointed by the War Work Council. Each of the six departments recruited its own staff of physical directors and operated under its own appropriation. The departmental physical director was a member of the departmental staff and was immediately responsible to it as a body and to the departmental director. Operating under the authority of the departmental physical directors were camp physical directors. Under these were local staffs, operating for the most part from Y M C A buildings, in each of the 32 major camps and cantonments and the various other stations. In National Guard camps from six to eight physical directors were stationed and in the large cantonments from nine to thirteen.

Never, however, was there an adequate supply of trained athletic leaders. The younger specialists in physical work throughout the United States enlisted in the forces, or were drafted: many of the older men were sent overseas. The Association from its own employed workers could not provide for more than a fraction of the needs of the Army. Physical work directors, therefore, were recruited

Athletics for the
National Guard
and for the
Drafted Men

The Departmental
Organization

The Training of
Athletic Leaders

wherever they could be obtained—from athletic departments of schools and colleges, from private clubs, and from other sources. A few of these recruits were all-round, efficient leaders. Some were specialists but were unacquainted with methods of promoting mass play. Others had no technical qualifications. Under these circumstances men without sufficient knowledge were placed, if possible, where they could work in close cooperation with more experienced directors.

In addition, in some camps regular classes were held for training leaders. In one gymnasium over 100 officers reported regularly to receive instruction in athletics and in turn teach their men. At Camp Devens two whole evenings a week were given over to schools for the teaching of recreational athletics. On Thursday evenings three groups of non-commissioned athletic officers reported under orders to receive such training. On Friday evenings a voluntary group of 150 to 175 officers attended. Among other things these officers were encouraged to form a committee of three enlisted men in every barrack "to start something every night." The physical director went to two or three barracks each evening and so made the round of the camp. The scheme was greatly favored because it prepared the men to employ their time profitably without special equipment. Such knowledge proved to be very important when they reached France as they were frequently thrown upon their own resources for recreation.

At various times the directors for the six departments, in addition to promoting such informal training schools as have been described, advanced efficiency by themselves going from camp to camp to give demonstrations and advice. Divisional conferences aided the dissemination of ideas and a constant stream of suggestions in the form of circular letters, descriptions of novel games, rule books, and reports of successful work emanating from the six departmental and from the national headquarters helped to keep the local directors energetic. These methods proved to be effective supplements to the short emergency courses in physical work that many of the newly appointed physical directors received at the Chicago and Springfield Y M C A Training Schools and at the six special Y M C A Army Training Centers established in the six departments.

The Commission on Training Camp Activities usually placed at least one physical director and a professional coach in each of the large cantonments. In a few camps there were several directors. The Commission's directors, as immediate agents of the War Department

Cooperation with
the Commission
on Training
Camp Activities
and with the
Army

ment, were given the status of commissioned officers. Wherever they were stationed they operated under orders to coordinate all athletic activities, whether promoted by the Army itself or by voluntary organizations. The most successful method of producing such coordination, a method employed in most of the camps, was the creation of athletic councils. These councils were made up of commissioned officers interested in athletics, the sports director of the Commission, and representatives of the Y M C A, Knights of Columbus, and other welfare organizations. Naturally the success of this method varied from camp to camp according to the situation and the ability of the various representatives. The general working basis adopted for division of activities assigned to the Commission's sports directors, responsibility for promoting representative competitive sports like boxing and wrestling, league baseball, and general athletic meets, while the Y M C A devoted its attention mainly to mass athletics and sports within and near its own buildings. In some camps, however, where the Y M C A physical directors happened to be the only available men or where for other reasons the situation required it, the Association systematically or on occasion promoted all types of athletics.

The
Manly Art

When the English and French officers brought to the camps new methods of training, especially in bayonet practice, the discovery was made of a very close relation between boxing and bayonet movements. This gave great impetus to the promotion of the "manly art." The Commission's Director of Physical Training, Dr. Raycroft, took particular pains to secure the cooperation of many professional boxers, both to give instruction and to stage exhibitions. The Knights of Columbus also gave special attention to boxing.

On the staff of the Commission were many popular football coaches and this sport flourished. The promotion of representative sports, however, was not entirely confined to the Commission, for the Y M C A also encouraged them in every possible way. In a number of camps Association directors taught boxing to officers who were organized by their commanding officers into schools for the purpose of first learning and then teaching their men. Adjacent to Association buildings in one camp there were no less than five boxing platforms lighted by electricity.

In many camps athletic meets of large proportions were promoted by the close cooperation of the Y M C A and the army officers. Camp Sheridan had 165 organized basketball teams; Kelly Field,

a twilight baseball league of twelve teams. Not only were representative inter-company and inter-regimental baseball, wrestling and boxing thus encouraged but inter-camp meets as well. On July 4, 1918, a meet open to all camps in the Southeastern Department had teams from 24 camps out of 30 eligible. On Kelly Field, at a single inter-camp wrestling and boxing match with Fort Sam Houston, the visitors brought over some 1,500 men and the crowd as a whole was estimated at six to ten thousand.

Although it is thus very clear that the Association encouraged representative games, athletic meets, and the more spectacular forms of play, the emphasis placed on mass athletics was much stronger. This led to a wide variety of activities. In many of the camps there were inter-regimental relay races and tug-of-war championships. At Camp Hancock push ball was popular. In one week 50 formal games were played with 6,550 men taking part. Two platoons were engaged on each side. Camp Taylor reported the playing of 30 games of basketball in a single evening. When cold weather came the athletic councils planned for indoor games.

Varieties of
Sports Promoted
by the
Association

Often in addition to the usual programs, special contests and circus performances were staged by professionals drawn from the ranks. At Camp Green on one occasion more than 100 men participated in the circus and 1,200 attended. In many places where the commanding officer desired assistance, the physical director gave setting-up exercises to thousands of men at once. One entire camp of 3,200 men was thus instructed in calisthenics, mass games, and a special method of hand-to-hand fighting. The schedule called for new classes every half hour from 7.45 a. m. to 4.30 p. m. A thousand men were often instructed at once. The hand-to-hand fighting methods introduced by the director made a hit with both officers and men. In every company street after drill periods one could see soldiers trying them out on each other. In a number of camps efficiency tests were devised so that it became possible for a regiment to record the progress of its members from month to month or to compare its ability with that of other regiments.

Physical work at the land stations of the Navy followed the same general lines as that in Army camps. The goal was the same, "Every man in the game." Records covering sixteen months beginning January 1, 1918, showed approximately 10,000,000 attendance at athletic events of all kinds, of which about 40 per cent were participants. The permanent buildings of the Y at navy stations made

With the
Navy

possible some novelties in indoor play, such for example as roller skate hockey on the concrete floor of the drill halls at Pelham Bay and Norfolk. Swimming instruction was very popular.

At the Bay Ridge Receiving Ship, the Commandant in July gave the Y M C A charge of five periods daily for mass athletics and games. The men reported in groups numbering 75 to 350 for one hour periods, the schedule running from 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. and including 1,000 to 1,200 men daily.

At the Great Lakes Naval Camp, where some 40,000 men were in training, the Association maintained a total of 22 buildings and promoted a correspondingly intensive athletic program. Because men were forbidden to cross regimental lines, camp programs were impossible. In the various buildings, however, the physical directors conducted calisthenics, mass play, games and athletic stunt nights, boxing and wrestling, so continuously that the approximate number of participations sometimes numbered 200 per day in each unit. When quarantine was not in force many of the physical directors assisted in managing track meets and in coaching regimental baseball, football, and basketball teams.

In addition to work of this character carried on at practically all of the naval units, the Y M C A had a large share in the distribution of athletic equipment to ships of the Navy. At the request of the Naval Department Commission on War Activities, an athletic equipment fund was created by the Y M C A, the Knights of Columbus, and the Jewish Welfare Board. The Association's quota was 74.9 per cent. Some of this material was stamped with the Association's mark, but in all cases was a gift to the individual ship. The standard recreational unit included equipment to the value of \$392.87 and was furnished to hundreds of vessels through the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

A highly appreciated special service was the reporting of the World Series Baseball scores by innings to all parts of the world where men of the Navy and Marine Corps were stationed.

When wounded men began to arrive from overseas a different kind of problem arose from any that previously had been faced. This was the problem of adapting physical exercises to the individual needs of each convalescent. Shortly after the men began to arrive, one of the Association directors who had made a specialty of this type of work, called a conference to discuss methods. This conference, held at the Great Lakes Naval Training Camp, was the initial

attempt of this sort. A considerable body of officers attended. As a result a number of very promising studies of patients' requirements were made. A variety of apparatus and play activities were devised, which aided greatly in restoring the strength and functions of impaired muscles, in reestablishing nervous pathways or in removing stiffness of joints. Quoits, volley ball, and similar games were among the means employed to secure involuntary exercise of muscles that the men never could have brought themselves to use by any amount of conscious endeavor. Special physical drills were also devised to restore impaired lungs.

In the nature of the case, no accurate record could be kept of numbers of participants or spectators of athletic events. There were no turnstiles or tickets, and secretaries had more important occupations than counting the men who thronged playing fields or crowded huts when boxing was going on. Nearly always and everywhere equipment for various kinds of ball games was issued on request for informal use, of which no record was made. Estimates of numbers in formal or scheduled athletics were conservative and unquestionably understate the facts. The compilation of such estimates covering all camps and posts in the United States is represented by the accompanying graph.¹

Amount of
Athletic Work

It indicates the small beginnings, the rapid increase in the summer of 1918 and the gradual diminution as the men were mustered out. Fluctuations reflect the influence of temporary conditions, as, for example, the quarantine made necessary by the influenza epidemic in the autumn of 1918.

One department, the Eastern, prepared a series of graphs, seventeen in number, one for each sport, covering the year 1918. Space does not permit their reproduction here, but a comparative study yields some interesting results. In October, 1918, representative sports such as baseball declined sharply from a maximum of 150,000 participants and 370,000 spectators in September to barely one-third those numbers. This was due partly to unfavorable weather and partly to the epidemic which caused large assemblies to be forbidden. Ordinarily the total participation in athletics would have correspondingly declined. But at that same period non-equipment group games, running, jumping, playground ball, volley ball, and similar games in which large numbers of small groups could engage independently,

¹ See Plate IX facing p. 332.

took a sudden acceleration, reaching their maximum at precisely the time that representative games declined. The provision of sports in large variety thus served a double purpose; it met differing tastes, and it freed men from the limitations imposed by weather or other causes on a single sport.

A second significant demonstration furnished by these graphs is the very high ratio of participants to spectators. Only in baseball and boxing was a marked predominance of spectators found, and even in these it was much less than is usual in American experience. In baseball it varied between four spectators to three participants and seven spectators to two participants, or only 125 men, on the highest average, watching eighteen men playing. The reason was that dozens of games were played simultaneously. If the slogan, "Every man in the game," was not fully realized, there was nevertheless a vast gain over the small proportion of players characteristic of this game among civilians. In boxing from 30,000 to 40,000 men participated each month, while spectators varied from 40,000 to 250,000. In group games, and in basketball, football and soccer, playground ball, volley ball and similar sports, participants outnumbered spectators as a rule, with only an occasional reversal.


Varying weather conditions, occasional shortage of supplies for one or another sport, and other influences affected the relative amount of activity in the different sports, so that numbers are not a trustworthy indication of relative popularity. The largest number of participants was found in non-equipment group games, a little less than a million, with baseball a close second with about 750,000. Tennis stood at the foot of the list with about 8,000 players. Quoits interested more than 300,000, while basketball, football, playground ball, boxing, and volley ball ranged, in that order, from 400,000 to 325,000 participants each. The total maximum for athletics was reached in September with 735,000 participants and slightly over a million spectators. It is fairly certain that these proportions, which as given refer only to the Eastern Department, held true in general for the whole country.

Students of national welfare and all who concern themselves with the conservation and increase of the human assets of the nation will be interested in the detailed records and experience of athletic work with the soldiers, which are here only summarized. They will find unlimited evidence both of the need and of the civic value of such work among Americans. The records of physical examinations



PARTICIPANTS & SPECTATORS IN ALL SPORTS

1,000,000



by the Draft Boards point a startling warning. How much of the inferior physical condition is due to lack of opportunity, how much to the American habit of "fanning" instead of playing, and how much to vestiges of Puritan austerity which survive in a vague impression that play is an indulgence needing excuse, cannot of course be determined. But it is clear that general education is needed to establish play as a major necessity of the efficient life, that more opportunities must be provided and leadership found in every community to stimulate the general participation which alone secures the genuine recreational benefits of games. The means and methods of attaining these objectives devised and developed in the Army are capable of transference, with suitable modifications, to community efforts. Very significant is the experience of the Y M C A in Czechoslovakia and Poland after the Armistice, described in a later chapter, which proved that the same methods are capable of extension to women and girls.

British and French officers who had opportunities of observing American soldiers in training and action repeatedly commented admiringly upon their initiative, resourcefulness, and fighting spirit. More than one crack German regiment was classed as second-rate after it had clashed with American troops because of loss of confidence in the face of the *élan* which marked their attack. Subtracting nothing from the native character and spirit bred in our youth, the element of sport has received the best recognition as a factor in military efficiency and morale, by its unqualified acceptance by military authorities, not only of America but of practically every nation that shared in the war.

Foreign
Opinion

CHAPTER XIX

ORGANIZING ENTERTAINMENT

Drama and music offer the richest resources for relaxation and recreation. Ranging from the ludicrous to the sublime they minister to all moods of all men. Under their spell one may forget worries in hearty laughter or be lifted to heights of vision and aspiration. Their potential contributions both to the happiness and efficiency of soldiers were too obvious to be overlooked, and individuals and organizations found in them a ready means of realizing their desire to do something for the men. Surely no other army was ever supplied with such abundant and varied entertainment as were the men in the training camps in the United States. Even those most familiar with the resources were amazed by the amount of talent discovered, as amateurs as well as professionals volunteered their services to amuse the men. The Government made a direct contribution by way of the Commission on Training Camp Activities. Through the chain of twenty-nine Liberty Theaters, constructed and equipped along the most modern lines, it brought to the men of the larger camps and cantonments, at an admission charge of from ten to fifty cents, some of the best attractions of the country, including plays, musical comedies, vaudeville, concerts, Chautauqua and lyceum entertainments, and motion pictures. The Y M C A, the Knights of Columbus, and the Jewish Welfare Board brought professional and amateur entertainers to the camps and made their buildings available for others who wished to help in this way. The War Camp Community Service, as well as numerous local churches, clubs, Y M C A's and other organizations rendered a similar service in communities adjacent to the camps or through which large numbers of troops passed. Cooperating with the welfare societies or acting independently was a large group of prominent producers and professional artists.¹

The soldiers were by no means dependent, however, on outside assistance. Company shows, planned by the men themselves and produced in mess halls or welfare huts, were among the common

¹ For a fuller account of entertainment, consult *Entertaining the American Army*, James W. Evans and Gardner L. Harding, New York, 1921.

diversions of camp life. The Army included many men from the theatrical profession, whose talent was utilized both in individual performance and in the training of others for soldier productions. Some of these were excellent and not only served to entertain the men in camps but were used to good effect before civilian audiences in connection with Liberty Loan campaigns, and achieved great successes on regular theatrical circuits. "Yip, Yip, Yaphank," for example, written by Sergeant Irving Berlin and produced by soldiers from Camp Upton, had a long run on Broadway as well as a successful tour.

The following account is necessarily limited to the efforts of a single organization. It aims to sketch briefly the contribution which the Y M C A made to the entertainment of the men in service.

Entertainment was the only one of the major activities of the Association's war work for the administration of which no special bureau was set up at headquarters. At the meeting of the War Work Council on April 28, 1917, the war-time promotion of the other outstanding activities was put in charge of the Religious Work, Educational Work, and Physical Work bureaus, which took over, to a large extent, the traditions, methods, and personnel of the corresponding bureaus of the International Committee. It was recognized, however, that not all of the camp activities would be covered by this arrangement and that in certain types of work, as, for instance, sex education, more than one of these bureaus would have a direct and vital interest. To provide for such contingencies, there was organized a Joint Committee on Association Activities, composed of the Directors of the three bureaus mentioned, together with Dr. M. J. Exner, the International Committee's specialist on the subject of sex education. Dr. George J. Fisher, Director of the Physical Work Bureau was named Chairman. Entertainments and lectures in the camps were regarded as coming within the field to which all these bureaus should be related, and the Joint Committee on Association Activities was charged, among other duties, with that of planning programs, selecting and appointing lecturers and speakers, and assigning them in consultation with the department executives. Secretaries of the Committee were appointed with a view to coordinating all the activities in the camps.

Under the procedure outlined for carrying on this work, it was left with the department executives, in view of their more intimate knowledge of conditions in the camps, to discover the points of need

and to make specific requisition upon the committee for such service as they desired from time to time. After relations had once been established in this way between any camp and the committee, the department executive might, if desirable, leave the camp to communicate its needs directly to the committee. The Joint Committee assumed responsibility for securing speakers and other entertainers and supplying them upon request of the departments to the camps. The need of expert professional assistance in the recruiting of talent was early recognized, and a secretary experienced in that kind of work was secured for the committee's staff.

Early
Achievements

In these early months of the war, before the National Army was called into being or the great cantonments were erected, the principal points of activity were the Officers' Training Camps, the permanent posts and stations of the Army and Navy, and the camps at which units of the National Guard were concentrated. During the first three months, in addition to arranging for nearly 150 religious meetings in 36 camps throughout the country, the Joint Committee developed four entertainment circuits over which it sent from one to thirteen attractions, including lecturers. Three circuits were in the East—one reaching five upstate camps in New York State, another covering eight points in and about New York City and Harbor, and another six points in and near Philadelphia. The one Western Circuit included Fort Benjamin Harrison, Fort Sheridan, Great Lakes Naval Training Station, two buildings at Des Moines, two buildings at Omaha, Fort Riley, Leavenworth, and Jefferson City.

A motion picture service was also inaugurated, which brought to these camps and to others less favorably situated a regular supply of film. This was not a part of the regular entertainment program, but was administered under a separate arrangement with the Community Motion Picture Bureau. This organization had for several years been engaged in supplying schools, community centers, Chautauquas, churches, clubs, and other societies with well selected motion picture programs. Soon after the war began, it offered its services to the Government without profit in connection with the work of providing the right kind of pictures for the soldiers. Its cooperation was accepted, and upon it was placed responsibility for the selection and distribution of all motion picture films used in the Y M C A huts in this country, the Y M C A paying actual costs. The arrangement was later extended to the work overseas. Owing to its experience and its working agreements with many producers and distributors, the

Community Motion Picture Bureau was in a position to secure from every source the best films available, and a careful process of selection was instituted to insure the presentation of the best only. The Association maintained in its own hands the local supervision of motion pictures in the camps. So far as possible, there was assigned to the staff of each building one man who in connection with his other duties could operate the machine, and somewhat later the headquarters staff of each large camp included a chief operator thoroughly familiar with the technical and mechanical details involved. Motion picture programs were given usually two or three times a week in each building and included all the usual types of feature, comedy, educational and current topic films.

It was recognized that the entertainment service hitherto provided would not be adequate under the conditions arising from the completion of the great cantonments and the assembling of the new draft army. Construction plans evolved by the War Work Council during the summer contemplated the erection in each National Army Cantonment of an auditorium with a seating capacity of 2,800 which might be used for special entertainments, motion pictures, and religious and other meetings too large for the ordinary huts. With the approach of the autumn these buildings, like other construction in the camps, were nearing completion, and during the month of September plans were laid for a greatly enlarged entertainment program, some features of which were put in operation during the fall.

In the meantime, several important developments had taken place. Reorganization
From the experience of camp and departmental secretaries in search of entertainment it was discovered that many speakers and entertainers of ability were willing to give their services without charge as a patriotic contribution to the soldiers and sailors. The Commission on Training Camp Activities, moreover, was now carrying into effect its elaborate program in the Liberty Theaters. In view of these considerations, the entertainment program of the Y M C A was much simplified. An agreement was reached with the Commission on Training Camp Activities whereby the Y M C A was to have the use of the Commission's large tents in the National Guard camps for three days a week, including Sunday, while the Commission was to have the use of the Y M C A auditoriums in the National Army cantonments for three days a week, Sunday excluded.

It was contemplated that only volunteer talent should be used and that perhaps one entertainment a week should be provided from

New York for the smaller camps and two each month for the larger camps, but it was soon found better to leave all entertainment matters in the hands of the Department offices. From the beginning of 1918, no budget was provided for a central administration, but all entertainments were booked, routed, and paid for by the Departments, except for a few speakers or entertainers of unusual importance occasionally routed through the camps by the Overseas Entertainment Section, which had become established as an independent bureau. This Bureau, constantly on the lookout for talent to be used overseas, naturally discovered and received applications from many who for one reason or another could not go abroad but were available for service at home, and such of these as seemed suitable it referred to the Department Entertainment offices. So much volunteer talent was thus interested that within a few weeks nearly all of the entertainers appearing in the camps in this country were serving without pay. While at the beginning there was some skepticism as to the practicability of such a plan, it proved entirely feasible and worked with great success except in some of the remoter camps.

From time to time, moreover, the Overseas Entertainment Bureau was authorized to take advantage of opportunities which presented themselves of sending to the home camps directly from New York speakers and entertainers whose contacts with the men might be of special significance. First and perhaps most important of these events was the notable tour of ex-President Taft in January and February of 1918. This tour took him to all but two of the National Army cantonments and to some of the other camps, where he delivered a great message on the causes and aims of the war, speaking often to several audiences in the same camp. His combined audiences numbered more than 250,000 men. It was designed that his message should be addressed primarily to enlisted men, and they were given the preference in his schedule, but on one occasion he spoke also to the 2,000 officers of a camp assembled thus in one body for the first time in its history. From many camp secretaries came the report that the visit of ex-President Taft was among the most significant events that occurred in the life of the camps. Other tours similarly arranged and financed from New York by the Overseas Entertainment Bureau were those of John Masefield, who in the summer of 1918 visited camps in the Eastern, Southeastern, Southern, and Western Departments, speaking on war topics and reading his own poems; and of a French Military Band sent to this country

through the cooperation of the French Government. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., also toured the camps under arrangements made by this bureau.

The departments in the meantime were actively developing their own entertainments. The executive staff at each department headquarters had by this time expanded in response to the growing need for supervisory work and included an Activities Secretary in general charge of religious, educational, physical, and other activities, as well as of entertainment. If possible, he had associated with him other secretaries, each to develop one of these particular interests. Thus, in most of the departments there was, sooner or later, at least one man giving himself wholly to the task of securing suitable talent and routing it to the camps in his territory. The department entertainment offices kept in more or less close touch with each other and with the Overseas Entertainment Bureau, and many of the professional entertainers were passed from one department to another. The policy all over the country continued to place the main emphasis on volunteer talent. Indeed, one of the best entertained departments worked under the rule that no entertainers should receive any fees beyond traveling expenses, and this rule was maintained until well after the Armistice, when many entertainers felt it impossible longer to donate their services and it became necessary occasionally to pay for some particular kind of feature not readily obtainable. Even so, more than 95 per cent of the entertainments furnished in this department were provided by volunteer talent. Another department went still further during at least part of the time and used, so far as possible, only entertainers who were willing to come at their own expense or could secure funds for their expenses from local sources.

Departmental
Administration

Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by these conditions, a notable array of speakers, singers, readers, actors, and other artists were brought before the soldiers and sailors under the auspices of the Y M C A. They included such figures as Ernestine Schumann-Heink, Louise Homer, David Bispham, Marie Sundelius, Christine Miller, Daniel Frohman, Mr. and Mrs. Coburn, Houdini, the "Friendly Enemies" company, the Apollo Club of Brooklyn, and the Columbia University Glee Club, while hundreds of others also, well or little known, of whose unselfish service it is impossible to speak too highly, went about without financial compensation and sometimes at no little inconvenience to themselves. Motion pictures, also, contributed their share of entertainment. The Community Motion Picture Bureau

was interchangeably distributing through the departments to the camps about seven million feet of film weekly, the Y M C A meeting the expense. Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks, Charlie Chaplin, Marguerite Clark, William S. Hart, and other favorites were often seen. Educational films, weekly reviews and travel scenes were shown regularly, and military pictures demonstrated various methods of drill and warfare.

Local
Entertainment

It was necessary to provide programs not only for the large auditoriums, but also for the huts serving smaller numbers of men, and the entertainment supplied occasionally from New York and more or less regularly from department headquarters was only a fraction of that actually produced in the camps. Other and more direct sources of supply were found in neighboring communities and among the soldiers themselves, and it was early agreed, as a matter of policy, that camp secretaries were to secure, so far as possible, their own speakers, lecturers, and entertainers, and to call upon the departments for assistance only when local resources failed. Enterprising secretaries took steps to organize the home talent available in communities near their camps, and in this respect they were fortunate if they happened to be within reach of a city where such talent was abundant and its possessors eager to do their bit.

The situation was more difficult, but by no means impossible, for camps located at some distance from any city. That small town resources were not to be despised was evidenced by the fact that at Camp Grant, where star attractions from Chicago, Minneapolis, and various other cities appeared, one of the greatest hits of the war was the New Milford Minstrels, a group of young people from a village surrounded by the camp, who had been trained by the pastor of the local Methodist Church. They played in every Y M C A building and were applauded to the echo by thousands of men from some of the largest cities in America. Occasionally opportunities would come to secure by extraordinary efforts some special attraction. Such was the visit of Harry Lauder to Camp Pike on New Year's Day, 1918. He was booked to appear at a Little Rock Theater on that day, and the camp Y M C A and the manager of the theater had used their best efforts to secure him at the same time for the camp, but at nine o'clock the night before came a telegram from his manager at Memphis, stating that on account of a previous engagement he would be unable to comply with the request. One of the secretaries, however, refusing to admit defeat, wrote the telegram of his life to Lauder

and told the operator he would sit up until the answer came. At 3.30 in the morning he went to bed, tired but happy in the assurance that the great comedian would be on hand that day. He came into camp at eleven o'clock with his drummers and pipers, was introduced by a major-general, and gave the boys an hour of his inimitable humor and music, together with a characteristic patriotic message inspired by his own war experience.

In all the camps, regardless of the resources of neighboring communities, it was found possible to accomplish a great deal by utilizing and developing soldier talent, and in some respects that part of the work was most valuable which taught the boys to entertain themselves when they should be in situations where others could not come to them. Every hut included in its staff at least one man whose special duty it was to promote social activities and good fellowship among the men who entered its doors, and these secretaries were always looking for new possibilities of amusement. As early as the autumn of 1917 one camp had already organized, in connection with each building, a lyceum bureau to discover among the soldiers men who might be used throughout the camp as lecturers and entertainers. At a building in another camp there was constituted an entertainment committee, composed of an enlisted man from each of the fifteen companies served by the building, under the chairmanship of a commissioned officer. This committee met weekly, discussed plans and methods, and assigned to small groups of its members in turn responsibility for particular programs. A secretary at still another camp carried the idea one step further by keeping a list of all the talent discovered in each unit, in order to send it on to the secretaries at the next post when the men should be transferred.

Activities of this sort contributed substantially to the development of social interests among the men. Acquaintance and friendship were stimulated by association in a musical or dramatic organization and by the influence of watching a fellow-soldier go through a clever individual performance. Stunt nights, therefore, in which the physical work secretaries also cooperated, became a standard feature of the Y M C A program in the camps. At the same time, the secretary sought directly by other means to promote good fellowship. Fireside conferences were held for the discussion of current events and other subjects of common interest, literary and debating clubs were organized, games such as checkers, chess, dominoes crokinole, and parchesi were provided, and tournaments promoted

Soldier
Talent

Social
Work

from time to time. As in the case of formal programs, many secretaries enlisted the interest of friendly individuals and groups in neighboring communities, who cooperated in providing social opportunities for the soldiers. Frequently a social would follow one of the programs given by a party from the town. In warm weather a space would be roped off outside the Y building, with strings of electric lights covered with Japanese lanterns, and games would be directed by a leader from a platform. In cold or wet weather parlor games would be played inside the auditorium, soldiers waiting sometimes three and four deep to take their turn on the floor. Contacts made in this way frequently resulted in invitations for the men to homes in the communities, and on special occasions, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, organized efforts were made to secure such invitations for as many of them as possible.¹

Work
Accomplished

It is estimated that from the beginning of the war to December 31, 1919, there were given by the Y M C A in connection with its war work in this country more than 114,500 entertainments other than motion pictures, with a total attendance of over 48,000,000 and about 127,000 motion picture programs, with an attendance of nearly 46,000,000.² All these, with the exception of a very few during a brief period in the autumn of 1917, were given without cost to the men. The figures convey some idea of the extent of the work accomplished in this field. They do not tell how many homesick recruits retained their cheerfulness under the spell of a film comedy, nor how many men of cultured tastes fed their souls with the best music amid the rough surroundings of an army camp, nor how many minds stretched on a rack of nervous tension were beguiled into an hour of self-forgetful relaxation.

¹ In March, 1918, the first women Y workers were introduced into the home camps; in all 1,665 women wore the uniform in home camp service. As a social force this group of workers accomplished an immeasurable result. Consult Chapter XXXVI.

² See Association Year Book, New York, 1920, p. 109.

CHAPTER XX

PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

In a very real sense, the Army and the Navy became great schools during the war. For the man who entered the service the purpose of life was changed, its whole trend temporarily reversed, and in so far as his past occupation did not contribute to the new objective he had to be re-educated with that end in view. The major part of almost every soldier's time, therefore, was spent in training, and this included not only physical drill, but the discipline of instant and unquestioning obedience and the practice of habits and the observance of relationships unknown in civilian life.

In addition to this general training the Army provided also educational agencies for specific purposes in connection with war needs. The Occupational Index lists 714 different forms of technical skill required in the Army. In an infantry division of 28,000 men, 10,895 trade specialists are needed.¹ With the great demand for skilled workers in industries incident to the war it was no small task to find a sufficient supply for both. The War Department's Committee on Education and Special Training wrestled with this problem and secured the cooperation of 147 technical schools in the training of 130,000 skilled workers in the National Army Training Detachments, between April 6 and November 11, 1918. The Committee also sought to supply the demand for commissioned officers by instituting the Students' Army Training Corps, with detachments at 525 educational institutions, enrolling in all 165,000 students, whose work, however, was cut short by the Armistice.

So much educational work as was essential to the production of military efficiency and the winning of the war, was undertaken by the Army itself, in addition to the usual educational activities of the Regular Army and the Navy. It left a wide field for the efforts of those agencies and individuals desiring to make their contribution to the morale and contentment of the fighting men by providing mental stimulus and educational facilities. Enlistments and the draft drew into the ranks men of all degrees of intellectual as well as physical and moral development, and pointed out in very striking fashion

¹ Report of Committee on National Training, Beaune, France, May, 1919.

some of the educational shortcomings of our country. Out of 1,552,256 drafted men examined, 386,196 or 25 per cent could not read a newspaper or write an intelligent letter.¹ Many more, technically literate, had not mastered fundamentals as taught in elementary schools. There was a wide demand for instruction in French on the part of those who anticipated overseas service. Many who had not the opportunity to enter the National Army Training Detachments or the Officers' Training Camps were eager to fit themselves to improve opportunities for transfer or promotion. Hundreds of thousands of men whose education had never proceeded beyond the grammar grades were enrolled in the Army and Navy and the enlistment of other thousands had interrupted college and high school courses. In all classes there were those who for one reason or another were in the service without knowing just what it was all about and who needed instruction in the background and aims of the war. In the face of this situation it was natural that for a time and in certain quarters there should be a tendency to undertake too much and that in the attempt to meet all these needs some efforts should be misdirected. It took the experience of several months to make clear the principle that during the period of hostilities military usefulness was the standard by which all educational work should be tested.

The National
Educational
Response

The educational forces of the country made an immediate response to the need. Not only did the recognized welfare societies undertake work of this character, but universities, colleges, public school systems and other organizations took thought how they might make the contribution for which they were best qualified. The Massachusetts State Board of Education, for instance, projected courses in French to be given in the armories and any national encampments to be established in that state; a committee of French instructors in the universities in Illinois planned a similar service in their state; and agencies like the International Reform Bureau, the National Board for Historical Service, and the American Correspondence School offered their cooperation to the War Department. The volunteer educational work in the camps, like other welfare activities, was supervised by the Commission on Training Camp Activities. On August 31, 1917, a Committee was named by Mr. Fosdick to be responsible for the Commission's relation to this work. William Orr, Director of the Educational Work Bureau of the National War Work Council of the Y M C A, was the Chairman of this Committee, which included

¹ Report of Committee on National Training, Beaune, France, May, 1919.

also Dr. P. P. Claxton, U. S. Commissioner of Education, Dr. Harry Pratt Judson, President of the University of Chicago, Dr. John H. Finley, New York State Commissioner of Education, and Colonel P. H. Callahan, of Louisville, Chairman of Committee on War Activities, Knights of Columbus. Because the Y M C A had a comprehensive program, which had already begun to function widely, the Committee adopted the policy of utilizing, where possible, this machinery which was ready to hand. It was prepared, however, to make use of any educational machinery readily adaptable to its purposes, and to make its services available in establishing helpful relations between the agencies in the camps and institutions in a position to provide the means and material of instruction.

Y M C A PREPARATIONS

The Y M C A has always stood for the "improvement of the mental condition of young men," although it is only within the last twenty years that education has taken its place as one of the chief activities of the Association looking to the development of well-rounded manhood. Since 1893 the International Committee, through the Educational Department, has maintained a supervisory relation to the work, encouraging the standardization of courses and methods and gathering up for the common benefit the results of local experience all over the country.

Pre-War
Experience

Educational work done in local Associations has been, of course, almost entirely with men beyond ordinary school age. It attracts that type of man who, because of economic pressure or boyish restlessness, has left school early, and has later realized the handicap under which he suffers through lack of information or mental training. Such students labor under especial difficulties. Their study time is taken out of hours needed for recreation when the day's work has left them fatigued. The number of hours per week is necessarily small; progress is slow and discouragements are many. Subject matter presented to them must be free from non-essentials, and must satisfy the student's own judgment of practical values, for he is under no compulsion except that of his own ambition and is almost invariably prone to abandon his exceptional efforts unless they are compensated by results that he can recognize. Thus the conditions with which Y M C A educators had become familiar had a striking similarity to the conditions presented in the military forces and these required a similar judicious, tactful, and practical handling.

Proposals

When the war came in 1917, therefore, the Association possessed a fund of experience on which it could draw for use in the emergency. With the first thoughts of the imminent possibility of war, it was recognized that there would be a place and a demand for an educational program among the troops as a means of supplementing the army training by teaching the men to take better care of themselves physically, informing them on army practices and usages, preparing them to obtain promotion or transfer to other branches of the service, as well as equipping them better for return to civil life. As early as February, 1917, plans were drawn up in the office of the Educational Department of the International Committee for such a program to be carried out among the men in training, and before war was declared tentative plans were made also for work among the men at the front.

A memorandum embodying the first of these steps was laid before the initial meeting of the National War Work Council on April 28, 1917. It proposed that educational work should be carried out through practical talks by officers, enlisted men, and secretaries on matters of common interest, such as personal hygiene, military history and biography, army customs and practices, and local geography; through lectures on the causes and aims of the war by notable speakers; through an information bureau service answering practical questions which would inevitably arise among the men in their new environment; as well as through formal class work, especially in elementary subjects, in technical and vocational subjects leading to promotion or transfer within the service, and in liberal studies for men wishing to continue work begun before enlistment.

Educational
Bureau

For the promotion of this program the War Work Council established an Educational Bureau, and appointed as its Director, William Orr, who six months before had come from a commissionership of the Massachusetts State Board of Education to become Senior Secretary of the Educational Department of the International Committee. The Chairman of the Bureau's Advisory Committee was Frederic B. Pratt, Secretary of Pratt Institute, Brooklyn. As in the case of other activities, the administration of the educational work was decentralized by the appointment of department and district educational secretaries to have supervision over the work in the field, although there was much delay in filling these positions, and it was not until September, 1918, that every department had its own educational director. At the beginning of 1918 more than 250 secretaries were giving their at-

tention primarily to educational work and by midsummer there were 325 building educational secretaries, supervised by about 50 camp educational secretaries, in addition to hundreds of volunteer instructors recruited from the ranks or from local communities, who contributed willing, devoted, and valuable service.

EDUCATIONAL SERVICE

In the Officers' Training Camps, there was not the same need for extra educational as for other types of work. These camps were instituted with a distinctly educational end of their own in view, and a very crowded schedule of military instruction, including classes and lectures as well as drill, was followed in order to make possible the completion of the course within the period allotted, leaving almost no time available for outside educational work except on Saturday afternoons and Sundays. Two lines of effort, however, were found to be possible and useful. One was the organization of classes for the study of French, which enrolled from 100 to 400 students at each point, with a total of more than 2,500 in the camps of the first series. The other, undertaken in cooperation with the War Service of the American Library Association, was the provision of reading matter, each building being supplied with 500 to 1,000 books and 30 to 50 current periodicals. In addition to this work for the student officers, courses in elementary English and mathematics and lectures were arranged for men in the contingents of the Regular Army and the National Guard attached to the Officers' Training Camps, and during the summer similar facilities were provided for those in the Regular Army Posts and the National Guard camps, the populations of which were increased daily by the flowing tide of recruits.

This rapid growth and the assembling of the National Army in the early autumn brought the Association face to face with its real educational task. The conditions under which educational work was carried on in the camps were very different, of course, from those surrounding the agencies of instruction in time of peace. During the early months of the war, practically all such work was on a purely voluntary basis, while the only time available was in such free hours as a soldier might have after a day of military drill, when physical weariness would be likely to lead him in search of other distraction. The frequent shifting of troops from camp to camp made impossible in many cases the holding together of a class for any consecutive course of lessons.

**Informal
Instruction**

In consequence, much dependence was placed on informal methods adaptable to the needs of men who could be reached only irregularly. Newspaper clippings containing the important news of the day were posted on notice boards, or newspaper headlines were copied on a blackboard—bulletin fashion—for the information of those without time or inclination to read details. The almost universal interest in geography aroused by the war was encouraged by the display of wall maps, with lines of battle and other interesting points noted. An eclipse of the sun furnished occasion for charts, demonstrations, and the provision of smoked glass. Secretaries learned to make use of the odd moments of audiences waiting for the beginning of movies and other entertainment, by presenting subjects of common interest in four-minute speeches. Debates, spelling matches, and oral arithmetic contests were arranged, and educational trips to points of historical interest were conducted. The Y made its services available as the connecting link in correspondence courses between University Extension Divisions and such students as desired to undertake work of this kind.

Lectures

Somewhat more regular and formal in character were other elements of the educational program. Lectures were given more or less regularly and were generally arranged to cover a single subject at one presentation. Primarily informative, they were intended also to include a sufficient element of entertainment to attract the men. Many eminent speakers in every part of the country contributed their services for this purpose, and other agencies cooperated, as, for example, the National Board of Historical Service, which furnished a series of lectures, with slides, on the warring powers and their relation to the great struggle.

Literature

Among the most valuable of the welfare activities carried on among the men was the provision of reading matter. For this great service the American Library Association was primarily responsible, but that organization in many cases worked through the other welfare agencies. In nearly all of the large camps the American Library Association erected library buildings, employed a staff of trained librarians, and maintained a service comparable to that of any large city. In addition to the central camp library, branches were located in the Y M C A and K of C huts and other community buildings, which were supplied through the camp library with collections of 500 to 1,000 volumes, to be used on the same terms as books borrowed directly, and many magazines. In the smaller camps without central

libraries, the same service was provided in the welfare huts, which were supplied with books and magazines by the American Library Association. This service was of great value in connection with the educational program of the Y M C A, because it afforded material for reading courses and made possible the use of reference works by students engaged in serious study.

At the same time with these informal educational activities, the Y, in spite of the difficulties involved, persistently pushed organized class work. The most extensive work of this kind was done in French classes and in English classes for illiterates and non-English speaking foreigners, with which was combined a certain amount of instruction in civics and elementary history. Other classes were conducted, however, in such subjects as mathematics, including commercial arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and trigonometry; geography; gas engines and automobiles; navigation for navy men; radio; animal husbandry for men in charge of horses and mules; commercial courses, including typewriting, shorthand, bookkeeping and commercial law; mechanics; electricity; physics and chemistry. The extent and grade of instruction in these classes depended very much on local conditions.¹ The majority of teachers during the early months were volunteers either from among the soldiers themselves or from neighboring educational institutions, and the choice of texts and determination of standards were left largely with camp and building secretaries. Steps were taken, however, to make available for those who desired them, special soldier text-books, the need for which had been recognized from the beginning. Educational secretaries were urged also to relate all instruction to the military life of the soldier students, making it contribute directly to their adjustment to the new surroundings and to the new national ideal and purpose.

In English classes for illiterates and foreigners, instruction at the beginning was based upon methods formulated by Dr. Peter

Class
Instruction

English for
Illiterates

¹ A statistical report for the first three months of 1918 showed the following results:

Department	Books Circulated	No. of Lectures	Attend. at Lectures	No. of Clubs	Attend. at Clubs	No. of Classes	Attend. at Classes
Northeastern	72,422	446	120,286	143	2,780	1,906	46,125
Eastern	419,607	1,026	330,702	150	22,536	6,483	183,714
Southeastern	277,198	1,671	675,194	31,446	521,118
Central	205,843	1,181	348,557	152	4,373	11,028	295,123
Southern	163,124	847	206,375	8,329	146,102
Western	108,114	972	208,932	57	1,885	3,558	85,138
Totals	1,246,308	6,143	1,996,046	502	31,574	62,750	1,277,320

Roberts, of the Industrial Department of the International Committee. It was necessary to adapt these methods to military requirements, and special text-books were prepared and published for use by the soldiers. Among these were "The Soldier's Text-Book," by Mrs. Cora Wilson Stewart, and a "Camp Reader," by J. Duncan Spaeth, Educational Director at Camp Wheeler. An extract from an address made by Dr. John H. Finley in the spring of 1918 serves to illustrate the methods used and to give a vivid picture of English instruction:

"How practical is the need of a language in this country, common to all tongues, is illustrated by what I saw in one of the great cantonments a few nights ago. In the mess hall, where I had sat an hour before with a company of the men of the National Army, a few small groups were gathered along the tables learning English under the tuition of some of their comrades, one of whom had been a district supervisor in a neighboring state and another a theological student. In one of those groups one of the exercises for the evening consisted of practicing the challenge when on sentry duty. Each pupil of the group (there were four of Italian and two of Slavic birth) shouldered in turn the long-handled stove shovel and aimed it at the teacher, who ran along the side of the room as if to evade the guard. The pupil called out in broken speech, "Halt! Who goes there?" The answer came from the teacher, "Friend." And then, in as yet unintelligible English (the voices of innumerable ancestors struggling in their throats to pronounce it) the words, "Advance and give the countersign." So are those confused tongues learning to speak the language of the land they have been summoned to defend. What a commentary upon our educational shortcomings that in the days of peace we had not taught these men, who have been here long enough to be citizens (and tens of thousands of their brothers with them) to know the language in which our history and laws are written and in which the commands of defense must now be given!"

The difficulty from the military point of view of dealing with men unable to read or write and in some cases even to understand English made the importance of this work apparent from the beginning. Recognizing this, and also the difficulties involved in carrying it forward satisfactorily on a voluntary and irregular basis, commanding officers in some camps early signified their interest and approval by accepting the cooperation of the Association's educational forces and making attendance at classes compulsory for certain groups of men. In January, 1918, the Educational Bureau reported this practice and recommended that steps be taken to secure, if possible, its wider extension. On March 1st, reports from nineteen camps indicated

that, in seven, supervision of instruction was provided by the military authorities, instructors were detailed in nine, and attendance at classes required for certain groups in eighteen. A summary of reports from the six military departments as of February 20, 1918, shows 24,249 illiterates or non-English-speaking foreigners enrolled in classes.

In spite of searching tests of all kinds, many men were taken into the Army who were below the standard required for active service. Some had physical defects, others mental or educational. In May, 1918, the War Department ordered the organization of Development Battalions, in which those who were capable of improvement to meet army standards should be given intensive training. In dealing with these men, teachers and others were particularly instructed to avoid giving them the impression that they were segregated for any fault, but rather that they were given a deserved opportunity. Recognition was made in the public press and in *Trench and Camp* of any notable accomplishments or contribution to the life of the camps, and in some camps graduating exercises were held and certificates publicly awarded.

An important feature of these battalions was instruction in English for those whose knowledge of the language was insufficient.

A circular issued by the War Department in July, 1918, gave more detailed instructions regarding the establishment of English Schools for this purpose. Each school was to be in charge of an officer designated for that duty and men selected were to be required to attend. The Association's part was defined in the following provision:

"The civilian personnel necessary as instructors and assistant instructors, as well as books, stationery and other supplies, which may be required, will be obtained through proper application by the officer in charge of the schools to the local Young Men's Christian Association, which organization has agreed to furnish them."

As the Development Battalions were the first military organizations demobilized after the Armistice, the work with them in no case lasted more than six months, but within that period some valuable results were achieved. The degree of cooperation between the Army and the Association and their respective shares in the undertaking depended in large measure upon individual personalities in both organizations at local points, for within broad restrictions the administration of each school was entirely in the hands of the school officer. In most camps the actual teaching was done by soldiers detailed for that purpose, under the supervision of the Y educational secretaries and

in accordance with methods approved by them. In some cases brief normal courses for the detailed instructors were conducted by the Association. In one camp the whole teaching force came from the public schools of a nearby city. Chaplains also cooperated. Practically all nationalities were represented among the students. The Development Battalion English School of one camp enrolled in a single month more than 600 foreigners, including Italians, Poles, Russians, Austrians, Germans, Serbians, Croats, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Scandinavians, Mexicans, Egyptians, Belgians, Frenchmen, Montenegrins, Armenians, Japanese, Bohemians, Arabs and Turks, besides about 250 American illiterates.

French
Instruction

French instruction at the beginning was conducted in the same manner as in other classes. Teachers were secured locally, often from among the soldiers, and classes held when the military schedule permitted. Two text-books were specially prepared: "Premier Secours," by Walter L. Hervey and L. A. Wilkins, of the New York City Board of Education; and "First Lessons in Spoken French," by E. H. Wilkins and Algernon Coleman, both professors in the Department of Romance Languages of the University of Chicago. The object was to enable the student to use the simplest kind of conversational French for his own convenience and to this end the formal class work was supplemented by such devices as the duplication of signs and notices in French, the provision of menus in French in officers' quarters, the distribution of portions of the Scriptures printed in French and English in parallel columns, the singing of French songs, and mass instruction by stereopticon in which French words, phrases and sentences were thrown on the screen, to be repeated in concert.

But this phase of the educational work sustained such a close relation to actual military activities that it became necessary to change the whole policy with respect to it, and for the recognition of this necessity and the development of the new policy credit is due the Modern Language Association of America and Professor E. H. Wilkins. At its annual meeting in December, 1917, the Modern Language Association, which is the national organization of teachers of modern languages, appointed a Committee on Romance Language Instruction and the War, with Professor Wilkins as its Chairman, to study the methods and results of French instruction in the camps. The Committee's conclusions, based on observations made during January and February, were embodied in a report which condemned the system then in use, because the majority of classes were composed of enlisted

men, whereas the need for French was greater among the officers, who must conduct all business and negotiations; because volunteer teachers, both military and civilian, were unable to give adequate time and attention to the work; and because the lack of mandatory cooperation from the military authorities and of an organic system of instruction made impossible the continuity necessary to successful education.

Steps were taken at once to carry out the recommendations of the Committee looking to the correction of these defects. The Committee's offer of cooperation in the selection of paid French instructors and directors for each camp was accepted, Professor Wilkins was related to the War Personnel Board for this purpose, and in due time many good teachers were appointed. In March, a circular was issued by the Divisional Headquarters at Camp Grant, inaugurating a policy, based on the Committee's recommendations, whereby the study of French was made mandatory for all officers and for enlisted men who had already some knowledge of French, with the object of training the more proficient in practical interpreting and in the writing of military reports and dispatches, and others in understanding and speaking French with particular reference to military needs. The experiment worked so well at Camp Grant that six months later the Adjutant General of the Army issued a general memorandum to all camp commanders, recommending a similar plan, which provided for instruction to be given by the Y M C A under the supervision of the Chief Intelligence Officer of each camp, attendance to be mandatory for such officers and enlisted men as he might designate, with opportunity for voluntary study on the part of others who wished it. Only the Armistice prevented the introduction of this system on a wide scale.

Before this memorandum was issued, however, the Educational Work Bureau had been reorganized. Professor Wilkins became director in September and assembled as his associates a group of experts on the principal lines of work followed. The new Bureau announced as its main policies: (1) service as a center from which good methods reported from any part of the field or plans originating in the Bureau might be transmitted to all parts of the field; (2) the maintenance of close relations with the several offices and agencies of the War Department concerned with educational matters; (3) the standardization of texts and methods in the different camps. The last of these occupied much of its immediate attention. Efforts had been directed to this end for some months, but even as late as October there were re-

Educational
Bureau
Reorganized

ported in use in the various camps some 25 different English texts and about 50 French. In view of the frequent shifting of troops, this created a very unfortunate situation for the large numbers of men who, on being moved from one camp to another, were unable to take up their study at the new camp in the same way and at the same point as at the old. In November, "Liberty French," a book prepared on the basis of suggestions made by French instructors in all parts of the field, was published as a standard text, the "Camp Arithmetic," prepared at Fort Oglethorpe by Roehm and Buchanan, was adopted as a standard arithmetic text, and steps were taken toward the preparation of similar books for English.

Effect of
Armistice

The influenza epidemic seriously restricted all educational activities, particularly class work and lectures, during September and October, and in November the Armistice gave a new direction to the whole enterprise. Among the inevitable early results of the cessation of hostilities were a moderation of activity and a relaxation of discipline in the training camps. Men now had more time on their hands, and were eager to be discharged and return home. Their interests became centered on the prospect of civilian life rather than on overseas service. Demobilization began almost immediately, and within two or three months the men who had been in the camps at the time of the Armistice were gone. Beginning in December, their places were taken by successive waves of men returning from overseas, who remained in debarkation and demobilization camps a week or ten days and likewise disappeared into civilian life. During this time, however, there remained large numbers of men in relatively stable groups, consisting of detachments of the Regular Army on duty in the camps, depot brigades, labor battalions and others, as well as the men in the naval stations, whose numbers were almost as high as during the war.

For the most part, therefore, the motive of military utility in the educational work was replaced by the two-fold purpose of maintaining the morale and contentment of the men while they were detained in camp and of helping them in preparation for return to civilian status. The short duration of their stay in camp made it impossible, except in the case of the more permanent groups, to undertake any class work covering a long period. Brief courses, however, of two weeks or even less, were immediately established and repeatedly conducted with successful results. About 100,000 men were enrolled in courses given by the Association between November 11th and April 1st. The Develop-

ment Battalions were the first units to be demobilized, but classes in English for foreigners and illiterates continued to attract large numbers. Interest in French swiftly declined, but there was large demand for instruction in vocational subjects, and courses were given in shorthand, typewriting, bookkeeping, salesmanship, commercial law, advertising, printing, mechanical drawing, carpentry, automobile mechanics, gas engines, motion picture operating, telegraphy, radio, surveying, agriculture and other subjects. In order that men who undertook work of this sort in the Army might be led to continue it later, the names of the members of these classes were sent to local Y M C A's in their home communities and also to the Bureau of Education, which forwarded them to local school authorities.

Owing to the conditions of irregularity under which the educational work had to be done during this period, the most effective way of reaching large numbers of men was found to be through a greatly expanded lecture program. Between November, 1918, and April, 1919, about 12,000 lectures were given with a total attendance of more than 3,000,000. Speakers were secured locally by camp and building secretaries and were also sent out by departmental and national headquarters. All sorts of subjects were treated, but those having to do with the theme of citizenship were received with most favor. Talks on the various vocations were also popular. For the use of speakers who desired them, the Bureau secured and distributed a number of lectures, written by eminent writers and educators and adaptable to the requirements of local situations.

Expansion of
Lecture Program

But the post-Armistice educational program was not limited to class work and lectures. It included also such elements as the distribution in the camps and on troop trains of pamphlets specially prepared or provided by other organizations, the publication of educational material in *Trench and Camp*, the display of posters and placards to drive home educational messages, the circulation of exhibits, personal interviews on vocational guidance, and the promotion by four-minute talks and in other ways of the plans adopted for the benefit of soldiers by various Government agencies, such as the United States Employment Service, the Department of Agriculture and the War Risk Insurance Bureau.

TRENCH AND CAMP

Although in no sense a function of the Educational Department, the publication of the soldiers' newspaper, *Trench and Camp*, was so

closely allied to educational work in purpose and spirit that an account of its great usefulness properly belongs in this connection.

Americans are naturally a people much given to publication. Let almost any group of them be distinguished by common beliefs, purposes or ideals, and they will sooner or later think of publishing some organ for the expression of their common interests. Witness the innumerable periodicals issuing from colleges and high schools, fraternities, lodges, churches, and other organizations. When large numbers of men were assembled into organizations in the Army and Navy during the war, one of the early demands among them was for soldier and sailor publications. In due time these appeared, with varying degrees of merit and scope, some representing entire camps and others particular units ranging from companies to divisions.

During the summer of 1917 it occurred to a number of those interested in the war work of the Y M C A that a national newspaper published primarily for and so far as possible by the service men would meet just this need. John Stewart Bryan, publisher of the *News-Leader* at Richmond, Virginia, as a result of his own experience in conducting a newspaper for the men at Camp Lee, conceived the plan of a nationwide publication, issued simultaneously at some 40 points throughout the country, inspired by a single editorial policy but containing local news and other items of particular interest to the men in each camp. By reason of his wide acquaintance and strong personal influence among leading newspaper publishers, Mr. Bryan was able to secure local cooperation and to build up an organization without which the projection of the camp paper along the lines which it actually followed would have been impossible. His proposals, upon being laid before the Government and the War Work Council, were heartily endorsed by both, negotiations with local publishers were carried on during the late summer, and on October 8, 1917, the first issue of *Trench and Camp* appeared, in 32 editions, at as many camps.

At the very beginning it was laid down as a guiding principle that the paper should be in a real sense the soldiers' own paper. It was published under the auspices of the National War Work Council, which also financed certain of the processes involved in its production, but was not intended to be an organ of the Y M C A. Like other organizations, the Association received publicity through *Trench and Camp* only in proportion to the news value of its activities. In an editorial in the first issue, the aims of the periodical were defined:

"Through *Trench and Camp* all the soldiers will be kept informed of the activities of the army. They will have their news from home, news from the front, news from their own camps. . . . We hope to make *Trench and Camp* a vital, living transcript of the life of the army that has been formed to keep alive civilization.

"Although *Trench and Camp* is not primarily designed for civilians, it will still keep as its ideal first and foremost to be a newspaper. It will seek to print the news, to inform, to stimulate and to help relieve the tedium and monotony of camp life. And for those unfamiliar with military routine, *Trench and Camp* will be a graphic account of the life of our soldiers, whether they are drilling or fighting, at home or 'over there.'"

In its original form, *Trench and Camp* was an eight-page paper, 11½ x 18 inches in size, published weekly. In most cases the same form was maintained to the end, but in a number of the camps the enthusiastic cooperation of publishers and soldiers made it possible within a few months to increase the number or the size of the pages, or both. For four of the eight pages material was supplied weekly from a central editorial office in New York, in the form of syndicated matrices convertible into newspaper press plates. Other material was secured by a local reporting and editorial staff.

Through the identical pages the central office was able to control the editorial policy and set standards for the paper as a whole. Their object was to "interpret to the soldiers the hope and enthusiasm of the nation behind them," and they contained editorials, cartoons, poems and stories, many of them the work of soldiers in the camps, besides special articles on military matters, social hygiene, geography, the French language, and other subjects of interest and concern to men in the service. Some of the foremost cartoonists, illustrators and special writers in America contributed articles and drawings especially prepared for *Trench and Camp*, and the soldiers found also in their paper the features familiar to all newspaper readers, such as the tabloid sermons of Dr. Frank Crane, the health talks of H. Addington Bruce, and the homely verses of Walt Mason.

The pages devoted to local interests were filled with news, articles, pictures, and other matter relating almost exclusively to the particular camp in which each edition appeared. Athletic and social events, entertainments, and the activities of all the welfare societies were recorded, as well as personals and general military news. Descriptive stories of training methods and opinions of foreign officers detailed as instructors were also printed. For the assembling of this

Editorial Policy
and Standards

material the local editor, who was in some cases a Y M C A secretary and in others a trained newspaper man especially engaged for this work, gathered about him a staff of writers and cartoonists from among the soldiers themselves. This was an easy task in camps where men of previous newspaper experience were to be found in sufficient numbers, but where this was not the case steps were taken to develop the capacities of others. Each military unit was encouraged to appoint a representative to report to the camp paper news of his own organization. In several camps self-governing press clubs were organized, limited in membership to contributors to the local edition, who were held responsible each week for definite assignments. The greater the participation of the men themselves, the greater was the interest in the paper as a camp undertaking, and the best editions were those produced by the soldiers to whom the local editor was but a friendly adviser whose chief function was intelligent supervision.

Both general and local sections of the paper endeavored to cooperate fully with all branches of the Government connected with the Army or its welfare. Hundreds of columns of space in the various issues were devoted to the promotion of Liberty Loans, War Savings Stamps, and War Risk Insurance. Liberal space was given to the activities of the Surgeon General's Department and the Quartermaster General's Department, notably the Reclamation Division. Earnest cooperation and assistance were given to the Red Cross and the various welfare agencies in their campaigns. A summary of the activities of the Commission on Training Camp Activities was published frequently. How the publication was regarded by the War Department may be gathered from a statement in the fall of 1918:

Government
Commendation

"The War Department has observed with growing interest the real influence exercised on the military spirit of enlisted men and officers by camp newspapers. This Department would be glad to see all Commanding Officers interest themselves in the practical development of camp papers as in the case of the chain of publications known as *Trench and Camp* and also in such effective publications as the *Bayonet* or the *Camp Dodger*, etc. . . .

"In the opinion of the War Department no single activity of camp life, apart from the actual training for military duty is susceptible of being made more useful to the creation of morale, in its widest and most effective aspects, than a camp paper that accurately expresses both the life of the soldier and the aims and ideals of the Army."

Added to the efforts of the central editorial office and of the local staff, a third indispensable element in the production of the paper

was the cooperation of the publishers in whose plants the printing and other mechanical work was done. They made no charge for composition of the pages filled locally or for the make-up and printing of the entire edition. In some cases they contributed also the white paper used, the making of etchings and the delivery of completed papers at the camps. The War Work Council paid for the editing, composition, manufacture, and shipment of matrices of the syndicated pages, for the services of the local editor in each camp, and in most cases for the white paper. Many of the publishers in addition gave substantial portions of their time to personal supervision of the preparation of the camp newspapers. Both they and their employes entered heartily into this undertaking as a patriotic contribution to the welfare of the men in the service.

At first provision was made for supplying 4,000 copies of the paper to each camp, making a total circulation of 128,000 copies, but the demand among the soldiers made it necessary almost immediately to increase this number substantially. The shortage and high price of paper constituted a serious difficulty, which in some cases was met by the acceptance of local advertising, the proceeds of which were applied to the purchase of paper for additional copies. The circulation was steadily increased until at its maximum it exceeded a half million copies, distributed among more than 40 camps. These were read not only by the soldiers, but by their relatives and friends at home, who came to appreciate highly this record and picture of the life of their representatives in the service. The paper was distributed to the soldiers without cost; civilian subscribers paid a nominal charge, covering the cost of white paper and mailing.

Some of the camps were so well served by independent publications as to need no edition of *Trench and Camp*. In the case of some other papers, the War Work Council cooperated, without requiring their affiliation with the *Trench and Camp* chain. Among the soldier publications which sprang up spontaneously soon after the war began was the *Gas Attack*, an excellent weekly printed on super-calendered paper in magazine form, and issued by the men of the 27th Division at Camp Wadsworth, under the auspices of the Y M C A but not as an edition of *Trench and Camp*. Beginning August 5, 1918, *Going Over*, another weekly, was issued for the benefit of the men embarking for overseas service, to whom copies were handed as they went on board ship. Its contents were similar in character to the syndicated pages of *Trench and Camp*, but the local appeal was necessarily absent

and the news which it carried was more general, with the emphasis on conditions overseas. This paper was published under the auspices of the War Work Council of the Y M C A and printed as a patriotic service by members of the Allied Printing Trades of New York employed in the plant of the Brooklyn *Daily Eagle*. Special news feature service was donated by the Associated Press, the United Press, the Universal News Service, and the International News Service. After the Armistice there was no further need for *Going Over*, but its place was taken by *Coming Back*, copies of which were printed in this country and shipped abroad to be given to the soldiers as they embarked for home.

As demobilization proceeded, the various editions of *Trench and Camp* were discontinued as their usefulness ceased, and certain necessary readjustments were made in the methods of their production. On September 1, 1919, after an existence of two years, lacking one month, their activities were officially closed.

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR EX-SERVICE MEN

Educational
Activities with
Ex-Service
Men

The educational service for men of the Army and Navy did not end with their discharge. In view of the fact that the unexpended balance of war work funds referred to elsewhere resulted in part from the assumption by the Government of the educational work overseas, the War Work Council, during the period from November 1, 1919, to December 31, 1921, appropriated the sum of \$6,500,000 for carrying out plans of the National Educational Service Committee, which included a comprehensive program of general education and vocational re-adjustment among ex-service men.

One of the outstanding needs of a large number of men on receiving their discharge from the service was educational training to fit them for the changed economic conditions which followed the war. There were also thousands of men whose education had been interrupted by their entrance into the military forces. A large proportion of both of these classes were financially unprepared to carry out their plans without assistance.

Of the total fund appropriated for educational service work, \$5,000,000 was allocated to scholarship awards. The plan of distribution was very thoroughly worked out and was designed to offer equal opportunities to all ex-service men regardless of their previous education or place of residence. For this reason the awards were made in all grades of schools, from the most elementary to the colleges and universities. In some parts of the South, where there were many illiterate

colored ex-service men, special elementary schools were established to meet their needs, and for men in all parts of the country who could not attend resident schools, instruction was provided by correspondence.

The awarding of scholarships in schools below college grade was done by local committees, of which there were more than 1,600 in operation, enlisting over 7,000 volunteers, and serving practically all parts of the continental area of the United States. The collegiate scholarships were awarded by State committees. These committees were painstaking in their work. They interviewed the applicants, and studied their needs, their service records, their character qualities. Nearly every committee had more applicants than its portion of the fund would provide for, and it was the desire to accomplish the largest good both to individuals and communities.

The scholarship awards made from the beginning of this service to December 31, 1921 (the service continued until July, 1922), numbered 89,936. Among the recipients are residents of fully 90 per cent. of the 3,000 counties in the United States. As divided among various types of schools the awards may be classified as follows:

In local Y M C A Schools	38,656
In non-Y M C A Schools	14,559
In Correspondence Schools	24,314
In Colleges and Universities	12,407
	<hr/> 89,936

A mere statement of the figures fails to give any idea of the value of this work. The awards made to students in colleges and universities were scattered among 992 different institutions, and in many hundreds of cases the students would not have been able to continue their college work without the aid given by these awards.

Not less valuable than the help given to college students was that given to the thousands who pursued vocational courses in trade and technical schools and in the day and evening schools of the Y M C A, and in the Y M C A and other correspondence schools.

Through this service many men were enabled to resume interrupted courses of study sooner than if dependent on their own resources; others were able to adjust themselves to economic conditions; and several found it possible to realize those higher ideals of life careers which grew out of their war experience.

Instruction for local Association Secretaries desiring to assist ex-service men in their choice of vocations, was provided under the

Scholarship
Awards

Vocational
Guidance Work

direction of Prof. E. W. Weaver. Local Associations were reimbursed for such service and for assistance rendered to ex-service men in finding permanent positions of employment.

During the period to June 30, 1921, more than 70,000 ex-service men were given valuable assistance through this bureau at an expense amounting to \$74,538. The reimbursements to local Associations were discontinued on June 30, 1921, but the counselling service of Prof. Weaver and his staff is continued as a permanent feature of the program of the United Y M C A Schools.

The educational service fund also financed a vocational placement service in connection with local Associations; a system of lectures on citizenship in connection with local posts of the American Legion; and a work of Americanization among illiterates and foreigners in industry, growing out of the similar work done for them in the Army. The lecture service was in operation about a year, being discontinued on April 30, 1921. The total expense of this lecture work was \$13,003.

During the period under consideration, the Association also carried on a very extensive Americanization work. Special secretaries for this work were provided in more than 150 cities, and comprehensive programs of English teaching, citizenship preparation, lectures and entertainments were conducted and assistance in securing naturalization papers was rendered. Men taught to speak English numbered 49,345 and 28,673 were assisted in securing their naturalization papers. In addition to this, there was a total attendance of more than 1,500,000 at lectures and entertainments, designed to inculcate the spirit and ideals of America. For this work, the sum of \$500,000 was appropriated.

By devoting a substantial portion of its unexpended war funds to educational work for ex-service men, and by creating in the United Y M C A Schools, a nation-wide opportunity, for all American men who have passed from school into industry, to supplement defective or insufficient early education, the Y M C A has declared its own judgment of the relative importance, from the national point of view, of its various wartime activities. Always actuated by the fundamentally religious motive, it has recognized in the need for education the most immediate claim upon its power to serve. In the Army and Navy too, the post-war emphasis is the same. "Earn, travel, and learn," is its recruiting slogan, and no inducement held out to citizens is more stressed than the value of the vocational or general education which awaits the American soldier.

Americanization
Work

Relative
Importance of
War-Time
Activities

The reader of this chapter and of the corresponding chapter on educational work overseas,¹ will find ample grounds for this resulting conviction. The educational deficiencies, revealed by the draft, administered a severe shock to the general American complacency about public education. That one-fourth of the drafted men were unable to read a newspaper, and that the Army had not only the expected task of imparting military knowledge to civilians, but had to teach thousands of unskilled men the elements of common trades in order to perform its military functions, was an imperative call to instant action which must not be forgotten because the military emergency has passed. It is of course obvious that there is a serious element of danger to the Army as well as to the individual, in the soldier who cannot understand challenge and reply at the sentry post, who cannot understand orders spoken or printed in the language of the nation. But such a man presents possibilities of civic danger of even deeper gravity.

Under the pressure of military needs, the educational efforts of all agencies were properly confined to those having immediate military value. But even these had to find place and time where they could. The educational idea had to be "sold" to soldiers so effectively that they would willingly give up their scanty free time which could be occupied more amusingly. Educators know the difficulties of getting good work even out of those whose principal business is study. The record of men past school age voluntarily attending classes, as well as lectures, will be to them convincing evidence of the persuasive approach and presentation achieved. The education for citizenship and for vocations in the post-Armistice period, in which there was admirable collaboration by many agencies, must prove a useful asset, even though not measurable, to the nation as well as to the men directly concerned. Nor can it be doubted that the new experiences of these nearly five million men, their contacts with fellow citizens, and their discovery of wide realms of knowledge of which they had had but vague intimations, must eventuate in stirred aspirations and resolves, to satisfy which will tax the educational resources of the whole nation.

Military and
Civil Educational
Requirements

¹ Chapter XXXV.

CHAPTER XXI

SERVICE TO MEN IN TRANSIT

Neither the soldiers nor their friends were particularly interested in the organization and methods, generally described in the preceding chapters, which made service possible. Their concern was with the product, not with the process. If we have seemed to dwell at too great length upon what lay behind the scenes, it is because some comprehension of the many and varied elements is indispensable to understanding the composite service into which they were combined. Diffused, through the channels we have outlined, throughout the vast field, these elements came again to focus in the workers who were in immediate contact with the men. They constituted the treasury of resources upon which each secretary could draw from day to day or from moment to moment, according to the situation in which he found the soldiers he was assigned to serve. It was his task to select and to weave into a serviceable and pleasing fabric the threads thus furnished for his loom. In this and the three following chapters we shall see something of the actual results of this foundation work.

Soldiers'
Travels

Mobilizing, training, maneuvering, and returning to civilian life an Army and Navy of more than five million men involved a good many journeys for each individual, varying in length from a few hours to many days, and in character from the movement of solitary casuals to that of whole divisions, under conditions which in peace time even the most lowly traveler would scorn.

The movement of a soldier from one of the far western states will illustrate all journeys which men in the service took. Let our recruit come, say, from Miles City, Montana, or Salt Lake City, Utah. After passing through the hands of the draft board, he would be put on a train with two or three hundred others and despatched to Camp Lewis, Washington, a journey of approximately 1,000 miles and of two days' duration. After several months' training in this camp, his regiment would be ordered to France. Early some morning he would entrain for the journey across the continent to an embarkation camp near the Atlantic coast, and for the next week would live a life of hardship and even privation. His food would often consist solely of cold "corned willy," hard tack and canned fruits or jams. At junc-

tion points such as Denver, St. Louis, Chicago, Pittsburgh, he would often have to wait for hours, not with the privilege of exploring the town, but confined to the limits of his car or the railroad yard. On the seventh or eighth day he would find himself at Camp Merritt, Camp Mills, or one of the other embarkation centers. His stay here would be short, from a week to a month. The next stage of the journey would be from the camp to the port, where, after a few hours of waiting, he would board the transport bound for France. Going abroad in those days was no voyage de luxe. All available space was filled with men and cargo. The trip across was rarely made in less than ten days and ordinarily consumed two weeks or more.

In due time this journey of more than 4,000 miles by land and 3,000 miles by sea, consuming more than twenty days, had to be retraced before his military travels were ended. Of course, not every soldier covered all stages of this itinerary. Two million men made the entire round trip, varying in time and distance according to the place they called home. Every man made the trip from home to camp and return. On each trip the physical and psychological conditions were such that welfare work was a welcome diversion.

The ideal to which the Association devoted itself was to render service to the soldiers, sailors, and marines from the day they left home to the day that they returned. In order, therefore, that there might be no gap in the service between points at which the Association was permanently established, work was inaugurated for men in transit. Here again, the peace-time organization of the International Committee offered ready means to carry out the program. For many years the Railroad Department had been serving men engaged in railroad work. When the war broke out there were Railroad Y M C A's in operation at 285 points in the United States. Because of the strategic locations of these Associations at junction points, and because of their established contacts with railroad officials and men, they were obviously in the best position to undertake any work to be done for traveling soldiers. So far as possible, the movements of troop trains were kept secret, and only men having the full confidence of railroad officials were acceptable for work in which this knowledge was indispensable. Because of their familiarity with the field, railroad secretaries foresaw the problems and needs that would arise in connection with transportation of troops and were prompt to meet them. At first, then, the work was undertaken by the permanent Railroad Associations on their own initiative. Regular secretaries of

The
Association
Ideal

these Associations began to serve on troop trains almost with the first troop movements. On July 1, 1917, the work was officially recognized by the National War Work Council, and the Transportation Bureau was established, with John F. Moore, Senior Secretary of the Railroad Department of the International Committee, as its Director.

TROOP TRAIN WORK

In the early days the work was not extensively organized. It was simply a matter of getting what information was available about the movement of troops, some of which was secured by the Railroad Department, and some by local secretaries from officials of the particular railroad systems to which they were related, and then putting a secretary on a particular train to do what he could for the men. The efficiency of the service gradually increased with experience, and methods and equipment became standardized.

Two situations requiring quite different procedures had to be met: first, service on trains carrying un-uniformed men from home to camp, and second, that on trains carrying uniformed men from camp to camp and to the ports of embarkation.

The most valuable service in connection with the troop train work was done on the trains that carried the recruits from their homes to camp. The psychology of the men was a most important factor. Many of them were leaving home for the first time. They parted from friends and families and embarked upon a dangerous undertaking knowing that many of them would never return. Rumors of the unknown conditions into which they were entering furnished ample food for foreboding imaginations. Reactions were extraordinarily varied. Some men were extremely depressed, others cast aside all restraint and, in a spirit of bravado, were ready to drink, gamble, or engage in any reckless undertaking, others were simply apathetic, some bewildered. The situation called for a friendly influence to divert, reassure and steady men until emotions were calm and thinking was normal. Often recruit trains left for camp with no officers in charge and trainmen learned to rely on the secretaries' influence to forestall disorder.

Secretaries were sent to all parts of the country, to the woods of Maine and the deserts of Arizona, to accompany the recruits from home to camp. From one to three secretaries were assigned to each train, according to the number of recruits and the distance to be

Recruit
Trains

Types of
Service

traveled. They were well supplied with song sheets, information sheets, booklets on religious and sex hygiene subjects, testaments, books, magazines and newspapers, writing paper and envelopes, Red Triangle post cards, games of checkers and dominoes, and first aid kits. They would proceed through the train as soon as it started, distribute supplies, and announce themselves as ready to serve in any capacity. They gave the men song folders and started them singing; distributed magazines and newspapers; furnished writing material; collected and dispatched letters, post cards, and telegrams; took messages which required personal attention and wrote cards and letters for those who could not do so themselves. Games of checkers and dominoes were distributed, drinking of liquor discouraged and men persuaded to throw away their bottles of "booze." They diverted irritated men from bickerings and checked the spirit of gambling by suggesting other amusements, by counsel, or appeal. Cuts, bruises, car sickness, and many minor ills received first aid and when necessary, the secretary telephoned or telegraphed ahead for medical assistance. Between times he drew into conversation a lad who looked troubled, and perhaps found a way to remove the cause of worry. He preached no creed except allegiance to God, clean living, and patriotism. When trains were late, he made arrangements with the Red Cross, local Associations, or station restaurants, to furnish meals that otherwise would have been missed. He tried to see that his men had an adequate water supply, too often a neglected matter. He frequently was able to improve their sleeping accommodations. He served as an information bureau on matters relating to camp, military life, discipline, and the hundred and one things about which the soldier wanted to know. In these and other ways the troop train secretary served, and earned his reward in the smiles and hand-shakes of the men of the new National Army. No one secretary performed all of these services, but they were all rendered.

The report of each one is a story in itself. They include experiences ranging the whole human scale. One secretary related that he found a newly drafted man sitting sullenly by himself, and on drawing him into conversation discovered that he had been obliged to leave a wife and three children without anyone to care for them. The secretary promised to keep him in mind when they got to camp. Accordingly he took the matter up with the Commanding Officer, and within three days the mistake of a draft board was rectified and the man was at home with his family, where he belonged. Another story

Illustrative
Tendencies

is illustrative of the efforts to discourage drinking. A secretary entered into conversation with a man who told him that he had in his pocket two quarts of whiskey which he proposed to drink before reaching camp. The secretary responded that such a course would probably mean his spending the first 30 days of his army life in the guard house and suggested that if he would throw away his liquor probably half a dozen others would follow his example. The idea appealed to him and he got up on his seat, repeated what the secretary had said and threw both bottles out of the window, with the result that eleven others promptly followed.

The report of a secretary illustrates the service rendered.

"Trip made on troop train from Forest City, Garner, Clarion, Dows, Iowa, to Camp Pike, Arkansas, July 24, 25, and 26, 1918. These men from Winnebago, Hancock and Wright Counties, Iowa, were, in the main, men from the country, off the farms, and from very small towns. They knew little, if anything, about the Y M C A and what impressions they had seemed to be that it was purely a religious organization and that the functions of its representatives were purely to preach to them. I gained the impression that they did not take kindly to this under the existing circumstances with the result that in the beginning the men held themselves aloof.

"There were no Government officials attached to the train. The train officials, however, received me cordially and the cooperation of the conductors over each division was splendid.

"As there were no Army officers aboard, and those whom the sheriffs had selected in the various counties as captains of their contingents had evidently received no instructions other than that they had to carry the meal card and that they were captains, it became evident during the first half day that someone had to take charge. So it was arranged between the conductor and myself that I would assume authority in handling the men.

"The boys took kindly to singing. It was not at all difficult to find one or more leaders in each car. The better known songs were, of course, favorites, and among those the religious songs predominated, although some of the later marching songs were much in favor. There was plenty of singing, especially at the stations. Singing is a good thing to get the boys in good spirits and to relieve the tension.

"There were 1,211 post cards, 219 letters, turned in to be mailed. I took eight personal messages to be delivered upon my return home. There were any number of personal things to be done for individuals upon the train.

"Anticipating that plenty of reading matter was required, I got in touch by phone two days before the trip with personal friends at Forest City, Garner, and Clarion where the contingent started, and

requested them to gather a goodly number of magazines and have them put on board. The response was splendid and there were enough magazines to provide two for every man on the train.

"With regard to newspapers, I purchased 500 copies of the Cedar Rapids Gazette on July 24th. At Burlington I supplied them with evening papers, and at St. Louis, Thursday, July 26th, I saw to it that the boys had the morning paper. The magazines and newspapers were well read, some of the boys contenting themselves with reading practically all the time.

"About 35 sets of checkers, fifteen sets of dominoes, several packs Diversions of flinch, and other games were put on the train. There were also plenty of card games. There was always a large group of boys around the interesting games in the car and this served a double purpose—it was not only an interesting diversion, but also vacated some seats which other boys could then use to stretch out on and get sleep. As a matter of fact, with 541 men aboard there were just enough seats to go around. In other words there were two men to each seat so that if all the men were in their seats no one could stretch out. There was but one chair car out of the eleven cars, the balance being ordinary day coaches, the majority of which were obsolete, discarded smoking cars.

"With the large number on the train and with the number of things to do for the immediate comfort and well-being of the men, there was very little time to sit down alongside of individuals and make much of a personal effort.

"There was no evidence of drinking until we passed St. Louis. At De Soto, Mo., through some disarrangement of railroad schedules, we were side-tracked for more than an hour. It was extremely hot weather throughout the trip and the boys, whenever they had an opportunity, got off the train. It was an easy matter for them to slip out and cross the street, and before one was aware, saloons in the neighborhood had been visited.

"I immediately got in touch with the saloon keepers and stopped the selling of liquor, and confiscated all that was in sight. I told the saloon keepers that these men were in the service of their Government and if a drop of liquor was sold thereafter I would see that they were closed up.

"A couple of hours after we left De Soto word was sent back to me to the rear of the train that there was a fellow out of his head in the second car from the front. I found that liquor was probably at the bottom of it. I had the man taken to an empty baggage car, and it required four men to hold him from pitching himself off the train. I secured a quart of strong black coffee from the cafeteria car and succeeded in getting it down the chap. About twenty minutes later he lost what whiskey he had and after a short time was ready to go to sleep. By the time he had his nap out he was sober. During that afternoon it was necessary for me to adopt the same measures with three more, although these three were not out of their heads, but

they were 'stewed,' and 'stewed right.' Several hours before we got to camp I megaphoned every car that every drop of liquor on their persons, or in their baggage, must be thrown off, because if it were found upon them or in their baggage in camp they would spend their first night in the guard house. About twenty bottles went off the train on that trip alone. One case of drunkenness escaped my notice; at least the man did not show any evidence of it aboard the train, but when he arrived in camp he was so intoxicated that he did not know his name. He was promptly put in the guard house. This was an object lesson for the rest and bore out that which I told them on the train.

Stop-over
Excursions

"The incident of the trip which the boys enjoyed most was a little diversion at Burlington. Through disarrangement of train schedule we had to wait over there for two hours. After having supper, the boys were permitted to go on the street as far as they could within a certain time. Of course, there was nothing in town to attract them, and as the weather was extremely hot it occurred to me that they would enjoy an auto ride. I immediately stopped the first machine that came along and asked the driver to take as many of the boys as he could and give them a ride until 7.45. I stopped every auto that came along and in twenty minutes it must have spread over town that a troop train was in, for enough autos came and offered their services to give each man a ride about town. This incident was a welcome diversion from the monotony of the long trip.

"On the day which I spent in camp there were almost as many things I was able to do for the men there as on the train. They were not allowed to move away from the barracks and there were numerous things they wanted. Besides, they always wanted information as to what could be expected, and it was easy for me to ascertain that and give it to them. For instance, they wanted to know how long they would stay in camp. With just a little inquiry from the proper authorities I ascertained that they would not be there very long, and that they would be promptly distributed to other camps.

"Such are the things that a Y M C A secretary could do for the men in transit and when tied up in quarantine in camp. That these services were appreciated is evidenced by the fact that on the first day somebody bestowed upon me the nick-name of 'Good Samaritan' and it stuck throughout the trip."

With Uniformed
Men

When the first troops were being sent from training camps to embarkation ports the need for service en route was again apparent, although the conditions were different from those of the first trip made by these men from their homes to the training camp. The uniformed men were under discipline. They had lived in camp and had become used to the changed conditions. They were no longer undirected, forlorn, homesick recruits.

The movements incurred were also of a different nature. Whereas recruits rarely traveled over 1,000 miles and generally not more than 350, whole divisions of trained troops journeyed to Atlantic ports from points West and South as far away as the Pacific Coast. After the Armistice the movement was reversed. As troops arrived at Atlantic ports from overseas, they were redistributed over the entire country to demobilization camps located as nearly as possible within 330 miles of their point of induction or enlistment. For the trips requiring several days' journey sleeping accommodations were supplied. For trips requiring not more than three days the men traveled in day coaches without Pullman accommodations. Many comforts which the recruits' trains lacked were provided and many abuses eliminated by military organization. Kitchen cars with army cooks in charge were attached to practically every train requiring more than 24 hours to complete its journey. Regular and sufficient meals were thus secured. An army doctor traveled on each train, who relieved the secretary of first aid duty. As the men were in uniform it was more difficult for them to get intoxicants. Drunkenness was therefore a small factor. On many trains gambling was also eliminated by orders of the train commander.

Until the time of the Armistice close secrecy was observed concerning the departure, routing and arrival of trains. The men were kept under close supervision and confined to the cars, with no liberty except that previously arranged. Rail equipment was often poor and crowded to the limit. The troop train secretary's efforts were directed to furnishing amusement and recreation and increasing comfort. He was a sort of social factotum. He promoted singing and other entertainment and games; he acted as helpful friend and willing servant. He studied the route over which the train was to travel and pointed out places of historic and scenic interest. He varied the monotony of army food with fruits, pies, and other tidbits, and insured the benefits of Red Cross service to his charges by informing that organization in advance of the time of arrival of his train at junction points. By officers and men he was considered a desirable addition to the journey—a feeling shared by the officials and train crew.

Secrecy of
Movements

The journal of a secretary who accompanied a troop train from Camp Mills, Long Island, to Presidio, San Francisco, California, in May 1919, illustrates the variety of functions performed on a single trip. This train carried 500 men and was made up entirely of sleeping cars. His report (abridged) reads as follows:

Illustrative
Report

"We didn't leave Camp Mills until about 6 p.m., so I did not have a chance to do anything but let the boys have a look at me the first day out. I had a bunch of late New York papers aboard and, starting with the officers' car, passed them out all through the train. I got off at New York with a bunch of telegrams and got aboard again after buying a box of cigars. These I passed around among the officers.

"I secured time tables of the road we were to go over and looked up the places of interest and explained them to the men in plenty of time for them to recognize them as we went by. I kept most of them up to see the famous Wyoming Valley and the city of Wilkes-Barre the first day. I found out from the train crew about what time we were to pass Niagara Falls. As we were to pass them at an early hour, I woke the men up at 5 a.m. (at their request) so they could see the Falls. They certainly did appreciate this, as a great many of them had never had a chance to see them before and perhaps never would again. At Niagara I purchased one thousand views of the Falls and gave two to each man.

"I wired ahead to the Red Cross at Port Huron, Michigan, that we were coming, and they were ready for us. I also asked the medical officer to wire the Chicago Y M C A in regard to baths for the men, which he gladly did. We arrived in Chicago about 7 a.m. where the men were all marched over to the Central Department Y M C A for a bath.

"The next day when we arrived at Hutchinson, Kansas, most of the men left the train for a stroll about town. Knowing that many of them had not had an American apple for many months, I decided to buy a barrel for them. I picked up a few men who were standing around the depot to go over to the wholesale house with me and carry the apples back. These men called themselves the 'Y M C A Replacement Squad.' Other men on the streets, seeing the procession, fell into line, so when I got to the warehouse, I had about forty men with me. I bought the apples and the wholesale man gave each of the bunch an orange and a bottle of pop. When we got back to the train, I told the others about it. They said that they were going to keep their eye on me in the future, so as not to miss anything.

"The next day we stopped at Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Y M C A and Red Cross were both ready for us. The men had a swim, hot coffee and sandwiches, and after walking around the town for a bit were ready for the rest of the journey. I bought papers for the men at Gallup, New Mexico, and Ashfork, Arizona. I also wired ahead to have San Francisco papers waiting for me at Barstow, California. These were the first Californian papers many of the men had seen for over a year and were certainly greatly appreciated.

"At Bakersfield, California, the next night I hired a couple of buses, filled them with soldiers and rode about the town for thirty minutes. I got the men singing, much to their own enjoyment and the amusement of the townspeople.

"We arrived in San Francisco on Sunday, where we were met by the Mayor and representatives of civic organizations. At the invitation of the Colonel, I marched in the parade up Market Street. A great many of the men introduced me to their friends and relatives, telling them what good care the Y had taken of them on the trip. I also went to Presidio and stayed with the men until settled."

The services just described are in fact very simple things, commonplace and unspectacular. But despite their simplicity, or perhaps because of it, they required the alert attention of one whose sole duty was to do them. How much they counted for, the soldiers who benefited can tell best.

The success of troop train work depended largely upon the per- Personnel
sonality of the individual secretary. His was a one man job, and in order successfully to fulfill the multifarious duties which were imposed upon him, he must have initiative, resourcefulness, and leadership. The greatest care was therefore exercised in selecting the men who were entrusted with this work. The Railroad Y M C A secretaries employed at the beginning were accustomed to serving American working men and knew their background and ways of thinking. When the movement from one camp to another or to a port began, the Transportation Bureau utilized secretaries drawn from the camp of departure, who had become used to the military atmosphere and view-point. After the Armistice the personnel at the Debarkation Camps was not sufficiently large to furnish men for transport work, and the Transportation Bureau built up a selected personnel of its own, known as the "Flying Squadron." These men met the incoming troops on the dock, accompanying them to rest camps and from rest camps to demobilization camps. In all about 373 secretaries were regularly engaged in troop train work.

After the first few months of experimentation, equipment nec- Equipment
essary to serve men in transit was standardized in units to serve 500 men, and was furnished to each troop train. Each unit included six baseballs, three catcher's mitts, three indoor balls, two pairs of boxing gloves, 24 sets of dominoes, 2,000 sheets of writing paper, 500 envelopes, 1,000 post cards, 100 pencils, 500 song leaflets and 1,000 pamphlets on patriotic, religious, and social hygiene subjects. This was supplemented by traveling library boxes containing 50 volumes furnished to the Y M C A by the American Library Association. Sweet chocolate, chewing gum and cigarets were distributed free during the period of demobilization.

Extent of Troop
Train Service

From the inception on July 1, 1917, to December 31, 1919, Y M C A secretaries traveled on 12,390 troop trains carrying 6,260,000 men. In the course of this service 250,000 sets of checkers and dominoes, 10,000,000 post cards, 5,000,000 pieces of literature, 3,000,000 bars of chocolate, 3,000,000 packages of gum, and 2,000,000 packages of cigarets were distributed free by the Transportation Bureau. The privilege of this service was granted exclusively to the Y M C A which first recognized and undertook to meet the need.

TRANSFER CENTERS

Transportation conditions created further opportunities for service at division points and transfer centers. Long delays at these points were of frequent occurrence, especially at such important centers as Chicago, Pittsburgh, Denver, and Cincinnati, where transfers had to be made from one train to another or cars were shunted from one system to another. During these waits it was inadvisable to let the men scatter and they were held within the bounds of the railroad yard and depot.

In order to render the tedium of these delays more endurable, the Y M C A developed large activities. At Chicago, Pittsburgh, Denver, and Cincinnati, the local Railroad and City Associations' equipment was sufficient to supply the needs. Representatives of these Associations met incoming trains on notice from the train secretary and, if time permitted, the men were invited to the Association building, given the privilege of a shower and swim, refreshments in the cafeteria, the use of pool and billiard tables, library and writing facilities, movies and other entertainments. In like manner the Associations at division points throughout the entire country opened their doors to the men delayed there.

St. Louis

About one-third of the entire number of troop trains served by the Y M C A passed through St. Louis, Missouri. As the equipment of the local Railroad Association there was not sufficient to meet the demand for service thus placed upon it, two attractive huts were built by the Transportation Bureau. The work received the whole-hearted support of the city and was made possible largely through the active cooperation of the citizens. Committees of women were organized to help, including a Troop Train Service Committee, a Canteen Committee numbering more than 200, and an Information Booth Committee. These women worked from seven in the morning until ten at night, day in and day out, for a period of more than two

years, and the success of the work was largely due to their splendid cooperation.

During the two years ending October 31, 1919, more than 3,000 trains were met and the 1,500,000 men they carried were served by these committees on the trains, in the huts or at the booth in the Union Station at St. Louis. More than 40,000 slept free of charge in the huts; 200,000 baths, with soap and towels, were provided free. Approximately 200,000 were fed in the canteen at cost, and free refreshments valued at \$1,000 a month, including ice cream, cake, hot coffee, sandwiches and smokes, were distributed. The attendance at religious, social, and educational meetings was approximately 90,000. Four hundred thousand letters were mailed. Twenty thousand men were taken on free auto trips through the city at the expense either of the Association or of the ladies on the Troop Train Service Committee. The cooperation of theaters made possible the free entertainment, at various vaudeville and motion picture houses, of large groups who had sufficient time. Similar action by the baseball managements gave thousands of men entertainment at baseball games. Hundreds of boys stranded in St. Louis were sent forward to their homes. Large numbers received medical aid from the Medical Association, the first organization to begin work and alone in the field for the first six months of the war. In fact these committees did everything they could think of to build up the morale of the soldiers going overseas and to show the same men returning to their homes in the West, Southwest, and Middle West, a welcome which they will never forget.

PORTS OF EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION

Service at the ports of embarkation was begun after an incident which occurred in the early days of the war. A New York newspaper published the story of a body of troops held in trains, in the midst of the New Jersey meadows, without food and water. It had been expected that the men would embark immediately on arrival, but the ship was not ready for two days and the men were held in the cars. Representatives of the Association quickly confirmed the report and the Transportation Bureau helped somewhat by supplying the men with food and drink. This experience opened the eyes of the Association to the possibilities of helpful service for men about to sail.

The two main gateways of the Atlantic during the war were Hoboken, New Jersey, and Newport News, Virginia. Of the 2,000,000

men who went overseas 1,656,000 sailed from Hoboken and 288,000 from Newport News. The equivalent of one division sailed from Philadelphia, 46,000 from Boston and a detachment of 4,000 from Baltimore. San Francisco was the port of embarkation for the 10,000 troops of the Siberian Expeditionary Forces.

As the number of men passing through the four latter ports was small and delays short and infrequent, no special service was necessary. Local Associations and neighboring camps did everything that was required. At Hoboken and Newport News, the Transportation Bureau instituted special service.

Hoboken

During the first months of the war Hoboken was wide open; immoral influences were at their worst. The Association secured a building which had been a saloon, cleaned it up and opened it for service. The very first night it was flooded with men of the Army and Navy. In the summer of 1917, General Shanks, Commander of the Port of Hoboken, ordered all saloons and disreputable houses in that port closed. The Y M C A then secured what had been one of the worst resorts in the city, a four-story building, and in less than twenty-four hours had a complete program of activities running. A rest room, reading room, pool tables, dormitories, and other features were provided. Twenty-five cents was charged for a bed, and meals were served at less than cost. From the beginning these accommodations were inadequate. The first night hundreds of men were turned away. Within a few weeks four other buildings in the neighborhood were taken over, but these also proved inadequate. At one of them, used solely as a lunch room, 117,000 men were served during the month of September, 1918, and on a single day, 5,200 within 24 hours. All buildings were kept open day and night.

Hudson
Hut

Finally, the War Work Council made an appropriation of \$100,000 for the biggest hut in America, the now famous Hudson Hut. It was opened in December, 1918, just in time to serve the troops returning in floods. As attractive without as it was comfortable within, it became the rendezvous of officers and men of the Army and Navy in this great port. In addition to a complete program of standard Association activities, numerous special activities were carried on in this establishment. It had a cafeteria which served meals to 1,800 to 2,500 men daily, and a canteen with the usual articles for sale, and a soda fountain. Shower baths, barber and tailor shops, and a bootblack "parlor" with free service, were features. A room containing 22 billiard and pool tables was thronged with men every

hour of the day. In the large auditorium an entertainment was given every night, free to all men in uniform. There were library and reading rooms, class rooms, hostess room, and commodious porches for lounging. Numerous requests to locate lost baggage led to the establishment of a special department for that purpose. Seven fireplaces attractively situated in the various rooms created a pleasant and comfortable social atmosphere. Around these fireplaces, whether the log was blazing or not, gathered groups of men to talk over their experiences abroad and their prospects and plans. In extent and variety of activity the Hudson Hut transcended all others in America.

An idea of the activities centering in the Hudson Hut and the adjacent buildings may be gained by the statistics of a single month. In April, 1919, 276,100 men were served; 176,000 pieces of writing material were used; 52,834 men attended 183 different social, religious and educational gatherings; an average of 4,500 daily were served in the cafeteria and canteen. During the year beginning November 1, 1918, about 3,850,000 men used the Hudson Hut and adjacent buildings. Here as in St. Louis, the success of the work owed much to the cooperation of women volunteers. During the first year of its operation, a total of about 500 women served in the Hoboken huts, coming from towns within the district roughly bounded by Morristown on the west and Montclair on the north, as well as from Jersey City, Newark, and Hoboken itself. All kinds of service were given by these loyal volunteers; sweeping, dusting, scrubbing, washing tables, making sandwiches, cutting pies and cake, serving coffee and food, playing hostess, and talking with the men in uniform.

A similar work, though of less magnitude, was carried on simultaneously at Newport News. During the first year of the war; service for troops embarking there was rendered by the local Associations and by the staffs of the local camps. Early in 1919 a large hut, costing approximately \$50,000, was erected on the casino grounds of the Old Dominion Line in order to care for the needs of returning soldiers. This hut was in operation until September 15, 1919, when the port ceased to be used as a debarkation center. During the time the hut was open more than 500,000 men paid over a million and a half visits to it and were served in its various departments.

The value of the work at embarkation and debarkation ports is attested by many letters of appreciation from officers of the Army and Navy. Captain W. W. Phelps, Commander of the Leviathan, writing of the work at Hoboken, said:

Newport
News

Appreciation

"It is this sort of service rendered by the Young Men's Christian Association to the Navy that I like best to dwell upon. . . .

"No one needs nowadays to eulogize the Y in its service to men in material ways. Its material achievements are too well known and understood. Its greatest value to the Navy and Marine Corps and, I am sure, to the Army also, has been in enhancing morale and improving thereby discipline and hardening will to victory. From this one standpoint alone, every cent of money that has been invested in the Y M C A and in other war welfare agencies (for we must deeply appreciate the same excellent work done by all the others) has been as sure a contribution to victory as an investment in Liberty Bonds. Surer I must say because Liberty Bonds provide the material things. The Y helped to provide the spiritual punch, so much harder to gain and so much more valuable when once gained; for did not Napoleon say that in war the moral stands to the material as three to one?"

Reception of
Returning Troops

About September 1, 1918, two Y M C A secretaries of the Ocean Transport Service, under the direction of the Port Chaplain at Hoboken, undertook the work of greeting and welcoming soldiers returning home from overseas. It consisted principally of assisting the sick and wounded in such ways as helping disabled men down the transport gang-planks to the pier and thence to the hospital tenders; sending telegrams, prepaid, to relatives of sick and wounded; collecting letters for mailing; supplying soldiers with writing material, tobacco and chocolate bars; reading to the blind and informing them of current events; and carrying baggage of patients between transport, hospital tender, and the hospitals. Around December 1, 1918, this work was reorganized and expanded. The American Red Cross undertook the work for the sick and wounded soldiers, and the Y C M A devoted itself to serving returning divisions.

Reception work was divided into four departments: Sick Bay, Pier, Ferry and Train, and Public Service. The work in the Sick Bay was under the supervision of the Red Cross, by whose consent one secretary was permitted to distribute writing materials, write letters, post cards, and telegrams, serve canteen supplies, and comfort in any possible way the sick and wounded. On the pier, post cards and chewing gum were distributed to all soldiers, on ferry boats candy, and on trains cigarets and matches. All services and supplies were furnished to the soldiers entirely free of cost. The Public Service Department was organized for the purpose of bringing soldiers and relatives into touch with each other, either by personal inter-

view or by written communication. People came from all parts of the country to Hoboken, anxious to meet returning soldiers whom they were expecting. The greatest proportion of the work consisted of carrying written messages to men aboard the boats or on the piers. Personal interviews between relatives and men were discouraged by the military authorities. They interfered with the expeditious movement of troops, and the prescribed passes were given only in rare instances. The number of messages carried by the Public Service Department numbered anywhere from two to thirty for a single ship. During the eleven months of its operation, this Department met 651 ships carrying 1,222,360 men. It distributed 2,000,000 post cards, 1,109,430 packages of cigarets, 1,174,000 packages of chewing gum, 1,076,000 bars of chocolate, besides thousands of packets of matches, pencils, and miscellaneous articles.

OCEAN TRANSPORT SERVICE

The full round of Association service to men in transit was completed on March 4, 1918, by the inauguration of Y M C A work on board transports. Permission for the work was granted directly by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy.

The mental strain of the soldier on embarking for overseas can be better imagined than described. Fast ships were necessarily slowed up to keep pace with the slowest in the convoy, and time hung heavy on the hands of men with not much to do but think. To make matters worse, their movements were sometimes limited to the particular part of the ship to which they were assigned. While the cessation of hostilities eliminated the submarine danger and permitted more freedom aboard ship, the return voyage was made under conditions as crowded and uncomfortable as the trip to Europe.

Relieving
Discomforts of
Ocean Travel

Welfare work under these conditions was a real boon. With his moving pictures, boxing gloves, entertainments, phonographs, writing paper and books, with his case of lemons and sour pickles for curing seasickness, the ocean transport secretary was often able to help the men forget in some measure the dangers and discomforts they were experiencing, to relieve the suffering of those not sufficiently ill to require medical treatment, and, by his general knowledge of the social needs of men under these conditions and constant watchfulness in ministering to them, to create an atmosphere in which the native cheerfulness of the American soldier could assert itself.

On the outward journey service began at the docks. Transportation secretaries went down the lines of men as they were waiting on the piers and distributed to each two cards, bearing the message, "I have arrived safely overseas." Having been signed and addressed by the men, these were collected, held until advice was received that the transport had arrived safely on the other side, and then mailed, free of postage. By this method friends and relatives received within a few hours information which through the ordinary channels would not have reached them for two to three weeks.

The program of activities on board ship covered the entire range of Association features. Movies were given daily for both officers and men. Soldier and sailor talent was sought out and performances staged on deck and in the saloons. Boxing and wrestling matches, comedy sports such as blindfold boxing, and rough-and-tumble games were organized whenever the weather permitted. These events were the life of the trip. While hardy soldiers and seasoned sailors mixed in exciting bouts, and gangs of negro stevedores wrestled about the deck, great throngs of men crowded around, or perched themselves like birds on the yards and stays, and forgot their anxieties and troubles in the excitement and hilarity of the moment. During the combat period certain features of entertainment were prohibited. Bands were not allowed to play in the submarine zone and as all lights visible from the water were banned, motion picture shows on the open deck were prohibited.

A liberal supply of necessary articles was placed at the disposal of the transport secretary. The regular equipment of reading and writing materials and ordinary games was supplemented by an average complement of 2,000 books supplied by the American Library Association. On arrival overseas these books were turned over to the Association for service in France and England. On the east bound trip no canteen articles were supplied. The secretary had at his disposal, however, a quantity of acidulous fruits and sour pickles, for use in cases of seasickness.

After the Armistice it was immediately felt that it was necessary to make some adjustments both as to the equipment placed on board ship and the type of program provided. With the passing of war-time restrictions, movies and vaudeville sketches were given on deck and the Army and Navy bands gave daily concerts. Knowing that the troops boarding transports for the homeland would be eager for newspapers from their home towns and for familiar magazines not

procurable abroad, these articles were furnished in large quantities. Pamphlets on farming, citizenship and other vital subjects, and illustrated lectures on such subjects as "Your Next Job and Where to Get It," "Farming as an Occupation," and "Why Go to College," were provided. Conditions were now such that creature comforts could also be supplied on transports. The men who had been for months overseas, where American delicacies were at a premium, craved candy, gum, and fruit, and a supply of these articles was added to the regular equipment. Practically all these supplies were placed aboard before the transport left America, and distributed free of charge to the men on the return voyage.

Until the signing of the Armistice, the Y M C A was the only organization which had received authority from the Government to place its representatives on troop ships. Shortly after that event the privilege was extended to the Red Cross, Knights of Columbus, and Jewish Welfare Board. Larger vessels were authorized to carry two representatives of the Y M C A and of the Red Cross and one of the Knights of Columbus and of the Jewish Welfare Board. The result was not entirely satisfactory. The functions of the organizations were identical, and an inevitable duplication of effort occurred. The Navy was also reluctant to spare the limited cabin space on transports, as it was hard pressed to get officers and men home. In order to eliminate difficulties and to conserve space, permission for all welfare societies to work on transports was withdrawn in June, 1919. From that time on the work was conducted by the Morale Division of the Army and Navy. The welfare societies continued to cooperate, however, by furnishing equipment, and gift boxes containing candy, cigarets, tobacco, and toilet articles were prepared and distributed in large numbers jointly by the Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board and Y M C A, the latter paying 74.9 per cent of the cost, amounting to \$228,000.

Cooperation by
Other
Organizations

In undertaking the larger work of service to troops on transports, the Transportation Bureau did not overlook the thousands of men who made up the crews of our cargo fleet. It was impracticable to put a secretary on each of those smaller vessels, but equipment similar to that used aboard transports was placed at their disposal. One thousand and eighty-one such ships were supplied with as many equipments, at a cost of \$81,075.

Cargo
Boats

A work similar in all respects to the transport work on the Atlantic was performed in the army transports carrying the Siberian Ex-

Siberian
Expeditionary
Forces

peditionary Forces from San Francisco to Siberia and replacements to the Pacific possessions. Because of the length of the journey, an extra complement of supplies was provided. For example, motion picture films for sixteen full two hour performances were necessary on the Pacific, while half that number sufficed on the Atlantic transports. Although the number of troops crossing the Pacific was not large, the character and quality of the service rendered to them was of the first order.

Extent of
Transport Service

As in troop train work, the personality of the secretary was the first qualification for service on board ship. For the period of the voyage the transport secretary was the only representative of the Y with whom the men came in contact. The Transportation Bureau, therefore, exercised the greatest care in the selection of the men whom it placed aboard boats, and when, under the competing demands of the many fields and types of service, it was temporarily impossible to get men of the right quality, ships were allowed to go without secretaries rather than risk the work in the hands of untested men.

In all, 717 Y M C A secretaries made round trips on transports. To commercial liners carrying troops from America to France and England were assigned two secretaries, who on arrival overseas remained to work with the Association forces there. Seven hundred and ninety-five men served in that capacity. Commercial liners sailing from foreign ports for America were supplied with secretaries by the overseas organization. In all, 1,512 men, not including those assigned by the overseas organization, made 1,102 one way or round trips as transport secretaries, serving 3,173,200 men. The equipment for this service cost \$1,057,158, and included, among other things, 20,085,442 cigarets, 1,009,100 bars of chocolates, 25,333,880 pieces of stationery for letters.

Continuation with
Merchant
Marine

When demobilization was completed and the necessity for transport work with the Army thereby ceased to exist, the Y M C A continued its services for the benefit of the men of the Merchant Marine. As a result of wartime experiences this work has been coordinated with the regular work for railroad men, under the Transportation Department of the International Committee.

CHAPTER XXII

CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS

The camps and cantonments in which the recruit found himself upon completion of the journey from home were, in effect, cities with modified urban needs and problems. Housing, sanitation, transportation, and similar physical fundamentals were no more necessary than facilities for healthy social intercourse. Even if the emphasis given by their military character were absent, the needs would have been present in such concentration of men for any purpose. There are only about 180 cities in the United States with population equal to or greater than the average cantonment. It would be hard to imagine such a city as Bethlehem, Pa., Charleston, S. C., or Lincoln, Nebr., without a single church, theater, club, ice cream parlor, billiard room, or other public place where men could gather in their leisure hours. Every man in the Army, from however small a village he came, had lived within range of some at least of such social centers. The fundamental service of the welfare organizations was to provide their equivalents in the camps.

The Government was, of course, fully alive to the needs, and simultaneously with its physical preparations took steps in this direction. The Commission on Training Camp Activities operated directly the post exchanges which took the place of the general store, instituted the Liberty Theaters and coordinated the activities of volunteer organizations. Public spirited citizens, churches, and clubs in the vicinity of each camp volunteered services. The welfare organizations provided the buildings which served as church, club, theater, and school, and were responsible for the activities carried on in them. The Y M C A threw itself wholeheartedly into this undertaking, and from the day the men reported in the camps until the last man was entrained for home, its huts and tents were open and busy.

Since the program was similar from camp to camp, the story of one is the story of all. Detailed records of particular camps are precluded by limitation of space, not by failure to recognize their merit and importance. These, in several instances, have been signalized by special publications which the interested reader may consult.

FIRST PERIOD OF TRAINING, SEPTEMBER, 1917, TO APRIL, 1918

The soldier had but a little way to go from his barrack to the long, low building, distinguished usually by a coat of paint from the bare, weather-stained buildings of the camp, where the Red Triangle sign extended its welcome. Some little extra care or touch of beauty—a bed of flowers, walks edged with whitewashed stones, or the like—added neatness and attractiveness to the exterior. Passing within he found a large room filled usually with men evidently very much at their ease. The appearance of the interior depended upon the initiative of the secretarial staff and the cooperation of the soldiers. Most huts had a simple and pleasing color-scheme, supplemented by flags, posters and pictures on the walls. Interested citizens in some camp communities raised funds to improve the interior of the huts, the objective being always cosiness and comfort. Often the soldiers would add features with their own labor—an extra fireplace or some such touch that added to the homelike character of the place.

Through the haze of tobacco smoke came the sound of a piano, where perhaps a real musician might be playing Beethoven or Chopin, or with equal probability some one who called his playing “banging the box” would be pounding out the latest jazz success from Broadway. Perhaps a group would be lustily singing “The Long, Long Trail,” or “Pull Your Shade Down, Mary Ann.” Not always harmonizing, a phonograph in another corner would be grinding out records without intermission. Around the fireplace a group might be vociferously discussing the prospects of favorite teams in the professional baseball leagues or the last game in an inter-battalion series. By the big map of France on the wall, a soldier, newspaper in hand, would be locating the latest fluctuation of the battle-line in France, or sticking a flagged pin into the dot that represented his home on the map of the United States. Meanwhile, oblivious to the noise, men were writing letters at the tables, others reading the books and magazines liberally provided by the American Library Association and others intent upon the next move on a checker board.

At the service counter a secretary was always busy. He gave out writing materials on request, sold stamps, money orders, or small articles for personal use, answered questions and kept an eye out for the man whose face or manner showed that he had some trouble on his mind. Every secretary, whatever his special tasks, took his turn at the counter, for there were the most frequent opportunities for

The
HutsInterior
Scenes

the personal contacts that so often led to special personal service. At another counter was the wet canteen, where hot or cold drinks were sold with sandwiches and other light refreshments. After the services of women were introduced, a woman would usually be in charge here, and a group would always be found before her hoping for a bit of talk between customers. In a somewhat secluded corner a sign announced that buttons were sewn on and mending done, and here a motherly woman sat with a chair near by where a soldier might sit and chat while some little service was being performed. It was not unknown for a man to pull a button off his tunic in order to have an excuse to occupy that chair.

From another room came the click of billiard and pool balls, where men were playing at several tables. A closed door bore the sign "Quiet Room" and here a man could find a comfortable chair, a book, and a chance to sit quietly and think or read over his letters from home. A stage, too, and a moving picture booth promised entertainment to come. Altogether there was wide variety for the satisfaction of individual tastes and every man was free to follow his inclinations without intrusive supervision. On the other hand, there were usually one or two secretaries on "floor duty" whose job was to respond to the openings for talk or service which men might offer or seem to invite.

Eventually all camps and cantonments had buildings presenting the features described. In the cantonments they were ready when the first drafted men arrived. In the National Guard camps, such features as were possible in tents were to be found. The tents were, of course, smaller and their nature did not permit so great variety nor such comfort as the huts. There was more variation from type in the huts which replaced these tents, because many were hastily erected on plans made locally instead of upon the carefully studied plans of the Hut Construction Bureau. Some of these variations were distinctly attractive and some furnished features unique in the huts where they were found.

In addition to the social comforts, each hut was equipped to serve in innumerable little ways. Letters deposited at the desk were mailed at regular intervals by a secretary. Parcel post service was also universal. In the initial days at camp this was of special importance to National Army troops. The draft men reported to camp in civilian clothes, many of them with suitcases and other non-military articles which subsequently had to be returned to their homes. In order to

The
Quiet Room

Minor Services:
Mail

handle the situation the Y M C A furnished paper and twine for wrapping, weighed the packages, sold the stamps, very often had to write the addresses, and afterwards loaded them on trucks and took them to the nearest post office. The packages mailed at the Y M C A contained an interesting variety of articles including civilian clothes, boxes, bags, grips, souvenirs, jewelry, candy, and similar articles which the boys sent to their girl friends and the home folks. A large amount of incoming mail was also received and distributed to the soldiers who had instructed their friends and relatives to address them in care of the Y M C A unit which they ordinarily patronized.

Banking

Banking service proved of large importance, especially in the more isolated camps. Certain classes of negotiable securities were cashed for officers and men. Although cashing of personal checks was not part of the regular business, many men known personally to the secretaries were accommodated in this manner. In some camps the plan was adopted of accepting checks and sending them to the bank on which they were drawn for collection. This proved cumbersome and involved, and eventually was almost entirely abandoned. The secretaries were personally responsible for the personal checks they accepted. The volume of business was comparatively small and there were surprisingly few attempts at fraud. Few experiences in history ever gave men more reason for faith in their fellows than the almost universal honesty of the service men, but because of the presence of a few dishonest men among them, it was necessary to adopt protective measures. Express money orders were sold to soldiers wishing to transmit funds. At one time money was received on deposit for men who wished it. These operations necessitated the handling of considerable cash, and caused inexperienced secretaries the greatest amount of worry. A single evening's business sometimes amounted to thousands of dollars. Regular trips to town were made in banking hours, so that as little money as possible was kept in the safe in the building. The sums of money handled in all Y M C A transactions ran into millions in each of these big camps. Each camp was allowed a definite sum of money as working capital, based upon a specific need, and each building was apportioned a part of the camp's fund as a working capital. The building secretary of each hut was under bond for financial responsibility of the building.

Telegraph and Telephone

An enormous telegraph business was done in the huts. Messengers from the telegraph company made regular trips or responded to special calls. The rate was ascertained by telephone and money for

the message was left at the Y M C A desk to be turned over to the messenger. This service rose to a peak when a division was about to leave camp, literally thousands of messages going to friends and relatives of the departing soldiers. Telephones—both local and long distance connections—were also features of the huts. They were used to the limit at all times, and more than once in every building the service had to be suspended temporarily until some agent of the company could be secured to empty the money boxes that were too full to hold another dime. There was always a rush for telephones when a division was about to leave camp. A line was formed and men sometimes waited for hours, some sitting up most of the night for a last word with the “folks.” The central office of a big camp would sometimes put in as many as 30,000 telephone calls in a day when a division was leaving.

A great need was filled by a notary public service, provided free at the administration building and liberally used by officers and men. Affidavits and attestations for business papers from home and all sorts of legal transactions were constantly being required from soldiers. The Y M C A man who received an appointment as notary would sometimes stamp as many as 50 papers a day, each of prime importance to the soldier. In some camps an attorney service was also furnished. One of the secretaries who was a lawyer established himself at headquarters and kept his time free for giving legal advice and executing legal documents, such as wills and powers of attorney. In a few cases, on request, the Y M C A accepted for sale personal property, such as band instruments, automobiles, and typewriters, the proceeds of which were turned over to the owners. This was rather a troublesome proposition, but enabled a number of men to dispose of valuable property which they could neither take with them nor place in storage.

Legal
Services

Many of the boys left little articles at the Y M C A to be given to any one who wanted them. Hundreds of suits of civilian clothes left by soldiers were turned over to the Salvation Army by the Y M C A in the early months of the war. These little business services varied in number and volume from camp to camp. Inconspicuous as they were, they will be remembered by some of the soldiers as the greatest benefit conferred upon them by any welfare organization during the war. They served in a way to round out the activities of the hut and to give a civilian touch to a life that was already burdened with military monotony.

There was hardly a soldier at any one of these 32 camps and cantonments, no matter how short his stay, who at some time or other did not have occasion to avail himself of the conveniences of the huts. Some representative figures will show the extent to which they were used. In Camp Gordon, with thirteen huts and a population of 30,000 troops, the attendance during one month, February, 1918, was over 700,000, almost the entire population of the camp every single day. During that time 692,000 letters were written, \$58,780 worth of money orders were sold, and 1,850 books were circulated, besides a much larger number of magazines and papers. Camp Logan, with a population of 32,000 National Guardsmen and only seven buildings, had an attendance of about 300,000 men. Here 243,000 letters were written, \$8,432 worth of stamps and \$30,813 worth of money orders were sold, 9,500 pieces of writing material were given out, and 4,482 books were loaned. Camp Jackson, with a population of 23,000 men and eleven Y huts, had an attendance of 214,000 men during the same period; 161,000 letters were written, \$16,650 worth of money orders were sold, and 2,484 books were loaned. These figures are typical of the work from month to month and demonstrate the large part the Y hut played in the daily life of soldiers in camp and cantonments.¹

In the arrangement of programs the chief consideration was the military routine, which determined not only when and how long the soldiers should be at leisure but their mental and physical condition. From six o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon the soldiers' time was entirely occupied with drills, instruction, and the necessary fatigue duties. By military orders, the huts were usually closed all or most of the morning. Opening hours varied from camp to camp, however. A few huts were open to soldiers at 8.30 a.m., some at 10 a.m., and others at noon. The morning hours were utilized by the building staff in preparing for the day's activities. The buildings had to be "policed," equipment put in order and supplies unpacked and arranged for afternoon and evening sessions; conferences held for planning future activities, correspondence relative to speakers, entertainers, and the like; bulletins posted and announcements circulated; patients in hospital and prisoners in guard house visited; and business transacted with the commander or other officers relative to the work. Until four o'clock each day except Sunday, the general club features of the hut were the only features offered.

¹ See Association Year Book, New York, 1919, pp. 336-349.

From that hour until retreat—the evening parade and roll call, at 5.45 p.m.—the soldier was free from military duty, although not allowed to leave the reservation. Retreat was followed immediately by evening mess, after which he was free until called to quarters at 9.30 p.m. One afternoon a week and the hours from Saturday noon until Sunday night were also free from drill. On these occasions men of good standing were granted passes to visit neighboring towns. Over-night passes were the exception and were granted only in limited number. Day after day, week after week, month after month, this routine continued, broken only by overnight hikes, a few days spent at some detached rifle range, or a ten-day furlough.

The soldiers' leisure hours constituted the service day of the Young Men's Christian Association. Programs of course differed from camp to camp and from hut to hut, as well as at different periods. But all contained religious, educational, athletic, entertainment and social features of the types described in previous chapters. The following is a typical schedule for one building for one week:

The Standard
Program

Monday

6.00 p.m.—Professional Entertainment (Alternate: Quiet Night
or "Write a Letter Home" Night)
Six French Classes
One Automobile Class
Two German Classes

Tuesday

6.00 p.m.—Bible Class
6.00 p.m.—Sing
6.45 p.m.—Bayonet Contest
7.30 p.m.—Movies
Two English Classes
Three French Classes
Two German Classes
Ten Bible Classes
6.30 p.m.—Basketball (Auditorium)

Wednesday

6.00 p.m.—Military Movies
6.00 p.m.—Bible Classes
6.30 p.m.—Basketball (Auditorium)
6.45 p.m.—Illustrated Lecture
7.30 p.m.—Movies
Two French Classes—One Class in Journalism

Thursday

6.00 p.m.—Military Movies
 6.30 p.m.—Basketball (Auditorium)
 6.45 p.m.—Band Concert
 7.30 p.m.—Religious Discussion Meeting
 Five French Classes—One Normal Class

Friday

4.00 p.m.—Committee of Ladies to mend clothing
 6.45 p.m.—Movies—Sing-Song between reels (mass singing)
 Five French Classes—Two German Classes—Two English
 Classes

Saturday

6.30 p.m.—Social Night—Stunt Night
 Three French Classes—One Educational Club

Sunday

7.00 a.m.—Roman Catholic Mass
 8.00 a.m.—Holy Communion
 9.30 a.m.—Regimental Service
 10.00 a.m.—Bible Class, or Sunday School
 3.30 p.m.—Concert
 6.30 p.m.—Service

Staff
Activities

In addition to the items appearing on the foregoing schedule, there were setting up exercises and a morning conference each day for the staff, and every evening a Fireside Goodnight Prayer Meeting was held. Some of the Bible classes, educational classes, and practical talks were conducted in barracks.

In addition to the ordinary hut schedules, events of interest to the whole camp occurred nightly in the centrally located auditorium.

A specimen program of movies was the following announced in *Trench and Camp* at Camp Gordon:

Movies at the Y Huts for the Week

Mixed Programs of Comedy, Drama and News Weekly

Monday	Building	156
Tuesday	"	153
Wednesday	"	158
Thursday	"	152
Friday	"	154
Saturday	"	150

Marguerite Clark in "The Amazons"

Monday	Building	151
Tuesday	"	155
Wednesday	"	149
Thursday	"	156
Friday	"	153
Saturday	"	158

Tom Mix in "Six Shooter Andy"

Monday	Building	152
Tuesday	"	154
Wednesday	"	150
Thursday	"	151
Friday	"	155
Saturday	"	149

Mary Pickford in "Stella Maris"

Monday	Building	161
Tuesday	"	160
Wednesday	"	157
Thursday	"	162
Friday	"	164

Douglas Fairbanks in "Modern Musketeer"

Monday	Building	157
Tuesday	"	162
Wednesday	"	164
Thursday	"	161
Friday	"	160

The athletic program was carried on chiefly out of doors. Play ^{Athletics} periods of fifteen minutes to half an hour were allowed by the military authorities in some camps during drill periods. In all camps the time between afternoon drill and retreat was used to organize informal games, to coach company, battery, troop or regimental teams, and to encourage in every possible way wide participation in games and sports. Each camp had its athletic field or fields, while the majority of huts had in connection with them volley-ball courts and quoit alleys which were extensively used during good weather.

That the afternoon and evening schedule of hut diversions, coupled with the extensive opportunities to engage in games and sports, offered ample recreational facilities to any soldier who was inclined to avail himself of them, is shown by the fact that the entire population of the camps and cantonments (approximately 1,200,000 men) was equaled by the attendance at the huts every

three or four days,¹ by the attendance at entertainments every nineteen days, by the attendance at religious meetings and educational lectures every 25 days, while spectators and participants in all athletic games equaled the camp population every eighteen days.

Special
Services

The activities described above were all a part of the established Association service. They constituted the military routine, so to speak, of the camp Associations. In addition to these activities, however, the Y M C A in each camp gave special services whenever opportunity offered. Special programs on Christmas, Easter, Memorial Day, the Fourth of July, Bastille Day in honor of France, Britain Day, and other special occasions, in which the whole camp participated, were common. Under the leadership of the Religious Work Department, Mother's Day was featured. The men were urged to write home, and favors in the form of cards and flowers were distributed.

Among the most common of the special activities were services rendered to troops on marches of more than a day's duration. Writing material, reading matter, and athletic supplies were taken along in trucks, and tents for Y service were usually set up in the over-night camps. Troops occasionally hiked from one camp to another. When the 161st Artillery, for instance, hiked from Camp Grant, Ill., to Camp Robinson, Wis., a journey of 200 miles consuming two weeks, three Y secretaries accompanied them and set up a Y tent every night. At each camp troops made overnight hikes to rifle ranges and maneuver grounds. The practice of accompanying troops on the march was universally adopted.

Service to
Officers

At first no special accommodation was offered to commissioned officers other than that of reserving certain seats at entertainments, movies, and other meetings in the huts. The conditions of camp life soon made evident the need of a social center for officers. In order to meet this need the Association provided officers' clubs in each of the camps. Quarters for the clubs were secured sometimes by building additions to the standard huts used by the men, at other times by utilizing a portion of the administration building, and occasionally by building a separate hut. These huts were equipped with comfortable furniture, attractively decorated, furnished with current periodicals and a good selection of pictures, and otherwise made as attractive and comfortable as possible.

¹ See Plate VIII facing p. 332; and Association Year Books, 1918, pp. 317-327; 1919, pp. 336-349; 1920, p. 109.

SECOND PERIOD OF TRAINING, APRIL TO NOVEMBER, 1918

The changes in the military arrangements instituted with the beginning of the great troop movements in the spring of 1918, wrought some important changes to the welfare program in the camps.¹ The intensive character of the training had the effect of reducing the soldier's leisure time, while the shortness of his stay prevented personal acquaintance with welfare workers and restricted such activities as educational classes, Bible classes, and entertainment circuits of soldier talent which required organization for a considerable period of time. In those cantonments used as embarkation centers, the welfare work took on the same characteristics as that in the permanent embarkation camps.²

During this period, the Association rapidly increased its equipment and staffs. In the camps the number of huts was increased from 159 to 171 and in the cantonments from 161 to 228. In Camp Lee, with a population of 80,000 men, 27 huts were put into operation. The huts were universally used to their utmost capacity. There was no longer anything new or strange about them to the recruits. The word had gone through the country that the Association huts in the camps were there to serve. They had become a part of the camp tradition, and the men now regarded their existence as their natural right. The flow of troops from camp naturally increased all hut activities.³ Men departing and men arriving crowded the huts to write farewells and greetings. The turnover of books and magazines increased in due proportion. The demand for parcel post, money orders, telephones, telegraph, and innumerable other services became stupendous. The activities in the divisional camps were intensified but not changed in character. In the replacement camps the work was adjusted to meet the new conditions.

When a divisional camp was broken up and converted into a ^{Replacement Camps} replacement camp, there was inevitably a slump in morale. At each center a complement of trained men from the old units was kept in camp to form a training nucleus for the raw recruits. These men who were forced to remain behind when their comrades left for overseas became discontented and even apathetic. Intensive training under camp conditions is tedious at its best and became doubly

¹ Consult Chapter XII, pp. 209-210.

² Consult Chapter XXIII, pp. 407-408.

³ See Association Year Book, New York, 1919, pp. 336-349.

so when the prospect of speedy release through overseas service was eliminated.

Adjusting
Conditions

In the Y M C A the departments of entertainment, recreation, and education especially had to be adjusted to meet the situation. As no large body of troops was a permanent fixture in camp and as the units were repeatedly built up for a month and then skeletonized, it was impossible to run any organized entertainment circuit of soldier talent or to promote company or regimental competition. The bulk of the entertainment, necessarily secured from outside the camp, naturally became more professional in character, and, while excellent in itself and enthusiastically received, did not have the intimate personal touch of the entertainment furnished by the men themselves. When depot brigades became permanently organized, however, something of the old camp spirit of self-entertainment was revived. With the cooperation of the military authorities, men having entertainment talent were enlisted and circulated through camp. Regimental and brigade nights became permanent features in the entertainment program, and various military organizations vied with each other in efforts to produce the best shows.

Transient
Activities
and Cordial
Cooperation

One of the most potent means of dispelling gloom was through an extensive recreational program. Here again the temporary nature of the military organizations prevented a long series of inter-organization contests. The emphasis was laid, therefore, on informal games and play. Athletic councils similar to those established in combat divisions were eventually formed under the leadership of a commissioned officer. So hearty and complete was the cooperation of all welfare societies and army officers in working out the plan of athletics that it is impossible to distinguish where the work of one began and the other left off. It was a case of the entire welfare and morale division of the camp meeting a great emergency. Through this united effort, the play spirit began to take hold. Brief periods of play and athletics were interspersed with drill periods, and when the depot brigades became more stabilized, inter-company and inter-battalion leagues were formed, which arranged weekly track meets. Men who were not skilful enough to play real games of baseball were eager to engage in playground ball. While the star athletes were going through their paces, the others were competing in team races, relay races, tugs-of-war, and a thousand and one other mass and comedy events. In some of the camps it was estimated that at least 40 per cent of the enlisted men played baseball and other major games regularly,

and that 85 per cent were engaged daily in minor games in play periods. Improved moral and physical development and the winning to the play idea of thousands who had never before known how to play, were some of the results of the athletic program in depot brigades.

Reports from the camps on this work are illuminating. At Camp Lee, for example, with a population varying from 60,000 to 80,000, the number of participants in athletics grew from 48,400 in April to 162,300 in July, and the number of spectators from 44,100 to 133,300; at Camp Upton, with a population of from 50,000 to 60,000, the number of participants in athletics in April, 1918, was 41,000 and the number of spectators 11,000. In June of the same year the number of participants was 85,200 and spectators 9,000. At Camp Funston, which was a divisional training center, the same trend is observed. Here the number of participants increased from 25,000 in April to 85,800 in August, and spectators from 46,100 to 131,300.

The character and constituency of the replacement camps changed so frequently that class work in units other than the development battalions was practically impossible. The efforts of the Educational Department, therefore, as far as general camp work was concerned, were turned to educational lectures. Large numbers of secretaries, many of whom had been missionaries in foreign lands, volunteered to carry on the work. Many illustrated lectures were provided. The subjects selected dealt especially with the needs of the soldiers at that time. These men were about to proceed to France at a time when the Germans were still hammering at the gateways of Paris and when it was still uncertain whether the Allies would be able to hold until American aid reached them. Lectures were selected, therefore, whose themes presented to the soldier a clear vision of the real underlying nature and strength of the Allied cause, of his place and part in the great struggle, of the fundamentally undivided backing of his fellow citizens, of the vital need for his specific service, and of his individual responsibility in the crisis at hand. During this period an average of 1,353 lectures a month were given to audiences averaging 371 men each. During the eight months beginning April, 1918, 4,024,000 men attended 10,827 lectures given in the 32 camps and cantonments.

One of the outstanding features of this period was the formation of the Development Battalions. Men assigned to those were classified

Educational
Lectures

Development
Battalions

according to their disabilities, those who could not run being placed in one class, those weak in arms or bodies in another, those classed as illiterates in still another. Each section was then given a course of training suited to its peculiar needs. The Physical and Educational Departments of the Y M C A rendered special service to the military authorities in training these units. A series of corrective games and exercises for the physically unfit was worked out by Y M C A athletic secretaries and Development Battalion commanders. Illiterates were taught mass games and exercises from which they derived both benefit and pleasure. Cage ball, push ball, mass soccer, and medicine ball appealed to foreign-born men. Games were played almost every evening, while sidelines were packed with fans, advising, pleading, rooting, and razzing in twenty different tongues.

Work during
the Influenza
Epidemic

Conditions prevailing in the camps during the influenza epidemic again brought to the Association opportunity for special service. Military measures taken with a view to preventing the spread of the disease made welfare work both more needful and more difficult. Strict quarantine was enforced in all the camps, and strict sanitary regulations were prescribed. Cots were separated by screens, and gauze masks were worn about camp. The quarantine closed the Association huts and isolated the men in their barracks. There was nothing left for them to do except perform their duties and extract such comfort as they could from associating with their pals in their quarters. This comfort was hard to accept when a barrack had sent from a dozen to fifty or more boys to the hospital and when collections were being made daily to buy flowers for dead comrades. In those chilly, gloomy autumn days the quarantine changed the camps into great prisons full of sick and dying soldiers.²

High morale is just as necessary in fighting sickness as in fighting an army. Despondency and worry are potent allies of disease. Many a man recovered, after being given up by the physicians, simply because of his will to live. The Y M C A bent every effort to stimulate morale during this crisis. The secretaries made their rounds of the barracks day by day. They distributed writing material, sold stamps and money orders, carried messages, sent telegrams, furnished books and magazines. They were walking delegates from the outside world, a sort of man from home. The boys eagerly gathered around them to hear and be heard. The secretary who could

¹ Consult Chapter XX, p. 351.

² Consult Chapter XII, p. 206.

leave such a group laughing and calling bantering remarks to him had brightened the day for the whole barrack and spoiled the "flu's" chances for further victims there on account of depression. The irrepressible optimism of the American youth was not long in asserting itself after the first few days of shock. Barracks began to liven up, singing and music were heard, and boxing bouts went on inside. Minstrels and vaudeville shows were put on with the company as the audience, outsiders contenting themselves by looking through the windows. The Y men were besieged with requests to undertake errands. They were commissioned by barrack stage directors to get new songs, wigs, costumes, burnt cork, grease paints, and all sorts of stage properties. Permits for occasional meetings in barracks gave opportunity to vary the soldier talent by sing-songs, lectures, religious services.

While buildings were closed for entertainments, they were permitted to remain open during certain hours of the day for the sale of stamps and money orders, the distribution of writing materials and books, and other counter activities. In some camps platforms were built alongside the huts, and men were permitted to write letters there. Electric lights enabled them to read at night, and meetings were held there on Sundays and weekday evenings. While seriously interrupted, schedules of educational classes and Bible classes in barracks were maintained as far as possible.

The Y M C A did not confine itself to ministering to the quarantined men. For the sick, the Association secretaries did everything within their power. They ran errands, distributed reading matter and writing material, and wrote letters. The Y M C A offered its services to the medical authorities and the Red Cross in all of the camps, and when the shortage of nurses and attendants became a serious menace, those who were qualified for such service rendered their assistance. In some of the camps Y huts were used as hospitals, each one accommodating about 200 beds. On account of the lack of hospital space men were often returned to their barracks while they were yet barely convalescent. At some of the camps these near-convalescents were segregated in Y M C A huts. When conditions warranted, victrola concerts and other forms of amusement were furnished by the Y M C A to the convalescents. A large service was also rendered by supplementing the diet of convalescents with fruits, milk, and other delicacies.

Relatives of stricken soldiers flocked to the camps in large numbers. When the Y W C A Hostess Houses were filled to overflowing,

Diversified
Welfare
Service

additional accommodations were offered in the Association huts. An information service was instituted, which recorded the names of men who had been sent to the hospital from each army unit served by the huts, thus enabling relatives to locate sick men without interrupting the military authorities. The saddest of all work which the Association secretaries were called upon to do was ministering last rites to the dead and comforting bereaved relatives. Many a mother arrived too late to see her boy, and it became the duty of the secretary to break the news to her. Words cannot describe the scenes of deepest pathos and mourning which occurred in the Y huts.

The death of 35 secretaries from influenza is sufficient testimony to the faithful service rendered during these three months. When the epidemic was finally checked, the Armistice had already been signed, and when the quarantine was raised, the American camps and cantonments entered on a new phase of activity.

THE PERIOD OF DEMOBILIZATION

"The slump" is the term universally applied to the period immediately following the signing of the Armistice. There were jollifications and parades, but when "the tumult and the shouting" died the slump came. "The war is over," was the common talk. Everybody wanted to go home, and in the meantime the soldiers thought that they could do as they pleased. A group of colored soldiers at Camp Funston started to turn in their mess-kits and other equipment as soon as they heard the news. Thousands of others wanted to, but did not go so far. It soon became evident to the welfare agencies that instead of relaxation, redoubled efforts must be made to keep the men interested and livened until the necessarily long period of demobilization was ended.

The entire Y M C A program underwent a change. Morale was still the keynote of its purpose, not the military morale which is the will to fight and die if necessary, but civilian morale which is the will to live and fight for a fuller life, a better community, and a better country. The change of motive produced a change of emphasis in the activities of the fourfold program.

In connection with the religious work, efforts were made to enlist men for religious, social, and welfare work and other Christian callings. Four-minute gospel talks were given in some camps either before or after motion picture programs. Stereopticon lectures on Biblical, missionary, and social themes were popular. Upon discharge

the men were given cards of introduction to local Y M C A secretaries in order to complete the circle of service.

Vocational training was emphasized in the educational program. Educational
Classes in trade, technical, agricultural and professional subjects were organized and largely attended. For the benefit of men who spent only a few days in camp, professional and business men, army officers and Y M C A secretaries lectured on business opportunities, on thrift and insurance, and many other subjects. For those who were more or less permanently attached to the camp, soldier schools were organized, where class instruction in business, technical and liberal arts subjects was given to men desiring it. The Educational Department endeavored to assist the military authorities in demobilization in every way possible. Close relations were established with the United States Employment Service, with the camp insurance offices and with other agencies at work for demobilized soldiers. The Y M C A became a publicity agent for these agencies and assisted in bringing their constructive plans to the attention of the men.

Demobilization depleted the ranks of athletes. It was a case Speeding the
Home-Going Men
of the whole army breaking training. The shifting of troops prevented the carrying out of schedules of inter-organization contests, and the demobilization process with its uncertain routine prevented extensive participation in play periods. The most that could be done was to organize informal games among groups of men with idle time on their hands. A large amount of athletic material was distributed.

Activities within the buildings were carried on as usual with only a few additions to meet the needs of the period. Stamps, money orders, and writing material were always in demand. Parcel post service grew in importance. The men purchased souvenirs, grips, bags, and clothing and sent them home by mail. While in the Army they had to carry a heavy pack, but once in "civies" they wanted to travel light. Each hut maintained a railway information service. Time tables were kept on hand and a large bulletin board displayed a schedule of departing trains to every important point within 350 miles of camp. Other little services of a business nature were rendered. While the Association endeavored to encourage the men to hold their Liberty Bonds, many were in need of funds and had to sell their bonds. These bonds were always receivable at the huts at the current market rate. Many of the men returned from overseas with French or English money, which was converted into United States coin free of charge.

On the day of discharge, each man was given a three months' membership in his home Association. These memberships were largely taken advantage of and served as a connecting link between the camp life of the soldier and the program of reconstruction.

The
Demobilization of
the Y M C A

By the spring of 1919, demobilization was well under way and by September 1st, only half a million troops remained under arms. During this period camp after camp began to close down. As the military population in the camps decreased, Y M C A buildings were vacated in proportion, and by January 1, 1920, had almost entirely been turned over for salvage or loaned to the Government for continuation of the welfare program in the Regular Army.

THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE

So far as volume of service is concerned, the reader who can translate figures into facts will find material for reflection in the statistical tables found in Association records.¹ Here it may be simply stated that a compilation of records and conservative estimates gave a total attendance at Y M C A buildings in the six military departments in the United States of 212,555,000 for the year May 1, 1918, to April 30, 1919.

An attempt to evaluate this service is futile at the outset, as its efforts were directed to intangible objectives—contentment, happiness, comfort, morale, not only military morale, the making of a better soldier, but civilian morale, the making of a better citizen. Those who were in the camps during the years 1917, 1918 and 1919, have only to imagine what camp life would have been without the Association or its equivalent. In the Army thousands of American boys learned for the first time the meaning of discipline and in the Y M C A for the first time the meaning of service. As the Army to thousands of American youths offered the first opportunity for travel and for association with large numbers of his fellows from different parts of the nation, so in the Y M C A huts thousands of boys saw for the first time a good drama, heard for the first time good music and experienced for the first time the pleasures of club life.

Through the first long period of mobilization and training, through the crisis of immediate succor to the struggling Allies in France and final victory, and at last through the weary period of demobilization, the huts, the religious services, the educational classes,

¹ See Year Books, 1918, pp. 317-327; 1919, pp. 336-349; 1920, p. 109.

sports and games, shows and movies, were always at the disposal of the men. What this service meant to the soldier is suggested by the following communication from Major General Leonard Wood, Commander of Camp Funston, to the *Kansas City Star*:

"I have seen the Y M C A work all over the world—in the Philip-
pines, Cuba, South America, the coast of Africa, etc.—and have
found it to be excellent everywhere; always helpful, always giving
encouragement and decent surroundings—in a word, helping to keep
men as we would have them kept.

Maj. Gen.
L. Wood's
Commendation of
Y Service

"Excellent as its work is and has been elsewhere, I believe that the work it is now doing in the great cantonments where our troops are being trained is perhaps the greatest and the best it has ever attempted. One has to see it to appreciate it. The Y M C A houses have meant everything to the men. They have been their clubs, their places for writing letters, for securing papers and seeing something of the current magazines. They have furnished a delightful change to the barracks. In addition to the facilities and conveniences mentioned, the Y M C A has furnished lectures, moving pictures and amusements of various kinds. In its work it has illustrated the value of constructive work in keeping men away from undesirable places. It is not enough to suppress vice and to close up undesirable places, but we must give the men places of the right type to go to—places where healthy amusements and decent surroundings, as well as reasonable recreation, can be secured. This is where the Y M C A has secured, perhaps, its best results. It has not only helped to suppress vice and evil doing, but it has given the men attractive places of assembly and wholesome amusement."

CHAPTER XXIII

SPECIALIZED WORK AND INSULAR POSSESSIONS

Not all of America's Army and Navy was trained in the 32 great training camps and cantonments, nor was active service of trained men limited to fighting overseas. As we have already seen, there were more than 500 points in the United States and its Possessions where troops were stationed in smaller numbers for training or garrison duty. Some of these had soldier populations as large as the divisional training camps. Such were Camp Joseph E. Johnston at Jacksonville, Florida, where the personnel of the quartermaster corps was trained, the engineer encampments around Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the great aviation camp at Kelly Field, near San Antonio, Texas. At points like these the Y M C A promoted its standard program of activities developed in the larger camps and already described in the preceding chapter, with such changes only as were made desirable by local conditions. At the camps established for the training of special branches, the Association service was carried on generally in the regulation service hut. At the more or less temporary expansion camps, tents were largely used in place of more permanent buildings. Everywhere it endeavored to provide personnel, equipment and service in proportion to the numbers and needs of the men concerned.

Certain groups of soldiers, however, presented to the welfare worker peculiar problems, growing out of racial differences, or circumstances of location and distribution, or engagement in special types of service or training. Certain groups of civilians, also by reason of their close and essential connection with the nation's military and naval activities, claimed the attention of war-time welfare agencies, and their needs naturally differed in some respects from those of the soldiers. It is the purpose of the present chapter to describe some of these particular undertakings. So far as possible and desirable, the standard program was provided for all these men, but limitations of space make it impossible here to do more than point out in each case the variations from the Association's normal problem and the resultant changes in service rendered.

SPECIAL SERVICES

Probably no phase of our national life was more affected by war conditions than that represented by the colleges and universities. As a rule, the young men in these institutions were among the first to respond to the call to arms, with the result that student bodies declined sharply in numbers as the months went on, while the men who remained were in a distracted and unsettled frame of mind.

Early in 1918 the War Department appointed a Committee on Education and Special Training, for the purpose of making available the facilities of technical and vocational schools throughout the country for training skilled technical workers in the trades required by the Army, and helping to supply the demand for commissioned officers. Out of the investigations and experience of this Committee grew the Students' Army Training Corps, authorized by General Orders No. 79, August 24, 1918. Under the plan finally adopted for this project, properly qualified men of eighteen to twenty were enlisted in the military service by voluntary induction and assigned to duty at various educational institutions, to receive instruction for periods of three to nine months. Soldier students to the number of 165,000, in military detachments at 525 different institutions, were thus enrolled between October 1st and November 11th, when the Armistice made unnecessary the continuance of their work.

Students' Army
Training Corps

The leaders of the Y M C A Student Department were quick to see this opportunity, and on September 12, 1918, laid before the Executive Committee of the War Work Council a definite plan which was promptly approved. A headquarters bureau was set up at New York, under the direction of David R. Porter, Senior Secretary of the Student Department of the International Committee, and a secretary with special responsibility for student work was added to each department headquarters staff. So far as possible, each institution having a S A T C unit numbering 250 men, or more, was provided with a full-time secretary, the needs of smaller units being met by volunteer or part-time workers, who had passed through a short period of intensive training. Inasmuch as many of the institutions concerned already had student Associations of their own, the facilities and personnel of these organizations were employed wherever possible and they made a great contribution to the success of the project. Through them or through centers especially established,

Association work was carried on at practically every institution with a S A T C unit.

Certain variations were made in the standard Y M C A program, because of the facts that the men were of an unusually high grade of intelligence and that they worked on an unusually strenuous schedule. At many points they had, except on Saturdays and Sundays, no more than one free hour a day. No extensive educational work was attempted, but one of the most successful features of the whole program was an open forum, conducted generally on Sunday evenings, for the discussion of world affairs. In the religious work, emphasis was placed upon study of the Bible and of social problems, especially with a view to encouraging the men to continue it themselves. There was a natural demand for social pleasures, and in providing these, committees of women composed of wives of faculty members and others rendered valuable cooperation. Saturday afternoons were usually devoted to athletic events, and the free hour on other week days, generally speaking, to motion pictures, entertainment, social events, and Bible study. In addition, service was afforded at all times in such matters as furnishing writing materials, telephone calls, collecting laundry, making purchases for men unable to leave the post, selling stamps and sending parcels by mail.

The S A T C was among the first of the military organizations to be demobilized, but until the end of the academic year the War Work Council cooperated with local student Associations with a view to serving the men who remained in the colleges and those who returned after discharge from other branches of the service.

Service in the
Cities

The extensive field of service constituted by the cities presented marked differences from those in camps, of which two or three aspects stood out as prominent. The needs were diffused and individual rather than collective. Men were "on their own," free for the time being of military restrictions of movement and the routine of bugle calls. It was not a case of establishing a club house in the midst of a large number who had nowhere else to go. Contact with scattered individuals had to be established by vigorous publicity and personal effort. Whatever was done by the welfare organizations was in competition with other enterprises of less benevolent purpose. The former had an advantage in the fact that contacts made in camp could be carried over to the city: the man who had found friendliness in the Y M C A or other huts was likely to look for the same organization if he found himself in trouble or perplexity. Attractive an-

nouncements and invitations to city centers were kept prominent on bulletin boards in the camps and distributed among the men so that when they took leave in the cities they would know what was offered and where to find it. Most of them looked forward to a "good time" when they reached a city, but many did not know how to go about securing it; some of course had perverted ideas of the meaning of the phrase. One of the chief services in the city was not so much the providing of entertainment as the steering of men to the best of every kind that the ordinary agencies in the cities offered so profusely. Two types of men not found in the camps presented special characteristics: the registered men in Class I not yet called but anticipating early enlistment, and discharged men seeking work.

The War Camp Community Service, working entirely outside the camps, devoted its energies to an efficient service in meeting needs of these men, but agencies which worked within the camps also had their representatives in the cities. For the work done by the Y M C A in this field credit is due largely to the local City Associations, to whose service in the provision of living accommodations, social opportunities, entertainments and other benefits, as well as to their cooperation with the Transportation Department in service to men in transit, reference has already been made. A number of Associations inaugurated clubs, classes, or discussion groups for registrants awaiting the call to the colors, with the object of promoting acquaintance, supplying information regarding military life and problems, and discussing war themes. Work of this kind done by the Cleveland Association was regarded so favorably by the military authorities that the War Department issued an official order establishing a similar plan of instruction in connection with all draft boards of the country, though the carrying out of the plan was made unnecessary by the Armistice. During demobilization, nearly all local Associations offered to ex-service men membership for a period of three months without cost, of which many availed themselves. These enjoyed all the usual privileges of membership, and others who did not join took advantage of special services offered, such as employment bureaus, and information and assistance in connection with war risk insurance, Liberty Bonds and other such matters. During the two years ending April 30, 1919, the City Associations reported a total of 7,259,400 men in uniform served, a record that is the more remarkable in view of the fact that 708 employed City Association secretaries were absent in some form of war service.

War Camp
Community
Service and
City Associations

Y Huts in
New York and
Washington

In addition to what was done by the local Associations, the War Work Council also interested itself in service in the larger cities. Encouraged by the splendid example of the Eagle Hut in London, Association forces in New York City planned a building to serve as the center of a similar work, and this, erected with the permission of the city authorities in Bryant Park, was completed, given the same name as its London prototype, and dedicated in June, 1918. In the beginning it was a standard F type hut, but the demands on its space soon necessitated the addition of two wings. Eagle Hut was never closed, and its many-sided service to the soldiers and sailors included an information bureau, writing and reading rooms, a parcel room, cafeteria, post-office, office for cashing checks, issuing money orders, and exchanging foreign money, games, sewing and mending, free sight-seeing trips, free and half-rate theater tickets, telephones, motion pictures, billiards and pool, entertainments and socials. An average of 2,000 meals daily and 3,500 to 4,000 meals Sunday were served here. This venture was largely planned and carried out by a committee of New York women, who enlisted at different times about 800 volunteer workers. In January, 1919, a similarly successful work was begun in Victory Hut, located at Battery Park. In Washington, Liberty Hut, the remodeled tabernacle which had been erected for Billy Sunday's evangelistic campaign, became a temporary home and recreational center for more than 400,000 soldiers. It rendered a service similar to that of the huts in New York, and in addition afforded sleeping accommodations for 1,400 men; as many as 2,200 were lodged on some occasions. A smaller Eagle Hut was also operated in Washington at a location on Ninth Street near Pennsylvania Avenue.

Financial Aid
Extended to
Local
Associations

The War Work Council also cooperated financially in the work done by the local Associations. In 1917 an appropriation was made to assist local Associations whose resources might be overtaxed in the free service of soldiers and sailors. Each case was considered on its own merits, the local Association in question was visited by a representative of the War Work Council, and the facts ultimately brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Council, who authorized such expenditure as he deemed equitable. After the Armistice, the Council, recognizing that the demobilization of the Army would lay a proportionate burden upon all parts of the country, arranged to give financial assistance to the state and local Associations on a per capita basis of 35 cents for every man enlisted from each state.

By the fall of 1919 wounded men began to be returned from France to the base hospitals in the East in large numbers, and after the Armistice, welfare work for convalescent soldiers became an important part of Y activity in the United States. Hospital Work

The athletic program proved especially valuable for men suffering from nervous disorders. The physical director worked side by side with the physician in restoring to use muscles and nerve controls long inactive. The recreation program was literally one of re-creation of a new and healthy psychology in men who had suffered shell-shock and its morbid consequences. Curative gymnastics and free spontaneous play put many a maimed soldier on his feet again, physically and mentally.

There was also the regulation Y hospital service, visiting the sick, attending to their correspondence, providing delicacies, recreation and entertainment for the convalescent, and the consolations of religion to the dying. The Association also attended to the comfort, both physical and spiritual, of bereaved relatives and friends, and did everything in its power to fulfill the Christian obligation implied in the words, "I was sick and ye visited me." In the course of this service the Association found itself from time to time acting along parallel lines with the American Red Cross, whose special care was the relief of the sick and wounded soldier. In several instances there had to be a definition of functions and a decision in the form of a military order. In most such cases the decision tended to place responsibility for relief and welfare work in hospitals upon the Red Cross, and little by little the Association withdrew. In many instances, however, the Y was in the field alone and did its utmost to step into the breach, to fill all needs, and minister to the sick and wounded.

The leading embarkation camps were Camps Merritt and Mills Embarkation Camps for the port of New York and Camps Eustis and Stuart for Newport News. Welfare work at these camps differed somewhat from that done generally, in that the men were there for a very short time, and its most important purpose was to perform last minute services and give them a good send off. The work was the same at all such camps. It consisted principally of such things as facilitating communication with their families, forwarding money to relatives, making wills, and bringing together visitors and soldiers. The Y secretaries arranged the entertainment of soldiers in private families and conducted a regular entertainment program inside the camps.

Camp Merritt may be taken as an example of the kind and amount of welfare service rendered. Eventually there were six buildings there and a Y personnel of 80 secretaries. The regular four-fold program was promoted, emphasis in the educational work being put on French. Thanksgiving and Christmas were great events and the Y did its best to make those holidays homelike for men going overseas. During the influenza epidemic the Y helped bear the strain, and one secretary lost his life in the service of the sick men. The work came definitely to an end October 31, 1919, after having served hundreds of thousands of men in transit to France and return. From September, 1917, to March, 1919, the figures for service rendered at Camp Merritt were as follows: attendance at buildings, 7,400,000; pieces of mail handled, 6,060,000; value of money orders sold, \$540,000; attendance at religious meetings, 538,290; attendance at Bible classes, 129,400; participants in recreational games, 504,000; attendance at educational classes, 90,000; attendance at lectures, 250,000; attendance at entertainments, 832,855; attendance at motion picture entertainments, 1,284,517; attendance at social gatherings, 270,272; value of service checks sold to men going overseas, \$2,000,000; value of checks cashed, \$825,000; foreign money exchanged for men returning, francs, 500,000; pounds sterling, 5,000; and lire 50,000.

Debarkation and
Demobilization
Camps

After the signing of the Armistice, the embarkation camps became camps of debarkation for troops returning from overseas. Camp Upton, because of its proximity to New York City and the port of New York, was chosen as one of the principal debarkation camps and is a good example of the work of all. The returning soldiers were brought to the camp from the transports and separated into contingents to be sent to the camps nearest their homes for demobilization and discharge. The stay in camp, at first of about ten days, was gradually shortened as the process of demobilization was accelerated, until in the closing part of the period the men were in camp sometimes for less than ten hours. Accordingly, again, there was no opportunity for continuous work of any kind. One special piece of service was that of meeting the divisions, as they came to the camp at the station gate, where they were given something to eat and drink. A cup of hot coffee was highly appreciated, especially by troops who came in the night. On the return of the 27th Division and of the 77th Division, both composed mainly of New York men, special preparations were made to meet them and to make their stay comfortable and pleasant.

Camp Upton was also a demobilization camp for New York State, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Soldiers living in these states were prepared for discharge, given their final instructions, paid off, and placed upon the trains to be sent home. Final service to men at this stage was rendered at practically all camps and cantonments. This was a very trying time for all the men. Those who had been denied the opportunity of going overseas were filled with keen disappointment and there was a great deal of grumbling at the military system and at their environment. The same spirit was also to be found among certain of the groups returning from overseas. The Y tried as best it could to meet this condition, to cheer the men and to revive their faith in the Government and in the ideals for which they had entered the service.

The welfare service at embarkation and debarkation points is typical of the attempt of the Association to meet the definite needs of the men and to adapt itself to all situations.

The war work of the Association for colored troops is significant from several points of view. However indifferent the majority of Americans may be to the race problem, it is a reality to which occasional race riots sharply call attention. If the same kind of thing happens in Ireland, India or Egypt, or if there is revolutionary rioting and bloodshed in Russia, Germany or Italy, we draw much more direct and obvious conclusions than if it happens at home. One of the great aims of the Association in its work for colored soldiers was to create good feeling between the races. The American negro during the war found himself subject to the same military obligations as his white fellow-citizen and served his country with the same fidelity. The striking prophecy of Lincoln suddenly came to pass: "Who knows but these men shall some day help to preserve the jewel of liberty in the family of nations?"¹

Work among
Colored Troops

Early in the war the National War Work Council committed itself officially to the principle of serving colored troops on the same basis as white troops in respect to buildings, equipment, and personnel. Groups of 1,000 or less were to be served in tents, larger groups in buildings of the standard types reserved for their use, and with colored secretaries, all, of course, under the supervision of the regular camp secretaries. This policy was consistently followed, with a few unavoidable exceptions due to local conditions. When they were scattered through a camp in smaller groups, they either used the

¹ Consult *The American Negro in the World War*, E. J. Scott, 1919.

same buildings as the white soldiers, if local sentiment permitted, or were served in tents or mess halls specially equipped for the purpose, sometimes with an outdoor screen for motion pictures and outdoor platform for entertainments and other meetings. In some camps the number of colored troops was not sufficient to warrant the employment of special secretaries; in others strong objection was made by commanding officers, or some similar circumstance made it impossible or inexpedient. Some of the colored secretaries served so efficiently with troops in training that they were sent overseas with the same units at the request of their commanding officers.

Stimulating
Education

The type of service rendered consisted of the usual fourfold program of activities. Much emphasis was placed upon educational work, because of the high proportion of illiteracy among the negroes. In some cases, colored teachers from neighboring towns were enlisted as leaders of classes in camp. Out of the first 6,000 colored troops sent to Camp Dodge, 2,000 were taught to read and write. The fact that colored troops were usually detailed to manual labor, and that consequently they were, as a rule, moved oftener than white troops, made it somewhat difficult to maintain a regular schedule of classes. Other methods than class work were employed, however. Lectures were given on social, hygienic, economic and other subjects touching the men's daily lives, and debates and conferences gave them opportunity to express their own opinions. As a rule, commanding officers cooperated heartily in the educational program. One company commander suggested to a class of illiterates that he might find it necessary to hold up the pay of anyone who could not sign the pay-roll, with the result that at the end of the month 41 out of a class of 43 were able to write their names.

In connection with the physical work especial guidance and stimulus was needed in the promotion of group games to which comparatively few were already accustomed. Soldier talent was used to a large extent on hut programs, to the mutual enjoyment of audiences and performers, but the professional and other entertainment features imported from outside the camps were routed through the colored men's buildings the same as through the others. The religious work was naturally of importance and usually found marked acceptance. Singing was greatly enjoyed, and much was made of it in religious services, while programs of mass singing proved highly successful. In many camps the proportion of attendance at Bible classes was larger among colored than among white troops.

There were about 400,000 colored troops in American camps and overseas. At about the time of the Armistice, there were 55 centers or groups in the home camps with Association privileges, served by 268 secretaries, besides twelve Students' Army Training Corps units with fourteen secretaries. It is estimated that total attendance at these various centers amounted to 2,000,000 men a month. There were per month 200 lectures with an attendance of 80,000; 1,500 classes with an attendance of 90,000; 30,675 books circulated; 700 religious meetings with an attendance of 30,640 men a month; 10,000 scriptures circulated; 125,000 participants in physical activities; 500 motion picture exhibitions with an attendance of 300,000; 1,250,000 letters written; \$110,000 money orders sold; and totals of 9,000 personal interviews; 7,000 Christian decisions; 11,000 War Roll signers. Thousands of men were taught to read and write their names.

After the Armistice and demobilization there was a good deal of race rioting and disorder in the South. Through January and February, 1919, it appeared as though there were to be greater race difficulties and conflicts than had ever been experienced before. Negroes armed themselves and talked defiantly. Among the whites there was ■ response in kind, organizations for the suppression of negroes sprang up, and many white persons armed themselves.

In December, 1918, immediately following the Armistice, certain leading men of both races conferred informally in New York City, under the auspices of the War Work Council of the Y M C A, on the grave problems developed by the war in the matter of race relationships. A large conference was held in Atlanta in January, 1919. Out of these meetings grew what is now known as the Interracial Committee, the aim of which was to study racial problems, find out what the negroes want, and agree on a platform to which intelligent white people might be rallied. The Committee proceeded on the theory that nothing substantial can be done for the improvement of conditions among negroes until the leaders among the whites are won to a united program. Accordingly white leaders only were included at first, but in February, 1920, negroes were admitted to the Committee.

By working for ex-service negroes the War Work Council at the same time helped to bridge the gap between the two races. A few of the results may be mentioned. Fourteen hundred leaders—900 white, 500 black—were trained for work for returning negro ex-service

Disturbing
Elements

Conference
on Race
Relationships

men. By December 31, 1919, 169 counties had been completely organized, the majority having joint white and negro committees; 136 other counties were partially organized. The press, Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, circuit judges, and others have been interested. There were successful attempts to forestall lynching, race riots, and friction between the races. Many towns secured schools, higher salaries for colored teachers, parks, and better sanitation. Homes were searched for arms and ammunition. A campaign against venereal disease was conducted.

For this campaign the War Work Council included in its budget for 1919, an appropriation of \$275,000. The only possible objection to the financing of this program by war work funds would seem to be that the benefits of the plan go not only to negro ex-service men but to all negroes. On the other hand, the War Work Council omitted none of the standard features of post-war service to soldiers and sailors. The Inter-racial program has included such definite service as meeting negro soldiers at debarkation points, service on troop trains, canteen and Y building service to troops en route, service to troops at demobilization camps, cashing checks, remitting money, sending home personal property, full privileges in Y buildings at all organized points, vocational and recreational guidance, and employment.

American
Indians

According to the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1918, more than 8,000 American Indians, out of a total of about 33,000 of military eligibility, entered some branch of military service. Of this number approximately 6,500 went into the Army, 1,000 into the Navy, and 500 into some other military work. Fully 6,000 were volunteers. These native Americans were trained in the same camps and fought on the same battlefields side by side with their white fellow soldiers, and with equal courage, loyalty and devotion. During the training period their numbers were largest, naturally, in the camps of the Southern and Western Departments. The only special welfare problem which their presence created arose from the natural reserve and reticence of the Indians themselves, which tended to keep them away from the crowded centers of activity. The special work for Indians, therefore, consisted largely of the establishment of a personal relationship with as many individuals as possible, with a view to bringing them into touch with Association activities at the buildings nearest their respective units. Two traveling secretaries devoted the major portion of their time to this work during the

year 1918, and others helped for shorter periods. As a working basis, lists of the Indian soldiers were secured from the military authorities at the camps. Then they were sought out individually, brought into contact with local secretaries and with the local churches of their preference, and encouraged to continue the relations thus established. Where conditions permitted, arrangements were made for religious and other group meetings where the Indians might sing their own songs and hear and speak their own languages. At several of the camps sufficient Indian talent was discovered to make possible an occasional "Indian Night" at the buildings, which served to bring them into closer relations with the other soldiers. An *American Indian Y M C A Bulletin*, published monthly and circulated among the Indians at home as well as those in the service, contained news of the Indian soldiers and sailors, articles designed to keep their ideals high, and suggested Bible readings for daily use. No Indian secretaries were appointed specially for this work, but in one of the camps where the number of Indian soldiers was relatively large, an Indian secretary served efficiently as physical director, at first for one of the buildings and afterwards for the entire camp, and was thus, while directing athletic activities for all soldiers alike, in a position to be of special assistance to men of his own race. A similar service was rendered at another camp by a building secretary who had formerly been principal of an Indian School.

WAR INDUSTRIES

"It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, farms, shipyards, mines and factories must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever, and that they must be more economically managed and better adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been. The men and women who devote their thought and energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great international service army—a notable and honorable host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. They will be as much a part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire."

Acting in accordance with the spirit of these words of President Wilson, the Y M C A sought to render to the men of the industrial army a service comparable to that provided for the men in uniform.

Before America entered the war, 150 secretaries were giving full or part time to industrial work other than the railroads; and in addition to what was being done by City Associations for men in industry, 117 Associations were especially related to industries or groups of industries, which had provided buildings costing more than \$3,370,000, funds for the maintenance of their work being contributed by both employers and employees. The stimulus given by the war to all industries, particularly ship-building and the manufacture of munitions, greatly intensified the need for such service as the Associations were rendering. During 1917, in the universal preoccupation with the men in uniform, the expansion of the industrial work was left largely in the hands of the regular Association agencies, but in January, 1918, the National War Work Council appointed a special Committee on Work for Men in War Industries, with Charles R. Towson, Senior Secretary of the Industrial Department of the International Committee, as Executive Secretary. During the rest of the war period, this Committee functioned in the same manner as the bureaus.

Limiting its efforts to the field of industries directly related to the effective prosecution of the war, the Committee promoted its activities among three classes of men: enlisted men in industry, civilian employees in navy yards and arsenals, and workers in ship-yards and munition plants under Government control. Generally speaking, the objects and methods of the work among these men were the same as for the Army and Navy, with such adaptations as were necessitated by the different conditions.

Lumber
Units

The first of these classes consisted of men actually drafted into the Army who because of some physical defect were considered unfit for active service, but capable of working. These soldiers, although assigned to duty in industrial service, were subject to the same military discipline as those engaged in purely military duties. The greatest number of them were sent to the spruce belt of the Northwest, to work in the logging camps of Western Washington and Oregon, which had been organized by the Spruce Production Division of the War Department to get out timber for the construction of aeroplanes. Thirty thousand soldiers thus employed were located at 295 points in a district covering approximately 8,000 square miles, along the Pacific Ocean, and containing in addition 110,000 civilian workers. Situated in a lonely country, separated for the most part into small working groups, and associated frequently with men among whom the spirit of unrest and radicalism was more prevalent than in any other

of our labor groups, they constituted a specially needy field. Notwithstanding the wide area to be covered and the scattering of the men into numerous detachments, the Association's activities reached men in 300 camps. No buildings were erected, but nearly 200 tents were provided either by the military authorities or by the Association. At the time of the Armistice 36 secretaries were employed. District headquarters were established at six points, and it was the usual division of work among the secretaries that while one was in the woods visiting the camps, distributing reading matter, writing materials, and small games, and meeting the men, his associate remained at headquarters arranging week-end programs for the loggers who came to town Saturday nights. Reports indicate that 730 entertainments were given, with an attendance of 87,513, besides 503 lectures with an attendance of 29,049, and 355 religious meetings with an attendance of 39,610. Athletic events attracted 10,632 participants and 27,992 spectators.

Work was organized in five navy yards and five arsenals, for Arsenals the benefit of civilian employes as well as soldiers and sailors. At the arsenals the Association program was carried on without permanent equipment. The largest work of this kind was at the Rock Island Arsenal, located on an island in the Mississippi River, and employing during the war 8,000 to 14,000 workmen from three cities. Here an extensive program of physical activities was developed. Two drill companies, comprising approximately 175 men and boys, were organized and commanded by an Army officer. Two football teams were organized and other games promoted, including indoor baseball, basketball and bowling. In addition, mass meetings and hikes were arranged for Sundays, and entertainments provided for the evenings, often with talent discovered among the men themselves. An orchestra of sixteen pieces, composed of arsenal employees, assisted at the Y M C A meetings. Programs of the Association's activities were published weekly in advance.

Work was also carried on at 34 shipyards and at twelve Govern- Shipyards and
Munition Plantsment owned or controlled shell-loading, chemical and powder plants. Many of these represented, as truly as the cantonments themselves, the sudden concentration of population at points where few or no people had lived before. Hog Island furnished a striking example. Nitro, West Virginia, grew from nothing into a city whose sole purpose was the production of explosives. In other cases war industries produced an unprecedented increase in the population of cities and

towns. Newport News, for example, doubled its population during the war. These abnormal populations consisted largely of men, although in some cases workmen brought their families with them, and created serious public problems. Housing, sanitation and public order were, of course, problems for governmental authorities, who in some cases went beyond the immediate demands of the situation and provided recreational facilities, as at Hog Island, where the Government built for the workmen, within a short distance from the ship-yards, dormitories and blocks of houses provided with community recreation centers.

The Y M C A brought to these men the benefits of its four-fold program, and in addition rendered some special services called for by unusual circumstances, as when the lack of banking facilities in the new communities led the Association to assume such a responsibility. Safes were provided in the buildings in which men might leave their valuables, money was accepted to be sent to banks in neighboring towns for deposit, and provision was made for the sale of express money orders. The high value placed by the Government and the companies on the Association's work is shown by the fact that out of 34 buildings erected during the war 27 were provided by the Government or the companies, at a cost of about \$1,000,000. More than 300 secretaries were engaged in the industrial work, of whom 180 were financed at Government or company expense. Special industrial secretaries to the number of 106 were placed on the staffs of 60 state and local Associations, who promoted activities in hundreds of munition plants, other than those with which the War Work Council dealt directly.

THE MEXICAN BORDER¹

Physical and
Social Conditions

There was probably no more important and picturesque—or less known—feature of the Army Y M C A work in the United States than that which was carried on among the soldiers stationed on the Mexican Border. This was a continuation and expansion of the work inaugurated in 1911 and expanded in 1916². During the period of training, when the eyes of the country were fixed on the battle fronts of Europe and the training camps where the men were preparing to

¹ The matter in this section is very largely contained in a descriptive statement by an educational secretary with the Southern Department.

² See Chapter XII.

take their place upon that front, the little force which guarded the Mexican frontier was practically forgotten by the public; yet it had an important task, in many ways no less difficult than that which confronted the Armies overseas.

The difficulties encountered in handling this work may be apprehended when it is said that in order to make a round trip to all the camps and outposts one would be obliged to travel 5,000 miles, much of the way over deserts and mountainous country. The country varies in character from an almost tropical jungle at the mouth of the Rio Grande to regions in New Mexico where the altitude makes the climate similar to that found in the central states. In the wilder regions found in the Big Bend District of Texas, and in the deserts of Arizona and New Mexico, long distances had to be traveled, under very difficult transportation conditions, the terrible roads racking cars to pieces and sometimes breaking down the health of the drivers, while, in the rainy season, mud and swollen streams often prevented even the Government commissary trucks from making regular trips. The only communication that the troops in these districts had with the outside world was by means of the telephone and the supply truck which, in the case of the Big Bend District, attempted to make trips twice a week. The population in such places was almost entirely Mexican, in some the soldiers being the only Americans in town, while in many instances the outposts were many miles removed even from Mexican settlements.

Typical
Difficulties
of Service
on the
Border

In order to serve the 100 or more camps and outposts scattered over the 1,500 miles of Border, the Y was organized under much the same system as were the camps, the Border Supervisor being regarded as a Camp General Secretary and each important camp as a unit. In general, the work of the larger camps was the same in its essential features as that already described, including the provision of huts and the promotion of all the activities of the four-fold program. There were some differences due to the local situation, as, for example, the establishment by educational workers of Spanish classes, for which there was little demand elsewhere. Around such towns as El Paso, Laredo, and Brownsville, the soldiers enjoyed many social advantages, and the work of the Y was simplified because of the possibility of calling upon the townspeople for cooperation in social, entertainment, and religious activities.

The distinctive feature of the Border work, however, was its outpost service, which sought to carry cheer to the small groups of

soldiers stationed at isolated points, who were without social contacts or recreational facilities, and for whom it was impracticable to provide permanent equipment. Special secretaries with automobiles covered these outposts on schedules as regular as conditions would permit, carrying with them simple equipment, such as writing materials, books, magazines, athletic supplies, and phonographs. Motion pictures were occasionally provided by means of trucks equipped with Delco plants. Near the cities this was not so difficult, but one secretary in an Arizona district was obliged to travel 18,000 miles in nine months. In the Big Bend District, longer than the State of Massachusetts, with a population of only one person to eight square miles, there were some sixteen camps and outposts, at distances of from 60 to 155 miles from the headquarters at Marfa. In driving to one of them (Candeleria), it was necessary to follow a winding trail down the side of a precipice where the road drops 2,500 feet within two miles. In case of a breakdown, a secretary was often marooned for days at a time before his car could be repaired, and it was customary to carry camping equipment and rations, so as to be prepared for emergencies. Conditions of this sort made it almost impossible to provide programs except in the form of motion pictures and an occasional speaker or entertainer who was willing to brave the dangers and discomforts of such a trip and whose services could be spared from the larger camps for a sufficient period of time.

Illustrative
Report

The way in which the outpost secretaries worked and the kind of service they rendered may be illustrated by brief daily reports:

Saturday, 22d—Visited the camps at Cement Plant, Ysleta, Military Police, and Camp Cotton. Left writing material and athletic equipment at each of the camps. Had personal interviews with several of the boys along the line of proposed work for the various outposts, as all of the detachments have recently changed guards. Attended a commission meeting of the citizens of Ysleta. Arranged to cooperate with them in their work for the detachment, which includes the use of a well fitted hall. Mileage, 69.

Sunday, 23d—Visited Camps at Ysleta and Socorro. Put on a religious service at Ysleta, consisting of a sing and an address by Mr. McCulloch, camp physical director, along definite religious lines. Mrs. Ralph Wilson sang two solos. After the service at Ysleta we put on a sing at Socorro, using the service song book. Mrs. Wilson sang a solo for the boys there. Mileage, 60.

Monday, 24th—Put on a volley ball game in the evening between the detachments of the Cement Plant and the detachment at Camp Cotton. Transportation to and from the Cement Plant to Camp Cot-

ton furnished by the Y M C A. Interest in the game was so keen that the boys decided to play again, to organize a baseball team, and put on games under Y direction. Mileage, 34.

Tuesday, 25th—Put on an entertainment for the detachment at the Cement Plant (three carloads of entertainers). This was the first entertainment of any kind the boys said they had had given them in two years and a half. Any entertainment which they had previously had they had paid for. They were enthusiastic and very friendly, and asked that they be remembered again in the same manner. About 50 boys present. Mileage, 13.

Wednesday, 26th—Put on a five reel movie for the detachment at the Cement Plant, using the outpost car. Entertainment put on in the open, about 35 men attending. Mileage, 12.

Thursday, 27th—Put on an entertainment for the cavalry detachment at Ysleta (two carloads of entertainers). Went down early, had mess with the boys and visited with them for some time. Boys were greatly interested and asked us to return before they changed guard.

Friday, 28th—Put on entertainment for the boys at the Remount Station (two carloads of entertainers). The boys were greatly interested in the Y M C A work and especially in the erection of the proposed new building in their camp. Attendance, 250. Mileage, 20.

Such was the service of the Y to the troops protecting our Southern Border against possible and actual raids and invasions. Soldiers were stationed along the river for a year and a half without ever seeing a railroad or coming in contact with the outside world except as it was brought to them by the Y and other welfare organizations. The very monotony of this police duty, coupled with the fact that they were being denied the military glory which came to the troops overseas, gave to their service a high degree of heroism. The Y secretaries' devotion relieved the monotony to some extent. Like that of the soldiers theirs was a tiresome, monotonous and grueling experience, embodying in many districts the greatest self sacrifice and physical strain, while lacking the excitement and stimulus which came to those who went with the Armies overseas. The achievement of the Army and its civilian workers on the Mexican Border will probably never be appreciated because its work was simply one of prevention, entirely overshadowed by the tremendous events of the World War.

Isolation
and Monotony

WORK IN THE INSULAR POSSESSIONS

Related to the work in the United States, but differing from it in certain vital respects, was that done in the Insular Possessions.

Here it was service for soldiers of different races, which could not readily be provided by secretaries trained along purely American lines and unfamiliar with the habits and languages of the natives of these islands. It was, therefore, built up around the nucleus of the permanent Associations already existing, and the enlarged staffs of secretaries were chiefly recruited among the natives.

Porto
Rico

The Porto Ricans responded enthusiastically to the war call and more than 100,000 men were registered for military service. It was for some time doubtful whether Porto Ricans were to be trained at home or sent to the United States, but in August, 1917, it was decided to let them stay within the island, and an officers' training camp was established in the mountains, near the village of Cayey. Two other such camps were later opened and in less than a year's time about 1,000 officers had passed through these camps. Camp Las Casas, a regular National Army cantonment, accommodating 12,000 men was established in the suburbs of San Juan.

Two years before the war, a Y M C A conducted along the same lines as the ordinary American City Association, had been opened in San Juan. Its leaders were fully aware of the possibilities for extended service which the war offered the organization. As the service grew in proportions, 32 secretaries were enrolled, of whom only six were continental Americans, these being men familiar with conditions in the West Indies. Two attempts were made to send secretaries from New York, but in both instances they were recalled on account of lack of knowledge of Spanish and inability to adapt themselves to the local conditions.

The Y was on the spot when the first officers' training camp opened, with a tent and such primitive facilities as could be provided until further supplies could be secured from New York. Within the large camp the Association erected several buildings of the F type, adapted to tropical conditions.

About 50 per cent of the men were illiterate and the secretaries were soon busy writing letters for them. Through the cooperation of the Association and the commanding officer, Brigadier General Chrisman, several hundred men were chosen from the ranks for teachers and all the illiterates were enrolled in compulsory classes, in which more than 2,000 men, or about one-third of the Porto Rican forces, were taught to read and write. A number of the better educated men were taught English. As the great mass of the soldiers had not the faintest idea about the meaning of the war, but considered

the training only a brilliant adventure, lectures were given to enlighten them on this point.

The religious situation was perplexing, in view of the fact that 95 per cent of the population are by profession Roman Catholics. True to its rule of serving all without distinction, the Y M C A invited priests to use its buildings for sacraments and confessions. In the officers' training camps religious activities consisted mainly of church service on Sundays, alternately Roman Catholic and Protestant. In Camp Las Casas the religious service was received with great interest and Bible classes for the enlisted men were well attended.

Entertainment was to some extent furnished from New York. Motion pictures, however, could not be obtained through the ordinary channels, as it was necessary to have titles in Spanish as well as English, and they were consequently selected from the stock of a local dealer.

In this narrative only the outstanding features arising from the specific conditions under which the service was rendered have been mentioned, but all the ordinary activities familiar in the home camps were also conducted in Porto Rico. That this service was valued is indicated by the increase in the number of members of the Y M C A and the generous response to an appeal for funds to carry on its ordinary peace-time activities after the demobilization in December, 1918.

Shortly after America's entrance into the war the President of the Philippine Senate offered President Wilson 25,000 men for service wherever he should see fit. The offer was accepted, but it was not until late in 1918 that a training camp for enlisted men was opened after the completion of the training of officers. In October, about 15,000 men began their training in Camp Tomas Claudio, in the vicinity of Manila.

About twenty Y M C A secretaries served in this camp, where the service was in many respects similar to that in Porto Rico. The numerous dialects rendered united service impossible, but with the exception of four continental Americans the secretaries were all natives of Spanish descent, who fully understood one or more dialects.

There was not much demand for educational work, because nearly all the men were comparatively well educated. The Filipinos looked upon an able military effort as an important step towards independence and therefore, quite naturally, men of high average intelligence had been picked for service. The religious work was of much prominence, and it was generally found that the soldiers were inter-

The Philippine
Islands

ested, especially in Bible study. Of entertainment features the moving pictures were especially popular, and screens were erected in the open for each regiment. The weather seldom interfered with the shows and it is easy to imagine that movies under the stars of a cool and peaceful tropical night took on an added fascination.

The Armistice quickly interrupted the training and in February, 1919, practically all the men had been demobilized. Later there was another opportunity for the Association to serve, when two American regiments visited Manila on their way home from Siberia.

A contingent of more than 6,000 natives of Hawaii were served during the war. The work was started in 1917 by the local Y M C A and in 1918 was taken over by the National War Work Council. The outstanding feature was education. The men were chiefly Oriental plantation laborers, of whom only a small minority could speak, read or write English. More than 4,000 men were given instruction in elementary English, primarily in order that they might understand the orders of their officers.

There was also a considerable contingent of American Regular troops in Hawaii, and service on the lines familiar in the camps on the continent was given to them and the natives as well. The Islands afforded small facilities for recreation of any kind, especially for Americans, and the Y M C A buildings were always crowded.

During the construction of the Panama Canal the Association, at the request of General Goethals, had established a number of so-called Canal Zone Club Houses. After construction was finished, these clubs were gradually changed into community centers under the administration of the Canal Zone authorities. The Y eventually withdrew from actual service, but the organization retained the name of the Association on their buildings and in their advertising. Many of the soldiers felt that these clubs showed discrimination in favor of civilians and that there was a tendency to debar the soldiers from certain privileges. When these conditions were made clear to the Association after a representative had been in Panama in connection with the United War Work Campaign, a letter was sent to the Canal Zone authorities requesting that the name of the Y M C A be no longer used by the club houses, inasmuch as they were no longer under the supervision of the International Committee. The fairness of this request was acknowledged and the Association at once started special service to soldiers. In December a number of secretaries arrived and service buildings were erected at nine different points. The Y M C A enjoyed

The Hawaiian
Islands

The Canal
Zone

the heartiest cooperation from the commanding officers in the district, who were awake to the dissatisfaction among the enlisted men, who had in most cases expected to be sent to France and were disappointed to find themselves out of the zone of active operation. The service was run on parallel lines with that on the continent.

In all the Insular Possessions, and even more so in the Canal Zone, a large service was performed for navy units. This service, which covered points of wider range than that for the military units, deserves, however, a chapter of its own.

CENTER AND CIRCUMFERENCE

The diffused service thus summarized constituted in its totality ^{Complexity of Service} a labor of extraordinary complexity. At each point there were peculiar conditions to be discovered and understood, some inherent in the racial or other characteristics of the men to be served, others in the geographical location and methods of communication. For remote and isolated points, material needs had to be foreseen weeks and even months in advance, and supplies started on their way. Required qualifications of special character enforced searches for individual workers possessing the right combination without disqualifying peculiarities, as difficult sometimes as the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack. Literature and scriptures in many different languages often necessitated special translation and printing. Only by constantly seeking information from officials could the Association keep track of small detachments. While it is not claimed that none were overlooked, it is demonstrable that persistent and intelligent effort was made to locate and serve all. Absence of mention, in this book, of any post or detachment is no evidence that it lacked service, for the utmost possible within space limits has been to indicate types and fields of service with their outstanding characteristics. It was no small responsibility that the Association assumed, nor was the enterprise undertaken without understanding, when the General Secretary of the International Committee offered service to the men in national service.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The operations of the United States Navy during the war extended all over the world. Its forces were stationed at Corfu, Gibraltar, along the Bay of Biscay, at English Channel ports, on the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at Murmansk and Archangel, at various stations in the West Indies, the Canal Zone, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, the Philippines, Shanghai, and Vladivostok, as well as along the entire coast line of the United States, both on the Atlantic and on the Pacific. Marines served with the American Expeditionary Forces and were stationed at Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Cuba. The principal duties at sea to which ships of the Navy were assigned were those of escorting troop and cargo convoys and other vessels to and from European ports; carrying out offensive and defensive measures against enemy submarines in the western Atlantic; duty in the war zone in conjunction with the naval forces of the Allies; patrolling home waters and protecting vessels engaged in the coastwise trade; and salvaging and assisting vessels in distress whether from maritime causes or from attack by the enemy.

Growth of
the Navy

When war was declared there were on the Navy list only 364 vessels, and the regular Navy was composed of 69,059 officers and men. Under the stimulus of an active recruiting campaign, the Navy personnel had grown by July 1, 1917, to 179,171; by April 1, 1918, to 302,302; and by November 11th of the same year to 538,000.¹ During the same period the number of vessels in service had reached a total of 2,003. The naval establishment maintained numerous stations and yards at the home base for training its personnel and maintaining its fleets, including seven Navy yards on the Atlantic and two on the Pacific Coast, submarine bases at five points, nineteen training camps and stations, some twenty naval air stations, and seventeen receiving ships and stations.

Many of these were permanent naval stations, expanded to meet the demands of the war. Training stations, varying in size from twenty men to two or three thousand, were operated in conjunc-

¹ Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1918, p. 72.

tion with or in close vicinity to a number of the Navy yards, receiving stations, and other centers. The greatest of the naval training camps, however, was devoted to that purpose alone. This was the Great Lakes Training Station, near Chicago, which at its maximum had a population of about 50,000 men. At these camps the men were housed in wooden barracks and were put through a schedule of training similar to that prevailing in the Army, except that it lasted ordinarily not more than six weeks. Conditions differed from those in the army camps also, in that recruits were organized in regiments of about 2,000 men each, and communication between the different regiments was prohibited. This was carried out with special strictness at Great Lakes, where lines were laid down between the regimental areas and the enlisted men forbidden to cross them.

After receiving preliminary training at the camps, the naval recruits were transferred to active service on board vessels of the fleet or at the operating bases. Thirteen districts served as the principal bases for the home fleet, centering about Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Key West, New Orleans, Great Lakes, San Francisco, Bremerton, Honolulu, and the Canal Zone. At these points almost the entire personnel of the Navy was concentrated when not operating on the high seas. In many respects conditions at these seaboard points were different from those in the training camps. A large part of the sailor population was no longer stationary. Numbers of dreadnoughts, mine layers, submarine chasers, destroyers, and miscellaneous navy craft, which were fitted out at the navy yards, put into these ports when operating in home waters. The activities which went on at these centers included all those required by ships and men under such circumstances, and their equipment included navy yards, receiving ships and stations, submarine bases, patrol hospitals, officers' schools, technical schools, and detention camps. After cruises lasting for days, weeks, and even months, in the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific, ships and men returned to the home base for much needed rest. Crews waiting for ships were quartered at these points for short periods, and armed guards for merchant vessels were trained here.

The Marine Corps in the United States was trained in three main camps, and small detachments were also stationed at some of the naval establishments just mentioned. At Mare Island, Cal., there was a small camp and recruiting center. Marines entering the service from western states were kept there for preliminary training only

and subsequently transferred to one of the eastern camps. The Marines established themselves at Quantico, Va., early in May, 1917. By June, 1,000 men were in camp and a few weeks later quarters for 6,500 men were completed. The largest camp was at Paris Island, near Beaufort, S. C. This had become a Marine Station in October, 1915, and shortly after the outbreak of hostilities began to receive large numbers of recruits. Its capacity was 20,000 men, and that number was reached many times during the war. The Island is only a strip of sand and marsh, remote from the accustomed lines of travel, and possessing few, if any, attractive features of its own. Without the hard work characteristic of Marines in training and the recreative facilities provided by the Government and the welfare societies, it would have proved a dreary place indeed. As a training station, it was composed of four rather distinct camps: the receiving barracks, where recruits were examined and sworn in; the maneuver grounds, where preliminary training was carried on during the quarantine period; the training camp, where preliminary training was completed; and the main station, where the activities of the camp were directed. Each camp was complete in itself and separated from the others by a distance of from three-quarters of a mile to four miles. Visiting from camp to camp was forbidden.

In addition to the men in training in the United States, the Marine Corps had forces of occupation in the West Indies. Some units had been in Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo as long as four years before the war. With the purchase of the Virgin Islands, a force was dispatched to garrison them. In all, a force of approximately 7,500 men were stationed in the West Indies in 42 main camps, seven of which were in Cuba, ten in Haiti, seventeen in Santo Domingo, and eight in the Virgin Islands.

Pre-War Work
for the Navy

The first Navy Association was opened in 1899, in a rented building near the Navy Yard in Brooklyn. Its rapid development and evident usefulness led Miss Helen Gould (Mrs. Finley J. Shepard) to provide a permanent building, which was completed in 1902. Continued growth soon rendering this building inadequate, it was enlarged in 1907 through the generosity of Mrs. Russell Sage. Other Associations were organized in rapid succession, until, in April, 1917, the men of the Navy and Marine Corps were being served by ten Navy Y M C A's.

These Associations offered to all the men of the Navy all the features of the regular City Associations. There was no membership

fee, and the services for which a charge was made, such as dormitories, restaurants and lockers, were available at prices considerably below those prevailing in commercial establishments. The Association not only had a large part in providing these comforts and conveniences for the men, but promoted among them its standard four-fold program. During the year preceding America's entrance into the war, the Navy Associations reported 6,742 men in athletic contests of various sorts, and 70,225 men in attendance at 513 socials and entertainments. A vital religious work was carried on among the sailors. During this period 700 religious meetings were held, with an average attendance of 1,098, and 29 courses of Bible study were conducted, with an average attendance at each session of 27 men. The Enlisted Men's Bible and Prayer League, an organization for men of the Army and Navy, enlisted 3,384 new members, and the Total Abstinence League 857.

When the war came, therefore, the Y M C A had a solid foundation upon which to build its naval service. The Navy Department gave official recognition in General Orders No. 313, July 26, 1917:

"The Y M C A is prepared by experience, proved methods and assured resources to serve our enlisted men. . . . It contributes to the happiness, contentment and morale of the personnel . . . and cordial recognition is hereby given it."

IN THE WORLD WAR

The work during succeeding months was largely that of expansion to correspond with the growth of the Navy itself.

The work with the Navy at home fell into two main categories, following the lines of the two types of stations already described—training camps and points along the seaboard used as active operating bases for naval vessels. The character of the service rendered was determined by the conditions prevailing at the centers of each type. As it is impossible to give an account of the work at each point, special reference will be made to the largest training station, Great Lakes, and to the largest base, New York, with a running sketch of other points reached by the Association where similar service was rendered.

The work at the training stations, especially those removed from active operating bases, such as Great Lakes and Pelham Bay, was in general similar to that done in the army camps and cantonments. As this is already familiar to the reader, only the variations

Work at
Training Stations

due to the peculiar conditions of naval service need be mentioned. Among these was the policy of isolating regiments, already referred to, one effect of which was to prevent the circulation through the camp of men who might otherwise have sought out their friends and acquaintances in adjoining units. At the Great Lakes Station, the Y M C A at the request of the Camp Commander, undertook to provide ■ hut for each regimental area, 22 separate huts in all. While this policy necessitated the erection of more than twice the number of buildings ordinarily supplied for the same number of men, testimony of both officers and secretaries at this and other stations demonstrated that it was entirely worth while.

Canteens

In the army camps, the post exchange, managed and operated by officers and soldiers under regulations of the War Department, was an effective agency for supplying the need of a general store for soldiers. No such institution was officially provided for in the Navy, probably because of the proximity of most of its shore stations to cities where sailors found ordinary purchasing facilities. In the permanent Navy buildings of the Y M C A it had been customary to run small stores for the sale of refreshments and minor articles of personal use. Although the policy of the Y M C A did not, in general, include the operation of canteens, a few exceptions were made, at the request of local commanders in camps where such facilities were not otherwise provided. They were conducted along the same lines as the army post exchange. Goods were sold at prices slightly above cost, without counting rental or the services of the canteen secretaries, and any profits were used in general welfare work at the camp.

Banking

Banking and safety deposit service was universally provided. In the army camps this was supplementary to the facilities offered by banking houses in the vicinity, but as many of the naval camps were located at isolated points, and the sailors had less opportunity for leave than did the soldiers, the need for banking facilities was in their case greater. This service consisted of the payment of cashier's checks and bank drafts outright, the acceptance of money orders and personal checks for payment within twenty-four hours, and the acceptance on deposit of money, securities, and other valuables. The proportions reached by this service are indicated by the fact that during the summer and fall of 1918 the bankable papers passing through Great Lakes alone reached the volume of over \$50,000 a month. In some regiments, the officers insisted upon the men taking their money to the Y M C A building to be deposited for safe-keeping. While this

service was a departure from the ordinary camp work of the Association, it filled a clearly demonstrated need, developed a habit of saving, and prevented possible thefts.

The educational work in the Navy camps also required a special Education program. The educational standard of the Navy personnel was comparatively high. There were very few illiterates or foreigners unable to speak or read the English language. On the other hand, there was a demand for instruction in mathematics, navigation, electrical engineering, and other subjects, mastery of which would enable a man to attain a higher rating. As the period of training was so short, it was impracticable to attempt educational work requiring long periods of intensive study, but the Educational Department prepared short courses in arithmetic, algebra, and trigonometry, including the elements of these subjects most essential to the Navy men. The response to this opportunity for serious study is evidenced by the fact that at Great Lakes alone during a single month in the summer of 1918, 5,077 students, or approximately 10 per cent of the entire population of the camp, were enrolled in educational classes.

The religious work at the Great Lakes Training Station, though Religious Work neither distinct in form or purpose from that carried on in the army camps nor typical of that done in other naval camps, attained so decided a success that it is worthy of mention here. Its outstanding feature was the Bible study program, and the basis of its success was the active cooperation of the teaching staff of business and professional men from Chicago, Milwaukee, and neighboring cities.¹ In August, 1917, the decision was made to push the plan of Bible study in all regiments. The hour between nine and ten o'clock each Sunday morning was set aside for this purpose and arrangements were made with the chaplains whereby this would involve no conflict with their services. The next step was to solicit the aid of interested civilians. Although at first only a few leaders were secured, the number gradually increased as the interest in the work became apparent and on the Sunday before the Armistice 185 civilian leaders came to the station. During the two years of service 556 different civilians assisted as Bible class leaders. The growth of the work may be indicated by the attendance record. In August, 1917, there were six classes with an attendance of 53; in August, 1918, there were 801 classes with an attendance of 41,348. When the Y M C A celebrated its second anniversary, in April, 1919, there had been held a total of 1,295 classes

¹ Consult Chapter XVII.

with an aggregate attendance of 388,259. Throughout an extended period approximately 20 per cent of the entire population of the station were regular attendants at Bible classes.

While the canteens, banking system, and educational work were the outstanding features of the navy training camps, it must be remembered that at the same time a full Association program, already described in connection with the army work, was being carried on, with such modifications as local conditions required. In many ways the work at Great Lakes was unique. The large proportion of buildings to the number of troops offered an opportunity for intensive work hardly equaled anywhere in the Association's experience. Other camps likewise presented their peculiar problems. At Cape May, in New Jersey, for instance, which is a summer resort and almost entirely deserted in the winter, the canteen was an important factor. A barber shop was needed, which the Y M C A supplied, and as no other laundry was available, the Association opened and operated one for the benefit of the men.

Aero
Stations

Each of the twenty aero stations established by the Navy Department was served by the Association. These stations were located principally along the coast in the Southern states, with scattered stations in New England and on the Pacific Coast. They were operated for the most part in connection with other naval establishments and need no special notice other than the fact that service was begun in a small way in temporary tent quarters, generally at the opening of the camps, and was expanded and improved during the succeeding months.

Work at
Operating Bases:
New York

The different conditions under which the men lived and worked at the operating bases on the seaboard made the welfare problem at these points somewhat different from that in the training camps. Owing to the constant shifting of personnel with the arrival and departure of ships, and to the fact that the men on leave from the ships were away from their accustomed living quarters, the first essentials of welfare work became a place where food and lodging could be obtained at reasonable cost, together with opportunities for rest, recreation, and communication with friends and relatives.

The New York District, including the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the Receiving Ship Barracks at Bay Ridge, the training camp at Pelham Bay, and fourteen centers of activity, was the largest of the operating bases. Naval vessels of all kinds fitted out in the Navy Yard, and transports and convoying ships made New York Harbor their base. More than a million soldiers were returned from overseas on Navy

ships through this port. It has been estimated that as many as 50,000 sailors and marines were either stationed in or going through the city each day.

The most extensive work in the district was carried on in the Navy Y M C A building near the Brooklyn Navy Yard. This building, whose doors for fifteen years had stood open to welcome sailors and marines, now became a center of ever-increasing activity. The average sailor obtaining leave after a cruise came ashore with a very definite idea in mind of what he wanted. He must have a clean bed, if possible in a private room. He must have a bath and a good meal with all the "trimmings" which were denied him while on board ship. He wanted candy, soda, cigarets and the other delicacies dear to the American youth. He wanted his mail and a place to write letters, and after having his fill of sightseeing and amusement, which the big city afforded, he wanted a place to lounge and to rest. All of these things were provided by the Brooklyn Association. Its patronage was limited only by the capacity of the building. It is not too much to say that ten other institutions of equal size could easily have been used to good advantage. An idea of the work done may be gained from the following facts. Five to six thousand men made their headquarters in the building each day. The 800 beds in the building were all in use practically every night. Its restaurant served more than 2,000 meals each day, the average price of which was thirty cents. More than \$1,000,000 were deposited for safe-keeping each year during the war. During the period of the war, the Naval Postal Service received, gave out and forwarded more than 750,000 letters, papers and parcels, and during the year 1918 mail was called for by 84,000 men every month. It is estimated that 1,500,000 requests for mail were received during the entire period. Educational lectures, practical talks, classes for the study of mathematics and navigation, socials and entertainments were attended by 243,352 men during the war period. Over 200 women gave full or part time in providing entertainment, suppers, sightseeing parties, and other social features.

The Brooklyn building was also used extensively in connection with the training of the men stationed in the Yard and neighboring points. It was early discovered that many hundreds of men who had enlisted for naval service were unable to swim. Classes were organized and instruction given in the Association pool. The Association provided instructors and maintained this work without cost either to the Navy or to the men. During the summer and fall of 1918 some

500 men each day were given swimming instruction in the building, while during the year a total of 78,700 men used the pool. During the same period 52,000 made use of the gymnasium.

In addition to the service rendered in the Navy Yard, Association centers were established at the sixteen other points in the New York District. These points served a daily total of 25,000 men and necessitated the employment of 30 secretaries. At the Receiving Ships Barracks at Bay Ridge and the Federal Rendezvous and Marine Basin at Bensonhurst, special buildings were erected. At all other points except one, quarters were provided by the Navy Department. At St. George, Staten Island, by the courtesy of the Borough of Richmond, the Association was permitted to share the St. George Hotel with the Red Cross and thus served the crews of the transports, cruisers and mine sweepers which were anchored off Tompkinsville. The commanding officers at all of these centers strongly endorsed the work, one of them stating that the Y M C A secretary was as valuable to him as any officer at his station.

Similar operations were carried on in each of the thirteen naval districts, with the exception of Great Lakes.¹ The second largest district was at Hampton Roads, Va. From 25,000 to 30,000 men were stationed here at all times, and a larger number from time to time when the Atlantic Fleet put in at the operating base for rest. In the permanent camps, seven special buildings were erected; the outstanding service rendered in the Norfolk District centered, however, in the permanent Association buildings. Two permanent Navy Y M C A's were located in this district—at the St. Helena Naval Training Station and in the city of Norfolk. In addition to these buildings, the Newport News, Portsmouth and Norfolk City Y M C A's devoted the greater part of their attention to work for men in uniform. The rooms and beds, baths, swims, meals, entertainments and club service rendered by these Associations were a large factor in keeping the men of the Navy contented and fit.

In Philadelphia the work centered around the Navy Yard at League Island where from 10,000 to 15,000 sailors and marines were stationed. Early in the summer of 1917, the two permanent buildings—one in Philadelphia, and one at League Island—proved inadequate to meet the demands made upon them. In order to care for the overflow a standard E type hut was erected in September, 1917, in the Yard. An outstanding feature of the work at League Island was the

¹Consult Chapter XVII.

swimming pool. In July, 1917, a generous Philadelphian donated \$15,000 to the National War Work Council for the construction of a pool to be used in connection with the E hut. On September 15th, a pool, 75x25 feet in size, with a capacity of 90,000 gallons of water, was completed. Upon discovering that many men who were located at the Navy Yard could not swim, the commandant issued orders that all officers and men passing through the Philadelphia Navy Yard would be required to learn to swim before being transferred. A regular schedule of instruction, from 8 a.m. to 7.30 p.m., was laid out, and all non-swimmers, or "sinkers," were detailed to the Y M C A instructors for lessons. From the date of its opening to June 30, 1919, 48,679 men used the pool, and of this number 11,261 were taught to swim.

The two naval districts on the New England coast included centers of activity of practically every branch of the Navy. For Y M C A service 38 buildings were being operated in the summer of 1918, requiring the services of 125 secretaries, and distributed as follows: in the Boston District, one permanent Association building and fourteen temporary quarters; on Cape Cod, three huts; at New London, five; at Newport, one permanent Navy Y M C A and eight temporary huts; at Portland, one; at Portsmouth, two; at New Bedford, one; at Rockland, one. More than a score of smaller naval points and nineteen stations of the United States Coast Guards were visited and furnished regularly with supplies.

In the south naval activities centered around three main ports, Charleston, S. C., Key West, Fla., and Pensacola, Fla. Y M C A work was carried on in sixteen special buildings, two at Charleston, five at Key West, four at Pensacola, two at New Orleans and one each at Morehead, N. C., Brunswick, Ga., and Gulf Port, Miss. The service at the Charleston Navy Yard was similar to that carried on at other yards, with the exception that there were no permanent Association buildings, and sleeping quarters were, therefore, not supplied. In the isolated Florida camps and stations, entertainment and recreational features were of special importance. At Key West, civilians at one time were not permitted to visit the Naval Reserves and were therefore unable to furnish entertainment parties. The Y M C A met the situation by producing from three to six motion picture programs a week in each of its five huts. At Miami, on the other hand, the entertainment facilities were exceptionally good. This locality was used extensively by motion picture concerns for the production of plays, and it so happened that while the men at Key West were en-

joying the shadow plays of the movie stars, the men at Miami were being entertained by many of the same stars in person. At these points the banking and canteen facilities were also highly developed. Aquatic sports were organized and extensively engaged in by the men. As in most navy camps, the educational work was devoted largely to technical subjects of special value to navy men. At Charleston alone, more than 100 men were helped to higher ratings through the Y M C A schools.

Bermudas

American submarine chasers and patrol boats made Hamilton, in the Bermuda Islands, a port of frequent call. From November 1, 1917, until the signing of the Armistice, a floating population of from 1,300 to 3,500 American sailors was in this port at all times. The fact that saloons afforded practically the only place for social gatherings naturally resulted in drunkenness and disorder. About January 1, 1918, a committee of American women opened a club house for the recreation of these men. As the facilities were limited, help was requested, and in July, 1918, the Y M C A sent a representative to the Islands. A 40-room hotel, with bowling alley, soda bar, and lounging rooms, was leased and opened in the early part of August. This comfortable and attractive club was conducted jointly by the Y M C A and the American Navy Club into which the American Committee had resolved itself.

Pacific Coast

On the Pacific Coast the Association maintained a full program for sailors and marines. By the spring of 1918 there was no point on the Pacific Coast at which sailors and marines were stationed, except in Alaska, where the Association was not ministering in some way. Except in extent the naval situation on the Pacific Coast was not materially different from that on the Atlantic. The main centers were Puget Sound, San Francisco, San Pedro, San Diego, and Honolulu.

At Bremerton, on Puget Sound, the Association operated five service buildings—a permanent Navy Y M C A near the Navy Yard, two special huts built by the Y M C A and two Government buildings. The educational work at this point was of special importance, most of the common branches being taught as well as some of the higher studies. The entire yeoman's class was put under the Association's direction.

At San Francisco the Y M C A operated two buildings in the city proper, where the sailors were able to procure cheap lodgings with the right environment. In the town of Vallejo, at the northern end of the Bay, the permanent Association building conducted the usual activi-

ties. It was found necessary to add an annex to this building, in order to furnish sufficient sleeping accommodations. On Mare Island a large building was erected, and at the naval training station on Goat Island two service buildings were operated. Extension work for sailors was conducted at the radio station and coaling station at Tamales Bay and Farallone Island, thirty miles out at sea. At San Pedro, California, were located a submarine base and detention camp for the Naval Reserves, at which two buildings and two athletic fields were provided. The most pressing demand made by the submarine crews was for recreation. This was liberally supplied in the huts, many musicians and other entertainers coming from Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena and other cities for this purpose. An extensive work was carried on at San Diego. For the naval training station, located on the Exposition Grounds, the Association secured two large exposition buildings which were attractively furnished and equipped. Service was rendered in a single hut at both the naval patrol stations and the aviation field.

The work in Honolulu was organized early in 1917. The Royal Hawaiian Hotel was secured and remodeled by the Army and Navy Department of the Y M C A at a cost of \$275,000 and operated at a monthly cost of more than \$3,500. This was one of the finest clubs in all the navy work and was used to its utmost capacity. The building was so taxed for beds that the men slept on pool tables, floors and cots, and yet many had to be turned away. Mention should be made in passing that the same familiar work was carried on by the Association at Guam, Olongapo and Cavite, P. I., and Shanghai and Hankow, China.

As Navy Department rulings did not permit the presence of ^{Fleet Service} welfare workers on ships of the Navy while at sea, direct service to men of the fleets was possible only when these vessels put into port. At such times the Association organized entertainment programs aboard the vessels, delivered reading matter, and carried messages to and from the men and their friends and relatives. Under Government regulations a fund of \$5.00 a year per man was available to naval vessels for the purpose of purchasing motion picture machines and leasing films. Naval commanders experienced some difficulty, however, in securing adequate film service, while on some vessels funds were not available to supply adequate equipment. About January 1, 1918, the Association undertook to supply this need. A film service was established at ports touched by vessels of the fleet. When a

vessel reached port it was entitled to receive supplies of films sufficient to insure two programs a week during the time it was to be at sea. These films were furnished at cost to vessels having funds for this purpose, and free to those without means of compensation. In January, 1919, the Navy Department requested the welfare societies to furnish, in addition to the film service, recreational equipment for 449 ships of the Navy at a cost of \$392 each. Acting on this request, the Y M C A, Knights of Columbus and Jewish Welfare Board set aside a fund of approximately \$230,000 for this purpose. The proportion of this fund paid by the Association was 74.9 per cent.

Work for
Marines :
Quantico

In the Marine training camps the Association rendered the same service which proved so successful at army and navy camps. At Quantico, ground was broken on June 27, 1917, for a Y M C A building which was completed within two months. As early as the time of its dedication, October 24th, this building was already inadequate for the needs of the camp, and a second was erected in the summer of 1918. The equipment was finally completed with the erection of a large gymnasium just across from the main hut. Here all the indoor athletics of the camp centered, and here, too, important meetings were held. During the year of demobilization a university was established and all types of educational work were offered. In May, 1919, the Post Commander, hearing that the Association was hard pressed for room for its educational work, turned over one of the officers' barracks to be used as a camp headquarters building.

Paris
Island

The Y M C A began its work on Paris Island on July 10, 1917, but did not get well under way until about August 1st. Two buildings were furnished by the Government, and later two standard service buildings were erected. At least one secretary was located permanently at the hospital from the beginning. Until after the Armistice was signed the only post office on the Island was at the main station, branch offices not having been established. This circumstance, combined with the fact that visits to the main station by men of the other camps were practically impossible, furnished the opportunity for the welfare forces to do a very distinct service in connection with handling of mail and money. Until January, 1919, practically all the outgoing mail at the receiving barracks, maneuver grounds, and training camps was handled by the Association. The post office reported that the Y M C A sold three-fourths of all the stamps canceled at Paris Island during the period of the war. Between September 1, 1917, and May 1, 1919, nearly 1,500,000 pieces of mail were handled by

the four Y M C A units. The money order, banking, and telegram service also proved a great boon to the Marines. The Y M C A often received and deposited as much as \$3,000 a day. Prior to the Christmas furloughs which were granted in 1918, secretaries accepted 1,978 telegrams in two days. The local office at Beaufort was taxed beyond capacity, and it was necessary to forward some of these messages to the station at Savannah. On September 20, 1918, the Y M C A published the first issue of *The Marine*, a weekly newspaper, associated with the National *Trench and Camp* service, which gave fresh and important news weekly to all men of the Island. The last issue was published on August 20, 1919.

Not the least of the service rendered to the Marines was that carried on by the Association in the West Indies. This was started in 1918 under the supervision of a general secretary and three assistants. The cooperation with officers was hearty and cordial. Due to local conditions it was impracticable to place secretaries at each point, but a satisfactory and practical arrangement was substituted through the cooperation of the chaplains. The chaplain at each point was provided with funds and equipment which he used at his own discretion. By this system it was possible to supply all posts with stationery, victrolas, records, current magazines and athletic equipment. Each of the larger camps was supplied with player pianos, quantities of music rolls, and pool tables. Where electric current was not available Delco lighting systems were used to provide current for motion pictures. Some of the special services which might be mentioned were the supplying of shot guns and ammunition for hunting parties, as well as of canoes for use on the river and the bay, and construction of a hunting lodge at Guantanamo Bay for the use of parties going to that point for more than one day's leave. Finally, every single detachment of marines in the West Indies received Association service and supplies.

To sum up, the Association endeavored to serve men of the Navy and Marine Corps wherever they were stationed. The work was established on the secure footing of eighteen years of service and was practically a continuation of peace-time work expanded to meet war-time needs. During the combat period this expansion took place coincidentally with the increase in personnel and stations of the Navy itself. In the majority of cases the Y M C A began its service at the time of, or shortly after, the opening of each station. In some cases it even preceded the arrival of troops, in others it lagged behind for

West
Indies

Transfer to the
Navy

periods of varying length. Following the Armistice the Association continued its program of service to men of the Navy and Marine Corps. The work reached its maximum extent at about the end of 1918. On January 1, 1919, the naval establishment of the Y M C A was as follows:

<i>Department—</i>	<i>Centers</i>	<i>Units</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Northeastern	11	26	70
Eastern	15	37	146
Southeastern	7	17	54
Southern	1	2	5
Central	1	22	130
Western	8	16	70
Insular Possessions	6	11	7
Total	49	131	482

The extent to which this equipment was used by men of the Navy and Marine Corps is indicated by the fact that during December, 1918, there were more than 2,700,000 visits paid to these huts. In the months that followed, the report of the Association service with men of the naval establishment showed a gradual decrease in the number of men served and the volume of service rendered, due to the gradual demobilization of these forces.

While the work with the Navy presented its own problems the lively interest and the active cooperation of the naval authorities smoothed out many difficulties and made possible a maximum service—a service which demonstrated itself to be a necessary part of the Navy's work, for as a result of war-time experiences the Navy Department decided in October, 1919, to incorporate all welfare work as part of the naval establishment. The words of the Secretary of the Navy himself are the best testimony to the results and value of the Association's service, and are quoted as a fitting conclusion to this chapter:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

7th October, 1919.

From: The Secretary of the Navy

To: The Young Men's Christian Association

The Navy Department wishes to express its appreciation of all that your organization has done for the officers and men during the war with the Central Powers. The Navy believes that a large share of the credit of victory should be given your organization for its work

in ministering to the men of the Navy and feels that the greatest compliment, the most sincere expression of its regard, lies in the decision to perpetuate your good work by means of a permanent organization within the Navy itself. No fuller recognition could be given the importance of welfare work. In order that there may be no duplication of effort, entire freedom from danger of confusion, and that the officers of the Navy may be trained to do this work themselves, I have approved the recommendations of a Board composed of representatives from all the corps of the Navy which are brought into intimate contact with the men.

In taking such action I have carefully considered the points above mentioned and feel that with the cordial cooperation and assistance of your organization this work will go forward to the permanent and lasting benefit of the men in the Navy. This object, the welfare of these men who devote their lives to their country, whether in peace or in war, is of course the objective which you and I alike are striving to attain. The battle efficiency of the Navy must depend upon the character of its training in time of peace. The structure upon which the fighting forces of the country must depend is the morale, the integrity of character and purpose which is built up in the men of the Navy.

This peace time training in character then becomes of tremendous importance. I have recognized this and have ordered that the service of some of the best officers of the Navy be wholly devoted to the welfare of the men of the Navy. Every officer, of course, constantly bears this in mind and is deeply interested in his men, but this organization I have ordered established has welfare as its sole duty. Its mission is "To Aid Constituted Authority to Maintain a High Morale," and there can never be the highest morale without the vital influence of religion and the spiritual life.

I am, therefore, writing to you to request that you assist the Navy in carrying out the program as herewith laid down. Its success depends in a large measure upon your cordial and sympathetic cooperation. We must above all avoid any break in the continuity of the work which you have carried on for the Navy and whose value you have so well demonstrated.

(Signed)
Josephus Daniels.

PART III

SERVICE WITH THE

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

CHAPTER XXV

CREATING THE EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION OVERSEAS

Of all the many contrasts which developed between welfare service to Americans at home and in France, the most radical were those which grew out of the instability of military conditions. At home the American military organization was in undisturbed control. The executive organization of the Y M C A, built out of seasoned material ready at hand, corresponded to the military organization, and neither underwent modification of a fundamental character. Overseas the American commander was, by agreement, subordinate to the Allied supreme commander and his council. For a full year after the first American troops reached France, the military initiative remained indisputably with the Germans; the total Allied forces were barely sufficient to maintain a defense whose only plan was to anticipate threatened attacks and to stop gaps as they appeared, with whatever troops were available at the moment. Changes in troop distribution and rapid enlargement of the forces continually threw the welfare organization out of gear.

Moreover, the executive organization of the Y M C A had to be created from the ground up. Except for a few experienced leaders, the American personnel was not in France, and service began before they arrived and grew faster than the staff. A division of labor and responsibility based upon the assumption that enough workers will be available, requires radical alteration when every individual has to assume several more or less unrelated rôles.

American Y M C A activity in the World War began in 1914. It consisted of the unique service to prisoners and interned civilians in all the countries involved, and of direct participation, through contribution of men and money, in the service rendered to the French Army by the Foyers du Soldat, and to the various British forces on all fighting fronts by the British national Y M C A's. Concerning the service, Lord Bryce wrote in July, 1917: Initial
Y M C A Assets
Overseas

"I can truly say that I have heard from every quarter including many naval and military authorities, the warmest acknowledgment of the excellent work done by the Y M C A during these three ter-

rible years of war, for the British and Canadian and Australian soldiers both in the camps here and at home and among the troops on the various fighting fronts."

Leaders
Overseas

No one had gained more intimate or broader experience in this service to the Allies than Edward Clark Carter. His career as a secretary of the International Committee had developed both vision and organizing ability. Graduated from Harvard College in 1900, he had served as Graduate Manager of Phillips Brooks House, where the social service and student religious activities of Harvard University are centered. He had been sent to India as a representative of the International Committee. After a brief period as traveling secretary, he was chosen National Secretary for India and Ceylon, a post which he filled for five years. In 1908 he was recalled to serve as Executive Secretary of the Student Department of the International Committee, supervising work in colleges and universities throughout the United States and Canada. In 1911 he resumed his former position in India, where he supported responsibilities similar in nature, within national limits, to those of the General Secretary of the International Committee.

With the outbreak of the war in 1914, Mr. Carter threw himself into service to British and Indian troops. This embraced not only the usual welfare and recreational service for troops in India, but with the expeditionary forces serving in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Gallipoli, East Africa, and France. In Mesopotamia, East Africa and India, it included the establishment and operation of canteen service as well. He was responsible for the organization and direction of the enterprise, including cooperation in raising of funds, purchase of supplies and equipment, and recruiting workers. In 1916 he visited America to secure funds and workers for India, and then was loaned to the British Y M C A for which, as Associate General Secretary, he worked in expanding the service to British troops in England, France, Egypt and Saloniki.

Although the early arrival of American troops in France was not anticipated, there were many Americans serving in various capacities with the Allies, and sailors from American ships were already appearing at French and British ports. Before Dr. Mott started on his special mission to Russia in May, 1917, he recommended to the National War Work Council that Mr. Carter be placed in charge of work in Europe for American troops and that Darius A. Davis be placed in charge of work for the French Army and the forces of the

Allies. On May 28th, Mr. Brockman, Acting General Secretary of the Council in Dr. Mott's absence, cabled to Mr. Carter to secure release from his British engagement and do everything possible to establish service for American soldiers and sailors in Great Britain and France. On the same day a corresponding cablegram was sent to Mr. Davis.

Darius A. Davis was graduated in 1907 from Syracuse University, where he was President of his class, of the Student Body organization, and of the University Y M C A. To these evidences of leadership among his fellows, he added the athletic ability of stroke of the 'varsity crew. After three years as one of the secretaries in the Y M C A at Washington, D. C., he was sent by the International Committee to Constantinople as General Secretary of the Association there. During the Balkan War he led in the organization of Red Cross Work, serving as first assistant to the head surgeon. While in Constantinople he served as treasurer of the American Chamber of Commerce, which gave him intimate knowledge of American commercial interests in the East, as well as of leading men of all races. During the earlier years of the World War, Mr. Davis represented the International Committee, in cooperation with the World's Committee, in work for prisoners of war in France, and also represented the International Committee in the Y M C A work for the French soldiers known as the Foyers du Soldat. His acquaintance with the French language and customs, and with leading men, both American and European, in France was a valuable asset.

Americans who had joined the Ambulance Corps and other branches of Allied service frequently appeared in Paris on leave, and the idea of establishing an American club for them had occurred to several persons. At a meeting called by Mr. Davis on April 13, 1917, at the Hotel du Palais, 19 Americans prominent in the business and social life of Paris, were present, fifteen of whom were, or had been, members of the Y M C A. An Executive Committee was organized May 9, 1917, of which the chairman was James R. Barbour, a successful Massachusetts business man of wide experience, who had been in Paris from October, 1914, as chief organizer of the American Relief Clearing House. A subscription list was opened, and funds were secured to start operations.

Mr. Carter arrived in Paris to take up his duties on June 8th. The Paris Committee had already secured local subscriptions amounting approximately to 100,000 francs, and had leased a large residence at 31 Avenue Montaigne. This building was opened on June 11th as

The Paris
Committee

administrative headquarters for the Association work throughout France, and a few days later as an Association center for Americans, providing lounging and reading rooms and facilities for recreation—tennis, baseball grounds, and excursions.

Offer of Service
to General
Pershing

General Pershing arrived in Paris with his staff June 13th. He found awaiting him a letter which placed the Association at the Army's disposal, outlined the program of activities it proposed and expressed the earnest desire to be of service in any way whatever that might be considered desirable and feasible. A week later a detailed estimate was submitted of the materials, facilities, and military privileges likely to be needed in rendering efficient service to the oncoming American troops. Conferences ensued in which, among other suggestions, the possibility of the Association assuming the operation of post exchanges, or army canteens, in France was considered. At the request of General Pershing, the Chief Secretary stated that the Y M C A would undertake this responsibility if desired.¹ The matter remained under advisement at General Headquarters until September 6th, when General Orders No. 33² was issued authorizing and prescribing the conduct of Post Exchanges by the Association.

Meanwhile on July 9th a more specific statement of proposed activities was submitted to General Pershing. This contemplated service to officers and men all the way from ports of entry to the fighting line. It included the establishment of huts, clubs, cafés and hotels, the provision of lectures, educational classes, entertainments, athletics, religious services, and direct and indirect safeguards for the moral and physical welfare of the troops. The intention to undertake recreational work with the French troops was also stated. On July 16th, General Pershing by letter heartily approved the program. A series of orders, bulletins, and memoranda was issued granting the necessary military authority and cooperation for all Association activities in the A E F.³

The First
Overseas Party
of Workers

The first party of Association workers, composed of about twenty men, sailed from New York for Bordeaux, June 25, 1917. Lewis A. Crossett of Boston, member of the War Work Council, accompanied the party as a delegate of the Council, to exercise an advisory and coordinating function while he should remain in Paris. On this visit he spent about six weeks in France and Great Britain.

¹ For full statement on Post Exchange, consult Chapter XXX.

² See Vol. II, Appendix V, p. 545.

³ See Vol. II, Appendix II, pp. 498-506.

Shortly after the cablegrams had been sent to Messrs. Carter and Davis, Frederic B. Shipp, General Secretary of the Pittsburgh Y M C A, was requested by the War Work Council to go overseas for a period of six months as its special representative. His duty was to counsel and cooperate in developing service for the soldiers and sailors of the A E F. Mr. Shipp had participated in Association service to American soldiers in the Spanish War, and for a short period had served as Executive Secretary of the International Committee for work in the United States. He arrived in France early in July, accompanied by Francis B. Sayre who went over to give two months' service, in whatever capacity he might be found most useful. They found the Paris Committee with Messrs. Carter, Davis, Crossett and his party, busy at headquarters. A tentative division of labor was adopted at an informal meeting, July 19th. Mr. Davis became responsible for the increasing work with the French Army, for transportation, and for relationships with supporters in France. Mr. Shipp took charge of office and business administration, and personnel. Mr. Carter undertook general supervision of activities and conduct of negotiations with government, military, and other welfare organization officials. Under the direction of these three the organization of a few bureaus and departments of basic character was delegated to the other members of the small staff. A cabinet was organized consisting of eight heads of bureaus and departments, with Mr. Carter as chairman.

With this assumption of responsibility by accredited representatives of the National War Work Council, the Paris Volunteer Committee disbanded on July 21st, having played a significant part, providing funds for immediate expenses in advance of cabled credits, preparing service for the disembarking 1st Division at St. Nazaire and a recreation center for Americans in Paris, and pioneering the great Association service which was to be developed. Responsibility as Chief Secretary for the A E F-Y M C A and Representative of the War Work Council in France and Great Britain was lodged with Mr. Carter. At the request of Messrs. Carter and Crossett, approved by cable from New York headquarters, F. B. Shipp consented to act for six months as Associate Secretary and Treasurer with the general responsibility for business affairs.

During the early months the number of workers arriving from America was inadequate, and did not include the required number of men possessing the qualities of executive leadership. This necessi-

tated the bearing of the greater part of the administrative burdens by the Chief Secretary and the Associate Chief Secretary. These responsibilities were delegated to competent leaders as fast as they arrived, according to a tentative plan of organization.¹

Increasing work necessitated more adequate office accommodations, and after considerable search and negotiation, Association headquarters were moved on November 26th from the building on Avenue Montaigne to an unfinished building at 12 rue d'Aguesseau, in a more central and convenient downtown location for administrative purposes. Seven other departmental offices were established later within easy radius of communication.

Service for American soldiers and for sailors and marines in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece, as well as in France, was included in the responsibilities of the Paris executives. Headquarters for the A E F-Y M C A in the United Kingdom were established at 47 Russell Square, London, under the direction of Robert L. Ewing, and later for the service for naval men with Edgar MacNaughten in charge, both reporting to Paris. A secondary office for naval service was located in Paris. Mr. Ewing and Mr. MacNaughten were both experienced secretaries of the International Committee, and had been in the active service for prisoners of war, the former in Great Britain and the latter in Austria-Hungary. Mr. MacNaughten had also sustained a leading relation to the regular Army and Navy Department of the International Committee.

The overseas organization was under a dual supervision. Its authority, gradually defined as experience accumulated, was drawn from the National War Work Council upon whom rested the ultimate responsibility. As a part of the A E F, it was under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief. To the Council it looked for money and workers, and general counsel as to all important matters of policy: to the Commander for facilities and privileges necessary for the performance of work. While the Council determined the share of total resources available for overseas work in the light of relative claims of many other fields of service, the Army could and did prescribe rules for procedure in the camps and for movements of workers and supplies. Moreover, as the officially designated organization for welfare service, the A E F-Y M C A was subject to requests both for increased service of the regular types to any specified unit of the forces, and for

¹ For the plan of organization, see Plate X facing p. 454.

service of unanticipated kinds by which the Commander believed its usefulness would be increased. Compliance with such requests was regarded as obligatory by the overseas executives, and sometimes compelled commitments before proper authorization could be procured from America.

Between these two controls it was inevitable that perplexing problems should occasionally arise. The novelty of service to expeditionary troops made impossible any advance definition of the scope and limits of the authority to be delegated; and in view as well of the relation to the Army, the War Work Council in practice allowed great latitude and freedom to the Paris executives who had been chosen because of their proved ability and character. Their first-hand knowledge of conditions, which outran the imaginations of any who had not personally studied them, could not be adequately communicated to men 3,000 miles away, because of slowness of mail and cable service and because of the limitation of the censorship. The situation was one calling for a high degree of mutual trust and confidence, rather than for prescription and regulation, and was so recognized.

On the military side, the Army was occupied primarily with its problems as a fighting organization. Welfare service, officially recognized as indispensable, must be conducted without interference with paramount military operations. Having defined the field of welfare activity in a broad way, and having transferred temporarily to the Y M C A certain types of service such as the post exchange and leave areas, the Commander, through the General Staff, concerned himself with the prescription of regulations designed to "gear in" the Y M C A organization as a part of the military machine. From time to time the Y M C A executives made known what they considered indispensable facilities for the work with which they were charged, and the General Staff responded with authorization of such as it found permissible in the situation and with instruction as to the procedure to be followed. In practice, both requests and instruction were formulated in conferences of the Y M C A with representatives of the General Staff, and the arrangements evolved as a result of trial and experience.

The relations with the home organization were conducted chiefly through the Overseas Department in New York, and its supervising Committees on the A E F and on Allied Armies.¹ C. V. Hibbard, head

Liaison with
New York

¹ Consult Chapter XIII, pp. 221-223.

of the Overseas Department in New York, who was already familiar with conditions in Europe, kept his knowledge up to date by occasional visits to the overseas field. The home bureaus concerned with overseas work were four—finance, war personnel, women's work, and overseas purchasing. To these was added later the overseas entertainment bureau. The activities bureaus, religious, educational, and the like, had of course a sympathetic interest and maintained a semi-official correspondence with the similar bureaus overseas, but their official responsibility was limited to the home field. In cooperation with the Personnel Board they helped materially in the selection and recruiting of special workers.

With the four bureaus named, the overseas organization was in constant communication as to workers, supplies, and funds. Its budgets were submitted to the Finance Bureau, which also exercised general supervision over its accounts through the accountants designated for this responsibility.

On July 28, 1917, the Adjutant General issued a Memorandum to the Chief Secretary for circulation among all workers, calling attention to the fact that "they are now considered as thoroughly militarized and are, consequently, subject to all the rules, regulations and orders which apply to soldiers in the zone of the armies."¹ On August 14th the Commander-in-Chief notified the Allied Commanders to the same effect.² On August 24th the personnel of the Y M C A was authorized to wear the uniform of the United States Army,³ and on August 28th, General Orders No. 26 prescribed the broad division of the field of relief and welfare work between the Red Cross and the Y M C A.⁴

Negotiations with the Army were conducted by the Chief Secretary, directly with the Commander-in-Chief on fundamental matters, and with the appropriate sections of the General Staff in details. The First Section of the General Staff, known as G—1, exercised general supervision over welfare and relief organizations. The second Section, G—2, was concerned with certain aspects of the militarization and movements of civilian workers, and with negotiations with the Allied Headquarters and the Fourth Section, G—4, with construction, transportation, and coordination of supplies. After general principles

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix II, p. 498.

² The same, p. 499.

³ The same, pp. 499, 500.

⁴ The same, p. 499.

had been adopted, negotiations as to actual operations were carried on direct between the heads of departments of the Y M C A and the staff officers. For nearly the entire first year, the General Staff had an inadequate working personnel, a condition duplicated in the Y M C A, and negotiation proceeded with remarkably little friction considering that all concerned were carrying excessive burdens of responsibility and labor.

The National War Work Council based its first appeal for \$3,000,-000 in May, 1917, on the estimated needs for home work until December 31, 1917. In July, Messrs. Crossett, Carter, Davis, and Shipp, assisted by members of the English and Canadian Overseas Associations, framed a budget for equipment and maintenance of service for troops increasing to a maximum of 250,000. This budget, estimated to cover the needs until the end of 1917, amounted to \$5,000,-000. When it reached New York, the total sums collected for war work were only slightly in excess of this overseas budget alone.

In making their budget for 1917, the overseas executives were frankly anticipating needs of the future. They had watched the shrinking stocks and rising prices of European markets since 1914, and were anxious to secure the maximum reserve of supplies before stocks were swallowed up by the flood of American troops and before shipping space from America should become practically unobtainable. Lumber was already scarce, yet hundreds of huts would be needed. Motor cars could still be had, and the day would come when a large fleet of trucks independent of army transport would have immeasurable value in terms of service. If an organization, skeletonized at least on an adequate scale, with strong men in key positions, could be set up in advance, expansion would be easy in comparison with reorganization under pressure. With such aims in mind, the overseas executives sent requisition after requisition for men, money, and supplies, which, with the acceptance in September of responsibility for the post exchanges, took on huge proportions.

As cablegrams and letters followed in rapid succession, the National War Work Council became very solicitous as to their ability to meet the requisitions. On October 19, 1917, the Finance Committee by cablegram asked for full information before placing further orders. The following day Mr. Shipp cabled the committee to the effect that commitments for buildings, huts, tents and equipment to date, amounted to \$1,100,000; for canteen supplies \$260,000. Operations were being conducted on the basis of the budget submitted in July.

The whole war work was imperilled if important orders could not be clinched at once. He urged that the budget be approved and the Paris officials trusted to expend the funds wisely. With full knowledge of the baffling conditions, and with realization always of the magnitude of the financial task imposed upon New York headquarters, they were seeking to represent the Association and War Work Council efficiently and economically in meeting the unprecedented needs and opportunities. On October 26th, Mr. Carter cabled that the Finance Committee's request that no commitments be made or orders placed without consulting them could not be complied with under war conditions, and pressed his reasons in the strongest possible manner.

It is easy, after the event, to comprehend the mental state of each group. Upon the Council rested the responsibility for work extending all over the world. The cantonments in the United States were full of men. The Navy must be served. Russia was calling for 500 workers and funds in proportion. To maintain a fair balance, to apportion limited funds so that no part of the work would suffer, was no easy task. The commitments of the Paris executives seemed likely to absorb far more than was warranted by the accepted plan of the War Department for the A E F.

None of these cares were borne by the Paris executives. Upon them impinged the needs, immediate and prospective, of the forces arrived and coming to France. Direct requests for service from officers and men only confirmed the overwhelming desire to serve that grew out of daily observation of the needs of the men. In conference and correspondence with General Headquarters, the responsibilities of the Association were officially interpreted; there could be no alternative to accepting them. The leaders in Paris welcomed the coming of representatives of the Council in New York to see the situation for themselves.

This commission, composed of John Sherman Hoyt, Chairman of the Committee on the A E F, Franklin B. Kirkbride, Philip L. James, and Douglas L. Elliman, arrived in Paris early in November. Their grasp of the situation was promptly shown in a series of cablegrams to New York Headquarters which stated that, after a careful consideration of all factors involved, it was absolutely essential to permit the Paris executives to continue expenditures on the basis of the budget submitted in July. The rapidly rising and contracting markets necessitated instant daily action and it was utterly impossible to report details in advance owing to the rapid shifting of conditions. In the

cables to New York the Commission endorsed absolutely the work done by the Association representatives under the most trying conditions. The results already achieved, the immensity of the task ahead, impressed the Commission with the vital necessity of eliminating any possibility of avoidable failures.

The entire situation overseas was covered in a comprehensive and lucid report which summarized the imperative needs in France as Staff, Supplies, Tonnage; the need in New York—the most perfect machinery for supplying these needs both in quality and quantity. The information and judgments cabled and later brought to America by the Hoyt Commission not only confirmed the insight of the group of leaders in New York who for three years had been studying war conditions at first hand, but they expanded the conceptions of the members of the Council whose knowledge was indirect and inferential. Through the Council the enlarged conceptions spread to the American people. The canteen undertaking, in particular, was put on a firm basis by the provision of adequate capital to be handled in business fashion. Not less important was the stirring of men of large capacity and responsibility to enlist in the welfare service.

The War Work Council sought and secured the services of those who stand among the best men and women in America. Even in the detailed accounts of activities which follow, it is possible to name but a few of these men and women. Considering the general demands made by the war, it was a distinguished tribute to the significance of Y M C A work that so many who carried the heaviest responsibility freed themselves in order to give their ability and strength to this service. The educational and religious leaders were men of national and world reputation, while in the administration of women's work were those whose names stand for leadership in the most significant activities of American women. Because of the immensity of the enterprise, a larger number of such men and women could have been utilized, but it is doubtful if any representative list of leading Americans could be written in which several scores of the Y M C A staff overseas would not necessarily be included.

Utilization of
Prominent Men
and Women

Following the findings and report of the Hoyt Commission and the various conferences of executives and field secretaries, the plans of organization for headquarters and field administration were greatly enlarged. The operations of the Post Exchange necessitated the building up of a business organization of proportions comparable to the greatest corporations and chains of retail stores in the United States.

Simultaneously with the rendering of widespread service, within six months a great organization was created. By January, 1918, relationships between Paris Headquarters and the field, also with New York Headquarters, were well defined and established, and the new plan of Headquarters Organization was put in operation.¹

The work was departmentalized under an executive committee with a smaller committee known as the cabinet, the members being without exception men of the broadest business and administrative experience. The Chief Secretary was chairman and executive officer of both. A limited freedom in expenditures was allowed to heads of departments, all proposed appropriations above a specified limit requiring explicit authorization in advance by the Executive Committee. The functions of the various departments will appear in the special accounts of each which follow.

Maintaining
Contacts

In March another important commission of five members of the War Work Council visited France to inspect and report on the work. Its chairman was Ralph W. Harbison of Pittsburgh, who was also chairman of the Council's Committee on Religious Work, and it included Hon. Le Roy Percy, former U. S. Senator from Mississippi, John C. Acheson, President of the Pennsylvania College for Women, James W. Kennear, attorney, and Rev. Hugh Thomson Kerr. Their report dealt largely with personnel and activities, and emphasized the difference in moral and social conditions surrounding the soldiers in France and the importance of a genuine religious spirit in and through all activities. These men were impressed with the magnitude and difficulties of the work, and gave their endorsement to the measures, as well as to the devoted energy, with which the problems were being met.

From time to time individuals returned to America for brief visits to report on general or special aspects of the work. In April, Dr. Mott and other members of the War Work Council inspected the work in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. There was hardly a month in which some members of the Council were not in the Overseas field.

ADDITIONS AND INNOVATIONS

Leave Area
Department

The Post Exchange Department was not the only novelty introduced overseas. Service to soldiers on leave presented problems un-

¹ See Plate X facing this page.

NATIONAL WAR WORK COUNCIL IN AMERICA

PARIS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

A E F --- YMCA

OVERSEAS COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN FINANCE COMMITTEE
in CHARGE of
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

CHIEF SECRETARY
CHAIRMAN OVERSEAS COMMITTEE
in CHARGE of LIAISON BETWEEN
A E F and ALL BRANCHES of YMCA

DIRECTOR of ACTIVITIES
in CHARGE of
PERSONNEL and FIELD SUPERVISION

WELFARE OFFICER AEF

ASSISTANT CHIEF
SECRETARY

MILITARY ATTACHE

FINANCE
COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN

TREASURER'S
DEPARTMENT

COMPTROLLER'S
DEPARTMENT

LEGAL DIVISION
DIRECTOR

REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT

INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT

CLAIMS
DEPARTMENT

PUBLICITY
DEPARTMENT

RECORDS
DEPARTMENT

REGISTRATION
INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT

CIRCULATION
DEPARTMENT

TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT

BUILDING &
OFFICE MANAGER
DEPARTMENT

CABLE
DEPARTMENT

GENERAL SUPPLY
DIVISION
DIRECTOR

POST EXCHANGE
DEPARTMENT

MOTOR TRANSPORT
DEPARTMENT

CONSTRUCTION
DEPARTMENT

HUT EQUIPMENT
DEPARTMENT

HUT DECORATION
DEPARTMENT

HOTEL & CAFE
DEPARTMENT

WAREHOUSE &
SHIPPING
DEPARTMENT

TRAFFIC
DEPARTMENT

TRUCK SERVICE
DEPARTMENT

GEN'L PURCHASING
DEPARTMENT

SALVAGE
DEPARTMENT

PERSONNEL
DIVISION
DIRECTOR and
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
for WOMEN

DEPARTMENT
OF ARRIVALS

RECRUITING
DEPARTMENT

TRAINING
DEPARTMENT

EQUIPMENT DEPT.
(UNIFORM)

ASSIGNMENT
DEPARTMENT

MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT
OF SALARIES
& ADJUSTMENTS

DEPARTMENT
OF SECRETARIES
LEAVES

DEPARTMENT
OF RELEASES

DEPARTMENT
OF HEADQUARTERS
HOST

DIVISION OF
FIELD OPERATION
GENERAL FIELD SECRETARY
and FIELD SECRETARY
for WOMEN

REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

LEAVE
AREAS

OCEAN TRANSPORT
DEPARTMENT

WOMEN'S
DEPARTMENT

ATHLETIC
DEPARTMENT

CINEMA
DEPARTMENT

POPULAR LECTURE
DEPARTMENT

ENTERTAINMENT
DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT
OF HYGIENE

DEPARTMENT
OF BOOKS &
PERIODICALS

RELIGIOUS WORK
DEPARTMENT

BOARD OF
DISCIPLINE

SUGGESTIONS
& COMPLAINTS
DEPARTMENT

GENERAL FIELD SECRETARY

REGIONAL DIRECTOR
REGIONAL WOMEN'S DIRECTOR

RECORDS

PERSONNEL

REGIONAL BUSINESS DIRECTOR
MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR of TRANSPORTATION

DIRECTOR of SUPPLIES

DIRECTOR of FINANCE

DIRECTOR of CONSTRUCTION

DIRECTOR of EQUIPMENT

DIRECTOR of SALVAGE

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES DIRECTOR
MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR of RELIGIOUS

DIRECTOR of EDUCATION

DIRECTOR of CINEMA

DIRECTOR of ENTERTAINMENT

DIRECTOR of PHYSICAL

DIRECTOR of PUBLICATIONS

DIVISIONAL SECRETARY

DIVISIONAL BUSINESS DIRECTOR

TRANSPORTATION

SUPPLIES

FINANCE

CONSTRUCTION

EQUIPMENT

DIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES DIRECTOR

RELIGIOUS

EDUCATION

ENTERTAINMENT

CINEMA

PUBLICATION

PHYSICAL

HUT SECRETARY

known at home which the Y M C A was requested to assist in solving. The plan adopted provided for the designation of areas in which soldiers should spend their vacations. These areas were selected with a view to their recreational attractions, and beginning with Aix-les-Bains, opened in February, 1918, they eventually numbered nineteen. Arrangements with hotel keepers were conducted by the Y M C A, and after considerable negotiation, the bills for food and lodging were paid by the Army, all entertainment and recreational activities being furnished free by the Association. To administer this service a Leave Area Department was organized, under the direction of Franklin S. Edmonds of Philadelphia.¹

Soon after the arrival of W. E. Seatree to serve as Comptroller, ^{Finance and Legal} a strong Finance Committee was organized. During the organization of the Leave Area Department the problem of procedure in leases, and possible relief from taxation, was discussed at a meeting of the Finance Committee in Paris, on May 27th, and decision was made to establish a Legal Department. By request, Mr. Edmonds on June 3d, submitted a report detailing the necessity, scope of work, and organization of such a department. He accepted the charge of this department in addition to his other service, and its activities were soon in full operation.

The changes and developments of these months had taken place ^{Effects of the German Offensive} in the most anxious period of the war. The evacuation of Paris became a possibility and precautionary plans for the safe and speedy removal of personnel and records were prepared. Each worker was instructed as to his movements should departure become necessary. Appeals from the supreme War Council, strongly endorsed by General Pershing, brought American soldiers at the rate of 200,000 to 300,000 a month where 50,000 to 75,000 had been expected and planned for. Welfare service on a scale anticipated only for the summer of 1919 was urgently needed in the summer of 1918, but the corresponding increase in workers and supplies could not be secured.

GENERAL REORGANIZATION

This sudden expansion made necessary a radical reorganization ^{Regional Plan} of administration. The system of supervision of divisional staffs direct from Paris Headquarters had proved slow and cumbersome

¹ Consult Chapter XL.

as the number of divisions increased. A conference was held at Paris, in which headquarters executives and representatives of the War Work Council, including Dr. Mott, discussed the situation with divisional executives. After full discussion, a committee formulated the changes suggested and recommended the Regional Plan.¹ France was divided into regions, each having headquarters at a convenient center for a considerable area. Regional directors became the representatives in the field of the central executive, which concerned itself with questions of policy, leaving their application to specific situations to the regional directors. Corresponding changes were made in the organization at Paris.² This reorganization went into effect June 26, 1918.

Perfecting the
Business
Organization

After a year of service, Mr. Shipp was obliged to return to America in June, 1918. He was succeeded as Associate Chief Secretary by H. F. Sheets, who had been serving as director of the General Supply Division.

On May 28th, the Finance Committee issued an important notice to Divisional Secretaries on the subject of perfecting the business organization, and stated:

"The sums of money represented by the budget just prepared are so staggering as to make important, if not actually necessary, the organization of our secretarial force to give the best stewardship of these funds as well as to take the largest advantage of our opportunity."

This was followed by practical recommendations embodying Mr. Seatree's suggestions and ideas for the enlarged service called for in the great offensives and defensives that were taking place, and the financial and business plan of administration of January, 1918, was readjusted and greatly improved in the light of experience.

These changes of plans involved reconstitution of the Executive Committee, the creation of other standing committees, and the appointment of a General Field Secretary. While all broad matters of policy were passed upon by the Executive Committee, the work at Headquarters was distributed among several divisions. Liaison officers assigned to the coordination of Association activities had their relations with the Executive Committee through the Chief Secretary

¹ For Regional Field Organization, consult Chapter XXVI.

² For Headquarters Organization as developed under reorganization see Plate X facing p. 454.

who acted as chairman. By the early fall, administrative work on the reorganized plan was in full operation at headquarters and in the field.

Attention has been called to the relations between Association Headquarters and General Headquarters. As a militarized organization, the Association was obliged to secure military sanction for every activity not specifically provided for in the General Orders related to its work. Many orders issued to the Army affected the Association in major or minor degree, and interpretations or modifications had to be sought to avoid obstacles that were unintentionally created. Wherever, in special instances, individuals violated orders through misunderstanding or negligence, the military authorities requested the Association executive to take necessary action. Travel of secretaries was under strict military supervision, and a daily courier service for securing travel permits and workers' credentials was operated between the Association Movement Order Bureau and General Headquarters at Chaumont. As the British and French military authorities exercised strict control of travel in their respective zones, into which Association service extended, there was almost constant negotiation with them. This was carried out always through American military channels. The regulation of purchasing in Europe forced constant reference of proposed transactions to the General Purchasing Board. The shortage of supplies kept the Association appealing for larger allotments of tonnage and for the privilege of buying from the Quartermaster. Regular reports on personnel and other matters were required by the Commander-in-Chief.

Coordination with
American and
Allied
Headquarters

Negotiations by personal conference and correspondence, on these and numerous other matters incident to operation with General Headquarters and with Army, Corps, and Divisional Headquarters, constituted a labor of enormous bulk, with many possibilities of friction. Nevertheless on each side there was a disposition to give full faith and confidence to the sincerity of the other, and to cooperate to the fullest extent.

In September, New York officials were becoming increasingly anxious about their responsibility to the public for the money that had been and was to be contributed to the Y M C A for war work. In September, C. V. Hibbard, head of the Overseas Department in New York, went to France. About the same time also T. Coleman du Pont of the War Work Council reached Paris on a special mission of observation and consultation. After close observation of activi-

Visit of
Council
Representatives

ties in Paris and in the field, General du Pont cabled on September 17th that more money should be spent, because the results were marvelous considering the circumstances under which they were being brought about.

The Fighting
Period

Except for changes in personnel made necessary by the return to duties in the United States of men heading important departments or bureaus, or by transfers, the executive organization underwent no significant modifications until some months after the Armistice. The Regional Plan proved sound in principle and sufficiently flexible to adjust itself to the changing conditions brought by the intensive fighting from July to November. The fighting ceased so soon after these conditions had revealed themselves, that the modifications in field administration were almost immediately superseded by the new situation created by the Armistice.

The
Armistice

The character of the reaction of the soldiers after the Armistice had been long foreseen and prepared for. Every department had its plans for increased service ready, and among the workers there was general comprehension that activities of all kinds must be conducted as never before. The general organization for service to stabilized troops had stood the test of experience. The task for the organization was to set up such service in any new areas that might be occupied by the Army, and readjust relationships in established areas. The most important new regions were the occupied zone in Germany, with its line of communication through Luxemburg, the greatly expanded embarkation center at Le Mans, and the new leave areas. These, however, demanded nothing new in principle; they gave opportunity for the introduction of improvements suggested by experience. The most serious problem was the finding of personnel, a problem that was solved in part by the detail of soldiers as assistants and in part by the large number of secretaries to whom passports were quickly issued in America. Certain problems of relationship with the officers detailed to cooperate in athletic, education, and entertainment service presented some local difficulties; in principle they were settled by negotiation between the Y M C A executive and the General Staff. The period was one of expanded and intensified work rather than of modifications of the organization.

The response of America to the United War Work Campaign immediately after the Armistice gave to the Association, as to the other welfare organizations, larger resources than any before received. It was clear, however, that no further request for funds could be

made. Whatever service might be needed must be provided out of the money in hand. No one knew, however, how long or how extensively service would be required. The physical transportation of 2,000,000 men across the Atlantic, and the distribution of twice that number to their homes in every part of America would take many months. Meanwhile the troops on guard and in process of demobilization were in a situation where service on a greatly increased scale was urgently needed. It appeared advisable to the War Work Council to re-examine the organization and administration of the work with a view to ensuring maximum efficiency.

Accordingly, early in December, 1918, a Commission sailed for France with authority to strengthen the A E F-Y M C A in all possible ways. The Perkins
Commission

This commission was composed of George W. Perkins, the well-known financier and publicist, Fletcher S. Brockman, Associate General Secretary of the War Work Council, and Mortimer Schiff, of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company. With them, as a volunteer to take a high executive position, was John R. Hall, a New York banker of wide business and welfare experience. Other members of the War Work Council, Cyrus H. McCormick, A. C. Bedford, and Arthur Curtiss James, were also in Paris, from time to time.

Messrs. Perkins, Brockman and Schiff, forming the Commission, and accompanied by Mr. Hall, went first to London. They suggested improvements in business methods and took steps to secure a better handling of purchasing and finance. From London they went to Paris where they met the Cabinet on December 19, 1918. Frequent cables were exchanged with New York, largely about finances. Mr. Perkins was much concerned lest there be not enough money to complete the work. He wanted the greatest economy not only in France but in America, so that every possible dollar could be wisely expended for the American troops during the tedious days of waiting.

A thorough study of the situation was made by the Commission and plans were made for an improved organization. Detailed suggestions made by Mr. Seatree in July and November for reconstituting the Executive Committee and creating a Cabinet, formed a basis to build upon. The months of January and February found Mr. Hall taking active part in the headquarters management; and a definite reorganization came into effect about the end of February, 1919.¹

¹ See Plate X facing p. 454.

Those members of the Commission who sojourned in Paris for various periods formed an ex-officio Executive Committee. They exercised a controlling power over the administration. In practise, all questions were settled at harmonious conferences. Gradually, by common consent, Mr. Hall exercised practically absolute power in administrative matters, leaving Mr. Carter free for the larger relationship or liaison matters.

The Finance
Committee

A very important act of the Perkins Commission was the establishment on February 26, 1919, of a new Finance Committee with real powers to establish a budget and control expenditures. The new Committee consisted of John R. Hall, Chairman; E. C. Carter, John R. Christie, Arthur Curtiss James, R. F. Sheets, and W. E. Seatree.

On March 22, 1919, the Chief Secretary issued the statement:

IMPORTANT CHANGES IN ASSOCIATION HEADQUARTERS ADMINISTRATION

By arrangement with the New York office the ultimate administrative responsibility for the A E F in France is now borne by the Overseas Committee representing the War Work Council consisting of the Chief Secretary as Chairman, Mr. John R. Hall as Chairman of the Finance Committee and in general charge of the business administration, and Mr. F. S. Brockman as Director of Activities and in general charge of Field Supervision. Mr. Brockman has temporarily assumed this position until such time as a permanent successor be secured.¹

The Chief Secretary will act as Chairman of the Overseas Committee, will continue to be responsible for relationships with the Army, with other Welfare Organizations, with the Allied Y M C A Council, and the office of the Chief Secretary of the A E F-Y M C A in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Hall will have general supervision of the following departments: Legal, Real Estate, Insurance, Claims, Investigation, Treasurer, Comptroller, and General Supply Division, Publicity, Records, Registration, Building and Office Management.

Mr. Brockman will have general supervision over the departments of Personnel, Association Activities and General Field Supervision.

The administrative difficulties that had attended Association service during the two years of war were disappearing. The establishment of this super-division of business administration under peace conditions, greatly facilitated expansion along all lines of welfare

¹ Within two weeks Mr. Brockman was succeeded by W. W. Gethmann.

activities with the Army of Occupation in Germany, and in the encampment and leave areas until the repatriation of the troops diminished the needs.

Negotiations attending transfers to the Army of extensive service undertakings called for exceptional business ability. The post exchanges were turned over in a single transaction at the end of March—nearly 1,300 canteens with a stock of goods appraised by mutual agreement at approximately \$10,000,000. In April the educational work was transferred to the Army, involving the closing out of the individual accounts of some 600 educational secretaries, and compensation for textbooks already provided by the Y M C A amounting to more than a million dollars. Special
Negotiations

Negotiation with the military authorities as to charges for transportation, gasoline, and motor parts, and with the French Government as to taxes and rebates were also of great importance. The Association, too, had vast sums invested or involved in buildings, owned or leased, as well as in equipment that could not profitably be shipped to America. Such matters were handled, of course, through the proper departments or bureaus, Legal, Salvage, Damages and the like. They are noted here because of the large proportion of time and labor of the executives which they absorbed.

On April 24th the Headquarters of the Services of Supply at Tours issued the official plan for the dissolution of the Services of Supply, pursuant to General Pershing's orders, and on May 12th, General Headquarters notified all welfare organizations to cease activities in each area as the troops were withdrawn. On June 2d, the Overseas Committee cabled New York Headquarters proposing the closing of the A E F-Y M C A on August 1, placing all work remaining under the immediate direction of the International Committee. An exchange of cables followed and on June 13th it was resolved to postpone the closing date to September, liquidation to be left with a proper organization to complete the remaining work. Demobilization

The Perkins Commission having finished its task returned to America. On June 21st, John R. Christie, Treasurer of the A E F-Y M C A, succeeded Mr. Hall as Chairman of the Finance Committee in charge of Business Administration and G. L. Fairbanks, former Assistant Treasurer, became Treasurer.

Under Mr. Christie's management, the principal tasks were those of the Bureau of Demobilization, the Damages Board, and the Salvage Department. With the exception of a few secretaries dis-

charged abroad, by special permission, practically all Association workers were assembled in "pools" during the summer and repatriated as rapidly as possible. The Salvage Department organized in February was converting into cash on the most advantageous basis, the assets of the A E F-Y M C A. The Damages Board organized in April as a branch of the Legal Department was handling claims against the Association for damages on account of injuries to property occupied by the Association as lessee. A Bureau of Records had been established in November, 1917, and the classification of the mass of records and the collection of historical material from June onward, led to the establishment of a Historical Bureau.

Final Changes
of Administration

Administration of work with the Army of Occupation in Germany was transferred from Paris to New York on September 2d. Mr. Christie resigned as Chairman of the Finance Committee and F. A. Jackson again assumed charge for the final stage. Grosvenor Dawe took charge of the Paris Division and, two weeks later, of all activities in France with the few troops remaining during the general closing down of business affairs. With this final adjustment, Mr. Carter resigned the position of Overseas Chief Secretary and returned to America in September.

CHAPTER XXVI

KEEPING STEP WITH THE ARMY

When the Y M C A offered to act as the medium by which the solicitude of the American people for its sons in arms should be transmuted into service, it undertook to stretch a human chain from the homes of America to the men at whatever stations of duty they might find themselves. Following the chain from the recruiting committee, we come to its last link, the hut secretary. All the plans and activities of the entire organization focused in him. Upon his personality and ability, upon the effectiveness with which he was supported with equipment and supplies, and upon the skill with which he was directed and his service coordinated with that of hundreds of similar workers at other points, depended the success or failure of the entire enterprise. A system of field organization devised to direct and coordinate service was, of itself, an intricate constructive problem.

The Hut
Secretary

The fundamental task of the hut secretary was, using whatever aids were furnished him, to embody and express an efficient as well as a generous friendship. In the performance of this function he was called upon for activities of a great range of variety. From hour to hour he became teacher, preacher, impresario, manager of a retail store, chauffeur, games leader, diplomat and friendly adviser. In the larger camps, as in the home cantonments, it was possible to provide more or less specialized staffs. The hut secretary was supported by athletic, educational, entertainment, and religious work secretaries, each particularly responsible for one phase of the four-fold program but sharing also in the general activity. In the billeting areas where soldiers were scattered among the villages in small groups, isolated secretaries carried on as best they could the entire program. In the small units even more than in the leave areas and larger camps, the employment of one or two women in canteen and social work proved an invaluable compensation for the lack of specialized workers who could not be furnished. The atmosphere which they created, with its suggestion of home and reminder of realities usually forgotten in the environment of war, achieved the fundamental purposes of welfare work more successfully in many cases than the full program could have done.

In America even the earliest camp workers found a fairly comfortable and specially designed and equipped building ready for use. In France, until long after the Armistice, it was the common experience that the first duty of the secretary was to find or create a place to work. This might be done by requisitioning a knockdown building from the Hut Construction Department, in which case he might or might not have to secure soldier details or French civilians to erect the hut, or perhaps do the work himself with the aid of his staff. It might be by securing from the zone major a house, café or room which could be adapted to the desired purpose. Once housed in what was called a "hut" regardless of whether it was a cellar, tent, house, or hotel, the next task was to equip it with facilities for reading and writing, counter for canteen and whatever means of comfort and amusement could be secured. Requisitioning or buying supplies for the canteen, athletic goods, reading matter and stationery, and putting out his Red Triangle sign, he was ready for service. He improvised entertainments, or advertised and arranged the appearance of entertainers and lecturers sent from Paris. He arranged religious services; and if no traveling minister was available, he conducted them. The canteen was a universal feature. At all times attentive observance was necessary not only to the orders but to the wishes of the commanding officer, so that the activities of the hut might receive his approval and support as really promoting military efficiency and not interfering with the duties of the men. Complete uniformity of service at all points was impossible; but it was essential that soldiers should find the familiar fundamentals everywhere.

Early Field
Service

Service began in April, 1917, when the advance detachment from the Quartermaster's Department landed at St. Nazaire and found an Association tent awaiting them. In May, provision was made for arriving naval forces at Brest and Bordeaux. When the 1st Division of the Regular Army arrived at St. Nazaire June 24, 1917, they were met at the port. With the assistance of American secretaries engaged in work for French soldiers, the American troops were provided during the days of debarkation with refreshments, facilities for writing their first letters home from "somewhere in France" and money exchange. The secretaries also acted as interpreters and guides. This service was provided by the Paris Volunteer Committee. The first American soldiers reaching Paris, for the celebration of July 4th, were welcomed at the Army and Navy Y M C A at 31 Avenue Montaigne which had been officially opened on June 22d.

After making a close study of the welfare work of the British Associations among that Empire's forces, the executives formulated far-reaching plans for American service, notably: units of the Association to be attached to each division from the time they entered the training camp to the time they were under fire at the front, the same units remaining with the same divisions so that full advantage might be taken of personal influence and personal devotion. These men were to be selected men of high type, each chosen for his own special part of the work. Five secretaries would go forward with each brigade of 5,000 men with a hut and supplies and each unit would start with a fund of \$10,000. As many huts would be provided for the men at the ports, in camp, and elsewhere, as might be needed. The General Supply Division would arrange for securing and distributing supplies, and the various headquarters departments would plan for activities of all sorts, to be carried out by the secretaries or by special representatives touring the camps. Events forced wide fluctuations from these standards.

Service Standards
Adopted

In general, the arrangements at base ports and in the large camps in the rear resembled those at home. The troops were concentrated, lived in barracks, and were fairly permanently located. Grouping was geographical rather than military. Administration was simplest by means of division into convenient areas, each with its own executive and staff. O. F. Gardner, Executive Secretary at Brest, was appointed Field Secretary for the rear areas, known as the Lines of Communication. It was his duty to act as liaison officer with the commander of the Services of Supply, securing information as to location and number of troops to be served, and, under direction of Headquarters, making the necessary arrangements. The organization presented no striking variation from familiar types.

Services of the
Rear

The first body of troops which came as an organized division was settled in the Gondrecourt area for training. It appeared that combat troops to come would be similarly grouped. The obvious course for the Y M C A was to provide a staff and organization to act as a unit in the service of each group. W. A. Tener was appointed Field Secretary for Divisional Areas. He was related officially as liaison officer to the General Commanding training areas. At the head of each divisional welfare staff was a Divisional Secretary.

Organization for
Army Divisions

The billeting of an army division in France differed widely from the arrangements in the United States, and proved both puzzling and unsatisfactory to new coming Americans. They found them-

General
Description of
a Divisional
Area

selves scattered in villages radiating in some cases eighteen miles from the railhead where headquarters was located. In a village perhaps 150 men might be located; in a town two or three thousand. An American division consisted of about 27,000 men, requiring from 25 to 80 villages for their accommodations. The men did not live together in barracks but were domiciled in existing buildings, sometimes with families in homes, sometimes in barns with the cows and chickens.

Notice being given of the coming of an American division, the French authorities would designate the town having the most convenient railroad connections and appoint a zone major. He and his assistants, accompanied by American billeting officers, would then inspect the housing facilities of the villages, assigning to each house or barn the number of soldiers that it could accommodate. When shelter had been found for all, in villages radiating in all directions from the railhead, a line was drawn about the district and it became a divisional area.¹

The first five American divisions in France, viz.: the 1st, 2d, 26th, 41st and 32d, were thus assigned to areas each with a good railhead as center. Base sections extended from the debarkation ports of St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Havre, Brest, and Marseilles. In these sections the Services of Supply, rest camps, and camps for special training were located. The divisional billeting areas were distributed throughout the intermediate sections of France. The training areas and encampments for combat troops were in the Advance Section radiating from Chaumont, to which center military Headquarters removed from Paris in September, 1917.²

The 1st Division had been in their area around Gondrecourt nearly two weeks before the Association succeeded in learning where they were. This was brought to the attention of General Pershing, who ordered that notification of proposed troop billeting should be sent to the Association as a matter of routine unless unusual military reasons forbade. Thereafter advance notice was usually received. The organizing secretary at once proceeded to the designated area, arranged with the zone major for billets for his workers, secured the use of buildings for warehouses and huts, or locations for the erection of buildings, and so far as possible assembled supplies and

¹ See Plate I facing p. 128.

² See Plate XI facing p. 470.

workers in readiness to welcome the troops on arrival. In a divisional area the Association would have about five large central huts depending upon the number of good-sized towns. In the villages, tents or rooms in houses were used. The aim was to establish a canteen in every village where troops were quartered. If this proved impossible, as it often did, an itinerant service by Ford light trucks was established to visit outlying villages with canteen supplies, and if possible a cinema show, lecture or informal entertainment.

As soon as possible after the organizing director had made these arrangements, a permanent Divisional Secretary and staff were sent from Paris to carry on the service. Appointments were made by the Chief Secretary, subject to approval of the Executive Committee. Besides the divisional director or executive secretary, the complete divisional organization included a business secretary, an accountant, a cashier, a warehouse secretary, a construction secretary, a director of transportation, directors of religious work, education, athletics, and entertainment, and a woman director in charge of the women secretaries. All reported to the divisional director who in turn was responsible to Paris Headquarters.

The divisional director or executive secretary had general supervision of all Association activities in the division. He maintained correspondence and relations with the commanding officer and other army officers commanding the various units in the division; also with camp secretaries on matters of policy, and in unusual situations. He notified Paris of the division's needs of workers, assigned to posts those sent him and was the medium through which Headquarters directed the work.

Duties and
Functions of
Divisional
Executives

The business secretary assisted the executive secretary in general supervision. He acted as executive secretary in the latter's absence. He supervised accounts, with Paris Headquarters and with camp secretaries, canteen receipts, home remittances, and expense accounts, and had charge of divisional funds.

The warehouse secretary received and made a record of incoming stock and issued and checked stock of all kinds selected by camp secretaries. Local purchases and transportation were under his direction.

The construction secretary supervised the erection and repair of huts and tents; the building of canteens, benches, tables, and other furniture, and employed the necessary labor for this work. He determined the supplies in the local market of lumber, roofing paper,

nails and other building material. Such supplies were purchased only on order of the Headquarters Construction Department, or of the divisional executive or business secretary.

The entertainment and educational secretaries cooperated with camp secretaries regarding entertainment programs, educational lectures, classes, and libraries. They routed visiting lecturers and entertainers, this service including reservations at hotels and transportation between trains and huts. The entertainment secretary distributed moving picture programs and arranged exchanges. He corresponded with directors of education, library, entertainment, and motion pictures at Paris Headquarters, the orders to these departments requiring approval by the business or executive secretary. The religious secretaries cooperated with the army chaplains in arranging for religious services and for visiting clergymen. Each of these divisional staff men, it should be understood, operated throughout the whole area, the service stations having usually only one secretary; and often a hut secretary would be responsible for two or three stations, giving part time to each.

Each division had its own peculiar problems, and it was not easy to formulate a general policy that would apply to all divisions. The greatest difficulty arose from lack of transportation facilities. With no surer reliance than the uncertain operations of railroads and motor transport, and local market supplies to supplement Association supplies, service was almost always a matter of being ready to meet emergencies.

General
Description of a
Divisional
Area

In theory the divisional secretary was the only medium of communication between the hut worker and Headquarters. Practically most hut secretaries assumed a large degree of independence. Each man adapted his activities to his own conception of the situation in which he found himself or to the wishes of officers and men whom he served. A great deal of correspondence was carried on directly between secretaries and Headquarters Department as to huts, decoration, supplies and program. Frequently a secretary, exasperated by delay, would take train or truck to Paris to secure needed supplies by personal importunity. Lack of personnel made it impossible to assign enough men to the function of traveling inspectors and supervisors. The result was wide variation in type and efficiency of service.

In every area problems arose, sometimes out of orders or regulations of officers having local authority whose ideas ran counter

to adopted general principles, sometimes out of differences of opinion among the Y workers, sometimes out of geographical or physical conditions. Many of these were beyond the scope of the Divisional Secretary's authority, and were referred to Paris. Communication was slow and uncertain, making prompt decisions impossible; practical adjustment called for a combined knowledge of the local situation and of the work as a whole. Long range supervision involved the dangers of mechanical interpretation of principles, when quick and intelligent adaptations and adjustments were needed. Everything pointed to the need of bringing executive authority and responsibility nearer to the field.

Until April, 1918, the number of workers in France had been approximately equal to the estimated need; from April until after the Armistice there was a steadily diminishing proportion of workers to soldiers, of which the effects may best be conveyed by extracts from typical letters of the period.

Effects of
Increase in the
A E F

From Brest, May 20, 1918:

"In the past weeks we have been dealing with approximately 15,000 men a week and now comes a challenge to be ready to care for 75,000. This means the establishment at once of seven new camps. . . . We have not a man available to put into them."

From Clermont-Ferrand, May 20, 1918:

"We have fourteen towns to serve in this area. I have been trying to hold the line in all of them without sufficient supplies; five men and one woman, no transportation and no money. . . . We need at least ten additional helpers."

On June 7, 1918, the Divisional Secretary at Vannes wrote:

"We have three units in this area that are unmanned. We need urgently two men each for these. We also need badly four assistants for units already in operation. More troops coming into the area every day."

On July 5, 1918, from another area:

"Rev. G. T. Rowe, who has been serving with the 2d Division is being returned to America with a bad case of shell shock. He has been under shell fire from March until the first of July. Dunn, who returned about six weeks ago, said before he left, 'If I had been given some relief, I could have stood it, but I was up there all alone.' These are sample cases. We ought to give our front line workers at least approximately a measure of relief that is given to the soldiers in front line positions."

These extracts are characteristic of the appeals from every part of the field. Reports of the directors of the Medical Department emphasized the number of secretaries treated for overwork and nervous exhaustion, and the difficulty or impossibility of persuading these men and women to take absolutely needed rest. Sent in from the field for treatment they felt the call of service as an imperative command, and hurried back to their posts in defiance of medical warnings.

Regional
Organization

By the Regional Plan¹ put into effect June 26, 1918, France was divided into eight regions,² each under the direction of a Regional Secretary who was the representative of the Headquarters Executive. A General Field Secretary was the link between the Regional Secretaries and the Chief Secretary. On the staff of each Regional Secretary were directors of business, personnel, supplies and transport, and women's work. These constituted the Regional Executive Committee. There were also directors of religious work, education, athletics and activities, who promoted and supervised work in their respective lines throughout the region, conferring with the departments in Paris as to program and policies.

The internal organization of a region was of two types. In the territory of the Services of Supply, the region was divided into geographical divisions. In the training and combat territory, Association divisions were to serve and follow army divisions. Each Divisional Secretary had a staff similar to the Regional Staff; an auditor and warehouse director were added, but the functions of personnel director were performed by the Divisional Secretary himself.

Each Divisional Area contained a varying number of camps or towns, each in charge of a camp secretary who was responsible for maintaining service at as many points as might be made necessary by the number and distributions of the troops located there.

In August, 1918, the number of divisions within a region varied from two to eleven. The number of operating points within a division ranged from nine to twenty-three. The workers assigned to a division averaged forty-one, varying from a minimum of thirteen to a maximum of seventy.

Territorially the regions varied widely. The Third was nearly equivalent to all the rest together. The Eighth, in the Advanced Zone, was approximately eighty miles long by sixty wide. Regional boundaries were readjusted six times to correspond with major


¹ Consult Chapter XXV.

² See Plate XI facing this page.

CHANGES IN THE JULY 1918 -




MAP 1
JULY 1, 1918 to AUG. 29, 1918



MAP 2
AUG. 29, 1918 to OCT. 12, 1918

St. Omer from Sept. 17
Abbeville until Sept. 17
Brest until Oct. 1
Rennes from Oct. 1
Tours until Oct. 1
Vierzon from Oct. 1
Nogent until Sept. 26
Dijon after Sept. 26

FRA



MAP 5
NOV. 26, 1918 to DEC. 24, 1918

Rennes until Dec. 21
Bar-le-Duc until Dec. 21
Toul from Dec. 21 (Region 5-B)




MAP 6
DEC. 24, 1918 to JAN. 3, 1919

Calais from Dec. 27
Lille until Dec. 27

REGIONAL CHANGES INDICATED IN RED
●-HEADQUARTERS OR RAILHEAD

YMCA REGIONS

SEPT. 1919



MAP 3
OCT. 12, 1918 to NOV. 14, 1918
Nancy From Oct. 18
Neufchateau until Oct. 18




MAP 4
NOV. 14, 1918 to NOV. 26, 1918
St. Omer until Nov. 16
Lille from Nov. 16
PARIS REGION RENAMED METROPOLITAN AREA

CE



MAP 7
JAN. 3, 1919 to APRIL 2, 1919
Toul From Feb. 3 (Region 5-B)



MAP 8
APRIL 2, 1919 to —
BASE SECTION NO. 7 REPORTED
THROUGH NO. 2

changes in troop distribution and army organization. No more vivid illustration of the effect of military changes in welfare work could be required.

Procedure under this plan provided that camp secretaries should make their requisitions for supplies upon divisional secretaries. These were filled if possible from the divisional warehouse. Divisional secretaries requisitioned the Regional Secretary and were supplied from the regional warehouse or direct from the base warehouses, as circumstances made necessary. Personnel also was requisitioned from the Regional Secretary, who consolidated and classified the requests from divisions. He notified the General Field Secretary of his requirements and distributed the workers sent from Paris at the points of greatest need. Formerly secretaries had been obliged to go to Paris for reassignment when released from their posts. They now reported to the Regional Personnel Director, who reassigned them within the region if possible. Entertainers, lecturers, and preachers, were assigned to the region for stated periods and were routed to the divisions by the activities secretary.

Without following details further, it is evident that this plan was constructed on a military model. Graduated authority and responsibility flowed from and to a single head, by definite channels. It had the characteristic merits and defects of all military organizations. In practice, the fact that it was manned by personnel without the military habit of mind, with abounding initiative and irrepressible independence, served to correct any tendency to rigidity and red tape. Operating parallel with and subordinate to the military organization of the A E F, and with supplies and transportation far below the needs, secretaries found justification for taking short cuts, just as resourceful officers were continually doing.

The executives at Paris, relieved of a mass of detail, could devote themselves more fully to major problems and policies. A more orderly administration of finance, a better balance between hut workers and activities specialists, and a more equitable distribution of supplies and personnel were secured.

The General Field Secretary's office became a general clearing house. There information of the needs of every part of the field was gathered, and studied. Allotments of personnel and supplies were made not on a mechanical basis but on knowledge of the conditions under which soldiers were living. The first General Field Secretary was H. B. Osgood, for several years sales director of a large Ameri-

General Field
Secretary

can manufacturing corporation, who had served for some months as assistant director of the General Supply Division. He promoted monthly divisional conferences in each region, and monthly conferences of regional directors. At these, matters affecting the whole work were threshed out, and knowledge of the problems and achievements in different sections was diffused. The votes taken were given great weight at Headquarters in defining and determining policies and procedure. Mutual understanding of Paris department secretaries and field workers was promoted and a marked improvement in team work and spirit attained.

This was a much needed benefit. Field men had felt that they were not getting proper support, and that those who were most important received an unfair share of supplies and workers. Visiting Paris they saw large numbers of men and women in the offices and on the streets, and drew comparisons between the little overworked group living in discomfort in the camp and these who by contrast seemed to have an easy lot. It was not apparent though it was true, that a large proportion of secretaries to be found in Paris at any time were detained by military regulations and chafing under the delays incident to securing the credentials and passes required in order to get into working contact with the Army. Nor was the magnitude of the labor involved in the administrative departments at Paris evident to a casual visitor.

On the other hand, a large majority of the Paris workers looked with envy on those privileged to serve in the field. Most of them had anticipated such service and felt that they had made a great sacrifice in accepting office drudgery and routine in place of the excitement and interest of life and work with the soldiers. They were doing their best to support the work with inadequate resources. Reinforcements did not keep pace with the needs, and they resented the complaints and insinuations of indifference or partiality. The coming together of representatives of both types with full opportunity to speak and to hear, gradually led to a diffused understanding of all phases of the problems which each worker grappled with in a partial manner only.

From April to November American troops made that brilliant fighting record which is the pride of the nation. On the triumphal welcome arches and the memorial tablets of cities and towns throughout America are inscribed the names of places consecrated with the blood of our soldiers. Cantigny, Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, St.

Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne, are familiar to every one. In the strategy of these operations, troops were moved here and there, back and forth, in a maze that only a trained student of war can untangle.¹ No general advance notice of these movements was given to Y M C A workers. The soldiers were lucky if the Association workers had time to load a truck or a car with supplies and start with them.

Clearly, even minimum service under these conditions would call for more workers than the static service on which minimum personnel estimates were based. There was no period in which the personnel shortage was so serious. In spite of differences of opinion, both in the Army and the Association, it was held that the needs of the fighting men had the superior claim. Telegrams were sent from Paris to all divisional secretaries in the Services of Supply, asking them to send in the maximum number possible of their best secretaries for service with combat troops. The emergency request met with generous response, and the already inadequate staffs of the rear divisions were sorely depleted.

This effort of the executives met the obstacle already referred to, of military orders prohibiting the sending of welfare workers to combat troops except on written request of divisional commanders. The most strenuous appeals from Paris failed to secure these requests from some divisions. On August 16th, six weeks after the order went into effect, no requests had been received from thirteen divisional commanders. This meant that approximately half the fighting divisions received no welfare reinforcements and were understaffed. Of course the generals had more important matters to occupy their attention. War is war. But the disappointment of the soldiers at the lack of service when most needed was no keener than the mental distress of secretaries straining to reach them and held back by a power they could not oppose nor even question. Many secretaries found ways to elude the restraint, however, riding up as helpers on supply trucks and quietly going to work in the hope that they would not be arrested or ordered back. The same preoccupation that prevented officers from requisitioning workers served to shield these "enterprising wights" from official observation.

The Regional Plan was designed to promote service both to stabilized and moving units. It contemplated that when a division moved out of one region into another, the supervision of the welfare

Effect of Troop
Movements

¹ See Plate IV facing p. 160.

staff should be transferred to the executive of the region entered, which should furnish necessary supplies. Troop movements, however, were too sudden and frequent for such administrative procedure. Divisions, brigades, regiments, even companies, passed from one region to another and were gone to a third before the Y staff had got into communication with the second headquarters. Secretaries, leaving with their units at short notice, had no time to communicate with their divisional directors, or were unable to tell their destination. When their supplies were exhausted they presented themselves at warehouses where they were unknown, and in default of regular authorization of their requisitions, made good their demands by argument, pleading, or storming. Letters containing orders, not to mention checks for living allowances, followed them from place to place, arriving when the orders were inapplicable. In short, for some weeks there was a considerable proportion of work done outside the range of orderly administration.

Accountants seeking to make a sound balance sheet for this period may well despair and military disciplinarians shake disapproving heads. But where, as in this case, there is ground for not even the slightest suspicion that irregularities had any purpose or motive but service to the soldiers, most inquirers will applaud. American common sense values method as a means to efficiency, and is ready to throw it to the winds when it fails to promote efficiency, especially if an emergency impends.

Of course the executives did not permit this condition to continue a day longer than was necessary. As soon as it was recognized, steps were taken to increase the elasticity of regional and divisional administration. In a rough estimate, the irregularities affected one fourth of service to combat troops: they did not affect the rear and intermediate regions. The emptying and practical abandonment of huts that took place when divisions moved away, leaving nothing for arriving troops, and the strain thrown on service points by the arrival of new units without workers or supplies, were alike inefficient. The plan as worked out called for a classification of members of divisional staffs. Part were to go with troops when they moved, part to stay and hold the ground in readiness to serve new-comers, and part to undertake rolling canteen service. This latter service contemplated steady travel from the warehouses along the lines serving soldiers wherever met regardless of the units to which they belonged. This plan had to be worked out by regional and field secre-

taries who were immersed in the distracting confusion of service. Just as it was being put into effect, the Armistice was signed and it was no longer necessary.

The terms of the Armistice provided for an American Army of Occupation on the Rhine. As soon as the territorial arrangements were settled by the General Staff, the Association created a new region with headquarters at Coblenz, with a staff of the regular regional type. For a few weeks, severe travel restrictions prevented the sending of sufficient workers and supplies, but by the middle of January, 1919, the work was proceeding on a large scale with the Third Army.

Effect of the
Armistice

The First and Second Armies were scheduled for return to the United States as fast as transports could carry them. Meanwhile they were settled in billeting areas, from which as their turns came, they were to be moved to the embarkation centers for reclassification and re-equipment. The largest of these centers was at LeMans, where a large staff of welfare workers was concentrated. These arrangements took some weeks and necessitated a readjustment of regional boundaries and responsibilities.

By April, 1919, the staff of the Association overtook minimum requirements; meanwhile the Army had detailed thousands of officers and men to cooperate in the activities for which the Association had formerly been entirely responsible, thereby making possible the practical working of an administrative system that had been partially crippled by lack of workers. Reports and accounting for this period indicate that the administrative problems had been correctly solved and that the system devised, given sufficient men to operate it, was well suited to the task.

As the repatriation of the A E F proceeded, regional and divisional secretaries were directed to reduce their staffs in proportion to the reduction of troops, and turn over buildings and equipment to the Salvage Department. When released, workers were ordered to Paris, to be cleared of financial responsibilities and formally released. Actual service became more and more concentrated at the embarkation centers and ports, and two secretaries sailed on each transport to serve during the voyage.

Closing of the
Work

By September only business representatives were left for winding up affairs, and a force of workers with the Army of Occupation.

The regional plan of field organization worked out in France was, of course, under another name, the departmental plan employed

The Test of
Experience

in the United States. In both fields, it proved efficient and adequate for service in defined areas occupied permanently or by successive bodies of troops. The supplementary divisional plan was equally serviceable so long as army divisions operated as units. When divisions were broken up under pressure of military events, the divisional welfare organization no longer worked; but the corrective was discovered although the need did not continue long enough for its general application. The intensive fighting period of the American Army was very brief; it was introduced by the sudden turning of the tide at the Second Battle of the Marne in July, and lasted barely one hundred days.

Conditions
Militating
Against
Efficiency

Generally speaking, two elements were lacking to the thoroughly efficient operation of the organization. One was insufficiency of personnel. Even the low minimum estimate was based upon stabilized service, while mobile service indisputably requires larger staffs. The Y M C A did not have half its minimum in this period. The second element was imperfect coordination between the military and welfare organizations. The administrative problems of officers handling transport and supply of troops in action were complicated and difficult. Unless the welfare activities are geared in as a definite part of that administration, they inevitably constitute a troublesome interference to the officers, however desirable to the men, and as inevitably will be checked or assigned the last place in the procession. Not having an unmistakable military character, the workers cannot be admitted to the confidence of the officers as to proposed military operation; they must conjecture and guess where good service demands knowledge. The fact that they are subject to a double authority of the local commander and of their own distant headquarters, breeds uncertainty and confusion. The tacit assumption of both welfare workers and soldiers that service will be approximately as complete in combat as in static areas is contrary to possibility—a fact completely demonstrated in the World War and calling for frank acknowledgement.

Without dogmatizing from a single viewpoint, it would appear that there should be a mutual agreement defining *welfare service in active operations*, and entrusting it to workers thoroughly familiar with military as well as welfare procedure, who should be militarized as completely as chaplains or surgeons, subject to the same authority and enjoying similar facilities. With a personnel so militarized, organization supervision of field workers could operate through chan-

nels parallel to the military channels, while the regional organization, like the military depot brigade, would serve permanently in areas to which many different bodies of troops came and returned. While this would mean occasional duplication of staff, it would have the very important advantage that secretaries returning with their units from active operation would have the opportunity for rest, needed by them as much as by fighting men, with the certainty that their units meanwhile were being served by fresh workers. Whether this program be feasible or not, the recognition that welfare service during active operations has a special character, sharply distinguished from that in permanent camps as to both character and quantity, constitutes the clue to the solution of this difficult problem, on which the experience of the Canadian Y M C A in Flanders casts illumination.¹ In the American experience, the ingenuity and resourcefulness of individuals went far to compensate for defects of organization.

¹ Consult Chapter IX, p. 162.

CHAPTER XXVII
WELFARE WORKERS IN FRANCE
PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The performance by civilian organizations of welfare work with soldiers on active service involves certain technical arrangements, which in the World War at least, were not thoroughly worked out in advance by either the War Department or the welfare societies. To understand conditions and procedures which involved much expenditure of time, labor, and money by the welfare organizations, and which set exasperating limits to the possibilities of service, some discussion of the relationships involved in the situation is necessary.

In a military community all individuals must be under military control. The reasons are obvious. For the maintenance of order and discipline, for the economic use of supplies and transportation, and for the efficient employment of individual ability, the commander must possess and exercise complete authority. In a state of war, facts which may be of great value to the enemy, lie open to the observation of anyone present. Misuse of such information must be securely prevented. In the country of an allied nation the relations of all alien nationals to the soldiers and civilians of the ally must be under constant supervision to prevent misunderstanding, irritation, friction, and conflicts.

So long as the members of the military community are soldiers under the immediate control of trained officers, this situation, while perhaps presenting numerous perplexing details, offers no serious difficulty of policy or method. But when civilians are introduced in considerable numbers, a serious problem at once arises. The military authority must first assure itself of the character, discretion, and loyalty of these civilians. In some way, it must find a proper mean between the freedom requisite for efficient service and the control requisite for safety and for prevention of interference with paramount military interests. This involves the establishment of a quasi-military status for such civilians, setting up methods for inducting them into that status, and defining the privileges which may appear necessary for their performance of the functions assigned them.

The number of workers to be permitted with any military unit Numbers was determined by the military authorities. The Y M C A in particular was under obligation to perform certain services for all soldiers. In order to do this it made a careful estimate of the number of workers required and planned their distribution.¹ The Commander-in-Chief did not at any time take official action upon this estimate nor issue General Orders on the subject. In static areas the Association staff was limited by the workers, buildings, equipment, and transportation available rather than by orders. Travel to combat divisions was subject to control of the divisional commanders. Since these commanders varied greatly in their attitude toward welfare work and their conception of the number of workers desirable, the organization varied greatly in different divisions.

FUNCTIONS OF OVERSEAS PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

The principal method of control adopted was regulation of travel. Securing
Passes A complicated system of passes was devised, the administration of which required a considerable staff of Y M C A workers specifically charged with the duty of making out applications in proper form, collecting the necessary supporting documents, securing and distributing the resulting credentials and passes, and keeping accurate records. This constituted one important group of the functions of the Overseas Personnel Department.

A second group of related functions included the transportation Reception of
Arrivals and maintenance of the workers in their progress from the United States to their assigned posts of service. Ocean transport was managed from the home base. Upon arrival at the ports of France and England of workers traveling on passports as civilians, it became necessary to organize their passage through the formalities of the port. Since railroads were heavily congested and the time of arrival of ships uncertain, it was usually impossible to arrange in advance for the necessary special trains or cars for the journey to Paris, so hotel accommodations for a night at the port had to be provided. The transfer of heavy baggage to the railroad station and of light baggage to the hotels called for a considerable motor equipment. Arrival in Paris was usually at nine o'clock in the evening or later. Once more representatives of the organization must be on hand at the railroad station with automobiles to receive the secretaries and transport them to the various hotels to which they had been assigned. Paris, of

¹ Consult Chapter XV, pp. 256-259.

course, was in a state of fearful congestion and the finding of places to shelter these incoming parties involved strenuous exertions and the employment of much tact and perseverance.

Assignments

A third distinctive function of the Department was the assignment of workers to posts of service. The importance of this is obvious. Theoretically, the process would have been to determine, from information submitted, the special abilities of each worker and then to assign him to a post where those abilities would be given fullest play. Great difficulties, however, were inherent in the actual situation. For reasons already stated¹ the force of welfare workers was 50 per cent below estimated requirements through the whole combat period and several months after the Armistice. Urgent appeals for more help were continually coming in from the field and at almost any given moment there were more emergency situations demanding workers than there were men and women to fill them. Assignment, therefore, became a process of finding among the available new workers those who possessed some qualifications for a particular piece of work, regardless of superior qualifications which might render the individual capable of work of a much broader or more difficult character.

Instruction of Workers

Anything deserving the name of training was of course out of the question. A minimum amount of information about the situation in which workers would find themselves, the rules by which they must be guided in dealing with military and civilian officials, in travel, in correspondence under censorship, and in the working methods of the organization, could not be omitted. The organization and conduct of these processes was a function of the Personnel Department.

Welfare of Workers

Provision for the welfare of the workers themselves constituted a serious problem. Only men free from liability to military service were available. This meant practically, that workers must be above the draft limit, or if below it, must have obvious physical defects. The conditions under which they lived and worked in the field, however, were practically the same as those endured by soldiers, except those in the front lines. Physical examinations were made by the Health Section to guard against assignment of individuals to duties for which they were unfit.² Improper housing, exposure to inclement weather, long hours, and the strain and tension of war told heavily

¹ Consult Chapter XV.

² Consult this Chapter, pp. 502-503.

upon them. It was frequently impossible to persuade them to take leave, even when most needed. The Health Section recognized this and repeatedly requested sufficient authority to prevent wastage of power through the break-down of over-worked men. Much thought was given to this, with practically little result. Medical care was given, and by cooperation of the Army Medical Corps and Red Cross, hospital treatment for the sick. Very late, a convalescent home was provided. Secretaries in the field arranged for themselves as best they could for housing and food; most of them paid little attention to the care of their health. Women, in general, were somewhat better supervised than men in these respects. In these matters the Health Section worked in close cooperation with the Personnel Department.

There was comparatively little need of discipline. Inevitably Discipline there were some men whose previous good record was based rather upon social restraints than upon firm character and tested principles. Some of these broke morally very soon after the restraints were removed. Disciplinary organization was established but as will be seen, its activities were, quantitatively, almost negligible.¹

Finally the character of the workers recruited presented problems Management of organization and administration not easy to solve. Outstanding men and women had been sought, the kind who were leaders in their communities, who had records of achievement, who were accustomed to making decisions rather than to taking orders, and who possessed initiative and resourcefulness in meeting new situations. Not easily did such men and women submit to rules and regulations whose usefulness or necessity was not clearly evident to them. Such regulations could seldom be sufficiently broad and elastic for simple application to all conditions in the field, and individual judgment was necessarily relied upon to a large extent. The attempt to determine in particular cases how individual judgment should be limited and regulations enforced, led to misunderstandings, and in some cases, to something closely approaching insubordination. If, however, individual bad judgment occasionally marred the record of the organization, it is beyond question that individual brilliancy of conception and performance reflected credit outweighing blame due to personal failures.

An account of the organization developed to deal with these problems, and of its performance of the varied and difficult functions in- Significance of the Discussion

¹ Consult this Chapter, pp. 505-506.

volved, has more than historic interest. It is not easy to see how in any future war the Army can spare sufficient attention from its primary duties to perform the whole range of welfare work on the large scale now established in precedent. Moreover, the intense interest and desire of the people to share directly in promoting the comfort of its men in arms will not easily be denied. Problems of civilian and military relationships will inevitably be encountered, the same in essence though differing perhaps in form from those arising in the World War. In no respect can efficiency of service be better promoted than by a study of these problems in the light of experience, with a view to maximum simplification of methods and processes.

ORGANIZATION OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Development

The Personnel Department, known also for a few months as the Bureau of Employment, Assignment, and Records, grew from a single secretary who gave only a share of his time to this work, to an organization of thirteen specialized bureaus employing more than 100 workers in Paris, besides regional and divisional representatives. At the height of activities, four additional separate but closely affiliated bureaus or departments performed functions which had outgrown their original subordinate character.

There was a rapid succession of directors and of bureau heads. The first three directors served only two months each, and the fourth six months, before they secured reassignment to field work. Considering the constant urgent need for secretaries in the field, and the universal desire to share in direct personal service to soldiers, the sense of duty which determined men to stay in the comparatively uninteresting drudgery of administrative work at desk or warehouse deserves grateful recognition. Nevertheless, the frequent changes and transfers, in the Personnel and other Headquarters Departments, interfered with consistent development.

Early Arrangements

Reference to the organization chart¹ will reveal the ultimate stage of the development. From July, 1917, to February, 1918, the Personnel Director aided by a Director of Women Workers, and with inadequate clerical assistance, performed the heterogeneous functions already outlined. He kept the records, went in person to the ports to receive and conduct arriving parties to Paris, ran about to secure hotel accommodations for them, arranged conferences and introduced

¹ See Plate X facing p. 454.

speakers and was a general factotum. The only specialization was the Movement Order Bureau which dealt with the Provost Marshal's office in the matter of military credentials and passes.

In February, 1918, the Department was organized in six bureaus: Organization of Department Travel, Records, Movement Orders, Uniforms, Workers' Welfare, and Women Workers. Competent heads were found for all bureaus, the director giving general supervision. This system continued until July, 1918, when the great increase in the A E F and the active fighting conditions forced a general reorganization. Through the whole of the first year, the Personnel Department was free of responsibility for assignments. Rightly considering that the wise use of the human assets of the Association was of supreme importance, the Chief Secretary or his Associate personally interviewed and assigned all arriving workers. By the end of the period, their daily schedules showed three to four hours blocked off in five minute assignment interviews, a lamentable interference with their executive duties while inadequate to the assignment task.

Reorganization in July replaced the Department of Personnel with a Bureau of Employment, Assignment, and Records. Bureau of Employment, Assignment and Records The Women's Bureau became associate rather than subordinate, the director reporting to the General Field Secretary. Seven sub-bureaus appeared, records, travel, movements, tickets, uniforms, personnel, and transients. It will be noted that three of the bureaus were concerned with aspects of travel, a fact suggestive of the growing bulk of work involved in supervision and facilitation of secretaries' movements under military control. Assignments were to be made by a Committee, consisting of the General Field Secretary, Director of Employment, and representatives of the activities departments. In fact, however, this committee could seldom be assembled, and the Director of Employment gave practically all his time to the work, sometimes holding 125 assignment interviews a day. With the appointment of regional personnel directors, something approaching adequate supervision of secretaries in the field became possible. The Director of Personnel was responsible for each secretary from his arrival at a port until his departure from Paris to post of duty. The Regional Personnel Director then became responsible until the secretary returned to Paris for re-assignment or repatriation.

Closely connected with the Personnel Department, at times a Women's Bureau part of it, was the Women's Bureau. This had been organized in the fall of 1917 by Miss Gertrude Ely and Miss Martha McCook. Early

in 1918, Miss Ely went into the field as head of the Women Workers of the 1st Division, with whom she continued until their repatriation, winning the Distinguished Service Cross and being awarded the honor of marching across the Rhine next after General Parker and his staff. Miss McCook remained in charge until June, 1918, when she went to the United States for a much needed rest. Mrs. Robert G. Mead served as acting Director while Miss McCook's return was hoped for, and later as Director until June, 1919, when Mrs. Slade took charge for a few weeks. In the closing period of demobilization, Miss Helen C. Miller directed the work.


The interviewing and assigning of women workers were entirely in the hands of the Women's Bureau, subject only to the approval of the Chief Secretary. The Bureau also supervised living arrangements in Paris and in theory had general control and direction of all women workers in France. During the first year, however, the Bureau staff was hardly able to keep up with the headquarters work; supervision of women in the field was out of the question. In February, 1918, it was ruled that women should be under the direction of camp and hut secretaries, and should take matters in dispute to the divisional secretaries, appealing to the Women's Bureau only as a last resort. Some question arose as to whether office workers in Paris were responsible to their department heads or to the Bureau.

The whole problem was dealt with in the general reorganization of July, 1918. A regional directress was placed on each regional staff, one of whose duties was to visit at least once a month every service point where women were stationed. The Bureau was made independent, reporting to the Chief Secretary, and was declared to have jurisdiction over all women and their assignments.

Between June, 1918, and January, 1919, the number of secretaries in France increased from 2,000 to 6,000. Sheer bulk of work forced further specialization. This was partially effected in February, 1919, and completed in April as a part of the general reorganization by the Perkins Commission. The bureaus of records and of circulation became independent and two new independent bureaus, suggestions and complaints, and rewards and discipline were created. The former Bureau of Employment, Assignment, and Records became, under the name of Personnel Division, one of four major divisions of the organization, with thirteen subordinate bureaus, reduced to ten in the chart of final organization.¹

¹ See Plate X facing p. 454.

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONNEL



During April, 1919, the maximum strength of the Y M C A in France was attained.¹ Cablegrams were sent to New York requesting that no more secretaries be sent. Although a few arrived in May, the great task of receiving, militarizing, instructing, and assigning new workers was practically at an end. Already Army evacuation was proceeding rapidly and the welfare organizations were ordered to reduce their personnel at a corresponding rate. The machinery of the Personnel Division was quickly readjusted to getting workers in from the field, clearing them of responsibility and sending them home. A Demobilization Bureau was set up into which the functions of the Personnel Division were absorbed. The transformation of the Bureau of Records into a War Historical Bureau marked the end of personnel activities in the A E F-Y M C A.

MOBILIZATION IN FRANCE

The representative of the Travel Bureau, whether at Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, or Le Havre, was a busy individual. Informed that a ship would land, for example, late in the afternoon of Thursday, he reserved hotel accommodations and mobilized a fleet of automobiles and trucks to convey the party and their baggage. At the announced hour of arrival, he might be informed that the ship would dock early Friday. He cancelled his reservations, and arranged for transportation to Paris, only to learn that the ship would be delayed until Saturday noon. It might actually arrive at midnight of Saturday or Sunday, and the chances were even that the arrangements he had made would require further alteration.

On the ship a party of two or three hundred awaited his appearance with lively anticipation. They were about to enter the stage of reality. The long preparations and delays, the partings, the slow voyage with its monotony shot through with excitement in submarine-infested seas—all these were over. Bursting with questions, plans, impressions, anxieties, and eagerness for action, they broke like a wave over this first man who could speak with knowledge of the new scenes upon which they were entering. "When can I get my letters?" "What is the first train to Paris?" "Can I go right up to the front?" "Can I have a personal interview with Mr. Carter today?" were questions incessantly repeated. The port secretary's first task was to round up his flock for safe delivery to Paris.

¹ See Plate XII facing p. 484.

The situation, at first, was new to all concerned. In the exigencies of war, French port officials, charged with the duty of scrutinizing every individual seeking entrance to France, were exceedingly punctilious in examining these nondescripts who wore military uniforms but possessed no military credentials. Tact and patience were required of the port secretary, to say nothing of the strain upon the limited American French which he could speak, before it became possible for him to establish the custom of passing the party through on his personal voucher, leaving their collected passports for a leisurely examination.

The duty remained to care for each crowd during the period of its stay in port, to reassemble them with their mountain of luggage at train time, to get them all to Paris and then to house them in a city where every hotel was full to the doors. Until the middle of November, 1917, the provision of hotel accommodations was possible only by much visitation and the reservation of whatever vacant places might be found. In November, the interest of Mr. Victor Duhamel, president of the Paris Hotel Keepers' Association and Director of Hotels Wagram, MacMahon, and others, was enlisted. Arrangements were completed for serving a hot meal at the Wagram to the entire party upon arrival, after which those whom the Wagram could not accommodate were escorted to other hotels.

Somewhere in transit the conductor of the party secured from each person a "dope" sheet, forms for which were provided. These were designed to furnish all information necessary for making out applications for workers' permits and for the use of the assignment committee. At the earliest possible moment these were delivered at the Personnel Department, and lists of appointments for physical examinations, for assignment interviews, and the like were prepared in readiness for announcement at the first conference of instruction.

The status of the Association personnel was fixed by a communication of the Adjutant-General to the Chief Secretary, dated July 28, 1917.¹ This provided that they were to be completely militarized, provided with military credentials, authorized to wear the uniform of the United States Army with proper insignia, subject to military orders and discipline and entitled to military privileges. Much time-consuming and exasperating red-tape was cut away at a stroke, so far as relations with the American Army were concerned.

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix II, p. 498.

For Allied commanders and officials a novel situation was thus created, with which they very slowly became sufficiently familiar to grant a working acceptance. In the matter of travel at military rates, for example, the full military status of Association workers was contested or ignored by the French for more than a year.

At about this time, also, was made the very important decision ^{Rank} that Association workers should rank as enlisted men. Granting honorary commissions to Red Cross workers was a long established practice, and a proposal was made that similar commissions be given Association secretaries. In the opinion of General Pershing, as well as Dr. Mott and other Association leaders, this was undesirable, chiefly on the ground that it might interfere with the unembarrassed relations with enlisted men essential to efficient service. A somewhat invidious distinction, not always easy to bear, arose between Red Cross men with their Sam Browne belts and bars of captain or major, and the Association secretary who wore no bars on his shoulder. To be refused admission to a first class railway compartment because one wore no officer's insignia, while a Red Cross man was admitted without question, tended to stir the bile of a bank president or distinguished lawyer who at the moment wore a Y M C A uniform. Nevertheless the decision was loyally accepted, and the broader reasons on which it was based were generally regarded as sound.

At first the military credential consisted of an identity card bearing a photograph of the holder, issued by the Adjutant General's office. In December, 1917, identity cards were called in and Red Worker's Permits substituted. The procedure for militarization was as follows:

<sup>Procedure for
Civilians</sup>

The basic authorization for any American civilian to be in France was, of course, his passport. Issued by the State Department of the United States, it had to be viséd by the French and British consuls in New York before departure was permitted, and upon arrival at a European port was carefully examined. If found in order the worker was permitted to proceed to Paris. There he was required to report within 24 hours to the American Provost Marshal, where his passport was registered. He then registered at the Headquarters of the Y M C A, and surrendered his passport, for which he received a temporary certificate pending the issuance of a military credential.

Passports were valid for a limited period, not exceeding one year. As the worker could not leave France without his civilian credential, it became a function of the Circulation Department to collect and hold all passports for safe keeping and to secure renewals and visés.

Based upon the worker's passport, the Association applied for a Red Worker's Permit, which was a general military credential authorizing his presence in the areas controlled by the Army. These applications were sent daily by special courier to G H Q at Chaumont. After investigation by the Intelligence Section of the Army and by the French Intelligence Service, the permit was issued in triplicate, the holder taking one, the United States Intelligence Office one, and the third being filed with French Headquarters. This process consumed at least three days, even after unofficial arrangements were made whereby most of the clerical work was done at Association Headquarters. Before that a week was often required, for army clerks at Chaumont were overburdened with work. Each secretary was carefully instructed that, if challenged, his Red Worker's Permit alone could save him from arrest as a spy, and on account of its value to a spy, he must guard it carefully from loss or theft, or submit to the consequences of his carelessness.

Instructional
Conferences

While this process of militarization was going on, the secretary was fully occupied with attendance at instructional conferences. These were held every week day, in a three-day cycle, the secretary beginning attendance on his first day in Paris. At this conference the uniform slips and expense sheets were distributed. Secretaries were asked to settle expense accounts the same afternoon, taking receipt to the Movement Order Office where they received their Red Worker's Permit and Movement Order. Physical examinations, assignment interviews, the checking of expense accounts, uniform adjustments, the gathering of matériel and personal effects, and similar activities left little time for sightseeing.

Congestion in
Paris

A complicated situation arose from the facts that newcomers could be militarized only in Paris, that those who had completed their term of service must go there to secure their passports and be cleared for repatriation, that the executive headquarters with large staffs were located there, and that workers from the field were constantly coming and going on business. During the war and the period of the peace negotiation the city was badly congested. In spite of the efforts of American and French military authorities, this congestion remained. The Y M C A wrestled with the situation but, under the conditions, was able only partly to mitigate the undesirable accumulation of workers in Paris. Only a complete revision of military arrangements, impossible at that period, could have achieved the desired result.

ASSIGNMENTS

For the work the Association had to do, the greatest asset was the personality of the workers. Having mobilized a force of men and women chosen for resourcefulness, adaptability and earnest desire to serve, how did they deploy that force for the campaign? In seeking the answer to that question, certain outstanding facts must be kept in mind.

First, there was no reservoir of trained experts to draw upon. ^{Few Trained Experts} Welfare work with soldiers was a novelty. It presented conditions, physical and psychological, unknown in peace and for which peace offers no opportunity for practical training. The great majority of workers were absolute novices in army life and work. With certain technical exceptions, the placing of workers was therefore experimental, and much shifting and rearrangement became inevitable.

Second, under the pressure of urgent haste, the men who made assignments had insufficient time and information to estimate the capacity of individuals. According to plan, all the information and impressions about each man gathered by the recruiting committees before which he had successively appeared, were to be sent to Paris in advance of his arrival. Actually, owing to circumstances beyond the control of the Association, this information seldom arrived in advance and often not until after the worker had been sent to his post. In most cases, the committee had for guidance only the "dope sheet" filled out by the man himself after his arrival in France. ^{Information Available}

Third, the Association was under mandate to serve the whole ^{Inclusive Responsibility for Service} Army. A Forestry unit of a few hundred men cutting trees far from any town was as legitimately entitled to service as a camp with 10,000 men. Captains and lieutenants commanding such isolated small units sent in urgent requests for service. Whether it would have been wiser to concentrate and to use the workers where they would have served the greatest number rather than the most intense need, is a purely speculative question. Certainly that might have been better for the prestige of the organization. But it was possible neither in honor nor in fact. As a part of the Expeditionary Forces, the Association extended its lines to conform with theirs.

Fourth, there were four principal types of need to be met, and an approximately fair distribution of workers devised and maintained. ^{Distribution of Workers}

Direct service to American soldiers divided itself into service with combat troops, with troops in training, and with the Services

of Supply. Approximately one-third of the A E F was engaged in heavy and monotonous labor at the base ports or on lines of communication. Opinion differed sharply as to the comparative importance of welfare service to these two sets of men. The American public seemed to think of the whole Army as engaged in fighting. The appeals for more workers which came from divisional secretaries, regimental officers, and observers at the front were almost irresistible in their recital of conditions. On the other hand men responsible for soldiers in the rear protested that these were the points of greatest need. When in September, 1918, workers were drawn from the rear to strengthen the forces at the front, the Senior Chaplain of Base Section No. 2 (Bordeaux) wrote:

"I am not in the least unmindful of the needs of the men at the front, but I cannot help feeling that the romance of the front line is to too great an extent clouding the vision of the tremendous moral problem of the S O S service and especially of the port cities."

Behind this direct service, the Association required its own services of supply.

Finally came a demand in behalf of the Allied Armies. In the summer of 1917 General Pershing had said that America could make no more important contribution to the Allied cause than to extend the full Y M C A service to the entire French Army. Yet there were not enough workers to meet the needs even of the American soldiers. Contrasting conceptions of the vital aim of the Association, and of the American people who supported it, came into conflict on this point. Was the Association in France to help win the war or to serve Americans? A commission from America reported that work for the French was "a fine and generous service" for which the Association was "under a Christian obligation," but held that

"Our first duty is to the American Army and until our men are thoroughly furnished with what the Association has to give, we have not fully justified our right to exclusive service in France. We must fully man our American field before we can claim to have kept faith with our own people."

On the other hand, workers with French soldiers emphatically maintained that service which promoted the fighting power of the French armies was in the truest sense service to America.

Fifth, there were never, until April, 1919, enough workers to supply all these needs. The reasons for the shortage have been fully

Aid to the
Allied Armies

Shortage of
Workers

stated.¹ The practical questions to be settled were, therefore, "Which of these needs is most urgent?" and "Which of these available men is best fitted for this post, regardless of his qualifications for some other post, at the moment less urgent?" For example, a division which had been stationary and not requiring much motor transport would suddenly be ordered into movement. Association Headquarters would have no advance information of the change. It would receive a message from the Divisional Secretary of which the essence was that the effectiveness of the entire divisional staff depended upon a supply of trucks and drivers. Men must be found who could drive, whether they were professional chauffeurs, ministers, accountants, or educators. Thus the Religious Work Department protested that ministers, whose inspirational value was sorely needed, were driving automobiles, and the Educational Department complained that teachers were diverted to canteen work. In succeeding accounts of the various activities, the effects of shortage are inevitably referred to, and the reader should remember that the decisions, right or wrong, which determined the personnel strength in any section of the field were those of men surveying the entire field and bearing the unenviable responsibility of pronouncing judgment upon the relative intensity of need. It is significant that dissatisfaction with these decisions was rarely to the effect that a man was not competent for the work he was doing, but rather that he was fitted for work of a higher grade. Equally significant was the cheerfulness with which men unaccustomed to manual labor accepted and performed disagreeable and laborious tasks with never a hint that they were fitted for easier and more congenial work.

For about a year after the beginning of operations, the method of making assignments was simple and direct. As already indicated, its vital importance led Mr. Carter and Mr. Shipp to retain it as a function entitled to their personal attention. Each secretary arriving was interviewed by one or both, and in the light of their knowledge of the field was assigned to a specific post. Their decision was guided by a quick study of the "dope sheet" and any other information at hand, and an estimate of personality made in a face-to-face talk. Individual preferences for type of service were consulted and followed when possible. The universal desire for front line service was necessarily disappointed in very many cases, and men who had enlisted

Method of
Assignment

¹ Consult Chapter XV, and see Plate XII facing p. 484.

with special types of work in mind and because of special experience, were frequently diverted to work which was uncongenial. The volunteer spirit was always invoked, and the appeal of the situation used to win the consent of the secretary to an unwelcome assignment.

Decentralization

In practice this method was somewhat ameliorated in the field. When, at the beginning, all work was directly supervised from Paris, original assignment to specific posts was the only possible method. As soon as divisional organization was effected, workers were sent to divisional secretaries who determined the specific work for each within the division. Thus a more intimate knowledge of the local situation was brought to bear upon assignments. On the other hand the divisional secretary was not always abler than later arrivals who became his subordinates, and the deference they cheerfully yielded to the judgment of the Paris executive was sometimes supplanted by criticism, and opposition to his plans and methods. As men showed their qualities and made their records in actual service, reassignments and transfers were numerous. It was the method of trial and error, with a gradual approximation to efficient team work.

Decentralization was carried still further in the reorganization of July, 1918.¹ Under the new plan, needs at local points were reported to divisional secretaries, who made requisitions upon regional directors. These in turn reported their total regional needs to the General Field Secretary who classified them; department heads did the same for their departments. Requisitions were then referred to the Committee on Assignments, before whom also came classified information as to available workers. Based upon this information, supplemented by individual interviews, workers were tentatively allotted for interview to the various department heads or to the General Field Secretary for regional needs. A more extended interview with these led to the return of the worker to the Committee on Assignments for definite assignment to a region or department, or for reconsideration. All workers assigned to a region were sent to the Regional Director who after consideration of each man's qualifications, allotted them to divisional secretaries, by whom assignments to specific posts were made. This was a slower process, involving more travel, expense and delay than the former. It made possible, however, a much more careful and thorough estimate of each worker's ability, and on the whole a more efficient utilization of the forces.

¹ Consult Chapter XXV, pp. 455-456.

The Committee on Assignments as constituted, consisted of the Director of the Bureau of Employment, Assignment and Records, the General Field Secretary, and the heads of activities departments at Paris. All these were overburdened with executive duties, and in practice the Committee seldom met, its functions being performed by the Director of Employment. From time to time, however, the Committee authorized a draft upon the field to meet special needs for which there were not sufficient new men. The most significant of these were calls upon the S O S divisions to send in secretaries for reassignment to combat divisions in the strenuous days of May and September, 1918. These calls met with loyal response, although the wisdom of making them was seriously questioned by those responsible for S O S service. In general, the committee watched the field and freely transferred men who showed clear evidence of ability for larger service. The 1st Division Staff furnished no less than seven Divisional Secretaries, who had acquired practical experience and exhibited efficiency in the field, for later arriving divisions.

The desire for front line service presented one of the most puzzling problems in this connection. Much study was given it, and various policies proposed, of which none was ever formally adopted. A rule was established, and somewhat irregularly observed, that workers should not be assigned to the front until they had had three months' experience in the rear. Selection after the three months' period was difficult. Most workers regarded transfer to the front as promotion, yet if it were officially stamped as such, grave injustice would have resulted. Men and women most deserving of such promotion were often in key positions, their removal from which would have crippled the work they left. Others were, in the knowledge of the Medical Department though not always of themselves, of doubtful physical fitness for risks and hardships which they were eager, but ought not to be permitted, to undertake. Like the General Staff of the Army, the Committee on Assignments was obliged to detail men to duty upon the authority of their knowledge of and responsibility for the whole work.

When, after the Armistice, the Army had settled down, more workers had become available and canteen pressure had relaxed, the various activities departments were able to draw together their specially qualified workers, and educators, physical directors and religious workers were in large degree re-assigned to tasks for which they were best fitted.

CIRCULATION

Objects of
Travel Control

The general purpose of travel control was to establish a complete record of the location and movements of every individual. By militarizing all civilians in Paris, and then stipulating that a special pass or travel order should be secured from the Provost Marshal for every journey this became theoretically possible. The specific objects of travel control were several. British and French commanders objected to the presence in their areas of American civilians not under their direct control. Possible leakage of military information, through careless talk or correspondence, detected by the Intelligence Service through the censorship or other means, could be quickly traced to its source and stopped or punished. There were from time to time places or regions in which only a limited number of civilians or none at all were desired. It was important that over-taxed transportation facilities should be used only for journeys necessary to the service.

Besides the obvious necessity of compliance with military wishes, as well as orders, under risk of losing necessary privileges, the Y M C A had reasons of its own for enforcing travel regulations. They furnished a very valuable aid in keeping track of the scattered workers, no easy task under the conditions that prevailed. Moreover there was a good prospect that, when the time came for settling transportation charges with the Army, the bill would be canceled if it could be shown that all or practically all travel had been for service to the soldiers and not for personal gratification. This would mean a saving running upward of a million dollars.

Department of
Circulation

Each relief or welfare organization was held responsible for the observance of travel regulations by its personnel. This made advisable the creation of a special bureau or department through which all applications for passes should go and with which the military authorities might deal directly. This function was performed in the Y M C A by the Movement Order Bureau, within the Personnel Department until December, 1918, when it became independent, as the Department of Circulation, and reported directly to the Chief Secretary. In addition to handling Y M C A circulation, this bureau or department secured passes for the personnel of the Y W C A, American Library Association, and Jewish Welfare Board. Beginning with part time service of one secretary and a stenographer, its personnel increased until the director was aided by a staff of eighteen.

The functions of the director of circulation were not limited to securing passes in conformity with regulations. He became an important factor in working out the whole system. At the beginning the Army, having to do with an entirely novel situation, framed regulations in a manner to restrict travel to an absolute minimum. The formalities and delays were such as to discourage any but the most urgently important journeys. A sounder ideal would have been to facilitate useful travel to the utmost while ruling out all unnecessary travel. To the acceptance and working out of this ideal the Y circulation staff earnestly addressed itself under the leadership of W. J. Symons, and his successor, G. J. Watson. Winning the confidence of the Army authorities by convincing demonstrations of sincere and competent enforcement of existing rules, Mr. Watson offered successive modifications, by which he believed the real objectives of both the Army and the Y M C A would be more surely and economically attained. Certain officers with whom he dealt saw the situation clearly. With their aid, many of the proposed changes were perfected and accepted, with results of which some indication can be better understood after a brief survey of the regulations.

No attempt can be made to describe in detail the complex and intricate rules which, even after simplification, were in force. Geographically France was traversed from north to south by three parallel strips of territory, known as the Base, Intermediate, and Advance Sections. Across these sections cut the Zones of the Armies—British, French, and American. This made a sort of checker board of nine blocks of territory, for each of which special travel rules were prescribed. For more than a year, the front was divided between the French and British, there being no American advance zone.

For travel in the American Intermediate or Base Sections, a pass or travel order must be secured from General Headquarters at Chaumont. In general the process for travel from Paris was as follows: A proposed journey of a secretary was authorized by the head of his department, who signed a request for movement order, stating the reason for the journey, and affirming that it was on Y M C A business. This request was delivered to the Department of Circulation, which filled out a Y M C A Movement Order, authorizing the journey, and a request to the Provost Marshal for a pass, known as a Travel Order. For nearly a year, the Chief Secretary's personal signature was required on every Y M C A Movement Order. Later

Functions of
Circulation
Department

Travel
Regulations

To the
American Areas

the Director of Circulation was deputized to sign for him. Twice daily a courier went from Paris to Chaumont with these documents, bringing back the travel orders issued by the Provost Marshal. These combined documents became the basis for a request for a transport order, which took the place of a railroad ticket. At first these were issued only by the Army, but later a supply was entrusted to the Y so that they could be directly issued. The process thus described was the simplest, and applied only to railroad journeys in the Base and Intermediate Sections of the American Zone.

If the journey was to the British or French Zone the request for a travel order required approval at American Headquarters, which sent it by mail to the American Mission or liaison officer attached to the Allied Headquarters. By this officer it was presented to those Headquarters, and if approved was sent back to Paris by the same circuitous route. Until the summer of 1918 there was no American front zone; American fighting troops were attached to French or British zones. All travel to such troops required consent of the French or British Headquarters, with which the Association was not permitted communication except through American Headquarters.

Applications for automobile journeys passed through all these stages, and in addition a special automobile pass was necessary for the driver of the car and for each passenger. These passes were issued for all parts of France by French Headquarters only.

A check upon travel was obtained by placing an Assistant Provost Marshal at all principal railroad stations, through whose barrier every departing and arriving traveler in American uniform must pass and present his papers to be officially stamped. Posts of control were established at strategic points on all principal highways with military police instructed to arrest or turn back and report any automobile party not provided with proper papers.¹

As already said, this is but a general account of travel regulations, and carries only a hint of the mass of details and of the expert knowledge involved in handling the business expeditiously

¹ It must always be borne in mind that the serious element in a situation of this kind was not primarily the delay and annoyance caused the headquarters staff of the Y M C A, though these represented great handicaps. The real difficulty lay in the fact that all such operations besides greatly delaying field operations meant the diversion of much time and energy to these intricate negotiations while every part of the service was staffed with less than one-half of an adequate number of workers.

To Allied
Zones

Automobile
Travel

Army
Supervision

Time Saving
Through
Organization

and without error.¹ For example, the members of the office staff needed, and acquired, an extraordinary knowledge of the geography of France, in order to determine in which zone and section any secretary's destination was located, and which set of regulations must be complied with. Anyone who has stood in the long lines of civilians, Red Cross workers, and miscellaneous people who in the early days waited for hours at the American Embassy, the French Prefecture, or the Provost Marshal's office for some required endorsement of a credential or pass, can form a vague estimate of the time and temper saved by individual secretaries who had only to hand in a request for a movement order, and go about their business, returning at the appointed time to receive all their papers in order. There was a corresponding saving of time for the Army's clerks, who after the Y M C A circulation department was well established, could rapidly handle the carefully prepared piles of documents, avoiding the delays, explanations, and corrections involved in dealing with individuals.

Probably the greatest simplification was that effected in the Simplification early summer of 1918. A conference was held at American General Headquarters on June 10, 1918, attended by officers of the American Intelligence Section, both from G H Q and from Paris, by French and American Liaison Officers, the French Circulation Service, and Mr. Watson, representing the Y M C A. It was agreed that authority to permit travel of all welfare workers to points in the French Zone

¹ The following statements from a report by Mr. Watson, dated November 15, 1918, indicate the volume of business handled in his office, and the economy of time, and therefore of money effected by progressive simplification of regulations:

"Passports now under our control or which have passed through our hands	5,406
Visés of same amount to an average of five daily.	
Time required for visés reduced from a period of seven to eighteen days to one to three days.	
Red Workers' Permits secured.....	5,356
Time and expense required to procure same materially reduced.	
Movement Orders handled daily.....	50 to 150
White Passes (British) secured.....	307
Time reduced from three weeks or a month to five or six days, or by telegraph, one day.	
Automobile Passes	4 to 10 daily
Time required reduced from 8 to 14 days to less than 24 hours.	
Carnets d'Étranger, Safe Conducts and other French Civilian Passes	238
The foregoing covers the principal classifications, in addition to which there are many miscellaneous matters which are daily handled but cannot be classified."	

A later report by Mr. Watson's successor shows more than 10,000 workers' permits secured, movement orders handled at the rate of 800 a week, and passport visés secured to the number of 200 a day.

of the Armies should be lodged with the French Service of Circulation in Paris. French and American officers went to French G H Q to urge this. It was granted, and resulted in a marked decrease in the time necessary to secure travel orders. Under the system laid down, travel orders to join American divisions were issued by the American Provost Marshal in Paris, and travel orders to points in the French Zone of the Armies were issued by the French Service of Circulation, both bureaus keeping each other fully advised of orders issued.¹

Travel to
Combat
Divisions

By an order issued in July, 1918, the Commander directed that the number of workers with a combat division should be determined by the Divisional Commander, who should make a written request to the welfare organization for the number desired. This order was meant to give greater freedom and elasticity than could be had by an order prescribing a general ratio of workers to troops, and to relieve General Headquarters of details. Regimental and company officers were forbidden to send requests for service to the welfare organizations; because such requests, in large numbers, were the basis of applications by welfare organizations to General Headquarters for permission to send more workers to the front than divisional commanders thought desirable. The order was interpreted by the Provost Marshal, with whom the requests had to be filed, as a prohibition of travel to combat divisions except in accordance with such written request.² This order prevented the sending to combat divisions of nearly two hundred secretaries called in to Paris from the Services of Supply because of the bitter need at the front in September and October.³ The director of circulation made strenuous efforts to secure the necessary requests, but at that time the final Allied offensive was gathering momentum and commanders were apparently too busy to attend to the matter. In October, 1918, G H Q notified the

¹ Scarcely a day passed that did not bring up numerous "special" cases, which took time and ingenuity to handle. The Y M C A employed civilians of many nationalities as motor truck drivers, cinema operators, entertainers, and in other work requiring travel, and the regulations were quite different as regards circulation of others than American citizens. Militarization was finally restricted to Americans, and in special cases, British subjects; all others were civilians, and were required to travel on papers issued by the French.

² The strictness of interpretation is illustrated by the fact that in several cases passes were refused to workers with combat divisions who had come to Paris on Y M C A business and sought to return to their posts, the reason being that the number of workers authorized had already been permitted to go.

³ Consult Chapter XXVI.

heads of all civilian organizations of a Staff opinion that the number of workers permanently attached to any combat division should be limited to five. Recalling the Y M C A schedule¹ which called for a minimum of 120 workers with a combat division of 26,000, it is apparent that this limitation to a ratio of one worker to more than five thousand soldiers would have automatically prevented any service worthy of the name. Spirited protest resulted in the proposal being dropped without official action.

A difficult situation occurred when the troops moved into Germany. The commander of the Third Army exercised absolute control over travel to his region. Transportation facilities had to be created, and the problems involved in the military situation were many and serious. Except for a few workers, including some women who marched to Germany with their divisions, and a small group of executives permitted to go to Coblenz to make plans, it was six weeks before the first force of workers was allowed to start from Paris. This party numbered 190, or about one worker to 1,000 soldiers in the occupied area. After the troops were settled down, more workers were admitted, but in every case the worker's name and the work he was to do had to be reported to Third Army Headquarters at Coblenz for approval before a pass from Paris was issued.

It had been agreed by the French Government that members of the A E F should enjoy the privilege granted the French Army, of travel on railroads at about one-fourth of the regular fare.² Transport orders for such travel were issued by the French Bureau of Circulation, and by the American Provost Marshal, the total transportation bill to be settled by the American Government after the war. General Pershing's order militarizing the Y M C A was interpreted by him and by the Y M C A to extend the privilege to the Association personnel. The French Government, and still more the French railway officials, were very reluctant³ to admit this. Numerous conferences led finally to agreement on the principle, but for more than a year local officials refused to recognize it in individual cases. Negotiations arising out of these cases and on the general principle, gave plentiful occupation to the Movement Order Bureau and the

Travel at
Military Rates

¹ Consult Chapter XV.

² General Orders No. 33, 1917; see also Vol. II, Appendix II, pp. 501-502.

³ Such a large proportion of travel and freight was military that the revenues of the railroads handling it at one-fourth of ordinary charges were seriously reduced, and they faced financial disaster.

Legal Department. Not until October 25, 1918, did the French Minister of Public Works notify the railway officials that Y M C A secretaries were entitled to the same travel privileges as soldiers, and the Armistice had been signed before the order was generally complied with by ticket agents.

Reactions of
Travel
Regulations

For the most part secretaries and soldiers were aware only in a general way of travel regulations. They were acquainted neither with the slow processes by which passes were secured, nor with the reasons for them. Men eager to get to the field complained bitterly of the Movement Order Bureau's delays, wholly ignorant that the Bureau was getting their passes for them in a tenth of the time they would have spent themselves in the same process. For military reasons the Movement Order Bureau was under orders to enforce regulations without explanations. Its apparently arbitrary rulings led to the charge that it was hindering service. Especially was this the case when the Director held up requests for movement orders signed by department heads, on the ground that no sufficient reason for the journey was shown. He very probably sympathized with the secretary for whom a brief sight-seeing trip had been arranged as a reward of merit, but he was acting as deputy for the Chief Secretary, who was held responsible for unnecessary and irregular travel. His refusal was actuated by the desire to protect privileges already gained and to secure larger privileges for the Association's work—privileges constantly menaced by doubts in military circles as to whether the large amount of civilian travel actually going on was really necessary. To him was reported every case of irregular travel discovered by the Provost Marshal's staff, usually with the intimation that repetition would result in restriction of privileges. But the secretary whose legitimate journey was delayed, and even more the disappointed one whose sight-seeing trip was prevented, held the Bureau and the Association behind it responsible for what appeared to be useless red tape or indifference. Dissatisfaction so created approached disaffection in some cases, and probably no one influence was more damaging to the morale of the Y M C A personnel than this.

On the military side there was a similar unfortunate and unmerited injury. Officers coming to Paris on hurried business trips saw hundreds of Y workers apparently idle on the streets. There was no one to explain that these men were detained in Paris for military permission to leave, and the fable arose and spread that

Y men were clinging to "soft" jobs in Paris and spending their time in sight-seeing. Nothing could have been more damaging to the Association in the minds of soldiers.

The loyalty of the men who silently endured such criticism and refrained from making the explanations that would have shifted the burden to the General Staff where it justly belonged, is worthy of record. The pressure on the personnel of the Movement Order Bureau was terrific, but not one resigned or sought transfer during the most trying period, the whole year from February, 1918, to February, 1919.

In no aspect of welfare work was military unpreparedness more apparent or more costly than in the matter of travel. The subject was not thought out in advance either by the War Department or the Y M C A. Authority was lodged in the Army which, under the influence of the French and British to whom welfare work on the American scale was completely novel, set up a method of control whose effect would have been practically to nullify the efforts of the welfare organizations. It became the duty of the Y M C A to prove that the real objective of all such regulations was to facilitate useful travel and prevent all other. It had also to discover ways and means by which this could be effected and persuade Army officers of their soundness. The final stage that was reached after two years of experiment and progress was far more complicated than was necessary, and left the onus of responsibility upon individual civilians instead of upon the Army where it properly belonged. If such an emergency occurs again, a thorough study of this problem will be a prime necessity.

Summary on
Circulation

MORALE OF WORKERS

Secretaries of the Y M C A were selected from two hundred thousand citizens of the United States, ineligible for military service, who were impelled by their own character and patriotism to have some direct share in the nation's struggle. All were volunteers. They were chosen primarily for established character and demonstrated ability. It was reasonable to expect of them as much of stanchness, devotion, resolute stability of purpose, and self control, as could be expected of any group of men and women. It would not be unjust to hold that, in such an emergency, they were less entitled than others to the benefit of extenuating considerations for lapses. Nevertheless they were human, and neither the organization nor any individual for

himself could predict with certainty how he would react under the complete change of environment and the mental and spiritual churning to which all who had a direct share in the war were subjected.

No task could be more difficult than to summarize and weigh the opinions and judgments recorded from many sources upon the character of the Y M C A personnel. A very large number of them are based on observation of a very few workers, and singularly enough, combine praise of individuals known with disparagement of the force as a whole. It is even amusing to find a single comment repeated in substance from the most varied quarters: "Our Y man was a prince—the only Y man we ever saw who was worth a damn." Ignoring such evidence, an attempt has been made to analyze three sources which seem competent, all being based on observations in the line of duty without thought of publicity.

Reports of
Medical
Director

The first is the report of the Medical Director, whose duty included physical examination of all workers on arrival and departure, and general supervision of the health of the personnel. The Health Section¹ was set up by Dr. J. H. McCurdy, but during most of the period it was directed by Dr. Frederick P. Lord, Professor of Anatomy in the Dartmouth Medical School. He had not been connected with the Y M C A before enlisting for war work. He says:

"In considering the work of the Y M C A men, there are certain factors that are not properly noticed by many. The average age of the Y man was over 39 years, whereas that of the soldiers was in the twenties. The Y M C A secretary came to France as a man of fixed habits without preliminary training. Many were allowed to come when they were physically below the average set for the soldiers. They ate what they could get and where they could get it. They went to bed when and where they could and had no regular hours or outdoor life in many cases. They were mostly independent as to the manner of the regulation of their daily routine and they always had more to do than they could handle. They were subjected to severe criticism only too often, so that many of them were worried most of the time. They came from the ministry, the law, and from business offices, and most of them had little ability, training, or knowledge as to how to care for themselves physically. They did not understand why they felt sick and listless when they had had but four hours' sleep a night for weeks at a time, when they ate little but meat and drank two or three cups of coffee at each meal. They lacked what the majority of the soldiers, not in the fighting area,

¹ Consult Chapter XXXVI.

had—an ordered daily routine with regular hours for sleep and work, a balanced ration, regular outdoor work, and a carefully ordered existence free from responsibility and worry. As a result, it is not strange that the Y M C A man often felt physically unfit. . . .

“From the doctor’s point of view, we found two kinds of sick secretaries: those who would lay off at the first chance they could get (a small minority) and those who would not lay off when they should. The latter is the harder to handle. Such cases when told to go to bed for two or three days would often refuse and some days later they might be sent to the hospital with influenza or pneumonia. This was also true of the girls. They would say: ‘I must do this,’ ‘I cannot give up now.’ ‘Let me alone, I’ll be feeling better shortly.’

“In the course of more than six months, in connection with my work in the Health Section, I have had occasion to make most of the more than 2,400 medical consultations. Among these cases have been many secretaries who were tired out, run down, in a condition of nervous prostration, extremely irritable, discouraged, and often sadly disaffected. These secretaries, from Paris and the field, were obviously in such a condition that they could not do their work well, that they would often antagonize others with whom they came in contact, and injure the morale of the organization in their immediate vicinity—in short their efficiency was far below par. Many of these individuals were in this state because of sickness, of exposure, of long hours and overwork, of continuous work over long periods of time, six, eight, ten months or more without let-up. Most of them had never been offered a respite, had never asked for one and would not be guilty of asking for one, believing, I think, that they could not be spared and that they would be poor sports to ask for a vacation even when they knew themselves that they were not doing good work.”

“I think the irritability of which you speak is far too common; and it accurately points to overstrain, rather than to a naturally unfortunate disposition. I trust that your very clear statement of the facts may help in a matter that is vital to our usefulness in France. It is this very matter, among others, that has made Dr. McCurdy and myself so anxious to have another physician in the Health Section, enabling thereby one of the physicians to get into the field and obtain more definite information on this subject and perhaps to help prevent some of the results of overzealousness which, I believe, is one of our misguided virtues.

“I should like here to express my strong and lasting conviction that the Y M C A secretary, as I saw him well and sick, for a year and a half, was a man who came to France into a difficult and somewhat anomalous position, earnest in his desire to do what he could, willing to work at anything that would help, a man who worked hard and long and with a spirit that held its own remarkably well against heavy physical and mental odds, and who rendered on the whole an astonishingly efficient service.”

The documents quoted invariably contain such recommendations as that secretaries should be given at least as much vacation as soldiers—one week in four months; that they be required to take their leaves when due; that provision be made for better housing, food, and care of the sick. As late as August, 1918, no system of leaves had been adopted and leaves were granted on the merits of the individual case when applied for. Dr. Lord mentions only "a few cases" of secretaries who secured medical leave but did not report for further examination or treatment, thus illegitimately extending their leave. It is clearly his opinion that the personnel was generally characterized by a zeal for service leading to overstrain and impaired efficiency:

"The Y M C A is made up of some thousands of people, large numbers of whom I have met and talked with, and I think I know the general type pretty well. In their spirit and willingness to work, and in their desire to stand for the kind of service we came over to give, I think they average pretty high. Based on these secretaries, I see no reason to doubt the worthwhileness of the Y M C A work in France."

Implicit support of Dr. Lord's statements appears in innumerable letters from divisional secretaries appealing for more workers.¹ These came from all parts of the field and were not, of course, written for publicity purposes but in the regular course of operations. Practically every such appeal was re-enforced by detailed statements of the number of troops being served, the number of points operated and the number of workers, with personal details about them showing long overdue leaves, long working hours, consistent efforts to make up for insufficient workers by extra exertion, and breakdowns resulting from such overwork.

On the subject of living conditions there is unanimous confirmation of hardships due to improper housing, feeding, and sleeping accommodations. Typical is a statement by Fred F. Stafford, a traveling secretary of the Salvage Department, who in December, 1918, volunteered a report to the Chief Secretary on living conditions of secretaries.

"I would not object to any necessary hardships or privations. On the other hand, I think it is the poorest business in the world either for the Y or any other organization to have their men suffering unnecessary hardships or privations.

¹ Consult Chapter XXVI.

"The conditions under which our secretaries are living in some of the large cities are worse than the conditions were out in the First Division last year. I am free to say that if I were compelled to live under the same conditions that some of our secretaries are experiencing now, with as little excuse for it, I would come in at the end of two weeks and ask to be sent home.

"Our firm at home has done considerable contracting in which it was necessary to employ a large number of Italian laborers. The conditions that we provided for these laborers were very much better than the conditions under which many of our secretaries live."

No physical condition, however, is more harmful to efficiency than mental uneasiness and anxiety, and no anxiety is more upsetting than that which has the welfare of parent, wife or children as its object. Secretaries, like soldiers, were separated by an ocean from their families, and when weeks grew into months without a reassuring message, or news of illness or trouble came, they were as seriously disturbed. In none of its efforts to relieve secretaries of unnecessary burdens was the Y M C A more successful than in the delivery of mail. A post office was established at Headquarters November 15, 1917, when there were about 130 secretaries in France. In the first week, 3,000 letters were handled. In March, 1919, the post office was handling mail for 9,500 individuals, including some officers and enlisted men, besides business mail of the organization. During the first week of March, 110,000 letters were handled, of which 50,000 were re-forwarded to individuals in the field. The post office could not hasten the receipt of letters from America, but it made heroic efforts to keep its list of forwarding addresses up to date and accurate, and to make sure that, once in France, letters found their way speedily to the waiting secretary.

Home
Communications

A second angle from which the morale of secretaries may be viewed is the record of delinquency. In the first part of this book, the effects upon soldiers of the complete change of environment have been discussed. Secretaries experienced the same change. Coming from all parts of the United States, from large cities and small towns, they found themselves in a situation where the use of wine was universal, where the invitation to sex indulgence was offered to them just as to soldiers, where goods and money in large amounts were entrusted to them without systematic oversight,¹ and where the supports and restraints of their homes and communities were absent.

Disciplinary
Records

¹ Consult Chapter XXXI.

For the first time many of them faced the maximum of temptation, with no restraint except their own principles and character. That is a searching test of the real substance of a man's morals and religion.

Some men broke in New York while waiting for transport. In almost every case, they were men who for the first time in their lives encountered the temptations of a large city. In France, there was a trickle of such cases through the whole period of operations. Until December they were dealt with personally by the Director of Personnel whose records were kept private. Then a Board of Discipline was established, with a Boston lawyer as chairman, who with a judge from Virginia and one or two others sat informally as a court, and before whom evidence was carefully presented. The detailed records of all cases have properly been kept confidential, only summaries being reported. Up to June, 1918, about 40 men had been convicted of drunkenness, unchastity, or financial irregularities, and sent home for discharge. From December, 1918, to March, 1919, the Board of Discipline dealt with 53 accused men, on charges ranging from insubordination to embezzlement. Forty-four cases were disposed of; 24 by findings of guilty, and 17 by acquittal; one case was referred to another department, and in two no finding was deemed necessary. Of the 24 guilty, seven were for offences involving moral turpitude, five for drunkenness, the rest for inefficiency or incompatibility. During the whole period, five men charged with embezzlement were turned over to the Army for court-martial, convicted, and sentenced to prison. One man was convicted of bigamy in England and sent home. He was pardoned by the War Department. Disciplinary cases included violations of military regulations, such as censorship or travel rules, most of which grew out of misunderstanding or ignorance, and were settled by an explanation and admonition not to repeat the offense. A very few such cases were court-martialed by the Army and sent home for exemplary purposes.

Undoubtedly there were undiscovered cases of delinquency. It is clear, however, that the common attitude was one of jealous regard for the uniform, and that this led individuals generally to feel that offences coming to their knowledge ought to be reported rather than concealed. There were, of course, many secretaries in France who were permanently connected with the Y M C A, and who felt that no shadow of suspicion ought to be allowed to rest upon the Association. It was the opinion of the Chairman of the Board of Discipline that most cases in which there was any reasonable probability of guilt came

Board of
Discipline

Loyalty

before the Board and that one of the most important services it rendered was clearing men of charges brought on insufficient grounds or through misunderstanding.

It is a significant fact that in many places Y workers not actually engaged in hut service, were not permitted to enjoy the privileges of the huts, which were held to be exclusively for soldiers. Such men had to spend their free time either in their sleeping quarters or in the streets and places of public entertainment. A number of men of unquestioned standing maintained that in failing to provide recreation facilities for certain groups of its own workers, the Y M C A was itself contributory to delinquency, and that its severity in cases of drunkenness and immorality was unwarranted. It may be considered that conflicting criticisms of excessive severity and excessive leniency justify the opinion that the actual record fairly pictures the facts.

All records for home and overseas were reviewed by the Personnel Board of New York, those of women by the Women's Bureau. Certificates of honorable service were delivered to 21,268 individuals, besides numerous others awarded for which correct mailing addresses were lacking. Certificates were denied to 319 men and 80 women, amounting to 1.5 per cent of all workers at home and overseas. The grounds for denial ranged from the serious moral offenses mentioned, to inefficiency, refusal to obey orders, or refusal to complete contract.¹ It is a matter for serious regret that the Y M C A had but one penalty for all offenses, and could not express any distinction between infraction of service rules and grave moral dereliction. It had of course no legal right to exercise any judicial or penal function, and could only dismiss from its service without an official recommendation.

The third point of view from which the general character of the personnel may be examined is that of the higher officers of the Army. Not only was their survey broader than that of the enlisted men or regimental officers, but they knew the restrictions and obstacles to welfare work arising out of military conditions and exigencies, and to them came the reports on service rendered by the welfare officers in each unit. Twenty-four divisions took part in active fighting. In twenty-two of these, the entire divisional Y M C A staff

¹ Certificates were denied to some because without permission they went on sight-seeing trips after their service posts had closed and they were released for repatriation.

Compare pp. 511-512.

was commended in orders or in official letters by the Major General Commanding, by Brigadier Generals or by Senior Divisional Chaplains. Each of these commendations, carefully examined, proves free from any sign of perfunctoriness. All specify work done, gallantry shown, and call attention to the difficulties and dangers encountered and successfully overcome by the secretaries. Of the two divisions in which no general commendation is found, one has a record of seven Y men and women cited in orders for gallantry under fire, and two others recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross. The other division was in the line only eighteen days and one of its secretaries was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross.

In addition to these general commendations, 99 secretaries were cited individually in orders and 220 were decorated, 80 of the decorations being bestowed by the French Army. Eleven were killed or died of battle wounds, and 79 died of accident or disease contracted in service. One hundred and twenty-eight were wounded or gassed. Omitting deaths from disease, although many of these were front line cases, it appears on the face of the figures that 458 Y men and women won individual distinction or gave ultimate proof of devotion on the front line. An undeterminable allowance should be made for duplications of individuals both wounded and cited or decorated, and for decorations on the Italian and other fronts, but the number in France cannot be less than three hundred. The reader will remember, from the account of orders governing the sending of workers to combat divisions during the period of intensive fighting, that the number of such workers was severely limited. Eight hundred are of record as being in the battle zone, a figure which should be somewhat increased in view of the fact that a number made their way to the front without passes. Making liberal allowances in both directions it appears that a minimum of 300 workers out of a possible maximum of 1,200 at the front, or one out of four, received military honors or became battle casualties.

In addition to the 24 divisions mentioned, five others were in the line in quiet sectors. In each of these the Y divisional staff was commended. Thirteen divisions never entered the line. Ten of them did not arrive until August, 1918, or later, and were the first to be sent home. Most of the Y service given these thirteen was in the Base Sections. In three, official commendation was given the Y divisional staff as described. There were five Base Sections in France, and in each the Y was officially commended.

Every one of the 2,000,000 soldiers who went to France had his opinion of the Y M C A personnel and service. Most of them expressed their opinions. Every soldier's complaint that reached the organization was investigated if information could be secured sufficient to identify the secretary concerned. Some complaints were found well-grounded and amends were made and the secretary disciplined. Some were shown to be based on misunderstanding. In some cases, the complaint was proved to be malicious, and the soldier retracted his statements as false. It is obviously impossible for the historian to analyze and weigh the mass of individual opinions. Statements in letters in the files range all the way from: "The whole Y M C A ought to be in hell," to: "Without the Y M C A the dough-boy would have been like a baby that had lost his mother." Between these extremes every degree of praise and denunciation is to be found. All this means that Y M C A workers and soldiers were human. The secretaries presented thirteen thousand different combinations of human virtues and weaknesses. Pride and humility, self-control and self-indulgence, patience and ill-temper, sympathy and prejudice, and all the other traits that make up men and women were in them all, and from day to day and hour to hour different traits predominated. No fault could have been more offensive than an indifferent or disobliging manner. Secretaries who developed such a habit were removed from contact with soldiers, but enough were occasionally culpable in this respect to furnish a start for swift-flying rumor.

The soldiers too were human, and according to their dispositions and passing moods they blamed and praised both wisely and unwisely. Defects were condoned and trifles eulogized; good service denounced and extraordinary efforts dismissed as a matter of course. Very frequently the mark was fairly hit by comments that both encouraged and suggested ways of improvement. That there was no respect of persons may be inferred from the two letters following:

[1]

Feb. 24, 1919.

to the Y M C A

I have had the chance to express my feelings to the workers of the Y M C A as to the help and benefit they have been to the Boys in France as well as myself I have heard some talk that was not in favor of it but I can not find anywhear that they can find grounds to start arguments against the Y M C A. For I feel that it has been a great help to me and I am surtenly verry thankful and greatful to the people of the Y M C A and I realy think that they have did their bit in

France and in some cases more than their bit and I think when a man turns down the Y M C A he has turned down a real friend for to me they have been as good a friend as I have had in France. I cant just express my feelings just like I would like to But it will give you an idea about how I feal about the Y M C A and the people of the Y M C A in France.

Yours truly,

Private ——

Motor Supply Train —— Co. ——

[2]

General Headquarters
American Expeditionary Forces
General Staff

From Commander-in-Chief, G—I

To Chief Y M C A

Subject: Appreciation of the work accomplished by the Y M C A.

1. The C-in-C desires to express to you and through you to the Y M C A workers who have been operating with the 19th Field Artillery, his satisfaction with the admirable results which they have accomplished.

2. When the work done is of such a quality as to produce from the Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment unsolicited a statement such as the one which immediately follows, and which is quoted for your information, it is believed that the matter should be brought directly to the attention of all concerned, and it is requested that a copy of this communication be forwarded to those responsible for this work. Lieut. Col. E. S. Wheeler of the 19th Field Artillery writes as follows:

"There is no one factor contributing more to the morale of the American Army in France than the Y M C A. The value of this organization cannot be overestimated. When I come to the Y M C A huts and see our men night after night and one day after another in their spare moments enjoying the privileges created by a corps of self-sacrificing Red Triangle workers, I know that they are better men and better fighters for so doing. Give me nine hundred men who have a Y M C A rather than one thousand who have none, and I will have better fighters every time. I voluntarily make this statement because I am so appreciative for what your efforts mean to the morale of our army."

3. The conclusions and opinions of Lieut. Col. Wheeler are concurred in by these Headquarters.

By order of the C in C
James A. Logan, Jr.
Col. G. S. N. A.
A. C. of S., G—I.

DEMOBILIZATION

Space does not permit the narration of the complicated task of gathering in the workers from the field when their work was done and restoring them to their homes. From what has been told, the reader may easily apprehend the practical details and difficulties. Transportation was as congested on the west-bound as on the east-bound voyage, and delays were equally trying to patience and temper. Most secretaries were impatient to get home. A large number, however, both of men and women, were sorely disappointed that they were not permitted to see something of France, especially of the regions in which battles had raged. It was not unnatural that they felt entitled to that small reward for faithfulness. The Y M C A attempted to conduct sight-seeing tours for released secretaries by auto truck to Verdun, Rheims, and Château-Thierry, but was quickly stopped by military orders. France already was at work cleaning up her devastated fields and cities and her refugees were seeking their homes and starting bravely to restore their habitations. For them it was tragedy, even in victory, and the presence of sight-seers was unwelcome. Strict orders were issued to the welfare organizations that their personnel should not be allowed to roam about France but should be started for home as soon as the units they were serving moved.

In these circumstances, the management of some secretaries became exceedingly difficult. Men and women tacitly asserted a personal freedom which they had willingly subordinated when there was need. Many considered that they had a right to go sight-seeing, and ignoring orders and risking arrest, they made the trips they desired. It became necessary to issue urgent bulletins appealing for loyal observance of orders in the last stretch, and to shepherd the flocks of men and women from Paris to the embarkation ports where they awaited ships and which they were forbidden to leave while waiting. The Women's Bureau issued notice that no woman who went A W O L would be granted a certificate of honorable service, and applied it strictly. Workers yielded under protest, with a sense of injustice, and only to save their records. Charges that the Y M C A did not appreciate their service and that, having called them in in its great need, it was now trying to get rid of them for its own glory, were not wanting. The fact that the Y M C A was under pressure from the General Staff was not known or was openly doubted. Favoritism and partiality were alleged. Financial settlements were regarded by many as niggardly and haggling; and the return of uniforms and equipment, cheerfully

assented to when service contracts were made, was regarded as unreasonable and churlish by men to whom the retention of their uniforms had gained a sentimental importance. The War Department had forbidden the wearing of the uniform after discharge from service and held the Y M C A responsible.

To offset such feeling, which was not of course universal nor even general, there was the eager desire to get home to families and friends and interrupted duties. Most of the secretaries had gone to France at real personal sacrifice. Their incomes had been reduced, their business or professional connections impaired and, not less than soldiers, they knew anxiety for their loved ones and longed to be among them. France had nothing to offer which could persuade them to stay a single day after embarkation became possible.

On the part of executives there were grave considerations to be met. The sense of accountability to the public for the large funds entrusted to the Y M C A was heavy, and must be reconciled to the desire to deal justly and generously with men and women who had made personal sacrifices and served well. The Army's orders concerning demobilization were specific and strictly interpreted. In order to use ship space offered, it was necessary at times to send men ahead of turn simply because they were closest at hand. So it happened that some who wanted to go felt that they had been unfairly delayed, while others who wanted to stay felt that they had been hustled off.

Into the Demobilization Bureau, which dealt with returning secretaries, were put the most tactful and experienced men available whose task was to try to persuade secretaries of the reasonableness and necessity of the rules adopted, but in any case to enforce the rules firmly and without partiality. On the whole, they succeeded fairly well, but did not avoid sending some home with a rankling sense of injustice. In New York the War Personnel Board employed its best men in interviewing every returning secretary and the Women's Bureau welcomed the women workers in the spirit of grateful appreciation of the work they had done for the soldiers and of the demonstration they had made of the capacity of women to play an honorable and useful part even in the field from which feminine weakness had been supposed to exclude the sex. Complaints were sympathetically listened to and claims of various sorts settled on their merits. All personnel records were assembled in a Bureau of Demobilized Personnel, which was made a continuing organ of the Association to act in all matters which might arise as delayed consequences of service

developed. The fact could not be avoided that, like soldiers, many secretaries found their former employment gone, and confidential records show temporary grants made to tide men over periods of unemployment, and aid in finding new employment. A moral obligation was recognized to physically incapacitated men and women whose needs were not sufficiently met by the indemnity insurance bought by the Association.

As returned workers settled down into the familiar surroundings of home, irritations born of abnormal strain soothed themselves, and the prevailing mood became one of gratitude for the privilege of service shared, frank acknowledgment of personal defects and failures mingled with cherished memories of genuine bits of good work, and a unanimous conviction that, were the thing to be done again, a far better record would be made.

CONCLUSION

Casting back over the whole record from recruiting to final discharge, the outstanding fact is that in the great national emergency the Y M C A, sweeping aside the limitations of its own membership, appealed to America for her best men and women, and her best responded. Whatever final record any individual made, he started as a man held in high esteem by that committee of his fellow townsmen upon which rested the first responsibility of selection. With tragically inadequate, because impossible, preparation, these men and women found themselves at first in an utterly novel situation where daily accumulating experience was their only guide. Within a year, experience had taught its lessons, and new arrivals for the most part became members of teams more or less accustomed to the situation. From that time the quality of service steadily improved, and as the shortage of workers was gradually overcome, and military situations became stabilized, the achievement approximated the intention both of the individual workers and of the organization.

The Appeal
for the Best

The problems of management and of adjustment to the military régime were worked out experimentally. Bigger problems had the right of way with the Army whose approval and cooperation were requisite at every step. The dangers arising from the presence of civilian auxiliaries in military areas were proved to be far less than had been apprehended and ways were found of reducing the inevitable minor interferences with military operations. But the speed with which military operations developed forced upon both the Army and

the Y M C A improvisations in the field which involved weakness and waste. It is clear that in such matters as militarization, travel, and assignments, efficiency and economy might easily be increased by the use of foresight. A very large part, though not all, of the assembling and coordinating of field staffs, for divisions or smaller units, might well be done when the unit itself was being assembled and trained. The efficiency of such staffs could then be tested before the strain of combat. Moving with the unit from the home base, the embarrassments attending the attaching of new and untrained workers in the field would be reduced or eliminated. The proper ratio of workers to soldiers, and the corresponding limitation of the program to the capacity of the numbers authorized, were never settled by processes of intelligence. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in an untried situation, any review of the welfare operations in the World War must also recognize that the prevalent conception of the Y M C A as a general utility organization,—a view shared by the General Staff and the rank and file as well as by the Y executives and workers,—is inherently unsound. An army, more than any other social organization, is constructed on the plan of strict definition and assignment of functions. The welfare organization may well undertake numerous functions, but to expect it to meet the current requests of any and every body for any and every kind of service, is to condemn its workers in advance to all the humiliations which disappointed men under severe strain can inflict. The first requisite of intelligent assignment of men to duty is definition or at least circumscription of the duty. In the World War that was impossible, because no one, from the Commander-in-Chief down, knew what the duties would be. But the experience gained made possible the necessary definitions for the future.

The Test of
Americanism

The entire operation was thus, so far as personnel was concerned, a searching test of the ingenuity, resourcefulness and determination of American citizens selected for those qualities in the light of their past performances. The Y M C A was the channel through which these citizens found their way to the field of service. With the constant counsel of the best advisers it could find among the financial, industrial, professional, and religious leaders of America, and under constant control and direction of the Army, the Y M C A laid down broad lines of policy and method, and sent its recruits into the field to grapple with the situations they might find. This book records their successes and their failures. It can only reflect the consecrated resolution which kept them steadfast to the end.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SECURING MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

Materials entered into service overseas in far greater proportion than in the United States, principally because of the post exchanges with their enormous distribution of consumable supplies, and in no small degree because auxiliary services, especially of transportation, were limited and the Association was obliged to provide its own substitutes. This meant the diverting of a very large number of secretaries into Association supply service. One-third of the A E F, according to the estimate of General Harbord, was occupied in similar service for the Army. Ocean transport was so overtaxed that it was of supreme importance to buy as near as possible to the place of consumption. It was necessary to depend heavily upon the Overseas Purchasing Bureau in New York,¹ but the purchasing organization in France invariably sought first for stocks in European markets.

The Europe which in 1914 ceased its peace activities and entered into war was, from an economic point of view, as close a unity as the United States. Highly specialized industries absorbed attention in each country, the population depending upon exchange with other countries for the necessities of life which they gradually ceased to produce for themselves. From year to year all became increasingly dependent on Russia and the transoceanic continents, for foodstuffs and the more essential raw materials, such as cotton, rubber, timber, and certain minerals. An elaborate system of exchange of products had become essential to the existence of all. This delicate, complicated economic system was broken to pieces by the war, which severed the intimate financial and commercial bonds which had bound industrial Europe together. The separate countries found themselves in desperate straits for necessities which they had ceased to produce for themselves and could no longer procure from their neighbors. Essential war material had right of way on the seas at all times; and, particularly after February, 1917, the inroads of the submarines greatly decreased the total available tonnage while a larger and larger proportion of such tonnage was being demanded for these essentials.

European
Commercial
Conditions

¹ Consult Chapter XVI.

When, therefore, America entered the war, the Allies were almost at the end of their own resources as far as material was concerned. They were also facing shrinking buying markets because of export prohibitions issued by the neutral countries. Such were the commercial conditions under which the Y M C A entered the field as a buyer of large quantities of foodstuffs, clothing, lumber, books, musical instruments, automobiles, and innumerable other supplies and equipment.

Scope and
Functions of the
General Supply
Division

In the first few months, while the plans of the leaders were taking form, and before the scope of Y M C A activities had been determined, purchasing was conducted by various minor bureaus. The acceptance of responsibility for post exchanges, in September, 1917, meant a huge expansion of purchases, and in the first definite organization of the A E F-Y M C A in January, 1918, all purchasing was merged into the General Supply Department.¹ Remembering that the Y M C A began its work overseas with the expectation of operating along familiar welfare lines with a very gradually increasing expeditionary force, it is apparent that reorganizations and readjustments of business machinery must have followed each other at brief intervals. By December, 1918, the General Supply Division included the following departments: hut construction, hut equipment, hut decoration, hotel and café, general purchasing, uniform, manufacturing, traffic, warehouse and forwarding, motor transport, salvage, and post exchange.

The functions of the General Supply Division amounted to nothing less than taking care of the whole building, purchasing, transporting, and selling program of the Y M C A. The business conducted by this organization during its eighteen months of existence ran close to \$100,000,000. To build up an organization of this size in so short a space of time and to make it function at all, evidently required business men of the highest type. The Association was always fortunate enough to secure these; unfortunately, the demands of their private business or of other phases of Association work forced many changes in the General Supply Department.

Business
Leaders

The first head of the Division was Francis Edward Powell, President of the Anglo-American Oil Company and Chairman of the English Petrol Board. He arrived in Paris in November, 1917, in order to organize the business end of the A E F-Y M C A. During the short period while he was able to give his support and advice to the General

¹ See Chapter XXV, also Vol. II, Appendix V, pp. 545-556.

Supply Division, he was responsible for several important decisions which affected the service during the whole war. The estimate of tonnage required to operate the canteens successfully—an estimate which afterwards proved to be remarkably exact¹—was made by him in consultation with officers of the Quartermaster Corps. He ordered the saw mills in England and America without which the Construction Department would have been severely handicapped in securing the necessary lumber to carry out its building program. Through his experience it became possible to convert into a semblance of order the chaos which characterized the French ports of entrance at the beginning of the ocean shipments. At a time when the Y would have been grateful for the assurance of a score of automobiles within the next few months he assumed responsibility for ordering 150 cars in England for immediate delivery. Only too soon, in March, 1918, was he compelled to leave for England to attend to his duties there.

He was succeeded by H. F. Sheets, Manager of the Vacuum Oil Company in Paris. Mr. Sheets was a man of broad business experience and with an intimate knowledge of French business methods. During the larger part of Mr. Powell's administration he had worked as his assistant. His experience was, however, soon required elsewhere. In May, he was appointed Assistant Chief Secretary, but continued to keep in close touch with the General Supply Division.

F. A. Grow, Vice-President of J. C. Whitney & Co., Chicago, was his successor but he had hardly begun work when he was obliged to return to the States on account of the death of his partner. Another assistant to Mr. Powell was William Percival Whitlock, a Cincinnati broker, who was appointed Assistant Director under Mr. Sheets and remained in this position until his temporary return to America in August, 1918.

Mr. Grow was followed by H. B. Osgood, of Chicago. During his administration the change of the whole Y M C A administration from a centralized system² was put into effect and Mr. Osgood was appointed General Field Secretary.

The next director of the division was Alexander N. McFadyen, of Detroit, General Superintendent of the S. S. Kresge Stores. He had for a time served as director of the Post Exchange Department. His term of service fell within the most critical period for the General Supply Division, at a time when the shortage of tonnage was madden-

¹ See Chapter XVI.

² See Chapter XXV.

ing. His experience as the head of a large chain of retail stores in America was of great value in the distribution of goods throughout this period. The warehouse problem became of supreme importance, and, in September, 1918, he temporarily resigned from his position in order to organize the warehouses, especially in the Fifth Region.

For a few weeks Theodore E. Brown, an insurance man from Philadelphia, who for a considerable period had served as director of the Construction Department, was head of the division. Mr. Sheets, who had been on three months' leave to America, then returned and for a time assumed the direction.

In the middle of December, Mr. McFadyen returned from the field and again became director until his return to the United States in February, 1919. His successor and director until the end was Willis L. Desnoyers, a real estate broker from Los Angeles. He handled the transfer of the post exchanges to the Army. From that time on the Salvage Department came into prominence.

Besides the several hundred secretaries employed by the General Supply Division in the Paris Headquarters, a considerable number of men with broad training were needed as supervisors in the field. The work of divisional and regional business supervision and inspection of the post exchanges could not be entrusted to novices.

By promoting to the director's position, every time it became vacant, a man already familiar with the organization and its work, a certain continuous tradition was built up at the top. But the conditions prevailing in the lower ranks produced perplexing problems. Not only was there a serious shortage of personnel, but there were many changes. Business men, especially, were in many cases unable to be away from their affairs for more than six months, a period of service sadly cut into by the delays incident to travel and militarization. The consequences of constant shifting of personnel and reorganizing of departments and field units to meet the repeatedly changed conditions need no elaboration.

CONSTRUCTION, EQUIPMENT, AND DECORATION OF SERVICE BUILDINGS

The first essential in the material equipment required for the Y's welfare service was the provision of buildings in which it might house its activities. As in the home camps, huts in France housed varied activities, but served, as there was less need at home, the more primitive requirement of shelters, in many cases the only shelters.

The Hut Construction Department was inaugurated in June, 1917, and immediately availed itself of the experience of its forerunners in the British Association.

The first head of the department was Cyrus W. Thomas, of Omaha, Nebraska. As assistant he secured another architect, John W. Chandler, who remained as chief architect for the department during its period of existence. The department soon grew to considerable proportions and as matters of contracts supplanted designing in importance, it was deemed necessary to appoint a business man as director. This position was filled by the appointment of a lawyer, D. L. Shillinglaw, on September 17, 1917. In May, 1918, he resigned to enter the Army and for a short while was succeeded by Theodore E. Brown. When the latter was appointed head of the General Supply Division, J. G. Ralston became director, continuing to serve until the department was closed in the summer of 1919. Organization

Owing to scarcity of lumber and labor, it was the policy to use existing housing facilities wherever they could be obtained. In cities in the training and base areas, the Association leased suitable buildings, through its Legal Department. Some of the finest were private residences loaned by their owners without compensation. Mobile units were served in tents, and in the billeting areas the qualified army officer would be requested to requisition suitable quarters, the Association paying rent at the established army rate. Sometimes the use of barracks would be secured from the Army. At the front the men were served in cellars and dugouts. The Huts

The Hut Construction Department was mainly concerned with the manufacture and erection of new buildings. It was charged, however, with the duty of installing improvements, such as electric lights and shower baths, in leased buildings, and with the repair and upkeep of all buildings used by the Association.

The irregularity of troop distribution in France made it necessary to design several types suited to the different typical conditions. Type A was originally a direct copy of the Callan hut, the service building developed from the Mexican Border huts through much practical experience by the British Y M C A. It was 43 meters long and 9 meters wide and had a "billiard addition" of 13 x 9 meters. The main hut consisted of a concert hall with stage and dressing room, a canteen with counter, store room, office, kitchen, ladies' room, mess room for secretaries, and the three sleeping rooms. The plans for this hut were modified from time to time. Provision for a quiet room was Standardization

among the improvements. Eighty-six of these huts were erected in France at a cost of 40,000 to 60,000 francs each. They were all built in the rear areas, St. Nazaire, Brest, Gièvres, Le Mans, and similar places. This type was designed to serve units of 1,500 to 2,000 men.



Units of 2,500 or more soldiers were served in the type B hut. This building was approximately 50 x 18 meters. It was, in effect, two A huts placed side by side and thrown into one by the omission of the dividing walls and was known as the "double" hut. It had several advantages over the A type, the auditorium, classroom, quiet room, and storerooms being twice as large. The long valley between the two roof sections made it very difficult, however, to prevent leaking and the increased width of the building impaired the lighting in the daytime. Forty-eight of these huts were built in the rear areas at an average cost of 85,000 francs.

The type C hut was adapted to the service of units containing 800 to 1,500 men. It was similar in design to the A hut, but had no billiard room annex. Further, the service quarters were reduced to a minimum consisting of a store room, kitchen, office, and sleeping quarters for one secretary. Thirty-one of these huts were erected. The cost of the C huts ranged from 20,000 to 30,000 francs.

Nearly all specially erected huts were modifications of these standard types. In the earlier period an attempt was made to combine service of the enlisted men and officers in a single building by making an addition (9 x 10 meters) to the A hut as a club room for officers. For various reasons this arrangement proved unsatisfactory and the policy was changed, separate buildings being used as officers' clubs. Wherever the number of officers warranted, a type A hut was used. In smaller camps the C type of barrack was assigned for this purpose. During the first year, before relief and welfare work had been defined and segregated, the Association constructed several huts similar to the officers' clubs for hospital service, providing accommodations for the hospital staff and Red Cross representatives, as well as a base for visitation of patients. In April, 1918, the entire hospital welfare service, including these huts, was taken over by the Red Cross.

Another hut type, the E hut or auditorium, was in process of standardization during the final stages of the work. This hut was 252 x 99 feet and provided with a stage, two dressing rooms, locker room, shower bath, store room, classroom, and six bed rooms. When used exclusively for entertainment it was provided with a sloping floor, a feature unsuitable, of course, if the hut were also used for

TYPICAL HUTS YMCA ... AEF



athletics. Five of these huts were constructed at a cost of approximately 90,000 francs each.

Besides these more or less standardized structures, 104 huts were constructed locally. These were built of material obtained at the place of erection and by local labor. The local secretaries in charge of this construction were not allowed to alter the standard basic designs; nevertheless, these huts varied from the standard types by additions or annexes.

Army barracks (buildings 6 x 30 meters) were used for the service of units consisting of less than 800 men. They were arranged on the same principles as the C huts. A number of these huts were also used as offices and living quarters for the secretaries in larger camps, as warehouses, garages, and for similar purposes. Of this type, 113 huts were scattered about France, at a cost of approximately 20,000 francs each.

During a critical period in 1917, while the department was still waiting for the delivery of ordered huts, some tents were purchased for temporary use. This experiment proved to be a success and the number of tents was repeatedly increased to a total of 1,045 in 1919. Most of them were of the so-called "abri" type, having the form of a tent but really being buildings made of canvas placed over a wooden frame. They were double-walled and provided with doors and windows. These "abris" were very comfortable, cool in summer and easily heated in winter. There were three different sizes in use, 6 x 8, 6 x 18, and a few 6 x 30 meters. The prices ranged from 3,500 to 10,000 francs according to size. About 300 tents were single walled and chiefly used as sleeping quarters during the summer, and for storage.

The Abri
Tent

Special huts of elaborate design were built at certain places. At Nevers, for instance, the 19th Engineers erected a large building of terra cotta tile, the local building material, and turned it over to the Y M C A.

The "huts" requisitioned, through army officers, for service to mobile troops varied in size from single rooms used as canteens or writing rooms to large buildings like, for example, the Fest Halle, the great town hall of Coblenz. In the area of the Army of Occupation the design of the huts was, as a whole, widely different from the structures used in France during the fighting period. More than 600 of these rented quarters were occupied at different times in France and Germany.

**Hut
Manufacturing**

If conditions had been normal, the natural method of providing huts would have been to obtain lumber locally and build by local labor. The shortage of building material and the congestion of transportation made this impossible. Already the requirements of the armies were far in excess of any quantities in sight. The Association, forbidden to buy in the open market, was forced to make contracts with French manufacturers for turning out "knockdown" buildings in large numbers, the Association furnishing lumber and all other material. This, of course, emphasized the importance of standardizing designs.

When the Association set out to secure timber, they were instructed to go into the Swiss and Spanish markets. Accordingly a man was sent to Switzerland where he secured lumber, and five carloads were, by a lucky chance, obtained in Belfort and shipped to the 1st Division "to help get those boys out of the mud." But this was only a fraction of what was needed. It was necessary to find some other method. At last Mr. Shillinglaw solved the problem by reaching an agreement with the army engineers to the effect that this corps promised to turn over to the department the output of a sawmill, the mill to be provided by the Association. Two sawmills were obtained in Great Britain and America and the department began to receive some green lumber from army mills though not from those it had provided. This opened the way to further army aid when forestry operations had become established on a large scale, and considerable quantities were secured from the Bordeaux region and the Jura Mountains. The necessity for using green lumber of course meant that large allowances for shrinkage had to be made in designs and manufacturing. Nevertheless the finished huts suffered much from leaking, which in turn made the repairs disproportionately large. The bearing capacity of the material in use seems to have been overestimated in the first designs. This was later remedied, but the first huts were unsatisfactory. The floors sometimes broke through on account of insufficient foundations and the rafters used for the roofs were too light. A great many of these huts had to be provided with new flooring and the roofs needed repeated repairs. The main reason for these defects was the green lumber which was used.

A difficulty encountered in dealing with French manufacturers arose out of the difference between French and American business methods. In the beginning the French manufacturers orally promised deliveries within a specified time. Most of these manufacturers,

however, had also contracts for hundreds of buildings for the various armies. They never attended to the Y contracts before finishing the army contracts and repeatedly failed to make deliveries at the time agreed on. When the Construction Department made claims on this score, they discovered that the oral contract was of no value whatever in France. From then on, of course, all contracts were written.

After an investigation of the profits made by the French contractors, the Department in the early part of 1918 decided to operate a factory of its own. It was opened at Champagnole in the Jura Mountains in March and run under the supervision of a small force of secretaries by the help of French labor. The operation proved a success and a factory in Bordeaux which had been used for manufacturing hut furniture was in June taken over by the Construction Department exclusively for the production of huts. The price of the huts manufactured by the Department was considerably lower than for those obtained from private firms. The Champagnole factory eventually saved the organization 48 per cent on each hut. The Bordeaux factory effected a saving of 25 per cent. The limited supply of labor, and the still more limited number of secretaries who could be spared for supervision, prevented the development of this work to a factor of dominating importance. The two factories turned out 15 per cent of all the huts built in France. The total production capacity of the department, during the summer of 1918, reached an average of one wooden hut per day, besides the erection of tents and furnishing of rented quarters.

Many of the secretaries assigned to the department had, if any, ^{Hut}_{Erection} only a theoretical knowledge of construction. This disadvantage, however, was overcome in large measure by the untiring energy of the small force of experienced contractors who supervised construction all over the field. The first huts consisted of several hundred parts which made the erection of the buildings a rather complicated matter. Realizing that the personnel as a rule was too inexperienced to erect such a hut, the production engineer of the department went thoroughly into the matter and simplified the manufacture of the buildings by a system of standards reducing the various parts to a total of 40.

One circumstance which caused the local secretaries a good deal of worry was the condition in which the material arrived. Often parts were broken beyond repair and other parts missing. The defects were reported to Paris but in the face of the cumbersome traffic regulations, shortage of cars, and eventually of embargoes,

these reports as a rule were made out only as a matter of form before the secretary started out to buy substitutes at the place of erection.

The erection of the huts was sometimes done by French labor but in most cases by army details secured by the local secretaries. In no other department was military cooperation utilized to a larger extent than in the construction work. Officers could see a direct and tangible benefit to be obtained by complying with requests for help in constructing the huts and they were always willing to detail the necessary forces.

Hut
Accommodation

On account of the many shifts from one place to another it is quite impossible to determine the exact number of points at which the Y M C A served the Army. An indication of the extent of the program carried out is given in the fact that, at the height of activities, 1,675 huts were being operated simultaneously for the benefit of the soldiers. The Hut Construction Department reported a total expenditure of 23,870,881 francs exclusive of the Army of Occupation, and the cost would have been much larger if the Army had not cooperated in the most generous way by furnishing labor and considerable quantities of material free of cost. The great chain of huts erected and maintained by this department were capable of accommodating 1,141,000 men daily.

HUT EQUIPMENT AND DECORATION DEPARTMENTS

As hut construction increased in volume the matter of equipment took on larger proportions. In the fall of 1917 and the early part of 1918 the purchases and distribution of equipment were managed by the Post Exchange Department. In February, 1918, a special Equipment Department was formed.

The main activities of the department had to do with the furnishing of tables, benches, chairs, and other kinds of furniture, and of kitchen utensils and equipment for the dry and wet canteens. Furniture was procured from many different sources. The factory run by the Construction Department in Bordeaux, originally for the manufacture of hut furniture, has already been mentioned. Contracts for large lots of furniture were made with French manufacturers or Spanish, Swiss and British firms. Expenditures for furniture and equipment reached a total of about 4,000,000 francs.

The department further undertook the supply of musical instruments to the huts. Expenditures for these ran close to 2,000,000 francs. About 1,000 pianos were purchased or rented for use in the

permanent huts. Mobile units were as far as possible furnished with folding organs as a substitute. A large number of phonographs with records and accessories were distributed to the various service points. Provisions of standard office supplies and typewriters to the field was also under the supervision of the Equipment Department.

While this department was fairly well supplied with workers it labored under the same shortage of material which hampered all activities. About 80 per cent of the equipment supplied under the supervision of the department was furnished through the Paris Headquarters. The rest was bought locally. Some secretaries displayed great ingenuity and enterprise in contriving furniture out of crates and packing cases, and there were striking instances of the utilization of materials in ways almost incredible.

In 1918, the directors of the Foyers du Soldat undertook to make the rough huts more cosy and homelike by a simple scheme of decoration. The walls were painted in pleasing colors and decorated with flags and posters, windows were curtained, and inexpensive rugs laid in the smaller rooms. It was all done in an economical and simple way, nevertheless a much appreciated touch of beauty was added to the huts. The idea was adopted for the American huts and a Department of Hut Decoration was set up. It was begun late, however, and hardly passed the experimental stage. The expenditures were somewhat in excess of 300,000 francs.

THE HOTEL AND CAFÉ DEPARTMENT

Early in 1918, when men in American uniforms began to be a common sight in the streets of Paris and other popular places, the Association realized that there was a gap in the service which ought to be filled. The majority of the French hotels charged prices which officers justly regarded as excessive and which, for the enlisted men, were ruinous. The restaurants were not much better. To counteract this exploitation, a Hotel and Café Department was established which, at the height of activities, conducted more than 70 hotels and a large number of cafés and cafeterias. The majority of these hotels were located in Paris, in the ports, and in other cities where transients were numerous. In the large cities there were special hotels for officers and others reserved for enlisted men. In smaller places no such distinction existed but the rooms for officers were generally furnished somewhat more comfortably and a higher price charged. All these hotels were highly popular and always overcrowded.

In
Germany

The most important hotel and café service was probably rendered to the Army of Occupation. The men in and around Coblenz were not allowed to eat in German restaurants, partly on account of the scarcity of food and partly to minimize contact with German civilians. When away from their own units they were, therefore, unable to obtain food in any other place than the Y M C A restaurants and hotels. Thirteen hotels and restaurants were run by the department in this zone under the supervision of experienced hotel men. The serving capacity was 15,000 to 20,000 meals a day. All kinds of food were bought from the quartermaster and in the first few months the bread was shipped from Paris. Later the Association started its own bakery in Coblenz.

Cost of
Hotel Operation

The hotel and café service established by the Y M C A was an activity limited to overseas service. As was the case with the post exchanges, the Association saw that the conditions in France created a specific need and extended its services to meet it. Like the post exchanges, the hotels and cafés were supposed to be self sustaining. In fact, the hotels were all run at a loss. The charges were so low that they only just sufficed to cover the expenditures from day to day. The extensive plumbing installed to meet the expectations of American patrons and the damage claims from the French owners on expiration of the leases cost the Association approximately \$700,000.¹ A special reason for this large item was the fact that the French leases usually called for restoration of buildings to pre-lease conditions. This was generally taken literally by the proprietors even to the extent of requiring the removal of baths and other improvements introduced by the Association.

GENERAL PURCHASING DEPARTMENT

The erection of so many buildings, the equipment of these and many others with furniture and fixtures, the provision of supplies required for their operation and of other materials for the use of the soldiers, and the undertaking of the post exchange, necessitated purchasing by the Association on a huge scale. The General Supply Division combed the markets of Europe for such articles as could still be obtained there. This task was undertaken by the General Purchasing Department. The first director of this department was P. A. F. Appelboom. Early in 1918 he was transferred to educa-

¹ See Audited Financial Statement, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

tional work and was succeeded by H. B. Osgood. When the latter was made head of the General Supply Division his place in the Purchasing Department was filled by H. J. Brown, Jr. About that time the department was divided into two; a special Post Exchange Purchasing Department was set up while the purchases for the construction, hut equipment and decoration, motor transport, uniform, athletic, and hotel and café departments remained under the General Purchasing Department. This department also supervised all the printing for the Y M C A.

In the late spring of 1918, the department was thoroughly reorganized. Up to this time all the purchasing had been done by secretaries, few of whom could speak French fluently. In consequence English-speaking French middlemen or agents were utilized. The reorganization scheme, which proved to be successful, replaced these secretaries by French employes who had experience in particular lines of business in France and who, in every instance, could speak English. Although the purchasing as mentioned was segregated into two departments, no account of this fact is taken in the following description of purchases in Europe.

In France nothing could be obtained in large quantities; only ^{Purchasing in Europe} small lots of any commodity could be purchased at any one place. Most notable of the purchases in France were timber—or rather logs—for hut construction; cocoa beans, of which several hundred tons were bought in Bordeaux and Le Havre and fruit pulp from Southern France for the Post Exchange Department. For this department also, 1,000 tons of tin, for cans, and 1,000 tons of sugar, were bought in Bordeaux. In Marseilles large quantities of colonial products—cocoanut oil, figs, dates, almonds, peanuts, raisins, cigars and cigarets—the latter coming from Algiers—were obtained. Notions, such as towels, handkerchiefs, sewing kits, shoe polish, soap, pencils, for the Post Exchange Department, were also procured in France. But the prices were high; in some cases excessive. In order to take the fullest advantage of whatever resources still remained in France, the divisional representatives in the field were authorized to buy locally for their own requirements. In these cases also prices were abnormally high, but the material had to be secured.

In England, purchases were made of books, athletic materials, ^{Purchasing in England} post exchange supplies (candles, biscuits, jam, etc.), raw materials for manufacturing purposes, cloth for uniforms, motor cars and trucks, tires and other automobile accessories. The shipments from England

were for the most part handled by the British Y M C A and turned over to the General Supply Division at Le Havre.

In Spain
and Switzerland

From Spain were procured fruit pulp, oranges, and nuts for the Manufacturing Department, tables and benches for the Hut Equipment Department. Several hundred millions of letter-heads and envelopes were ordered in Spain and set a little town buzzing with activity for several months.

Purchases in Switzerland consisted mainly of cigarets and large quantities of milk chocolate, also lime juice and citric acid for the wet canteens. A large lot of timber for the Hut Construction Department was procured from this country early in the war and filled a need which threatened a serious delay.

Uniforms

At first, it was assumed that secretaries would be fully equipped in New York. A Uniform Department was established in Paris, however, in 1917, for the purpose of supplying to the secretaries "additional equipment." It was soon deemed necessary to form a similar department for the women secretaries, who in the beginning got their entire outfit upon arrival in Paris. These two departments were merged into one in June, 1918, when H. L. Golsan, a real estate man from New York, took charge. He remained in this position until salvage had been completed.

Every secretary, upon his departure from New York was equipped with a service and a dress uniform, an overcoat, shirts, and hat, while boots, blankets, kits, and the like, were issued through the Uniform Department in Paris. It was found that the secretaries who were assigned to Headquarters service did not need the so-called service uniform but required two dress uniforms, while men in certain other service, as for instance the Motor Transport Department, needed no dress uniforms, but a minimum of three service uniforms within the six months period they were supposed to serve. These special wants were taken care of by the Uniform Department, which also, as far as possible, exchanged the misfitting uniforms with which some of the secretaries had been equipped in the rush of catching the boat in New York. It appeared advisable for the department to supply uniforms from overseas sources and two French tailoring firms were employed for this purpose. They turned out an average of 27 uniforms daily. Many complaints were received regarding the poor quality of the material of which the American uniforms were made, with the result that most of the material used in Paris was bought in the United Kingdom.

The average total values of the secretary's outfit was approximately \$225 for men and \$215 for women. After six months' service each secretary who stayed for a longer period was allowed \$50 for re-equipment and had his choice between buying through the Uniform Department or in the field, in which latter case he was expected to forward vouchers for his expenditures to the department. It was only by exercising the strictest economy that the secretaries were able to manage on this allowance. The men serving in the Motor Transport Department were granted an additional hundred francs for each six months' period. As a matter of fact the majority of the secretaries were forced to spend part of their living allowances on dress in order to present a proper military appearance.

The expenditures through the Uniform Department aggregated about \$3,200,000.¹

MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

Unable to purchase finished products in sufficient quantities, the Y, thrown upon its own resources, supplied the deficiency by going into manufacture on a large scale and making some of the important articles required for the conduct of its activities. Factories in France were leased and operated by the General Supply Division through the Manufacturing Department.

The A E F had a more intense craving for chocolate, candy and biscuits, than for anything else except tobacco. To satisfy this demand France and Switzerland were searched with unsatisfactory results. The French supply was small because manufacturing of these products was restricted or forbidden and the prices for such small lots as could be obtained were excessive. The industries engaged in these products in the United States were busy serving the Army and Navy. Orders could only be partly filled and not quickly. To these difficulties was added the congestion of traffic. Considering that some of the raw materials could be obtained in France, some in Spain, and others in tropical countries without adding to the burden of transporting from the United States, it was decided to assemble raw materials in France, thus reducing the shipping space required by such as must be brought from America, principally sugar and flour.

It was fortunately not difficult to find factories. The first factory was opened in October, 1917, in Paris. The number gradually in-

Chocolate Candy
and Cracker
Demand

¹ Salvage on secretaries' equipment amounted to about \$500,000. The depreciation of the franc was responsible for this comparatively low figure.

creased, and in April, 1918, this industry was big enough to attract the notice of the French Government which found that a French war-time mandate prohibited the manufacture of chocolate. This was construed to include the manufacturing going on for the American troops. The Minister of Food Supplies declared that he could make no exception but vigorous argument finally caused him to withdraw his objection.

Factory
Sanitation

The conditions prevailing within the French factories were unsatisfactory. Sanitary inspection was practically unknown; the Government-ruled sanitary organization, the "Salubrité," seemingly existed only in name. The Y demanded that both factories and workers should be kept clean. This demand resulted in a refusal by some manufacturers to begin operations, and those who voiced no objection were not very scrupulous in obeying this rule. The Medical Corps of the American Army was finally called to assist and sent inspectors regularly to the factories to see that sanitary requirements were observed.

Raw
Materials

In order to reduce the imports of raw materials from America to a minimum, extra efforts were exercised to supply these through other channels. In 1917, it was still possible to obtain cocoa beans and fruit pulp in France. When this was exhausted the fruit pulp was bought in Spain and the cocoa beans in Brazil. From England baking powder, cocoa butter, and various chemicals were imported. Switzerland also produced its share. The French Government, which originally demanded that import duties be paid on these materials, granted an exemption after negotiations with the Minister of Finances.

Extent of
Factory Operation

During the Summer of 1918, the number of factories operated continued to increase and reached a maximum of 44.

The monthly output from these factories was reported to be:

10,160,000	packages of biscuits
7,400,000	tablets of drinking-chocolate
3,500,000	bars of sweet chocolate
1,000,000	bars of milk chocolate
3,800,000	bars of chocolate cream
1,500,000	nut-covered chocolate rolls
3,100,000	cartons of caramels
2,000,000	tins of jam

Although no effort was spared to make the production as large as possible it was far from meeting the demands. Mr. Powell's estimate had, for instance, called for 375,000 bars of chocolate monthly

per 25,000 men, equivalent to one half a bar per man per day.¹ The maximum production covered only about one third of this.

The problem thus solved by the Y M C A was no less a problem to the Quartermaster Corps, which watched the experiment with interest. As it proved successful, some of the factories were commandeered for army service. The Y M C A protested, but yielded as always to the paramount claim. As a result of negotiations, an agreement was made on November 15, 1918, that the entire Manufacturing Department of the Y M C A should be turned over to the Quartermaster Corps, which in turn agreed to supply all requirements of the Y canteens. The materials imported by the Quartermaster were delivered so slowly that it was decided to keep the Y M C A organization in force until the Quartermaster's material was on hand. The last factory was turned over on March 19, 1919.

Result of Y
Factory
Operations

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix V, pp. 547, 548.

CHAPTER XXIX

TRANSPORTING AND DISTRIBUTING SUPPLIES

Military
Transport
Conditions

When the articles needed in Association service had been purchased or manufactured, the task of the General Supply Division was only begun¹. It still remained to distribute these articles to points where they could be made available for the use of the fighting men. The difficulties of ocean transport are well understood but the troubles of the Y M C A were by no means ended even when goods had been brought to French ports or border towns from America and other countries. There was still a long and thorny way to be traversed before they reached their destination. Transport conditions in France, and especially within the Zone of the Armies, were more difficult and more restricted by military necessities than anywhere else. The General Supply Division was responsible for the transportation and distribution of supplies, as well as for securing them originally, and carried out this part of its duties through the agency of three Departments.

TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT

The Traffic Department was organized and directed by Clarence Dale Silvernail, formerly Chief Clerk of the Traffic Department of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. It succeeded the Shipping and Order Department, which was in existence for a few months as part of the General Supply Division. Upon it rested the responsibility for the forwarding of all goods from the ports to the warehouses or other destinations. Originally this department was under the supervision of the Post Exchange Department, for which 90 per cent of the goods were destined. As, however, the requests for transport orders made independently by different departments and bureaus led to confusion and protracted negotiations with American and French military authorities and railroads, the head of the Traffic Department urged that all requests for transport orders for all departments be cleared through his office in order to centralize and quicken action.

¹ Consult Chapter XVI.

In order to analyze the situation we must return for a moment to New York. All the departments were looking to the Traffic Department for information as to the material available to meet their emergencies. Under normal conditions this would have been an easy matter, but during the fighting period the goods passed entirely out of the control of civilian owners as soon as they arrived at the docks in New York. The military authorities allowed no representatives of private concerns to enter the docks. Not until after the Armistice was this decision reversed in favor of the Y M C A. The consequence of this measure was that advices as to shipments from New York could mention only—by mail, not by cable—that goods were delivered at the docks at certain dates, without any indication as to whether the Army authorities would be able to ship them promptly or not.

American
Shipping Advices

It was not difficult to make an immediate check of goods arriving at French ports on commercial steamships, since the companies had adequate storage facilities on the docks. This was not the case with goods carried on army transports. The ships had to be emptied and the dock cleared as rapidly as possible.

On the Docks
in France

Except in case of special requisitions, there was no attempt to classify freight at the docks. Frequently a single sling-load would bring out of the ship's hold, Army, Red Cross, and Y M C A goods, which would be dumped in a heap and loaded into the nearest car. There was no attempt even to check goods against the ship's manifest.

As soon as personnel became available, secretaries were assigned to the Traffic Department to watch unloading and extricate Y M C A goods from the indiscriminate mass. Almost without exception they received cordial cooperation from Army Transport officers. It was recognized that while the Army was maintaining always an advance supply sufficient for 40 days, the Y M C A was always weeks behind its needs. In spite of this precaution, a very large quantity of goods went from the docks to army warehouses, where they turned up perhaps weeks later.

So much for the conditions at the army docks. The next step was the movement of goods—in case they had been segregated from the army goods—to the main warehouses of the Association. All railroads were under control of the French and American army authorities; and there was a persistent disposition on the part of French railway officials, supported by the military Bureau of Transportation, to regard the Y M C A as a privileged purveyor to the A E F rather than as an integral part of the forces. As such it would have been

Shipments
from Ports

obliged to move goods under a civilian permit instead of a military one, and would have been liable to many delays and to charges at civilian instead of military rates. To secure prompt shipments and the lower rate, both on passenger and freight traffic, it was vital that the militarized character of the Y M C A should be established. The head of the Movement Order Bureau, responsible for travel of secretaries, cooperated with the head of the Traffic Department to this end, supported always by clear statements from General Pershing, but it was not until October, 1918, after many conferences, that it was fully recognized.

It was not sufficient, however, to start the goods moving. As far as shipments from the American controlled ports to Gièvres along the American built railroads were concerned, the matter was simple enough. The goods were loaded in the standard thirty-ton type of American car—when such could be secured—and carried direct to the Y M C A warehouses in Gièvres. But American cars were only available to a very limited extent and could not pass to Paris and many other destinations; most of the goods therefore had to be moved in the much smaller French cars (average capacity 10 tons) which involved a multiplication of formalities as a separate transport order had to be secured for each car.

A great many difficulties were also encountered in the case of goods arriving from other countries. At Hendaye, the point of entry for goods from Spain, the department established connections with a Spaniard who was able usually to get the goods moved without unreasonable delay; but in many cases the department head in Paris had to travel to the border to clear the way. In the early months the American Army had no representative at Le Havre, but by the help of the British Y M C A it became possible to get the material from England through within reasonable time. When A E F troops traveling via England began arriving at this port and the shipments consequently increased, the conditions became more difficult. It was necessary for the General Supply Division to erect a warehouse there and most of the goods had to be shipped to Paris by river barges or by motor trucks. The traffic situation was so acute that the Army did not even have enough cars for the shipping of subsistence stores.

Formalities at the border were numerous and harassing, and shippers were careless of observing instructions. Thus cars would ultimately arrive at Paris, marked for the Y M C A, without notice to anyone. This particularly affected the Accounting Department

which looked to the Traffic Department for proof of delivery before paying shipper's invoices.

The movements under charge of the Traffic Department consisted of shipments from the ports and border towns to the base warehouses (Paris and Gièvres), to the manufactories, from manufactories to warehouses, and part of the shipments from warehouses to divisional points of distribution. Interior Shipping

The methods of shipping in France—under French supervision—were much more cumbersome than in America. Here, a car in transit can be diverted by telegraphic order to a new destination. Such a thing was entirely out of the question in France. When a car once had been set in movement, it was necessary to let it go to its original destination, and then go through all the formalities of reshipping under a new transport order. On account of lack of information as to the contents of cars such instances were frequent. Another cause of delays was the embargoes placed upon certain zones preventing freight movements in or out, often for considerable periods. During the Allied offensive, for instance, Gièvres was simply swamped with army orders. For weeks at a time it was impossible for the Traffic Department to move a single pound from the warehouses in that city. Only the existence of the Paris warehouse saved the situation to a degree. There was hardly a time when there was not an embargo on one or more zones where need was urgent. In especially exasperating situations the department appealed to the American or French authorities. Sometimes they made their case convincing enough to get a waiver of the embargo; as a rule they were helpless.

After several years of excessive use with none but the most necessary repairs, the French cars were in a sad state of deterioration. It often happened that a car broke down and was left behind the train for repairs. Tracing of such cars involved first an examination of the A E F car records in Tours and then, if no information could be obtained there, tracing the car from station to station by a secretary until it was found and the goods rescued. The movements of the French trains were abnormally slow. The journey from Gièvres to Paris which was considered an average American one-day haul usually took six days, often much more. In order to keep track of cars switched off for repairs, to speed up the movements of the trains if possible, and prevent pilfering which was going on to a large extent, a convoy eventually was sent with trains that contained sufficient cars with Y M C A goods to justify this use of men. Railroad Conditions

It became a difficult task to keep records required by the Accounting Department so as to trace lost shipments, and enable the Post Exchange Department to advise secretaries when the supplies they requisitioned might be expected. A cross reference system was established whereby it was possible to tell the contents of each car by number, and where it should be at any time; where it actually was depended on all sorts of incalculable circumstances. Secretaries were instructed to report immediately by telegraph the departure and arrival of any car containing Y M C A goods. If a car was not reported arrived within a reasonable time, a tracer was started. In the case of goods shipped to points in the advanced areas, the delays, incident to securing transport orders and other cases referred to, frequently resulted in the secretary's having left with his unit before the goods arrived. Tracing such cars was very difficult, a hundred letters and telegrams being sometimes sent before the car was found. Some never were located. The difficulties of the Accounting Department were somewhat lightened, ultimately, by transferring detailed accounting to the Traffic Department.

The amount of goods moved under these conditions was very large.¹ Transportation from ports to interior warehouses constituted about one third—in October, 1918, 421 cars out of 1465. The shipments for that month were classified as follows:

<i>Contents</i>	<i>Cars</i>
General Supplies	765
Flour	86
Sugar	148
Tobacco	148
Biscuits	52
Chocolate	59
Fruit Pulp, etc (for factories)	63
Lumber and Hut Material	144
	<u>1465</u>

¹ A report of the Traffic Department, April 5, 1919, contained the following record of cars shipped, figures in parentheses showing number of large (30 ton) American cars. Records previous to June, 1918, were stated to be incomplete:

1918	June	593	
"	July	837	USA
"	August	916	(50)
"	September	954	(155)
"	October	1465	(159)
"	November	1219	(110)
"	December	1467	(183)
1919	January	1187	(207)
"	February	916	(215)
		<u>9554</u>	

Besides these, large aggregate quantities were shipped in less than carload lots.

The efficiency of the department was largely due to the fact that it remained continuously under the control of an expert and that he succeeded in securing as assistants an unusually large proportion of men familiar with the type of work to be done. The largest number of workers ever at his disposal was about sixty. Only unremitting watchfulness could keep supplies moving forward, and the tireless fidelity of these traffic secretaries in their thankless task merits particular recognition.

WAREHOUSE AND FORWARDING DEPARTMENT

The Post Exchange Department, receiving nine-tenths of the supplies, felt itself entitled to control most of the minor departments of the division. Among these was the Warehouse Department. When, however, during the latter part of the actual fighting period, the supplies for other departments began to arrive in greater quantities, these departments thought they ought to have a word to say. This led at times to friction and conflicting orders to the warehouses and to the Traffic Department. To avoid those difficulties the Warehouse Department was created in November, 1918, as a kind of clearing house, with power to decide—in cooperation with the Traffic Department—to what extent the demands from the various departments could be met. It took control of the port warehouses, the base warehouses at Paris and Gièvres and some of the large sub-base warehouses as Ippecourt, Nancy, and Coblenz, Germany. The divisional warehouses were considered to contain only goods already passed beyond the jurisdiction of any but the local organization.

Shortly after the creation of this department, canteen supplies were secured from the Quartermaster and cablegrams arrived from New York as to the contents of each shipment of other articles under way. This was a great improvement for the Traffic and Warehouse Departments. The business of the Warehouse Department, from the time it emerged as partly independent, ran smoothly under the direction of Elmer E. Rowe, Treasurer of The Thorold Pulp Co., Canada, and after his return, in March, 1919, of C. C. Foster. The real story of the development of the warehouse system is, however, mainly associated with the actual fighting period.

The first object of the General Supply Division, when the goods began to come in larger quantities, was to find a base warehouse where

The
Staff

Paris
Warehouse

the articles could be stored and inventories kept to form the basis for distribution to the various military divisions to be served. The first base warehouse was rented in Paris, rue Cambrai, in 1917. At that time everything was shipped to Paris and segregated according to commodities by the warehouse force. The space rented, a large five-story building, soon became too small and another and larger building in the same street was added. The detailed record of material in stock was kept by secretaries while most of the physical labor was done by French civilians. About 35 secretaries and 50 to 80 French workers were busy in these warehouses during 1918.

Gièvres

As the volume of supplies increased it became apparent that it would be impossible to secure storage for all in Paris. Further the bulk of the American troops were located so far south that the transport of the goods via Paris in many instances became impracticable. Meanwhile the American Army had built its railway to Gièvres and opened its warehouse there. This was evidently the point for the Y warehouse, and after several months' negotiation,¹ the Army ceded a warehouse 50 by 350 feet in 1918. Later two more warehouses of the same dimensions were obtained but still the space was insufficient; and, during the summer months, as much as 40 per cent of the material was stacked outside the warehouses under tarpaulins or with no cover at all.

As far as possible all supplies for the Post Exchange were shipped to Gièvres, and athletic and entertainment supplies, and books, to Paris. Ten to fifteen secretaries were employed in Gièvres and the Army furnished details for all the physical labor. A large part of the work in Gièvres arose from the haphazard manner in which the articles were moved out from the ports. The secretaries were constantly searching the army warehouses, spotting and claiming Y goods. They also inspected incoming cars and often found cars filled with their supplies standing outside the army barracks.

Sub-base
Warehouses

During the early part of the war, goods were shipped direct from the base warehouse in Paris to the divisions, but as the number of divisions grew in number and the quantity of material available also increased, it was deemed advisable to erect minor warehouses covering several divisions at central points. Some of these warehouses were located at the ports where direct distribution to large numbers

¹ This negotiation was so typical of the difficulties faced by the Army in granting facilities to the Y M C A that the entire correspondence has been included in the Appendix. See Vol. II, Appendix XIII, pp. 601-621.

of troops could be made. To those warehouses five to ten per cent of the material arriving from America was shipped direct. The rest was forwarded to Gièvres and Paris and from there to the so-called sub-base warehouses. The largest of these was in Nancy from which supplies for fifteen army divisions were distributed. Others were located at Chaumont, Châtillon-sur-Seine, Belfort, Bar-le-Duc, and Dijon. These points were selected as corresponding to the regional system inaugurated in July, 1918.

In the training and rest areas and in quiet sectors of the front, Divisional Warehouses divisional warehouses were established, and in the active combat zones field warehouses were maintained at strategic points for the convenience of the secretaries serving units which might operate in the vicinity.

At the height of activities, 77 warehouses of different kinds were being operated. After the Armistice, two large warehouses were established in Coblenz and Trier.

MOTOR TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT

The principal activities of this department were directed toward the movement of goods from the points where railroad facilities ceased to exist—or were reserved for purely military ends—to the divisional warehouses, and ultimately to the huts and canteens. Another responsibility shouldered by this department was to supply the entertainment parties, inspectors of activities, athletic directors, and other traveling secretaries, with transportation facilities from camp to camp.

The first director of the Motor Transport Department after it had grown to be of consequence was S. C. Wolcott, appointed about September 1, 1917. During his period of service most of the orders were put in for cars and trucks. Before the dates set for deliveries of the greater part, however, his resignation occurred in the middle of June, 1918.

He was succeeded by G. E. Halvorsen, an experienced automobile man, who served during the most strenuous months of the war. He resigned on December 1, 1918, on account of failing health. During his period of service another automobile man, George E. Willey, had been his assistant. In January, 1919, Mr. Willey was appointed director of the Motor Transport Department.

The service required of the the department changed repeatedly. Functions of Motor Transport Department In the summer of 1918, for instance, the task was to get the goods

moved to the front at any cost. When the post exchanges were turned over to the Army, the emphasis was changed to the transportation of personnel and sight-seeing soldiers. At all times the department was short of trucks as well as touring cars. To overcome this shortage as far as possible, the material on hand was put to excessive use and only sent in for repairs when absolutely unfit for service. Consequently the cars were generally wrecks in much shorter time than would have been the case under normal conditions. The rate of depreciation was anticipated at twenty per cent a month. Fortunately practice bettered this estimate. The average life of a car proved to be about eighteen months.

Buying Cars

The department from the first moment faced a shortage of cars. Everything possible was done to increase the number, by buying second hand cars and by orders placed in the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Italy. From the United States little could be expected. Some of the cars bought early in England were commandeered by the Army. The number grew slowly to 90 cars in January, 1918, 500 in July, and 700 at the time of the Armistice. During 1919, it became possible to obtain automobiles from this country and the number was gradually increased to 1,665 in May, when they began to be sold in the course of general liquidation.

Types of Service

In periods of embargo it was often necessary to use trucks for transport of goods direct from the base ports to the front. For this, heavy four-ton trucks, chiefly of English make, were used. The transportation from sub-base warehouses to divisional warehouses was done by two-ton trucks, and the further distribution to the canteens was effected by camionettes, light Ford trucks with covered bodies. The camionettes could also be turned into passenger cars and were the most practical type of car in France. For transport of personnel engaged in activities, some 500 touring cars were gradually secured in the various countries. One hundred motorcycles were supplied for the athletic directors.

Repairs

Provision of spare parts and accessories grew into a very complicated problem. Altogether 47 different makes of trucks, cars, and motor cycles were used, not because standardization was ignored but because urgent demands for service forced the acceptance of any car procurable. The enormous stock of parts and accessories required for quick repairs on any car at any garage was out of the question. Orders for these supplies, as well as for cars, had to be approved by the Army and the Franco-American Commission, which usually caused

a delay of several weeks. This often meant that a considerable number of trucks and automobiles had to stand idle for months because accessories for repairs were lacking. It became impossible to supply any local headquarters with spare parts. If anything serious happened to a car in the field, help was secured from the army garages, whenever possible. If help could not be secured, the car was in some way or other shipped to Paris where the only garage with a complete stock of machinery and accessories was located.

This garage was greatly handicapped on account of the shortage of mechanics sent over from the United States. Some French mechanics were secured in addition, but although they did thorough work they were rather slow and unfamiliar with cars of foreign make. Garages

Another handicap was the inadequate space of the garage, which could only hold a minor part of the cars sent in for repairs. The department was able to take care of the lighter cars only and had to go to private French or American concerns for the repair of trucks. During the summer of 1918, a garage for the repair of trucks was obtained and the department became able to do the larger part of the repairs without outside help. In October, the conditions were further improved by the lease of a very large garage from the Société Générale. This garage was able to hold 150 to 200 cars and by working very long hours—generally from eight o'clock in the morning until far into the night—it became possible to do practically all the repair work within the department's own shop. In May, 1919, all garage work was transferred to a large factory which had formerly been used for aeroplane building. This building could take 260 cars at a time, but as the salvage at this time increased the demands very considerably, it became again impossible for the department to do all the repairs without outside help. In the period after the Armistice, some garages were also obtained at various regional headquarters for lighter repairing. From that time, a car was shipped to Paris only when it needed a complete renewal of essential parts.

Most serious of all was, however, the shortage of capable drivers. Drivers So-called drivers were to be had in numbers, but they were mostly people who owned pleasure cars at home and who, although they knew how to drive, could not make even road repairs. Driving a truck, too, is entirely different from driving a light pleasure car.

Demands upon New York were never even approximately met notwithstanding earnest efforts of the War Personnel Board. During 1917, while the demands on the Motor Transport Department were

still moderate, the situation was greatly relieved when the two ambulance units which had been serving with the French Army were taken over by the Americans. A considerable number of the drivers resigned and about 30 were secured for service with the Y M C A.

Driving
Conditions

As the volume of business increased, this handful of men soon was hopelessly inadequate. Forced by necessity, the department assigned amateur drivers to the truck service in increasing numbers. Even under normal conditions this service would have been a heavy strain on untrained men. During the combat periods all the movements at the front and a great part of the movements in the rear areas were made after dark. No lights of any kind were allowed. The roads were generally in a very bad condition and, near the front, torn by shell holes. Of course it often happened that a truck landed in one of these holes. This not only retarded the service but it was a terrible strain both on the truck and driver. It was always necessary to keep watch over loaded cars not in movement, to prevent thefts. During long hauls, drivers were obliged to stay with their trucks for several days in succession. They got little sleep, only an opportunity for a short doze now and then. They seldom had time for the preparing of a hot meal or even coffee. Nervous breakdowns were not uncommon.

The drivers were men recruited from all classes of life. A great many of them, especially drivers of touring cars, were men of prominence at home, doctors, bankers, lawyers. Their life was not a pleasant one.

Adjustments
to Conditions

The decentralization effected in the summer of 1918, was also tried by the Motor Transport Department but with little success. There was a severe shortage of cars and a constant clamor from the various units for means of transportation. The centralized system was reinstated and each division supplied according to the director's judgment of its needs. Six routes for heavy truck shipments were established from Paris and Gièvres to the front and distribution to the actual fighting line was taken care of by lighter cars. A great effort was made to follow the various drives by a concentration of rolling stock. During the St. Mihiel operation, for instance, transportation of supplies was accomplished with striking success.

After the Armistice a considerable number of the heavy cars were used for transportation to the Army of Occupation. The rest were turned into sight-seeing cars, and tens of thousands of officers and soldiers were carried on pleasure trips. The normal activities

of the Association were promoted with renewed vigor and the lighter cars were used to their full capacity by educational, athletic, and other traveling secretaries.

THE SALVAGE DEPARTMENT

This department was inaugurated a few days after the Armistice, in preparation for the possibility of immediate return of the American Army. But the fond hopes of the troops did not materialize and the Salvage Department did not come into prominence before February, 1919, when the homeward movement really got under way. In January, 1919, a committee was appointed for the purpose of formulating a more elaborate plan for a salvage organization. It was decided to appoint a Salvage Board, with a department head and field representatives for each region, all under the supervision of the director of the General Supply Division.

The first director of the department in its new form was D. L. Shillinglaw, formerly head of the Construction Department and now released from army service. At this time the activities were not restricted to salvage only, but chiefly concerned with keeping the property and equipment of the Y M C A in active service. During the period of actual warfare, most of the departments were working under a shortage of equipment. It now became the object of the Salvage Department to get a comprehensive view of the situation; to be on the spot as soon as activities ceased at any point and instantly remove the huts and their equipment for use in the area of embarkation, where the troops flowed in from all the French regions, or in the Army of Occupation. These transfers took place in cooperation with the departments concerned. In order to reach the highest efficiency the regional representatives of the department assigned to a secretary with each division the duty of informing the regional salvage secretary as to any release of equipment within his division.

The American Army took the position that the Association should let the army units get well away from the various points, before they started to sell their goods. But vicious pilfering was going on all over France and the salvage organization felt bound to protect the Association against loss, and began selling while the army units were preparing to leave or just as soon as they had left. The operations were performed by a flying corps of salvage men who followed each demobilization move made by the Army and auctioned the supplies to the local populace. This method of sales avoided packing and trans-

portation expenses and eliminated all middlemen's profits. Very satisfactory results were obtained. As one of the leaders reported:

"The competitive instinct in the crowd to get hold of something they don't want and don't know how to use when they get it, showed itself in France as it does at any auction anywhere."

In this way the salvage corps disposed of the equipment. The huts were in many instances sold to the local towns for use as community centers. A number of huts were sold for use as schools, churches, or other community buildings, in the devastated areas.

Various kinds of equipment for which a fair price could not be obtained locally were shipped to Paris where the warehouse was used as a salvage center. This was the case with quite a volume of wet canteen supplies, athletic equipment, and musical instruments. Most of these goods, if not redistributed from Paris to the few centers still operating, were sold at very satisfactory prices. The International Committee bought considerable quantities for service in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Salvage of
Automobiles

The Motor Transport Department was the last to close its activities and when the moment came for the disposal of the vehicles a most thorough job was done. Practically all the cars were in such a state that it was impossible to obtain a satisfactory price for them. A large repair and rebuilding garage was established in Paris, and in view of the large number of American cars which were sold to the French by the American Army or had come into France through other channels, the secretaries in charge established the plant as a permanent enterprise. When this shop had been put into running order, a few cars, which had arrived so late that they had not been uncrated, were sold to the British Motor Trading Corporation for cost plus ten per cent. The unused but uncrated cars were sold to the same concern for cost price and all the cars which were to be rebuilt were bought by the corporation for £90 to £100 each.

The Paris shop turned out rebuilt cars at the rate of 50 a week. Several hundred cars were rebuilt and disposed of. The trucks were sold to a French concern and after all cars which could be rebuilt had been finished the remaining spare parts and the junk were sold to an American business man for a million francs. If this stuff had been disposed of at retail, it might have been possible to get a larger price. Since the mechanics employed at this time, after demobilization had been completed, were not paid secretaries' allow-

ances, but as high wages as they could demand in any ordinary private business, it was judged that the cost of carrying on the organization for months would exceed the profits. Further, the Salvage Department was very well aware of the fact that there were about 200,000 Allied cars in France and that it was only a question of time when the country would be flooded by second hand cars, greatly depressing prices. There is little doubt that, if Mr. Desnoyers, then head of the General Supply Division, had not taken quick action, the sales would have brought a much smaller return than was actually the case. The motor equipment was sold at an average of less than ten per cent below cost.

Of course this department also encountered a lot of trouble. All sales were subject to the approval of the Liquidation Board and the French Selling Board. The French reserved the right to consider every offer made by the department for six weeks before the goods could be offered to anybody else. When the sales of the motor equipment took place, the French authorities had forbidden the Allies to sell their motor cars in France. This difficulty was avoided by selling to the British concern subject to delivery in France. When later this corporation tried to sell their cars in France, the Government levied a duty of 75 per cent on the transactions. Government Regulations

The Perkins Commission which visited France in March, 1919, estimated that the salvage ought to produce 12,000,000 francs. The total actually realized was approximately 41,000,000 francs. The entire expense of salvage operations amounted to about 25 per cent of gross receipts.¹ Results of Salvage

¹ The net receipts, above expenses, derived from the various sources were as follows:

Huts and tents.....	\$ 988,530.15
Furniture and equipment.....	844,734.13
Moving picture outfits.....	303,909.75
Motor transport equipment.....	2,567,581.97
Office furniture and equipment.....	168,213.14
Athletic equipment	793,603.72
Uniforms	458,924.55
Entertainment equipment	6,227.63
Religious equipment	20,898.58
Writing material	121,023.25
Fuel	5,589.57
Books and periodicals.....	16,141.42
Educational Commission	894.74
Leave areas	221.04
Miscellaneous supplies	47,700.90
Total	\$6,344,194.54

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF WELFARE WORK

The immense volume of business roughly outlined in this and the preceding chapter will strike the minds of most readers with some surprise. Their mental pictures of welfare work, for the most part, go little beyond the hut made so familiar by photograph and description during the war, and the mere statement of the number of huts or of millions spent carries no realization of the mountains of goods and materials to be found, adapted and transported for even the barest modicum of service. Only those familiar with business on a large scale can fill in the innumerable details of execution and the administrative problems to be grappled with by responsible heads. Moreover, unless they had actual experience in the countries where the guns could be heard and the bombing airplanes seen circling overhead, even such readers can hardly estimate the additional complications, the exasperating delays and formalities, and the wear and tear on nerve and sinew, which made business operations in France many times more difficult than any that peace time knows. Any judicial estimate of the historical achievement of the welfare organizations must weigh well this fundamental of service, which had to be created by each organization in proportion to the service it rendered, but by none so much as the Y M C A which carried responsibility for the post exchanges for the whole A E F. Such problems necessarily accompany and condition army welfare work on a large scale, and the student of such work will find in the experiences of the Y M C A, not only a remarkable series of improvisations and instantaneous solutions, but a rich store of data, in failures as well as successes, for framing an adequate program of welfare preparedness.

CHAPTER XXX

THE POST EXCHANGE

The Post Exchange constituted a unique service of the Y M C A overseas, not shared in by any other organization. General Pershing delegated to the Association in France complete responsibility for the task performed at home by the army units themselves, of establishing at each post a retail store for the sale of minor articles of comfort and personal use. Other organizations were permitted later to operate canteens at such points as they chose, and to give away cigarets, chocolate, and similar articles, or sell them at such prices as they deemed wise. The Association was under obligation to conduct stores at every point where soldiers were stationed, or as near every point as military and physical conditions made possible, under General Orders and written instructions specifically prescribing that they should be financially self-sustaining, i. e., that goods should be sold at prices sufficient to cover cost and operation with a reasonable margin against loss. In the performance of this duty exchanges were operated varying in number with a maximum of 1,281 besides rolling and wet canteens to the number of 544,¹ at one time, and the value of goods sold was approximately \$46,000,000. The funds contributed by the public were employed only as invested capital, for the return of which to the War Work Treasury the Y M C A was responsible. Even in its commercial aspects the Post Exchange had a distinct welfare character, for it protected men from exploitation and made possible gratifications of taste and habit not otherwise provided for in France. Nevertheless, as a commercial activity it was entirely alien to ordinary Association practice and experience, and the circumstances under which it was undertaken as well as the methods employed and results attained, require thorough-going exposition.

By the terms of their enlistment soldiers are entitled to pay and subsistence. The kinds and quantity of food, clothing, and equipment issued through the Quartermaster Department are determined by military authorities. Naturally they do not include all the varieties

Personal
Purchases
by Soldiers

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix V, pp. 545-556.

of articles of personal use and consumption required to satisfy all individual tastes and preferences. Like civilians, soldiers buy minor luxuries and comforts to suit themselves. When the citizen soldiers of America left their homes, they did not become the dependents of a paternal government or of organized charity, limited to the enjoyment of such things as might be handed them in accordance with regulations or benevolence. They retained their independence and freedom of choice.

To a large extent, however, they did leave behind the opportunities for purchase to which they were accustomed. Obviously, shopkeepers could not be allowed to locate at will within the camp limits. Cantonment areas were measured by square miles, and a company barrack might be a long distance from the camp boundary, so that only when a man had considerable time free from duty and then only at much inconvenience, could he go outside to make his purchases.

To meet this situation, the Army established in the home cantonments the facilities long employed in garrisons and military posts. These were of two kinds—the Quartermaster's stores and the post exchange. The first, as the name indicates, is a regular function of the military administration. It is a store where all articles included in the regular issue, and certain others in general demand, may be bought at cost. The post exchange, on the contrary, is a cooperative enterprise run by the officers and men. It is the successor of the oldtime sutler, who in former days was a civilian who had secured a concession permitting him to do business within a military post. His place was half store, half saloon. Because beer and wines formed a chief article of his trade, it was known as a canteen. The sutler was in business solely for profit, and since he was operating free from competition, his prices were usually as high as the traffic would bear or the Post Commander permit.

About twenty years after the Civil War it occurred to some military authorities that the profits from soldiers' purchases might as well be saved for their benefit as allowed to pour into private pockets. In 1887, by Army Regulations, authorization was given for the operation of post exchanges by the local military units under prescribed conditions.¹ The capital for the post exchange is secured by the issue of stock to each organization stationed at the post, in

Quartermaster's
Stores and
Post Exchanges

Army Regulations
for Post
Exchanges

¹ Consult Army Regulations, Washington, D. C., 1887.

proportion to the number of men enrolled. The business is conducted by a Post Exchange Officer appointed by the Post Commander and working under the direction of a Post Exchange Council. Barber and tailor shops, laundries, billiard rooms, bowling alleys, and similar features may be operated. Because buildings, light, and fuel are furnished free by the Army and the labor is performed by detailed soldiers at little or no cost, it is possible to undersell civilian competitors and make a good profit. Goods bought from the Quartermaster must be sold at cost, but other goods in large variety are handled and these are never sold at cost except for business reasons. The exchanges must be self-sustaining, and a profit of about ten per cent is usually aimed at. From time to time the Council may declare dividends payable to the common or mess funds of the share-holding units. These funds are used to improve the quality or variety of the mess, and occasionally to finance an athletic team or soldier show. In no case is there direct distribution of profits to individuals. It is, in brief, a cooperative business enterprise, serving the convenience of soldiers, protecting them from civilian exploitation, and utilizing the profits from the purchases of individuals for the common benefit. The thought that it should be an agency for free distribution is not even entertained.

The arrival of the first American troops in France brought up the problem of supply of personal needs, which had been met at home by post exchanges. Many articles to which Americans are accustomed were unobtainable in French shops. Others were very scarce and war conditions had greatly increased prices. The general impression of French people that Americans were all wealthy made it certain that supplies procurable from local shopkeepers would be held at high prices. If the American soldier was to have the cigarets, tobacco, candy, chewing gum, canned fruits and preserves, toilet articles, and all the other minor luxuries and comforts he was used to, at a fair price, the post exchange or some substitute for it must be set up in France. A survey of the Allied Armies showed among the British the Army and Navy Canteen, a chartered corporation doing business for profit. In the Near East, the British and the Indian Y M C A had established canteens on a moderate profit-making basis, using the proceeds in general welfare work. The Canadian Y M C A did the same. Neither of these organizations was ever supplied by its public with funds even approaching the sums entrusted to the American Y M C A, and their service would have

Soldiers' Purchases in France

been seriously reduced without this income. French soldiers bought what little their meager pay afforded at the *Coopératives*, run by the Government, whose tobacco monopoly was a source of revenue. None of these methods appeared entirely satisfactory for the Americans.

Delegation of the
Post Exchanges
to the Y M C A

In the letter which awaited General Pershing on his arrival, a broad and unconditioned offer was made on behalf of the Y M C A, of service in whatever ways the Commander-in-Chief might deem desirable. Conferences were held for discussion of the ways in which the Y M C A could be most useful, and in these conferences the subject of the post exchange came up, the first suggestion coming from a member of the General Staff. The matter was extensively discussed, between members of the General Staff and representatives of the Y M C A, and by correspondence with New York Headquarters. Opinions were divided. The main considerations were broadly stated as the following:

Army
Considerations

From the point of view of the Army there was a supreme objection to the operation of post exchanges by the military units, as at home. It would divert several thousand officers and men "from their proper function of training and fighting." Considering the intense need of fighting men, General Pershing held that the large number required for post exchanges could not be spared, and, in a letter by the Adjutant General, his disapproval was formally stated.¹ A second consideration was that market conditions prescribed that a single organization should handle purchasing and distribution of canteen supplies for the entire A E F. Ocean transport conditions made it certain that the supply of goods would be insufficient to meet soldiers' desires, if not their actual needs, and wherever the responsibility for shortage might properly lie, the organization operating the exchanges would have to bear the brunt of resulting dissatisfaction. Apparently some General Staff officers were quite willing to pass the exchanges to the Y M C A on this ground alone. There was a counter objection on the score that operation by any civilian organization would cause a great increase in the number of civilians in the camps, a condition disliked by most officers. Apparently the fact was tacitly ignored that, if the Army could not bring combatants across the ocean in sufficient numbers to spare an adequate force for the exchanges, a civilian organization would encounter still greater difficulties in bringing non-combatants for the same purpose.

¹ August 20, 1917.

From the point of view of the Y M C A, the exchanges promised Y M C A
Considerations sure and intimate contact with soldiers at all points, thus multiplying opportunities for its regular welfare work. Divisional and brigade commanders exercised complete control over the location of buildings in their areas. It was certain that some commanders regarded all welfare workers as intruders, and would not facilitate their operations. If, however, the Y M C A exclusively was authorized to run canteens, the demand of the men for this type of service would ensure good locations for the huts and a more favorable attitude on the part of unsympathetic officers. No other advantage to the Y M C A is discoverable. On the other hand, it meant a tremendous increase in the number of workers and in equipment. It meant a great business enterprise, involving purchase and manufacturing, transportation, retailing and accounting, for which the Association had no preparatory experience. It called for capital running into the millions with the prospect of heavy losses. Complicating free welfare work with operations of commercial character would inevitably lead to misunderstandings and criticisms that might seriously militate against the success of its customary activities. All this was clearly foreseen by Association leaders and to several was a formidable objection to the assumption of such a responsibility.

Nevertheless there was an inescapable necessity that the task Acceptance of
Responsibility should be performed by someone. The men must have opportunity to buy what they wanted, and protecting them against exploitation should legitimately be regarded as true welfare work. On August 20, 1917, the Adjutant General asked Mr. Carter to inform him whether the Y M C A was willing to undertake it. Without having received specific authority from the National War Council, but on the principle that the Y M C A was with the Army to render the maximum possible service, Mr. Carter informed General Pershing on August 23, 1917, that, if desired, the Y M C A would accept the responsibility. On September 6, General Orders No. 33 (1917) was issued delegating responsibility for the post exchanges to the Y M C A and forbidding the opening of exchanges by army units.¹ The National War Work Council found itself facing a *fait accompli* and, with misgiving on the part of not a few of its members, confirmed Mr. Carter's undertaking.

The fundamental conditions governing these operations were officially fixed by General Orders No. 33 (1917)¹ as follows: Conditions
Governing
Y M C A
Exchanges

¹ Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, General Orders No. 33, France, September 6, 1917.

"III—I.—The Y M C A is granted authority to establish exchanges for the American troops in France subject to such rules and regulations as may be issued from time to time from these headquarters and under such control by Commanding officers as will insure no interference with military operations and discipline.

2.—These exchanges will be operated, insofar as the same are applicable to them along the general lines of post exchanges, whose place they are intended to fill, in order that officers and enlisted men may not be taken away for that purpose from their paramount military functions of training and fighting.

3.—Commanding officers will therefore prohibit the maintenance of any army exchanges in Commands in which exchanges have been established by the Y M C A.

4.—The establishment of these exchanges should not be limited to the areas more remote from active operations, but it is particularly desirable that they should be pushed as far to the front as military operations will permit in order that such comforts and conveniences as they afford may reach the soldiers in the more advanced positions where they are most needed.

5.—Commanding officers are enjoined to facilitate the efforts of the Association's officers in this work. They will arrange suitable locations according to circumstances for the establishment of these exchanges, and accord such considerations to the officers of the Association engaged in this work and insure such facilities to them as would be enjoyed by those operating post exchanges under similar conditions, to the end that the purposes and objects of this undertaking may be duly accomplished.

By Command of Major General Pershing:

JAMES G. HARBORD,

Lt. Col. General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

BENJ. ALVORD,
Adjutant General.

Self-Sustaining
Stipulations

As understood by the Y M C A, and as explicitly stated in explanatory letters by the Adjutant General, this meant that the gift funds of the Y M C A should not be drawn upon.¹

¹ In a letter, August 20, 1917, the Adjutant General wrote: "These canteens will not be a source of expense to the Y M C A funds, but on the other hand could, while selling articles at a lower cost than obtainable elsewhere, still make a small profit, which would be available for investment in your other recreational and amusement features which involve expense and bring no return."

In a letter, September 28, 1917, the Adjutant General wrote: "Inasmuch as this exchange service has been entirely voluntary, and as the principal object of the Y M C A is to minister to the needs of our soldiers, it is not believed that any regulations are necessary which would fix the percentage of profits. The history and reputation of the Y M C A are sufficient guarantees against any unreasonable conduct of the exchanges. Sales will be made at a slight advance over cost price plus cost of operation of the exchanges."

A slight profit over and above all costs, including operation and transportation, was to be aimed at. Owing to the rapid shifting of military units, no distribution of profits to units was to be made, but profits were to be used by the Y M C A in other forms of free welfare work for the soldiers in general. The Y M C A bore the entire responsibility for establishing and maintaining exchanges at all points where troops were stationed, including the combat areas. Local operations were under control of local commanders, who were instructed to facilitate the work in all ways possible without interference with military operations. Each of these points became a source of perplexity and misunderstanding.

Certain stipulations were laid down by the Chief Secretary in preliminary conferences and correspondence, but at the request of the Adjutant General these were withdrawn, and the responsibility was accepted unconditionally, with the understanding that the Army would give all possible facilities. These stipulations throw light on the foresight of the Y M C A executives. One was to the effect that the same amount of tonnage for supplies should be allotted to the Y M C A as would have been available to the Army for the same purpose. The tonnage actually furnished was only a small proportion of the minimum requirement.¹ The Y M C A never challenged the priority right to transportation of purely military supplies, and never questioned that it was granted all tonnage possible, but it was not allowed to explain to soldiers that the shortage they complained of was due to causes beyond its control.

Another of the stipulations, withdrawn at the request of the Adjutant General, was that other organizations should not be permitted to operate competing exchanges. This was not to obtain the commercial advantages of a monopoly, or to prevent the soldiers from receiving maximum service, but to avoid the evils that would inevitably arise from variations in prices and service. Moreover, if the Y M C A was to bear the entire responsibility, it was not just that any portion of the facilities for transporting workers and supplies should be diverted to others. Although plainly implied in General Orders No. 33, this stipulation was ignored. Quartermaster stores were operated in many places, selling goods at purchase cost with no addition for transportation or other expenses of any kind. Naturally the Y M C A could not meet these prices without drawing

¹ See Chapter XVI.

on gift funds, which under the arrangement it was not permitted to do. Other organizations were permitted to operate canteens, sometimes in close proximity to Y canteens. Although these were few in comparison to the Y exchanges, they were under no obligation to be self-sustaining, and their lower prices or free distribution led to a general belief that the Y was profiteering among soldiers who did not know that by official orders, canteen operations of the Y were on an entirely different basis.

Free
Distribution

While carrying on the post exchanges for the Army, the Y M C A at all times included in its plans free distribution of creature comforts as well as of stationery, athletic supplies, books, and newspapers, and the use of huts and equipment. The post exchanges and the wet canteens were the distribution points for gifts as well as sales. Business complications resulting have already been referred to. Not less embarrassing were the misunderstandings which arose from absence of uniformity either in selling or giving. On May 1, 1918, the following regulations were issued:

FREE DISTRIBUTION OF POST EXCHANGE AND CANTEEN SUPPLIES

This service must be restricted (subject to the discretionary authority referred to in the next paragraph) to the dispensing of hot and cold drinks to the troops:

- A. In front line and support positions.
- B. At points which will serve men going in and out of action, or in and out of trenches.
- C. At points along line of march at the front.
- D. At such other points as may be specially authorized by the regional secretaries.

"The free distribution of such other supplies as chocolate, cigarets and tobacco in times of special stress or troop movements, may be permitted at the discretion of the regional secretaries or Association Headquarters on the recommendation of the divisional secretaries when it can be established that the service will clearly be of real military value. It is particularly desired that this privilege should not be abused and that the permission should only be sought under exceptional circumstances.

"In all cases of free distribution of supplies an actual record of the value thereof must be taken and promptly reported to Association Headquarters in order that proper credit therefor may be obtained. This is essential to insure a correct accounting, not only with the divisional offices, but also in order that the amounts so expended on this kind of welfare work may be definitely ascertained."

The indefiniteness of these rules left much to the discretion of the individual secretary. He continually met situations in which there was no time for reference to his superior. The most typical were those in which men had or claimed they had no money. Especially during the fighting periods, individual soldiers and groups of men got separated from their units and could not draw their pay. There were some divisions whose pay was delayed for two or three months. It is evident that the Association could not officially assume responsibility for the failure of soldiers to receive their pay, and order that supplies be given to all such men. Such a policy would soon have brought it to bankruptcy. As a matter of fact, each secretary used his judgment in each case. Some were too niggardly, others too liberal. In general, these sound regulations were most generously interpreted.

The regulations specifically authorized the free gift of hot and cold drinks in front line and support positions, to wounded, and to men going in or coming out of the trenches. This was regularly practiced, and was extended by most advanced area secretaries to include cigarets and bar chocolate when available. It was a general practice for secretaries to carry packloads of supplies beyond the points to which trucks could go, and distribute them free. At many points also, secretaries forbidden to advance farther, delivered supplies in bulk to supply sergeants, taking receipts when possible, but seldom with a view to subsequent payment. In wet canteens throughout France it was the practice to keep open house during advertised hours on Sundays and at other special times, when drinks, biscuits, and sandwiches were served free to all comers. A very general service was rendered in supplying hot drinks and sandwiches to moving units on departure or arrival, this in many cases involving forty-eight hours' continuous serving under conditions frequently trying in the extreme.

The free distribution of canteen supplies reported from May, 1918, to May, 1920, amounted to 15,332,720.47 francs, or at current exchange about \$3,000,000¹ which must be increased by an amount for the preceding months undeterminable, because accurate records were not kept. Analyzed by periods, more than two-thirds of this took place after the Armistice, partly because of the greatly increased number of distributing points. During the preceding period also, the

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, p. 546.

Association was operating on a much smaller fund, and the enormous expenditures on other forms of welfare work caused serious anxiety lest financial disaster might be met. It should be remembered that the figures given refer to canteen supplies only and exclude the stationery, books, magazines, newspapers, Christmas gifts and the like distributed free to individuals to the aggregate of 20,000,000 francs.¹

No organization received from the American people funds sufficient to distribute as gifts the immense quantities of creature comforts bought by the soldiers in the exchanges, in addition to the varied welfare service rendered by the huts and these activities. Moreover, the practice of unrestricted giving was not approved by the Commission on Training Camp Activities, representing the Government, nor by most of the welfare organizations. General Pershing cabled to the War Department in December, 1918, recommending that the free distribution of creature comforts be limited to ten per cent of the United War Work Fund. The Committee of Eleven voted that this should be the rule, the Knights of Columbus alone preventing the vote from being unanimous. At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus, February 24, 1919, a resolution was passed denying the right of the Commission or the Committee of Eleven to restrict free giving. The Secretary of War did not find it advisable to issue an order on the subject, and the practice was continued by the Knights of Columbus, with the inevitable result that had been foreseen. Few soldiers understood that the post exchanges were, by orders, on a self-sustaining basis, and substitutes for the cooperative stores operated at home by the soldiers themselves, and entirely distinct in nature from the free distribution practiced by the Y M C A and all other welfare organizations.²

A thorough study of the evidence summarized in the preceding pages leads irresistibly to the following conclusions:

1. The Y M C A and the General Staff assumed that soldiers did not expect to be treated as objects of charity, but desired to buy articles for personal use and enjoyment exactly like civilians. This is an assumption that no American will dispute.

¹ There should be no confusion between "free distribution" and "free service." The former refers to creature comforts given to individuals for immediate consumption. The latter includes moving pictures and theatrical shows, athletic supplies, educational service, and all the costly creation and maintenance of huts and their club features, for which no charge was ever contemplated or made, and in which the welfare funds were almost wholly expended.

² Consult *Knights of Columbus in Peace and War*, Maurice Francis Egan and John B. Kennedy, New Haven, Conn., 1920, Vol. I, pp. 366-369.

2. It was recognized that civilians would exploit soldiers if given an opportunity. The original reason for establishing army post exchanges in American posts was civilian exploitation of soldiers. During the war, exploitation was practiced in the United States as well as in France. In every town near a cantonment prices rose sharply in shops, restaurants and hotels. Attempts by "jitney" drivers to collect exorbitant fares for transportation of soldiers and their visitors between camp and town, had to be met by orders of camp commanders fixing fair rates and excluding from the camp those who charged more. Protection was equally necessary in France.

3. The Commander-in-Chief was opposed to sparing officers and men to run the usual post exchanges for protecting soldiers in this way.

4. Such protection was regarded by the General Staff and the Y M C A as a patriotic service which, although a departure from the usual forms of welfare work, was well within the conception of such work in the emergency.

POST EXCHANGE OPERATION

The existence of General Orders No. 33 was, for some reason, not made known to the Paris executives until the middle of September. Building the
Organization Immediately steps were taken to devise and create the immense business organization required. The previous activities of the Y M C A had, of course, never required such an organization. At that time there were about 65,000 American soldiers in France, with an expected increase at the rate of two divisions or 55,000 men a month. There was no reason to anticipate the speeding up of troops which began in the following April, and which completely altered the scale of operations.

The principal features of the new organization were four: Financing, or providing the necessary capital; accounting, purchasing, and distribution. The first concerned the New York Headquarters. After much correspondence and the report of a commission sent to France to investigate, it was voted to advance \$5,000,000 to be used exclusively as operating capital for post exchanges. This sum, it was originally stipulated, should be regarded as a loan out of the funds contributed by the public, to be repaid with interest at current bank rates. No interest charge was ever made, however. Owing to slow "turnover" of goods, and also because of the enormous increase in the A E F in the summer of 1918, the original capital was found

insufficient and was increased from time to time. About November 1, 1918, a total of \$20,840,365 was invested in the Post Exchange.

Beginnings of
Canteen Service
in the Camps

It was recognized, of course, that the men already in France, could not wait for their daily supplies until a great commercial organization should be built up and made ready for systematic operation. At once, camp secretaries were directed to open canteens. They were provided with working funds, varying in proportion to the number of troops to be served. With this capital they supplemented the few supplies that could be furnished from Paris, by buying locally according to their individual judgment and opportunities. Such goods as they were able to procure they sold at prices fixed by themselves in accordance with the accepted principle that a small profit, sufficient to secure the Association against loss, should be obtained. Goods were bought in small lots from different dealers, at prices practically dictated by the seller. Secretaries had often to choose between facing soldiers over an empty counter or offering goods at prices which they knew to be too high. Inevitably there were fluctuations from day to day in each canteen, and wide variation from place to place, and equally inevitably, dissatisfaction and complaint arose among the men. It became evident that the undertaking could not be carried on except by complete centralizing of purchasing, and establishing uniform prices.

In the reports made by secretaries during this period there was no segregation of the transactions in the exchanges. Out of a single working fund equipment was bought, current expenses paid, and canteen supplies purchased; and into that fund canteen receipts were absorbed, the secretary rendering a periodical report on his entire operations. None of the secretaries had been selected with a view to running a retail store. Many had a very scant knowledge of bookkeeping and very little time in the pressure of service without adequate assistance to keep records in any business-like fashion. Until May 1, 1918, when Mr. Seatree's accounting system was set up, with definite segregation of canteen operations, there were no records by which the volume and profit or loss of the canteen business as a whole could be determined.

Problems of
Price Fixing

In February, 1918, the Billing Department (later the Post Exchange and Warehouse Accounting Department) directed by E. S. West, of Newark, N. J., set up a system of price-fixing. While authorized to include operating costs, no account was made of any overhead charges. Buildings, equipment, and services of workers,

including a large number of French civilian employes, as well as accounting expenses, were charged to free welfare service. Only the original cost of goods, ship and rail transportation, and insurance, were included in the calculation of costs. Each of these was not only variable, but at times indeterminate. The War Department allowed some space for canteen goods in army transports, but did not inform the Y M C A what freight rate would be charged. The Quartermaster's Department advised that it would be safe to estimate \$50 a ton on such freight, the matter to be adjusted after the war. This required the accumulation of a reserve fund. Freight rates on commercial ships were higher, and an average of \$60 a ton was estimated. To this was added insurance premiums at $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 per cent. The cost of rail transportation in France was to be determined after the war by the French Government. Advice was given that this would be about \$25 a ton, and a corresponding reserve was set up. Even the purchase price of goods was often unknown when they were ready for distribution. The censor forbade the cabling of information about shipments. Letters miscarried or were delayed. Goods arrived at the ports and were ready for shipment from the warehouses before invoices or even shipping advices were received at Paris. Unless the men were to be denied goods for which they were clamoring, the cost had to be estimated. Knowing that errors were inevitable, and that if estimates were too low the loss would fall on the Y M C A, and if too high it would have to bear the odium of profiteering—knowing too, that for reasons of military secrecy, no explanation would be permitted by the General Staff—the Post Exchange Department grasped the horns of the dilemma, made the best estimate it could, and put the goods on sale.

From time to time price lists were revised as conditions changed. Revision of Price Lists
In the summer of 1918, a very large proportion of goods arrived on army transports, which made possible a reduction of ocean freight reserves to a basis of \$50 a ton, and of marine insurance to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In August reserves were further reduced to \$40 a ton, and on October 1st, to \$30 and insurance to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In October it was intimated, though no official assurance was given, that no charge would be made for freight carried on army transports, and at about the same time advice was received that all goods would be carried on transports. On the basis of records of actual haulage on railroads, inland transportation reserves were reduced to \$22.40 per ton. Prices were reduced from time to time in correspondence with these lowered

costs, the insurance charge of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent being continued until December 1st, presumably to cover pilferage which had been found to be of serious proportions. It was estimated that on an average 2 per cent of inland freight disappeared through pilferage, theft as already stated only being diminished when convoys were sent with trains that contained sufficient cars carrying Association goods to warrant a guard.

Price
Comparisons

Although the Army established no post exchanges, the Quartermaster ran stores in a considerable number of the larger centers. These sold goods, generally in wholesale quantities, officers or representatives of the men buying for whole units. According to established practice, they sold at purchase cost. Enjoying great advantages in purchasing in the United States, and being free of the necessity of recovering freight and insurance charges, the Quartermaster undersold the Y M C A by about 15 per cent. Bitter criticism began to beat upon the Association. The executives tried to secure the privilege of buying certain articles from the Quartermaster to be resold at his prices. The application was approved in principle, to become effective when a sufficient reserve supply had been accumulated for the Army's own needs.¹ In July an arrangement was made to secure tobacco from the Quartermaster, part of the limited tonnage allotted to the Y M C A being released, and on August 1st, the prices for tobacco in all forms were adjusted to conform to the Quartermaster's list. This, however, did not silence the criticism as to other articles, and prices were reduced until the canteens were running at a heavy loss. At last, the conclusion was reached that the Association must ask to be relieved of the post exchanges or be authorized to purchase all supplies from the Quartermaster and sell at his prices. A proposal to this effect was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief on October 12th, and on December 2, 1918, three weeks after the Armistice, Circular No. 61 (1918) was issued authorizing the proposed arrangement to become effective January 1, 1919.² After that date all goods were sold at Quartermaster's prices. As compared with prices in French shops, which sold very few of the articles especially in demand by Americans, the Y M C A prices were very low. They were distinctly lower than civilian prices in America. A few taken at random from the printed price list of October 1, 1918, may serve as illustrations.

¹ Consult Chapter VIII.

² See Vol. II, Appendix V, pp. 554, 555.

Article	Y M C A	Price.	Q. M.	Price
Cigarets	Francs	Dollars	Price.	in U. S.
			Dollars	Dollars
Camels35	.07	.07	.15
Fatimas40	.08	.08	.20
Smoking tobacco				
Prince Albert (2 oz.)	.40	.08	.08	.15
Velvet (2 oz.)30	.06	.06	.15
Chewing gum20	.04	.03	.05
Gillette Razor Blades				
(doz.)	3.50	.70	.30	.75
Shaving Stick50 to 1.00	.10 to .20	.20	.25 to .35
Tooth Paste (Colgate's)	.75	.15	.14	.25

A curious result of investigations into complaints of overcharging was the discovery that many soldiers had not mastered the difference between French and American currency, and sincerely believed that they had paid thirty-five cents for Camel cigarettes, for example, when they had really paid thirty-five centimes or seven cents.

At the close of business on March 31, 1919, the exchanges were transferred to the Army. The books of the Post Exchange Accounting Department then showed a loss of approximately \$1,500,000. Among the liabilities were the anticipated charges for ocean and inland freight. The War Department, however, later ruled that inasmuch as the goods had been solely for the benefit of soldiers no freight charge should be made. By establishing with the French Government and railroads the fact that the Y M C A was not a favored private purveyor but an integral part of the American Army, the advantage was gained that all freight charges against the Y were directed to the American Army, and settlement became a matter between the Army and the Association. When the ocean transport charge was canceled, the inland freight charge was also canceled on the same ground. When accounts were balanced on December 31, 1919, these liabilities were written off, and there resulted an apparent profit of \$508,899.91, or slightly more than one per cent of the gross business done. The Y M C A had included no charge for all labor of civilians and secretaries involved in purchase, accounting, and selling. The Government contributed ocean and railroad transport. The soldiers, therefore, secured \$46,000,000 worth of goods at cost plus one per cent.

On February 7, 1920, by direction of the Executive and Finance Committee of the National War Work Council, a letter was sent to

Financial Results
of Post Exchange
Operations

Gift to
American Legion

Franklin d'Olier, National Commander of the American Legion, stating the situation described above, and offering the surplus to the American Legion, without any restriction as to its use, but with the suggestion that it be employed for the benefit of disabled ex-service men or patriotic work with ex-service men as, for example, in the Americanization work of the Legion. On February 11th, Commander d'Olier informed Dr. Mott that the National Executive Committee of the Legion accepted the gift "with gratitude and appreciation," and issued a bulletin setting forth the facts to all post commanders.¹ The processes of liquidation and transfer of funds were necessarily conformed to the proceedings of the general American liquidation. By the time the funds were transferred, French exchange had declined heavily. The post exchange account finally showed a loss of more than \$5,600,000.²

Headquarters
Administration

The post exchange constituted by far the largest single element of the business of the General Supply Division, of which it became a department in the general reorganization of June, 1918. The names of the men who successfully directed this division³ and its departments are the best indication that the Y M C A put its confidence in and received assistance from American business men of the first order of ability and experience. Those who directed the Post Exchange Department, which was specially concerned with operating the canteens, were Alexander N. McFadyen, R. W. Brumley, and Frank W. White, experts of national reputation in the operation of chain department stores and mail-order business.

Post Exchange
and Warehouse
Accounting
Department

The Post Exchange and Warehouse Accounting Department was essentially a reorganization of the earlier Billing Department. It was under the immediate direction of E. S. West.

A force of business secretaries, regional, divisional, camp and hut, represented the department in the field. Their functions were to check up shipments and sales, inventories, and cash, reporting and remitting at regular intervals. The canteens closely resembled the largest systems of chain stores which have become familiar in America. There were several outstanding differences, however. Many of the canteens were of very brief existence owing to shifting of troops, and secretaries moved with or without their goods from one divisional or regional control to another. Often the military orders

¹ For entire correspondence, see Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 521-526.

² See Audited Financial Statement, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

³ Consult Chapters XXVIII, XXIX.

left no time for making a proper inventory, or the secretary was obliged to leave before any successor appeared to give him a receipt for the goods left behind. Discrepancies appeared in the reports which there was no possibility of adjusting, due sometimes to errors, sometimes to pilfering in the absence of a responsible custodian. There was no way of foretelling when a well-stocked canteen would lose all its customers by removal. When that occurred, transportation might be lacking for a transfer of the goods to some other point, and a sort of salvaging operation had to be performed at a loss.

The canteens were managed for the most part by men selected for other purposes and without experience in store keeping. American chain stores find it necessary to keep a staff of traveling supervisors and auditors in the field to see that local managers are conducting business in accordance with instructions. The shortage of secretaries made it impossible to assign men to such duties until well after the Armistice. They were needed for direct service. The lack of such supervision had the natural consequences. Accounting for goods given away was particularly unsatisfactory. Secretaries managing canteens were given a vaguely defined discretion as to giving goods to soldiers who had no money, or under circumstances which lent some significance beyond mere intrinsic value to a gift. Theoretically, the secretary was supposed to make a record of each gift and include the total in his weekly or monthly report. Practically such gifts were often made in the midst of a rush of ordinary selling. With a line of men waiting impatiently to buy, there was no time to write out a slip recording the gift of a package of cigarets or a bar of chocolate. Many secretaries made no attempt to keep such records, but simply entered as gifts whatever amount was needed to balance their accounts. Mistakes in change-making sometimes swelled, sometimes lessened this item, and losses through pilfering disappeared from view in the same way. Goods missent would turn up as part of a shipment receipted for in full without proper checking against the invoice. Many secretaries reasoned that, in any case, the goods had ultimately reached the soldiers, and as the cash in the till represented the total remuneration received by the Association, the balance was in fact the amount by which the men had benefited without payment. The Post Exchange Accounting Department investigated whenever it appeared necessary and referred a few cases to the Bureau of Investigation. Two secretaries were court-martialed, convicted, and sentenced for embezzlement. In all other cases investigation showed that no

Difficulties of
Service

private profit had been intended or had resulted. It may be doubted whether under the most severe and alert supervision, a business of such magnitude and employing so many men at scattered points has ever been conducted with such honesty. Nevertheless, the work of accountants at headquarters was extremely difficult and perplexing, and the result of the vigilance and patience of the staff was one of the best pieces of work done overseas. Some idea of its extent may be gathered from the following records of canteen sales:

1918	Francs
May	7,122,429.61
June	9,184,672.73
July	12,426,463.02
August	15,529,887.03
September	14,300,378.35
October	17,774,070.36
November	21,289,343.65
December	25,183,934.03
1919	
January	26,816,451.10
February	29,281,314.95
March	33,409,757.07
Total	212,318,701.90

The financial records for the period preceding May, 1918, were not kept in such a way that the canteen operations can be segregated, but the sales would undoubtedly raise the total to at least 250,000,000 francs or some \$46,000,000, besides the free distribution of canteen articles of various creature comforts, to which we shall later return.

To serve the men adequately, it was estimated, a post exchange would be needed for each company or similar unit of approximately 250 men. There were not sufficient workers for this. Although practically every secretary gave part or full time to the canteen, to the detriment of other activities before the Armistice, the average was nearer one canteen to five companies or half a regiment. In addition to the post exchanges, wet canteens were established for the distribution of hot and cold drinks, sandwiches, and biscuits. The following table shows the number of canteens on the first of each month, and the average number of soldiers per canteen, based upon the War Department's reports of the total number of soldiers in France:

1917	Dry Canteens.	Soldiers per Dry Canteen.	Wet Canteens.
May	1		2
June	2		2
July	11		3
August	26		4
September	39	1153	11
October	78	833	15
November	79	1316	20
December	114	1131	31
1918			
January	156	1128	38
February	185	1216	58
March	304	838	84
April	324	987	125
May	398	1065	118
June	418	1727	147
July	639	1558	325
August	628	2058	175
September	742	2128	213
October	715	2577	238
November	803	2454	260
December	1030	1887	361
1919			
January	1257	1461	487
February	1281	1335	544
March	1217	1283	648
April			720
May			552
June			306
July			167
August			75

The table accurately reflects the critical points in the growth and reduction of the A E F. In April the sudden great increase in the expeditionary forces began, and the number of exchanges although increasing absolutely, did not keep pace with the number of men to be served. At the Armistice, the number of exchanges had doubled, while the number of troops had been multiplied by six. This period from April to November included, of course, the battles of the Second Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne, when canteen supplies meant more to soldiers than at any other time, and when military priority for munitions and rations made distribution most unsatisfactory. The Army itself was unable, in many instances, to get food promptly and regularly to men in advanced positions, partly because of the im-

Results of the
Increase in the
Expeditionary
Forces

possibility of using exposed roads by daylight. Y M C A trucks and cars were borrowed or commandeered by army officers for transport of rations, and for removal of wounded. Nevertheless the volume of goods distributed in the advance zones rose steadily through June and July, suffered a slight decline in August and more than doubled in September.¹

After the Armistice the number of Y workers increased, soldiers became available for detail as assistants in the exchanges, and the A E F was reduced in number by repatriation. Exchanges increased in number both absolutely and relatively until March, 1919, when they were transferred to the Army.

Distribution of
Exchanges


The distribution of exchanges was very far from even. In the rear regions where men were concentrated in large numbers, a single large canteen could serve several thousand. In the training areas, where men of a division were billeted in small groups in numerous villages, exchanges were established in the towns and railroad centers most convenient for the majority. Some of the men might have to walk several miles to get supplies, and the custom of sending a representative to buy for a group naturally grew up. To give the maximum service possible, rolling canteens consisting of truck and trailer visited outlying villages. This was a late pre-Armistice development, which demonstrated significant possibilities for future service. With moving troops in the advanced areas, conditions were haphazard. Secretaries seized, from day to day, the most advantageous positions procurable, in house, café, cellar, or out-of-doors, and distributed to all who passed, sent supplies forward on ration trucks, or packed all they could carry on their backs, for trips into the trenches. Sales and free distribution were inextricably mingled, and service was rendered night and day until supplies or the secretary's endurance were exhausted. There was no way of knowing in advance where troops were to be, and often Divisional Y Headquarters did not know for several days where its representatives were. Reports would come in that considerable units had been without supplies for several days, and efforts to reach them would end in the discovery that they had moved again. There were also numerous small detached units of various services, lumbermen, railroad guards, engineers, in isolated places where their opportunities of all kinds were intensely restricted, but where the number involved was too small to warrant the taking of secretaries from much larger groups to serve them. From time

¹ See Plate XIV.

DISTRIBUTION of CARLOADS of SUPPLIES and CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS to S O S and ADVANCE ZONES

RR.
CARS
450

RR.
CARS
450



to time, supplies were sent to such units on application by officers, but many received no service whatever.

Relative claims for service of troops in the rear and in the advance presented a delicate problem. General Pershing had specifically directed in General Orders No. 33, that service at the front, "where there is the greatest need," should be emphasized. When, however, in the period of intensive combat, a large number of secretaries were transferred from rear areas to serve canteens at the front, the withdrawal evoked protests from officers in the S O S. The Y M C A laid down no arbitrary principle, but the records show that combat troops received the larger proportion of available supplies. The number of car-loads shipped each month to points in the Services of Supply and Advanced Zones, respectively, is shown on Plate XIV facing p. 566.

Relative
Distribution of
Goods in Advance
and Rear

The post exchanges have been likened to chain retail stores in the United States. But there exists nothing in this or any country in peace-time to aid imagination in picturing the extraordinary variety and strangeness of the conditions under which this business was carried on. Some canteens were in large, well appointed huts with electric light, running water and heat. Others were in cellars in towns under fire, where the two or three candles which diluted the darkness were frequently extinguished by the concussion of exploding shells; where water had to be carried in buckets and fuel begged or "requisitioned." In the first type, a long line of men was to be found at any time of day waiting for their turns at the counter. In the second, business was carried on chiefly at night, small groups coming in during a lull in firing and waiting for another lull to rush out and make room for the next group. In one a staff of half a dozen men and women, aided by as many French civilians and a detailed soldier or two, would divide the work. In another a solitary secretary tried to combine the functions of store keeper, banker, athletic promoter, religious leader, educator and entertainment manager. Elsewhere a man would run two or three stores in places several miles apart, getting back and forth by the sturdiness of his legs and an occasional lift from a passing truck, or, in rarely fortunate cases, by a motor cycle or Ford car, furnished by the Motor Transport Department. An account of certain definite problems which arose in many places will, perhaps, best convey an impression of the whole.

Operating
Conditions

In nearly all places, business might have been done in the canteen at every hour of day and night. In the multiplicity of military duties,

men were going to or coming from work at all times. Travelers were passing through towns and troops were moving continually, and few caught sight of a Red Triangle sign without feeling instantly a desire for cigarettes, cookies, or a cup of chocolate.

Hours of
Business

In most places the canteen was open about six hours a day, commonly from 9 to 11.30 in the morning, 1 to 4.30 in the afternoon and 8 to 9 in the evening. In the advance zones, business hours were conformed to conditions, continuous day and night service being given up to the limit of the secretaries' strength in periods of great military activity. Various conditions imposed limitation of canteen hours. One was military orders. Local commanders had, under General Orders No. 33, authority to control canteen operations. Many exercised that right in specific orders prescribing canteen hours. Sometimes the purpose was to prevent the gathering of groups in places exposed to enemy observation and fire; at other times to keep men from slipping away from their duties to loaf in the huts. If a commander issued such orders, the secretary had no option but to obey. A second limitation was insufficiency of supplies. Knowing that he had goods enough to last only a couple of hours a day, a secretary would announce a limited period during which they would be on sale. This was the most practicable method of ensuring that all should have an equal chance to buy; and, to play fair, goods could be sold only at the advertised times. A third limitation was forced by the limits of human endurance. The solitary secretary had to eat and sleep. He had also to open cases and keep accounts, to sweep or hoe out his hut, find fuel and keep up fires, clean and fill lamps and perform a multitude of other equally uninteresting, time-consuming, yet unavoidable jobs. The only way he could accomplish anything was to plan his day with due regard to all duties, and then stick to his plan.

Types of
Secretaries

Men of course varied. Some regarded it as a sacred duty to keep themselves fit for continuing service. Others burned themselves out quickly by overwork, and became physically or nervously unfit for any work within a few months.¹ Undoubtedly some men were lazy or spleeny. Such were out of place and the Y M C A as well as the Army was benefited when they were discovered and sent home, and injured when they evaded official cognizance. It is significant, however, that the Y M C A eventually established a rule that secretaries, like soldiers, should be entitled to one week's leave every four months, and that the number of leaves taken was far less than the number earned.

¹ Compare statements by Directors of Health Section, Chapter XXVII.

None of these reasons for temporarily closed canteens diminished the disappointment of soldier or officer who could not come during business hours or who arrived cold, hungry, wet, and tired, and found doors locked and the secretary asleep. Still less were they satisfied when, in broad daylight, a secretary refused to sell goods until the hands of the clock pointed to the advertised hour. Variations in practice in different huts suggested the inference that each secretary did as he pleased. The circumstances did not permit the establishment of any universal rule, and secretaries necessarily exercised their judgment, subject to orders of local commanders. Occasions for making exceptions to rules were innumerable and good judgment was required for quick balancing of the appeal of the individual case against the service of the whole. Under these conditions, invidious instances, naturally, were bound to occur.

A second consequence of existing conditions was the limitation of sales in certain circumstances. This took two forms. One was to limit the quantity any man might buy, the other to make sales only to men of the unit the secretary was assigned to serve. The reason for the first was evident. There were not enough goods to meet the demand, and the only way to secure fair distribution was to permit each man to buy his share and no more. The second, when it happened, was a forced compromise with circumstances, as repugnant to the secretary as to the man to whom he refused goods. It occurred only in the training and combat areas, where secretaries were attached to military units; and it grew out of the inadequacy of supplies. Supplies were issued to these secretaries on the basis of the number of men in their units. The secretary who sold some of his goods to men of other units had to face the complaints of his own men whose supplies were thus curtailed. He had also to face the possible curtailment of privileges, including the priceless motor transport, which the officers of his unit could give or withhold. Americans at home thought of the Army as a whole and in their giving felt no partiality or favor for any regiment or company. But in the Army there was intense unit *esprit de corps*. The popular officer was he who took good care of his own men, getting the best housing, equipment, food and service for them whatever might befall others. The same held true of a secretary assigned to the unit. He could remain *persona grata* with the officers and men who were his daily associates only if he gave them the preference. All his possibilities of service depended on their goodwill.

Limitation of
Sales

A typical instance occurred in a famous fighting aviation unit a month before the Armistice. The secretary was getting about half the supplies his men needed, and was using an army truck allowed him one day a week by the transport officer to move goods from the divisional warehouse. One day an American secretary serving in a French Foyer a few miles away applied to him for a haversack full of canteen supplies for a dozen or so detached Americans who had unexpectedly come into his village. The Foyer, serving French soldiers, had no American supplies, nor was there any place within several miles where cigarets, tobacco, and chewing gum could be bought. The aviation secretary was interested, and was in the act of selecting the goods, when a soldier detailed as his assistant interposed objections, culminating in a threat to tell his fellows that the reason their supplies were short was that the secretary supposed to serve them had sent away their goods for the benefit of another outfit. There was no escape from the dilemma. The soldier refused to listen to appeals in behalf of the isolated handful of Americans, and the Y man who had tramped five miles to get goods for them tramped back with his haversack empty.

No condemnation could be too severe for the Y man who, having plenty of supplies, refused service on the ground that his duties were limited to a particular group. There may have been such instances although none are recorded. In limiting sales for the reasons stated, secretaries were conforming to the current ethics of the Army. The real result of the practice was that men were benefited by it when with their own units, which was generally the case, but suffered when absent, which was the exception.

In ordinary life, almost every minor purchase involves making change. With a plentiful supply of small currency in circulation, the merchant has little difficulty in getting silver in exchange for bills at a neighboring store or at a bank. In France, silver and copper coinage practically disappeared from circulation during the war. Its place was partially filled by paper scrip, easily soiled and torn. Five, ten and twenty-five centime pieces were rare. Most of the articles sold in the canteens were priced in centimes, and practically every purchase involved the use of minor coins. To supply the lack, matches at five centimes or one cent a box were often used, and soldiers were asked to make purchases up to even francs if possible. Thus two packs of cigarets at thirty-five centimes, called for thirty centimes or six cents change from a franc, and the soldier might be asked to accept a pack-

age of chewing gum and two boxes of matches. Usually the necessity for mutual adjustment was readily perceived and cheerfully acquiesced in.

Individuals, however, often have need for small coins. The universal practice, under ordinary conditions, is to go to the nearest store and make a small purchase, offering a bill in payment. Soldiers followed this practice when they wanted change for any purpose, including crap games. Obviously the secretary was bound to conserve his always scanty stock of change for bona fide customers. If unable to make change, he had to make a quick decision, either to refuse the sale or give the required goods for nothing. The consequences of either course need no description. The situation is extremely suggestive of aspects of business found in military camps in war-time France which presented puzzles and perplexities not conceived of by those who think in terms of peace-time business in America.

It sometimes happened that a soldier found inside a package of cigarettes he had bought at the canteen a card stating that the cigarettes were given by some individual or organization for free distribution. In every case where this was brought to the attention of the secretary, the money was refunded. At the request of the Y M C A the matter was investigated by army officers. The investigations invariably found that the cigarettes came from cases bearing no marks to show that they were gifts, nor any indication of the fact except within the individual package. They were either bought from the Quartermaster, or were delivered at dock or warehouse as part of shipments carried on transports for the Y M C A. As a result of these investigations, General Pershing requested the War Department to order that no gift supplies be accepted for transport unless plainly marked outside as gifts and containing inside at top and bottom of the case a placard stating the same fact. The description of the manner of handling goods on the docks at base ports in France already given indicates the certainty that such mis-delivery of unmarked cases would occur.¹ Having once occurred, the error forced upon the canteen secretary a new need for alertness in handling goods.

In the early months of 1919 it became more apparent from day to day that the homeward bound movement of the troops would be a long drawn out affair. The soldiers settled down for indefinite periods in a comparatively small area and the demands on the Y for normal

Sales of
Gift Cigaretts

Post Exchanges
Transferred to
the Army

¹ Chapter XXIX.

Association activities became urgent. At the same time the department heads, upon whom rested responsibility for increased activities, urged that secretaries be relieved of business duties in order to return to their real work as athletic, educational or religious workers. Further the reason for the acceptance of the canteens, the scarcity of fighting man-power, had disappeared. There were now plenty of officers and soldiers to conduct the canteens. On January 29, 1919, these considerations were presented to the Commander-in-Chief with the request that the Y M C A be relieved of further responsibility, and on February 22d, the request was granted, to take effect March 31st.¹

The technicalities involved in the transfer were discussed at several conferences between representatives of the Quartermaster Corps and the Y. The final conference which led to a written agreement was held at Tours in the beginning of March. The Quartermaster Corps agreed to accept the goods without inspection, upon the personal guarantee of Mr. Desnoyers, in the name of the Association, that only clean, saleable goods would be delivered. The price was to be the inventory value. Careful detailed instructions were prepared and the stock of nearly 1,500 canteens besides that in warehouses and factories was inspected and reports received from all points within fourteen days. In not a single case did the Quartermaster's representatives reject goods offered. The entire transaction together with minor transfers later of goods in transit at the moment of release involved a sum of approximately 58,000,000 francs, or more than \$10,000,000. Supplies to the amount of approximately 17,000,000 francs were retained for use in the wet canteens which were continued in operation until the final departure of troops. After April 1, 1919, the Quartermaster's stores provided purchasing opportunities to the troops.

The complete experience of the Army and the Y M C A in post exchange operations leads to the conclusion that this was a function which, under any circumstances, should be performed by the Army itself. War conditions must inevitably make exceedingly difficult the problem of determining the allotment of transportation, supplies, and workers in proportion to the importance of other needs of the men and of the Army as a whole. Control must remain, as it actually did in the World War, with the commander acquainted with all elements of the situation, and responsible for the physical welfare of the men as for the fighting efficiency of the Army. No civilian organization

¹ Officially promulgated in General Orders No. 50, March 17, 1919.

should be expected or should consent to place itself in the invidious position between the commander and the men, where it must bear the responsibility with no possibility of sharing the control. If military conditions render it unwise to use tonnage or men for any specific purpose, the resulting deficiency should be attributable to the decisions of the commander and not to the inexperience or inefficiency of a volunteer organization or its individual representatives.¹

In the Quartermaster Department there exists the necessary machinery to do whatever is possible in any given situation with maximum efficiency. Buying, transportation, and accounting are already provided for, whereas any civilian body must improvise in time of war an organization which cannot be maintained, and for which there is no function, in time of peace. In camps and posts also, all such matters as location and policing of stores, hours of business and restriction of purchases, when necessary, can be regulated directly by local commanders with minimum interference with the primary duty and interest of the Army as a fighting organization.

Complication with commercial operations is indisputably a hindrance to the success of normal welfare work. There are services to be performed for soldiers whose value depends absolutely upon the disinterested voluntary friendliness of the worker and those whom he represents. Officialism and commercialism alike denature such services, and the old adage which warns against mixing business and friendship received striking illustrations in the enterprise just described. Not only did the exchange absorb time and energy which belonged to the distinctive functions of the Y M C A, but it tended to obscure and taint the reception by soldiers of services which far transcended the canteens in volume, cost and results.

All this, easy to discern in experience, was partly foreseen and apprehended by the high command of the Army and by the Y M C A in the summer of 1917. Referring to this subject in a speech in May, 1921, General Pershing said:

"We all had our hands very full in those trying days. The Army had to be organized and a great general staff had to be built up to handle the multitude of details as to plans of operations, supply and transportation. It was in the midst of these preparations that I called up Mr. Carter and asked the Y M C A to take charge of the army canteens to follow our troops; he responded promptly and entered upon the work as a duty."²

¹ See Plate VIII facing p. 290; also Plate XII facing p. 484.

² See Vol. II, Appendix XV, pp. 627-629.

It would be impossible to make a statement more accurately representing the records of the time, or the spirit in which the arrangement was agreed upon.

Whether under existing circumstances the Army could or would have functioned more efficiently in this enterprise than the Association, is a question that may be left to those who enjoy speculation on what might have been. As to the actual achievement, General Pershing, in relieving the Y M C A of the responsibility, wrote to Mr. Carter:

"In making the change, permit me to thank you for the very valuable services and assistance which the Y M C A has rendered to the A E F in handling these exchanges. Handicapped by a shortage of tonnage and of land transportation, the Y M C A has by extra exertion served the Army better than could have been expected, and you may be assured that its aid has been a large factor in the final great accomplishment of the American Army."

CHAPTER XXXI

ADMINISTERING THE FUNDS

The operations surveyed in the preceding chapters had financial characters of two distinct types. Foremost, both in significance and extent, was the administration of money for free welfare service to soldiers. The amount expended in this way with the A E F was somewhat in excess of \$61,000,000.¹ Next in importance and magnitude was the post exchange. From the financial viewpoint, this was a merchandising enterprise, on capital advanced by the National War Work Council, sometimes from funds in hand, sometimes borrowed on its credit, amounting in the period of largest operations to about \$21,000,000.²

Types of
Financial
Operations

To these two, a third type of financial responsibility was assumed when the Association offered to transmit funds for soldiers to the United States or elsewhere. This was purely a banking operation. Secretaries in the field accepted funds from individuals, forwarded them to Paris, whence advice was mailed to New York Headquarters which remitted by check to the designated payee.

While these different types of transactions were separated in the headquarters organization, there was diminishing possibility of keeping them apart as service approached the front. In the field, a single individual in a single day, served as banker, salesman and administrator of activities, with neither apparatus for bookkeeping nor time to use it. His reports were made, sometimes on forms furnished from Paris, sometimes on stray sheets of paper, and at such times as he could find means of transmitting them. Nevertheless, by patience and persistence, the accounting staff at Paris managed to gather and organize a record surprisingly complete.

Combination in
Practice

Administration of welfare funds was the most important and complicated financial operation. Budgeting to secure a fair distribution of service to every part of the A E F and a due proportion of available resources to the various departmentalized activities, called for continual study of a continually changing field. In its first financial estimate, calling for \$3,000,000 to carry on work until the end of

Budgeting
Service Funds

¹ See Audited Financial Statement, Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

² Consult Chapter XXX.

1917, the National War Work Council had tentatively set apart only \$300,000 for overseas. As against this the overseas executives in July, 1917, submitted a budget calling for \$5,000,000 for the same period.¹ In October, 1918, funds were exhausted weeks before the start of the United War Work Campaign, which had been postponed by request of the Government until after the Fourth Liberty Loan Drive. Even the huge sum received in the campaign would have been insufficient to carry on operations at full height for the period contemplated when the appeal was made. At the rate at which money was being spent in March, 1919, the balance in the treasury at the end of August would have barely supported service one month more. The extraordinary speed with which the A E F were repatriated saved the Y M C A from a deficit. The strain on the men who, under such conditions, bore ultimate responsibility for giving service without bankrupting the Association, may be imagined.

It was the task of the leaders in France to forecast the needs of every department and adjust them to each other in due balance, submitting semi-detailed budgets for the whole A E F to the Finance Committee in New York.

Payroll

The payroll which at times ran as high as half a million dollars a month, involved living expense and equipment allowances for secretaries numbering in all about 13,000, with a maximum at one time of 7,000.² These allowances varied greatly according to location and type of work. All allowances to men in the field were paid monthly by check from Paris or by deposit in a Paris bank to the secretary's credit. The location of each individual in the shifting multitude had to be constantly known. The payment of foreign help on the wage basis also involved many complications under war conditions.

A E F REMITTANCES

The American Expeditionary Forces soon found that they could save a substantial part of their pay overseas, and the Government adopted various methods to take care of the men's savings. One of them gave the soldier an opportunity to deposit his savings with the Government. Another method was the well-known allotment plan. By a third method, the soldier by notifying his company commander could have any part of a single month's wages transferred to America by Post Office Money Order.

¹ Consult Chapter XXV.

² Consult Chapter XV.

None of these schemes was especially popular with the men and many squandered the larger part of their pay. What seemed extravagance to the French had the effect of disorganizing prices, and the French authorities turned to the Commander-in-Chief, seeking to find some device for correcting this situation. This request, which was passed on to the Y among others, for consideration and action, together with a natural wish to inculcate the principle of thrift and to help the soldiers to save and transfer their savings with as little trouble and expense as possible, led ultimately to the organization of the Remittance Bureau.

The A E F Remittance Bureau conducted a business widely different from the other functions of the Accounting Department of which it was a part. It transmitted funds to the United States and seventeen foreign countries ranging from Brazil to Syria; all being money sent by the A E F for supporting relatives, for deposit in banks, or for meeting obligations. With the exception of less than \$300,000 sent by cable or bank draft at the request of the remitters on which they paid the tolls, this entire amount was handled without any cost to the soldiers.

Howard Butcher was originally in immediate personal charge of this business, but when Mr. Seatree arrived in March, he took charge. In May, 1918, he created the Remittance Bureau as a separate unit of the Accounting Department under the supervision of William R. McGowan, who filled this position until the closing down of the bureau's activities.

The bureau operated several different kinds of money order facilities. Methods

1. If the soldiers so requested, the money was transferred by cable. In these cases the bureau charged a flat rate of 30 francs to the remitter. This actually turned out to be slightly over the average expense for cable orders. The total volume of this business amounted to only \$98,457.14.

2. For remittances to foreign countries (except France and Canada), the bureau secured drafts payable in the country designated, deducted the cost of the draft from the amount paid in, and mailed the draft to the address designated. These remittances aggregated \$185,088.41.

3. Orders transmitting money from one soldier to another in France were handled without any charge to the sender. The total amounted to \$623,487.89.

4. Most of the orders were, however, remittances through New York to the United States and Canada. The soldier who wished to send money home went to the local Y secretary, filled out and signed the order and received a receipt. The orders, carbon copies of the receipts and a report covering all orders were then forwarded to the divisional headquarters together with the money collected. Divisional headquarters checked the cash and record, returned a duplicate of the report to the secretary and forwarded the rest to Paris headquarters together with a duplicate report covering all orders received in the division. In Paris the items were checked again and a duplicate divisional report returned to the divisional headquarters. Abstracts of the orders were then made on letters of advice, in original and three copies, and numbered consecutively. The originals were mailed as soon as possible to New York headquarters and checks were mailed from there to the intended recipients as designated. Two weeks later copies of the letters of advice were mailed to New York to be used in case the originals should be lost. A total of \$20,446,873.54 was sent through the bureau in this form.

Volume of
Remittances

The number of remittances and the amount of money handled expanded rapidly from 83 orders aggregating \$3,213.73 in February, 1918, to 59,112 orders aggregating \$3,313,034.93 in October the same year. Following the Armistice in November, the soldiers' conviction that they were to return within a few weeks caused a considerable decrease. Christmas expenditures had similar effect in December. In January, a new increase was recorded, but from then on the orders dwindled rapidly with the return of the troops to \$38,000 in June.

Scattering remittances after the closing of Paris Headquarters brought the total of funds transmitted by all methods to \$21,558,339.97. A careful estimate of the cost of sending this sum by bank draft sets the figure at \$152,124.68; by post office money order, \$97,098.40. These sums therefore represent the savings to soldiers through this gratuitous service of the Y M C A.¹

Effectiveness of
Remittance System

In view of all the precautions taken, it would seem that this service would be almost infallible. This was, however, not always the case, because of actual conditions underlying the practical operation.

First should be mentioned the great difficulty experienced in the spring and early summer of 1918, in securing the necessary paper and printed forms. The result was that several divisions, after exhausting

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, p. 528.

their small supply of forms, were continuing the service by giving receipts on blank paper. This was the beginning of a pernicious irregular series of numbers.

Less trivial obstacles were encountered in the field with the combat divisions. Division after division was thrown to the front line. In the haste receipts were given on scraps of paper; men of one division gave money to secretaries of other divisions. Men lost receipts, or would not or could not wait for receipts, or threw them away, or sent them home without keeping any record. Some men actually forgot their home addresses, many could only tell the approximate street number. What happened to the soldiers also happened in some instances to secretaries. In the confusion of action, secretaries lost their bags, or lost the money or the orders. In most cases the missing articles were recovered. If not, the secretary advertised for the men who had handed him money, and thus as nearly as possible straightened out the records. Two secretaries embezzled the money handed them by the soldiers. When complaints came in, these secretaries were court-martialed and convicted. The Y M C A of course reimbursed the owners. Taking into consideration all this confusion, losses were comparatively small, being not over 30,000 francs, or one-fortieth of one per cent.

Difficulties under
Combat
Conditions

An insufficient staff, pieced out with French workers who knew nothing about the geography of America, hampered the activities of the remittance bureau at the Paris headquarters. Some delay naturally occurred in Paris under these conditions, but as a rule the bureau succeeded in forwarding the remittances on hand to the treasurer twice a week for mailing to New York.

For sheer lack of means of communication, secretaries in the field often had to hold remittances several days, and transit to Paris from points in the combat areas might occupy two or three days. Trans-Atlantic mail frequently was three weeks in transit. In the early part of the year the letters were mailed from Paris by French post via Bordeaux. The New York office complained that the letters by regular post reached America with great irregularity, and after August, it was arranged with the naval authorities to send the letters on returning transports. This improved the situation somewhat, but it still often happened that the copies of the letters of advice reached New York ahead of the originals. Once during the fall, letters covering more than 20,000 remittances crossed the ocean three times on a transport, thus causing a delay of more than one month. The average

Mail
Irregularities

time from receipt of the money in the field to delivery to payee in America was two months.

In spite of these difficulties and of those which regularly attend similar transactions by business organizations, such as imperfect addresses or death or removal of payee, the service attained an extraordinary degree of perfection. Errors of address, or removal or death of payee led to an immense amount of correspondence in the effort to find either sender or payee on some hundreds of remittances. American newspapers cooperated by publishing the facts, including names, dates, and amounts. The audited financial statement of March 7, 1921,¹ showed that out of 351,468 remittances, only 41, or about one one-hundredth of one per cent, remained undelivered.

Closely related to this remittance service was banking for soldiers, the cashing of pay or personal checks and exchange of currency. Banking began at Issoudun, an aviation training camp, where weather conditions affecting flying left the men with much idle time and where gambling became a serious evil. Association secretaries organized an active thrift campaign, encouraging the men to save their money or send it home. Special rounds of the barracks were made at frequent intervals to collect funds for deposit. This service was extended throughout the field.

Money exchange was an outstanding feature at many points, especially the ports. At Brest a capital of \$5,000 devoted to this service was turned over as many as three times in a single day. Eventually the capital was increased to 250,000 francs, and as early as June, 1918, the transactions in exchange reached 3,000,000 francs for the month, with a total of 28,500,000 francs for the year 1918. At Châteauroux a maximum of 50,000 francs in a single day was reached. The best rate of exchange was given, which, together with the fact that no discount was charged for service, gave the soldier a benefit of about 50 centimes to the dollar, or ten per cent, as compared with commercial exchange dealers.

Cashing of paymasters' checks, personal checks on home or French banks, and various forms of remittances from the United States, led to some losses. Few secretaries had the training of bank tellers, and in case of doubt, leaned to good nature. Bad checks and non-negotiable paper were cashed and sent in to Paris. Mistakes in figuring exchange were not uncommon. On June 24, 1919, the treas-

¹ See Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

urer reported to the Finance Committee that out of a total of 1,612,-464.38 francs in the "Bad Checks Account" as of April 30, there remained to be collected or charged off, 573,296.88 francs. He was instructed to reopen all cases of bad checks charged off and forward the checks to General Headquarters for collection, following the cases through to conclusion.

FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION: FIRST PERIOD

The financial history of the A E F-Y M C A divides itself naturally into two main periods, each with two stages, the pivotal date being April 1, 1918, when the reorganization projected in the fall of 1917 was actually realized and Mr. Seatree took charge as comptroller.

In the first tentative division of labor¹ adopted in July, 1917, F. B. Shipp, as Treasurer, had general charge of business matters. A simple bookkeeping record of receipts and payments was kept. Camp secretaries were authorized to make expenditures not exceeding \$250. All contracts and appropriations involving larger amounts required approval of the Executive Committee. Budgets were subject to approval by the Executive Committee of the War Work Council in New York, whose members were at this time undertaking responsibility for a series of enterprises extending over all the warring fronts on every continent.

In November, 1917, F. A. Jackson, comptroller for Europe of the New York Life Insurance Company, undertook the duties of comptroller for the A E F-Y M C A. Because of the multifarious responsibilities resting on Mr. Shipp, a large part of the treasurer's work passed into the comptroller's office. The period of nine months to April 1, 1918, was comparable to the building of a plant and installing of equipment by an industrial corporation, plus the performance of service on a rapidly increasing scale from the very beginning.

By January 1, 1918, about 176,000 soldiers had reached France Scale of Operations or England, and 781 Y M C A workers. Service was being given at 238 points, of which 156 included a post exchange among other activities. The budget to cover the period to the same date, submitted in July, 1917, was as follows:

¹ Consult Chapter XXV.

Huts and Tents	\$1,500,000
City Associations—Paris, Bordeaux, Brest.....	150,000
Automobiles, petrol and oil supplies.....	250,000
Personnel, men and women, including expenses from America	500,000
Administration, supplies, maintenance and General Head- quarters	250,000
Transportation and Insurance.....	500,000
Incidental expenses, enumerated under various heads...	600,000
<hr/>	
Total.....	\$3,750,000
Work with French Army.....	1,000,000
Work with England.....	250,000
<hr/>	
Total.....	\$5,000,000

This was estimated to cover service for an American force increasing to 250,000 men, but proved to be inadequate.

Workers arrived at a rate corresponding almost exactly to the minimum estimate of needs for actual service, with no surplus for constructive organization work looking to the future. Secretaries in the field often grew impatient with unavoidable delays. They were, in large proportion, business and professional men accustomed to act upon their own initiative rather than subordinate themselves to authority. Enthusiastic to serve and advocates of the right of American soldiers to receive what they needed, it was not strange that many took short cuts, bought what they wanted, and sent in the bills. As late as January, 1919, an energetic regional secretary who had failed to secure benches from the Paris warehouse, rented a factory and produced them for himself.

Under these conditions, with slow communication with New York where ultimate financial authority resided, and with fellow workers, technically insubordinate, incurring liabilities without authority or even previous notice, the financial task of the chief executives was sufficiently difficult. A leading New York business man who made a thorough investigation with a view to final reorganization, commented:

"I felt very positive that the conditions under which the men worked and the trying circumstances that they had to cope with at all times were such that it would have been almost impossible for the best of business men to have made a perfect organization, and with that feeling I never attacked the situation with any spirit of criticism toward the things which had been done in the past."

The comptroller stated in his report of the first six months' work, that it was a wonder that financial arrangements were as good as they were.

Financial action consisted of allotment of funds by the Executive Committee to activities departments and to divisional areas, and the authorization of special expenditures. Guided in a general way by the budget they had prepared, they undertook many emergency or preparatory commitments. Bills coming in from the field were passed upon by department heads, more with a view to the propriety of the expenditure under the existing conditions than to formal authorization.

The accounting and auditing operations passed through a series of developments as the magnitude of operations increased in proportion to the increase of the A E F. An accounting system was set up under the supervision of F. B. Shipp, in August, 1917. At the outset one man performed the work alone, but soon had two assistants assigned, one of whom took charge of the payroll, which was then separated from the accounting department, but later restored by the comptroller. In November, 1917, W. A. Cochran, a public accountant from Cleveland, took charge as general auditor. One of the first acts of Mr. Jackson and Mr. Cochran was the preparation of a "System of Accounting for Camps reporting direct to Paris."

Accounting and
Auditing

A cash statement covering welfare service, not including post exchange, for the period from the beginning to December 31, 1917, showed total receipts 13,574,111.87 francs; disbursements 11,915,645.11 francs; balance in banks and cash 1,658,466.76 francs. For the same period the post exchange account showed:

Sales	frs. 4,350,400.10
Adjustment credit	95,437.45
	<hr/>
	4,445,837.55
Cost of merchandise	4,169,166.79
	<hr/>
Profit	276,670.76

[This did not include transportation or any overhead charges.]

From the point of view of peace time business, with its sober respect for the safeguarding and accurate accounting of all funds, and especially those having the character of a trust, the only picture that can be drawn of this period is indisputably somewhat shocking. But the reader remembers that this did not occur in time of

peace. His judgment must be profoundly affected by the realization that American youth were coming by multiplying thousands into physical and social conditions which could be ameliorated only by the devotion of the Y M C A men, who at that time shared the responsibility only with the Red Cross. In the name of the American people and for the sake of American soldiers, they took personal financial risks and committed the Association to greater risks when the alternative was failure of service.

FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION: SECOND PERIOD

Notwithstanding the justification of the emergency, Association leaders both in France and the United States had recognized and striven for the early establishment of scientific financial direction. Owing to the fact that the first accountants who served the War Work Council in New York were unable to arrange for supervising accounts abroad, there was delay due to transfer and to the setting up of a new system.¹ In daily expectation after December of the arrival of a representative of Price, Waterhouse and Company, with a consequent revision of accounting and auditing, the simple system that had served in the day of small things was left undisturbed. Mr. Seatree arrived late in March and a few days later assumed the duties of comptroller. A thorough reorganization of financial operations was at once effected, the work being departmentalized and coordinated along the lines familiar in great commercial organizations. A Finance Committee was appointed on April 9th, consisting of F. A. Jackson, formerly comptroller, as chairman, F. B. Shipp, and A. M. Harris, of the banking firm of Harris, Forbes & Co. Mr. Harris relieved Mr. Shipp in the treasurer's office. Mr. Seatree joined the committee April 19th. This committee took over some of the functions of the Executive Committee, including appointment of business secretaries in conjunction with the Board of Management of the General Supplies Division, approval of contracts up to 25,000 francs, supervision of comptroller and treasurer, and final action in all legal matters. On matters of general policy, including budgets, its relation to the Executive Committee was advisory. This régime, with modifications from time to time, continued in effect until March 5, 1919. Theoretically, up to that time, the budgets of the Executive Committee remained subject to approval by the National War Work Council in New York,

¹ See Chapter XIV.

although in practice action was frequently taken while such approval was pending.

This was the moment at which began the enormous increase of the A E F, often referred to. The proportion of soldiers to workers doubled in two months and rose still higher in the three following months.¹ Divisional organizations increased from 30 in April to between 80 and 90 on November 11th. Organization building competed for workers with insistent demands for field workers. Office staffs were supplemented by French civilians, especially women, whose limited knowledge of English, and training, if they had any, in the markedly different French commercial and financial practice, severely limited their efficiency. A great improvement was effected, in connection with the Regional Plan inaugurated in July, by the placing of regional, divisional and camp business secretaries throughout the field. Accounting procedure for regions, divisions and subsidiary field units, and the status, duties and responsibilities of business secretaries were set forth in detailed instructions, circulated early and published in book form on July 15th. This was supplemented, September 15th, by a memorandum explaining points on which some misunderstanding had arisen and deciding certain unforeseen issues. From April 1, 1918, regular monthly reports were received at Paris.

In this period, the A E F grew from 320,000, April 1st, to 1,971,000, November 1st, then decreased to 1,562,000, March 1, 1919. The complicated troop movements in the fighting period were followed by the march of 250,000 men to the bridgehead on the Rhine, and the turning of the rest of the A E F toward embarkation centers and ports, both operations involving extensive shifting of Y M C A service points. Y M C A personnel attained a net increase from 1,400 to 6,100,² a very large number having their accounts closed on completion of service, with new accounts for those who replaced them. Post exchanges increased from 324 to 1,217, and at the end were on the point of transfer to the Army. Total points at which the Y M C A operated increased from 571 to 1,271 during the combat period and subsequently to 2,009. Motor vehicles increased from 90 in January, 1918, to 1,665 in May, 1919. Value of post exchange supplies handled at base ports increased from 7,000,000 francs for May, 1918, to 33,000,000 francs for March, 1919.³ Factories operated by

Scale of
Operations

Consult Chapter XV.

² Consult the same.

³ For complete monthly figures, see Chapter XXX.

the Y M C A for chocolate, biscuits, and other supplies reached the number of 44, of which the last was not transferred to the Army until March 19, 1919.

The Finance Committee which was established at the beginning of this period undertook very large responsibilities, as follows:

"The minutes of each meeting should be submitted to the Executive Committee for consideration.

The committee may call in chiefs of departments and divisions at headquarters and divisional secretaries for budgets and other information concerning financial operations.

It shall receive from the comptroller monthly statements of accounts and may call for other statements when required.

It shall prepare budgets for the War Work Council.

It shall fix the amounts of advances to divisional secretaries and limits to bank accounts.

It shall act in all leases, insurance contracts and other contracts, and copies of such leases and contracts shall be filed with the Chairman of the Committee—it being understood that divisional secretaries may close leases or contracts when the total obligation does not exceed 5,000 francs.

It shall act in all contracts initiated by the Supply Division—it being understood that the joint committee of the chiefs of division of the Supply Department may close contracts that do not exceed 5,000 francs. It is further understood that the Finance Committee may authorize the closing of contracts, without referring to the Executive Committee, up to 25,000 francs.

It shall act in all legal matters.

It shall have power to authorize the treasurer to borrow funds on account of the Association in case of necessity.

It shall have the general supervision of matters which concern the finance of the Y M C A."

The Finance Committee met not less than three times a week, and at frequent periods held daily sessions.

Very soon after the creation of the Finance Committee, Dr. Mott visited Europe, to gather facts about the work and its needs, and to secure a budget for the future. The preparation of this budget, so far as France was concerned, was entrusted to the Finance Committee. In the United Kingdom, Chief Secretary R. L. Ewing directed its preparation. It was in two parts, one for six months ending October 31, 1918, the other for the following twelve months. Every department, division and bureau was called upon to submit detailed estimates of its needs, showing what service was proposed, and these were collated. Estimates were based upon the expectation, at that

time unquestioned by the Allied commanders, that fighting would continue well into the year 1919, and that 5,000,000 American soldiers would be in France by that time.

The total, after careful analysis of all forms of service, was divided as follows:

Y M C A		
Bureau Estimate		
American Expeditionary Forces in France		
	6 Months to Oct. 31, 1918	12 Months to Oct. 31, 1919
Building and Equipment	\$ 3,405,473.84	\$ 5,674,746.66
Motor Transport Equipment	848,510.00	646,000.00
Operation Motor Transport	506,000.00	1,541,000.00
Workers' Living Allowances and Expenses	2,800,000.00	10,250,000.00
Operation and Maintenance of Huts and Divisional Headquarters	1,273,904.69	4,178,412.89
Social Work and Entertainment	9,279,764.35	23,489,714.25
Athletics and Physical Training	268,500.00	938,000.00
Educational Work and Libraries	470,431.79	1,344,145.51
Religious Service	369,407.69	752,456.12
Other Service, including writing materials furnished free, gratuitous canteen service, leave areas and net operat- ing cost of hotels and restaurants	1,141,719.29	4,414,561.39
Headquarters General and Administration, including insurance, publicity, office rent, etc., etc.	350,877.18	833,333.33
	<hr/> \$11,880,700.50	<hr/> \$31,772,210.70
Additional Expenses in U. S. for A E F- Y M C A		
New York Headquarters	4,589,297.00	9,032,152.50
Entertainment	124,200.00	737,000.00
Women's Section	173,316.00	517,304.00
Cable and Telephone	15,000.00	30,000.00
	<hr/> \$16,782,513.00	<hr/> \$42,088,667.20

This budget revised by the Finance Committee in New York, became the basis of the requirements for the financial drive.

The methods established by Mr. Seatree were those employed in American commercial practice, modified necessarily by the conditions in France. The necessity of entering all items in francs as well as dollars greatly increased the clerical work. Eventually a staff of 134 accountants was engaged at Headquarters, besides several

Accounting and
Auditing

hundred business and financial secretaries in the field. Post Exchange accounting requires some special treatment.

To provide the necessary funds for the operation of post exchanges, New York cabled on May 10, 1918, for an estimate of capital for twelve months, basing calculations on the needs of 40 divisions. Owing to delays in shipping and inland transportation, it was not thought possible to turn over the capital under four months; a liberal estimate was therefore recommended. The head of the General Supply Division replied that there was no accounting basis for determining the turnover. Estimating a turnover of \$100,000,000 per year, he suggested a capital of \$20,000,000 for the post exchange.

Anyone familiar with this type of business will realize the enormous labor involved in keeping accurate record of shipments from New York through all the various stages of their distribution, making due allowance for the many items of shortage occurring under such extraordinary conditions. Nevertheless, a complete system was installed covering the whole transit and warehouse situation.

Secretaries in charge of divisional warehouses were responsible for the making out of proper invoices or charge slips for all supplies issued, and it was the duty of the hut secretaries to insist that they receive such invoices or charge slips with the goods. There was frequent resort to divisional warehouses by officers of detached units not served by Y M C A exchanges, for wholesale purchases. Secretaries also, who had no regular canteen, frequently had temporary need for supplies for soldiers not provided for. Such purchases were for cash, the warehouse secretary being provided weekly with a list of canteens to whose secretaries supplies might be charged. The warehouse secretary was bonded, and credit to unauthorized buyers was allowed only at his own risk. Cash sales at warehouses ran sometimes to very large amounts.

The business secretaries were held responsible for the acknowledgment to Association Headquarters of all merchandise received from the base warehouse. This acknowledgment was provided for in the form of a divisional copy of a shipping and invoice sheet, which had to be returned promptly to Association Headquarters.

A complete physical inventory of all post exchange and canteen merchandise on hand, both at the warehouse and huts, priced at the regular selling prices, was required at the end of each month. The

¹ The Operations of the Post Exchange Department are described in Chapter XXX.

business divisional secretary was charged with the duty of seeing that this rule was rigidly adhered to except in those special cases where the physical conditions were such as to render such an inventory impracticable or impossible. During the strenuous fighting period, from March to November, 1918, this was the case in several instances, when, under more than casual shell fire or when a division was under movement orders, the work had to be postponed until conditions became more suitable for the task.

FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION: CLOSING PERIOD

The visit of the Perkins Commission in March, 1919, resulted in the creation of a new Finance Committee,¹ with power of control, instead of recommendation, over expenditures and over the allotment of the sum of \$29,000,000 for the completion of service to the A E F. To this might be added, if necessary, the net proceeds of liquidation of the post exchanges. This fund the Finance Committee was to use at its discretion, reporting to but not requiring the advance approval of the Finance Committee in New York. John R. Hall was put in charge of business administration, the accounting and auditing remaining to the end under the direction of Mr. Seatree.

The situation was that of a rapidly shrinking service. Between March and August the A E F diminished in numbers from 1,562,000 to 133,000, an achievement in ocean transportation surpassing the unprecedented performance of the corresponding months of 1918. Service points were closing daily, the number declining from 2,009, March 1st, to 70, September 1st. Welfare personnel were repatriated at the same rate as the Army, the number declining from the maximum of 6,357, April 1st, to 150, September 1st.² The task of the executives was first to keep service at maximum efficiency at every point where soldiers were still living, and second to liquidate the material assets of the Association at the maximum value.

The most impressive single feat of this period was the holding of the Inter-Allied Games³ in the Pershing Stadium financed by the Y M C A. The contract price for the building was 450,000 francs; and 200,000 francs additional was appropriated for decorations, prizes, and service to contestants and soldiers attending the games. The first recorded act of the new Finance Committee was the allocation

¹ Consult Chapter XXV.

² Consult Chapter XV.

³ Consult Chapter XXXV.

of \$200,000 a month for six months, retroactive to February 1st, for educational work. The second was authorization of the purchase of 100 pianos at a cost of 133,000 francs. These indicate the directions in which service was to be emphasized. The decision to relieve the Y M C A of the post exchanges had already been made and preparations for the transfer were nearing completion. Funds and workers would thus be released for the proper activities of the Association. Athletics, entertainment, social and religious work were supported with the utmost liberality by the Finance and Overseas Committees, while careful supervision secured maximum results from the large sums appropriated.

The financial aspects of the transfer to the Army of post exchanges¹ and educational work,² and of the repatriation of personnel³ and the salvage of materials,⁴ received of course the closest attention of the Finance Committee.

Final
Liquidation

On September 2, 1919, responsibility for further service and business of the Association in France and Germany was transferred to the National War Work Council. Grosvenor Dawe, one of the organizers of the United States Chamber of Commerce, took charge of operations in France, which included then the full program for men at the ports and in the Graves Registration Service, and entertainment and sight-seeing for soldiers and sailors on leave in Paris. A permanent staff continued work for the American Army of Occupation in Germany.

The results of final liquidation may be found in the audited financial statement by Price, Waterhouse and Company.⁵ Much of the splendid work of the Salvage Department was offset by the heavy decline of French exchange which followed the signing of the Versailles Treaty. Up to September 30, 1918, the expenditures in France were converted at the rate of 5.70 francs to the dollar. On that date the current rate was 5.47 francs to the dollar, at which all current assets and liabilities were converted, showing a considerable book profit. The final losses due to the depreciation of the franc amounted to \$5,658,629.52 on post exchange account alone, and on net surplus funds returned to the United States, \$827,680.

¹ Consult Chapter XXX.

² Consult Chapter XXXIV.

³ Consult Chapter XXVII.

⁴ Consult Chapter XXIX.

⁵ See Vol. II, Appendix III, pp. 526-540.

SPIRIT OF FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Welfare service was costly. In that, it shared with every form of war activity. There is no more costly indulgence or necessity than war. The sums paid by the Association for necessary equipment, supplies, and service appear, in some instances, almost appalling until one compares them with corresponding records of various Government war boards and bureaus. The profiteer did not overlook the welfare societies. Final judgment on welfare financial operations must turn on the worth, at the time and in the circumstances, of the benefit received by the soldiers, and upon the ability and zeal employed in making that benefit a maximum in relation to expenditures.

In reviewing the financial conduct of Association work overseas, two groups of facts stand out with startling distinctness.

First, the Association was committed to instantaneous service whose growth and magnitude no one, from the President of the United States to the least conspicuous citizen, could foresee. While the first funds were being collected, soldiers began to arrive in France. Representatives empowered to survey the field and recommend plans had to begin spending money or tell American soldiers to wait for service. From that moment the obligation to serve grew faster than organization could keep pace. There was not a day in the first eighteen months when formal regularity of financial procedure could have been secured except at the price of postponing service. Nor were any more anxious for the speedy establishment of formal regularity than the men through whose hands immense sums were flowing. Making no pretence of expertness in finance or accounting, they urged insistently that the best professional experts in America should be sent to establish proper channels and regulate and record the flow of funds.

Promptitude
of Service

Second, until this could be done, character, integrity, patriotism, and counsel had to be substituted for the unattainable system. Calling to their aid the available Americans in Europe who occupied positions of trust and were most experienced in large business and financial operations, the leaders formulated general service policies. Then they sent trusted and trustworthy men into the field with large discretion for application of these policies to the local situations they might find. The course was instinctively adopted rather than deliberately chosen. With a personnel in whose selection earnest desire to

serve was a criterion never relaxed, any course that put service second to any other consideration would, in all probability, have provoked indignant and effective resistance. Determination that the soldiers should be served was both the danger and the protection of the Association. It created the risk of extravagance on the one hand, but on the other was the best security against dishonesty. Y M C A workers were Americans of high character, but they were not necessarily more immune to temptations to enrich themselves than such Americans in business at home. That they were, as the records prove beyond doubt, immune to such temptation during their service, even though opportunities were many and easy, may reasonably be attributed to the fact that high character was buttressed by a fervor of patriotic devotion, expressed originally in sacrifice for the sake of entering the service, and burning with increasing ardor as they lived day by day with the men in arms. Errors in judgment, individual and collective, were made. Losses were incurred and large expenditures rendered fruitless, sometimes because of misdirected enthusiasm. But the ratio of service rendered to money spent rose steadily; and sound financial system was finally established, with the unpremeditated consequence of bringing clearly to light the integrity and zeal which, instinctive in the entire personnel, had carried the organization through perplexities and dangers, and without which the best system would have been vain.

CHAPTER XXXII

SPIRITUAL SERVICE

The responsibility of the Y M C A workers for religious service ^{Army} Chaplains overseas was proportionally much larger than at home. No longer could neighboring clergymen visit the camps, nor could the laymen of American communities be called upon for Sunday Bible classes or addresses. While, of course, the Army chaplains were officially in charge of religious work, their number was proportionally smaller than at home. Although approximately 2,000 additional chaplains were commissioned during the war, the distribution of the A E F in comparatively small units made it physically impossible for the chaplains sent to France to reach all troops with even moderate frequency. As late as five months after the Armistice, the condition in the Advance Section of the S O S was thus described by the Senior Chaplain of that section:

"A survey of the Advance Section disclosed the fact that there were 170,000 American soldiers and 12,324 German prisoners distributed in 500 villages and a large number of camps. These were broken up into 1,500 units, varying in size from four men working in a forest to a complete regiment of artillery or infantry. Then there were the base, evacuation and camp hospitals, where there were a great number of patients to be cared for. As you know, the most serious handicap we have encountered has been the shortage of chaplains. You will appreciate how great was the need in the Advance Section when I tell you that there were but 70 U. S. Army chaplains, fifteen Red Cross chaplains and five K. of C. priests performing purely chaplain's functions for this large body of men.

"There was one discovery, however, which was as a ray of sunshine that brightened the whole situation and that was the excellent work being done by the Y M C A. I do not refer to your educational or entertainment programs, as valuable as they may be, but to the strictly religious work being done by the excellent men assigned to points where there were no chaplains. You will never know how large a part these Christian ministers, working under the auspices of the 'Red Triangle,' have played in developing and keeping up the morale of these troops.

"The Commanding General feels as badly as I do regarding the shortage of chaplains, but I voice his feelings when I say that the Y M C A has made a distinct and valuable contribution to the spiritual

life of a great number of men, who have been without the services of a chaplain and would have been utterly neglected were it not for the great help of the Y M C A."

The situation thus described was one to which the Y M C A would and did instinctively respond. With the exception of certain special workers, such as accountants, motor mechanics, and entertainers, the fundamental impulse which led the majority of secretaries to enlist was the desire to serve the spiritual needs of men. This had been emphasized by recruiting committees. The addresses given in training conferences and the pamphlets on Association history and methods, provided for study on the voyage, had further stressed it. It was commonly understood that religious work was a general function of all secretaries as they might find opportunity.

Few, however, were prepared for the conditions, strikingly different from the home camps, into which they entered overseas, and the new labors to which the Y M C A was committed. All these new tasks were regarded by the Y M C A, not as substitutes for its normal service, but as additional responsibilities. The challenge was to meet them without failing in service of the types which constituted the fundamental reason for the Association's presence with the forces. Radical readjustment was necessary. That the readjustment was successfully made by most men is the best evidence that recruiting committees had been successful in their search for adaptability.

From the point of view of organization, the effect was to delay the development of specialized activities departments. From the point of view of service, it was found that religious, educational, and athletic work was not wholly dependent upon organization, but could be done extemporaneously by individuals. It was a full year before personnel could be spared from prior obligations to enable the Educational Department to function administratively in putting into effect throughout the A E F the well coordinated plans submitted and officially approved nine months earlier. Much the same might be said of the Athletic and Religious Work Departments. In each a director was early appointed, who with a meager staff of assistants, surveyed and studied conditions, started supplies on their way, and stimulated hut secretaries to promote their typical activities. Even if a special religious or educational worker were provided in a camp, the canteen absorbed much of his time. Yet there were few places in which the one or two men and women of all work who comprised the usual hut

staff did not succeed in holding fairly regular religious services and Bible classes, as well as teaching illiterates to read and write, conducting French classes, and getting up impromptu entertainments and athletic sports. The number of secretaries set apart specifically as religious, educational, or athletic workers was small, yet each department could justly claim that its work was receiving some time and attention from nearly all workers. Even those specifically engaged in support service, in warehouses, factories, or offices, seized and used many of their hours off duty to have a taste of the kind of work they had all expected to do when they enlisted under the "Red Triangle."

When Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College, became head of the Religious Work Department just before the Armistice, his first step was to think through the whole Association task and the relation to it of the task of the Religious Work Department. He published a "Program of Religious Work"—a pamphlet, by the way, which should be in the hands of every religious worker and student—in which the following was laid down as the first basic principle: "Religion is not a department of a man's life; it is the spirit of his entire life shown in all its many-sided relations."

The
Comprehensive
Principle

This was not the announcement of a new principle; it was the formulation of a rule that had been suggested at home and was instinctively followed by most workers, whether in executive authority, or in day to day contact with soldiers. To one new recruit, presenting his certificate of acceptance to the secretary at New York Headquarters whose duty it was to instruct him in the various things to be done before sailing, the latter said:

"I see you are a minister. Let me give you a tip. If your religion is only good to talk about, stay at home; but if you can put your religion into handing out a cup of chocolate, go ahead and God bless you."

It was the belief that religion could be put into any act that induced men to accept assignments in France very different from what they had expected, and it was the recognition of religion in service that made soldiers eager to hear the spoken message from those who had proved by their works their right to speak.

Many a college professor, business man, or minister of the gospel, the marks of his profession lost under the common disguise of khaki, might have been found washing dishes, sweeping out huts, distributing chocolate, or driving motor cars; men who, with a spirit of readiness

to meet any emergency, had been willing to turn from the service they could render best to something which for the moment was more urgently needed and which there was nobody else to do. One of the traveling speakers of the Y who chanced to be a minister from a western town, had to be driven some miles by one of the Y chauffeurs to fill a speaking engagement at a large camp. Arriving at the big tent, he informed the chauffeur that he was to be the speaker and would be glad to have him come into the service and hear his address. The chauffeur courteously declined, stating that the car required some special attention. The service ended, the speaker got into his car for the return journey. Telling the driver the particular town from which he came and the church to which he ministered, he inquired of him what his work back in the United States might be. "I am the minister of the First Congregational Church in _____" (a leading New England college town) was the reply.

This broad conception of religion, as President King pointed out, "does not deny the need of specific religious emphasis, any more than the fact of the unity of man's nature denies the need of specific emphasis on hygiene."

Although that emphasis was not effectively departmentalized for nearly a year, the very difficulties deepened the resolution to overcome them. While the statement that the Army primarily expected canteen service stands indisputable, it is equally true that this demand was in no sense exclusive. Soldiers wanted religious services, as was shown not only by their attendance but by frequent requests. So secretaries, most of whose time was absorbed in hut and canteen duties, found or made opportunities for services of worship, for personal talks with men who desired counsel, and for the organization of Bible study groups. During the first year the religious emphasis was diffused by spiritually minded men alert to seize occasions. After the Armistice, the department became effective in organizing a broad program, carried out by a large corps of special workers assigned to the various divisions and camps, and supported by visits of speakers, singers and Bible class organizers, as well as by the distribution of large quantities of religious literature. The work of the small staff of pioneers in the department bore its fruit in this later period.

THE RELIGIOUS TASK OVERSEAS

The broad conception of the religious task already implied revealed itself in varied forms of service. It was the Religious Work

Department, for example, that directed the placing of "Hut Mothers," who while sewing on a button or mending a torn garment, gave the man openings to talk about his mother or wife or child at home. It sent out evangelists and also speakers who dwelt on the patriotic ideals of citizens as well as of soldiers. It recognized that morals and religion are inseparable, and while seeking to give spiritual reenforcement in the fight with temptation, helped other departments in providing the congenial preoccupations which enabled men to avoid the conflict.

The task overseas was not different in essence from that at home; it was more intense, perhaps, and was much modified by differing conditions. Its new emphasis began as soon as the men broke camp and headed for a port of embarkation. They were now on their way to the front and excitement and nervous tension increased. Home ties, which retained a tangible character so long as the soldier had not left America, gave place to a feeling of remoteness when not land but ocean began to separate him from home. No longer could he hope for a visitor from home or a possible furlough that would enable him to see his family. No longer could he go to the sort of church he was familiar with, in a community which was at least American, if not his home town. Private hospitality in England and France, though cordial, was limited, and comparatively few fortunate ones could enjoy it. Even letters came irregularly or were lost in transit. The camps in America had given but a suggestion of the real bitterness of homesickness. The everlasting monotony of uniformed comrades drove men to seek other companionship, any companionship, even if it were but the chance acquaintance of the café or the street. Delayed in getting into action, with discomforts and disappointments multiplying, a desperate loneliness and discontent settled over thousands from which distraction of any kind was welcome.

External conditions too were different. Throughout England and France, intoxicants could be obtained without difficulty by men in uniform. In place of a strictly enforced law, forbidding sales of liquor to soldiers, the Army command could only impose severe penalties for drunkenness. So too with sexual indulgence. Certain districts could be declared out of bounds, and military police posted to enforce orders, but vice was nowhere segregated. Its invitations were offered not only in city streets, but up to the very sentry lines of camps. The Army combatted venereal disease by prophylaxis and severe penalties imposed on men who became military casualties from this

The Men to
Be Served

Social
Environment

cause. It also issued frequent General Orders, and directed the giving of lectures by medical and other officers, pointing out the national dangers as well as the personal ones which were risked by indulgence. Such instruction unquestionably was effective with thousands of men who did not know the facts, or had not thought out their implications, and who needed only guidance to be the good soldiers of their own intention. But the conditions and circumstances under which men lived presented temptations never before encountered so intensively, while homesickness, monotony, and nervous strain tended to weaken inhibitions. Religious workers believed that in cultivating Christian loyalty they could nourish an inner strength that would be the most potent influence for clean living.

The Experience
of Battle

Among fighting troops still a new condition was recognized. The inevitable brutalities of war inflicted a moral and religious shock that cannot be measured. It became the duty of men to perform acts that were in themselves the direct repudiation of every religious principle, save that of patriotic duty. They came out of conflict dazed and numb, morally and spiritually at sea. If in the ultimate test, the needle of the spiritual compass pointed due south instead of north, what reliance could be placed upon it or what authority recognized in lesser problems? Then, if ever, men needed a spiritual pilot.

The Question
of Immortality

"Nor can we leave out of account,"—wrote President King,—“in thinking of the imperative need of the message of religion for this time of war and world crisis, the constant way in which the fighting forces have confronted the possibility of death. There may have been little said about it by the soldiers; the fact may have been avoided in conversation, and a kind of fatalistic attitude taken; but we may be sure that the thought was more or less continuously in the background of the mind. The question of a future life was no longer an academic question for disinterested discussion. It mightily concerned a man. The healthful instinctive feeling and faith of men carry with them the immortal hope; but this war has surely shown that men face to face with death need to have this supplemented with the steadily, strongly assuring religious message of the Eternal Father, and of the involved nearness and reality of the other life, and with the ministry of the sacraments in which the Father's upholding and forgiving love is evidenced and offered.”

Home after
Victory

After the Armistice, the emphasis again changed. Lack of occupation, discontent with the delays in going home, and reaction from the tense strain of actual or anticipated fighting, multiplied moral

dangers to men, regarded with joyous gratitude by a society released from four years of anxious dread. One could not but sympathize with the happiness that made men and women kiss and embrace strangers in the streets in the first days of celebration, but the effervescence did not exhaust itself in harmless exuberance. The Religious Work Department had a very definite part in the great task of directing the excess energy of millions of men into safe and beneficial channels. While the Athletic and Entertainment Departments redoubled their efforts to keep the men absorbed in congenial occupation, the Educational and Religious Work Departments set before them the goal of a better America, needing and worthy of the continued devotion of her sons. President King put the task in clear words:

"Many soldiers have made, at least in their attitude toward the cause involved in the war, a great fundamental moral decision, more or less unconsciously. They need to make this decision consciously and to extend it to all aspects of their life and to the period after the war as well as now. The critical question here is: Is the man determined that all the aspects of his life, the whole spirit of it after the war as well as now, shall show the same unselfish devotion to humanity and to the cause of Christian civilization, which his willingness to make the supreme sacrifice in battle shows?"

To help these men translate the spirit of sacrifice, to which their own experience was a key, into an essentially religious decision; to translate the home hunger universally felt into "a new and still deeper hunger for the Eternal Father"—and to prepare them for a "new citizenship for a new America in a new age," became the primary objectives of religious work.

This analysis of the situation represents obviously the attitude of religious minded men. There was no reason to expect that all soldiers would agree or sympathize with it. In the Army, as in every civilian community, there were those who from conviction or temperament held an opposite attitude. With the possible exception of politics, there is no other subject on which those who differ find mutual understanding and appreciation more difficult. How men acted was really a matter of manners. Some met the approaches of religious workers, chaplains or secretaries, with courteous indifference; others with sneering contempt. Accusations of canting hypocrisy were not lacking, for which a color of justification might be found in the presence of some workers whose piety was more zealous than intelligent. Such workers quickly found their positions untenable, and either ad-

Men of Diverse
Minds

justed themselves or were withdrawn from direct contact with soldiers. The fact that very many petitions were received from soldiers asking that the worker who had been with them in the field should be permitted to accompany the unit on its voyage home confirms the irresistible impression made by the records of attendance at religious services, Bible class membership, and the like, which follow. Most workers demonstrated in conduct a sincerity which not only refuted calumny but won respectful attention to what they had to say, and most soldiers resented bitterly any failure of a Y M C A man to maintain in personal conduct and conversation the Christian standards implied in his uniform and insignia. The effect of the accumulating experience of war service was to deepen the conviction of thoughtful men that the ministry of religion was a positive factor in morals and morale that could not be spared.

Cooperation with
Chaplains

In the performance of this task there was the most cordial cooperation between chaplains and secretaries. Early in the spring of 1918, Bishop Charles H. Brent, who had been serving as Y M C A Religious Work Director at G H Q, was invited by General Pershing to become Senior Chaplain of the A E F. This appointment assured mutual understanding of policies and plans, and a working liaison between the two groups most favorable to efficient service. All secretaries were instructed to avoid trespass, or even seeming trespass on the chaplain's functions, to put all Y M C A facilities at his disposal, and to seek his approval and support for their own proposed activities. In general the chaplain used the hut for his service, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, at the hour of his preference, usually Sunday morning, while the secretary conducted a later morning and an evening service. The hut was also used for confessions. Many secretaries, at the invitation of the local chaplain, or of the commander where no chaplain was stationed, performed all ministerial functions.

BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

Debarkation
Ports

Service to troops on an extensive scale began at the debarkation ports, of which St. Nazaire was typical. Early in July, 1917, a staff of six men was sent there from Paris, to join one or two pioneers who had located service points in the city, on the docks, and at the great American camp laid out by the engineers. Cooperative relations with military and French civilian officials had been established, restaurant and canteen started, a baseball field rented and laid out, a booklet with map of the city and useful information published, and

newspaper service begun. Of the six new members of the staff one was charged with specific responsibility for religious work. On the day after his arrival he conducted a service attended by 500 men. St. Nazaire developed rapidly, the soldier population frequently numbering tens of thousands, and service points were multiplied. Like Bordeaux and Le Havre, it was one of the few points in France where concentration of large numbers permitted the use of a specialized staff from the beginning. The religious work secretary arranged Sunday services and evening meetings for song, prayer and informal addresses in all the huts, frequently speaking himself and facilitating the work of the chaplains.

As the men went forward into training camps there were other points where similar situations existed on a smaller scale. At Issoudun was an aviation school with seven flying fields several kilometers apart. As early as Thanksgiving Day, 1917, there was a religious work secretary on the camp staff, although correspondence shows that he was giving a good deal of time to the canteen. Gondrecourt was a populous American center. The 1st Division was billeted in adjacent villages and various military schools were conducted there. Dr. Robert E. Freeman, of Los Angeles, went there for the dedication of the first double hut, which occurred on Christmas Day, 1917. General Robert Bullard took part. The religious work secretary was reporting regular Sunday services, however, as early as November. Dr. Freeman reported that three of the secretaries ought to be in hospital—"They are worn to rags." At St. Maixent, another aviation training camp, service was begun December 16, 1917. Services were held Sunday afternoons in the French Protestant Church with an attendance of 200 to 300. Confessions in English were arranged for once a week in the Catholic Church, where, of course, Catholic soldiers could attend mass. When the Jewish holidays came, arrangements were made for the Jews to observe them at a point eighteen miles away where there was a rabbi. No chaplain was attached to this camp until October, 1918, so that the Y workers were responsible not only for public services but for hospital visiting and conducting funerals.

Apart from base-port and special instruction camps, there was a steadily increasing number of men in billeting areas. Service points might be found in perhaps one-third of the villages, men in other villages hiking in or sending representatives for supplies. One secretary, or at most two, conducted each hut. Occasionally a visiting

Special Training
Camps

Billeting
Areas

speaker would reach them. For the rest an occasional singsong with informal talk by the secretary and perhaps a Bible class or two summed up the specific religious activities. The physical discomforts of that winter in the mud and rain, with billets unlighted and unheated, made the mere provision of a dry, warm, light place where men could gather in some semblance of comfort, a service so significant as to justify the secretary's giving his whole effort to it.

Religious
Literature

Religious literature was extremely scarce. The tonnage allotted the Y M C A from the United States included no space for it, and very perplexing difficulties attended the effort to manufacture it in England and France. Frequently workers found themselves without songbook, Testament, or helps to Bible study of any kind. In one important center a secretary had given away to the men, not only the few Testaments which he carried in his baggage, but his own Bible. He was conducting a large class in the life of Jesus, purely from memory. Somewhere he had secured smooth boards and black paint and had constructed a blackboard, on which he drew outlines. The fact that the life of Jesus had made such a lasting impression on him deepened the impression he made on the men. Many other secretaries proved in similar ways that hands empty of usual helps could not defeat souls filled with the knowledge and love of Christ.

Beginning of
Organization

The first departmental organization of the A E F-Y M C A was effected in January, 1918. Dr. Freeman, who had been serving with the 1st Division was appointed executive secretary of the Religious Work Department. His staff consisted of one stenographer until March when a second stenographer was added. Dr. Freeman's rare pulpit gifts kept him in constant demand as a speaker and it was his regular practice to spend each week-end at one of the camps with frequent additional mid-week appointments. The administrative need to which he particularly addressed himself was the securing of a supply of religious literature.

Securing
Supplies

A single experience illustrates the situation he faced. The use of a few copies of H. E. Fosdick's "Manhood of the Master" had met with such a response from Bible study groups that 10,000 copies were ordered of the Book and Periodical Department in London. A search of the publishers' stocks there revealed less than 200 copies available. There was no hope of securing the books from America. The London secretary so reporting was directed to arrange for re-printing. The book was copyrighted in America, however, and an exchange of cablegrams was necessary to secure permission to reprint.

The overloaded cable service took two weeks to transmit the message and reply. Then the paper difficulty was faced. Printers and paper manufacturers were limited to half their pre-war supply. Only by securing from the British paper controller a permit to import a corresponding amount of pulp could the secretary persuade the dealer to sell him the necessary stock. The price was a shilling and three-pence, or about thirty cents, a pound for paper that would have been high priced at three cents before the war. Every one of these negotiations, which extended even to materials for the paste used by the binders, was a trifling matter to the busy officials whose permission had to be secured at every step. More than three months elapsed before the first copies were secured and delivered to the transport office for conveyance to France, and another month before the books reached their destination in the camps. The hours upon hours spent in running about from one office to another, untangling difficulties and accelerating the exasperatingly slow processes, exceed imagination. It is no exaggeration to say that the cable, slower than ordinary transatlantic mail, was typical of the slowness of every process, and any movement at all was the result of repeated urging.

A trickling stream of Testaments, Scripture portions and other religious literature crossed the ocean as part of secretaries' baggage. The Book and Periodical Secretary in London received the hearty cooperation of the Bible publishing societies of England, which helped immeasurably. But the only way to secure general religious literature was to create it in France. Dr. Freeman prepared or secured copy for half a dozen small pamphlets or leaflets and, after much tribulation with French printers whose stock of English type was small, secured large quantities for distribution. He also secured from the Executive Committee authority to print an edition of a song book containing about fifty hymns, 500,000 copies with words only and 50,000 with music. The latter had to be made from photographic plates and were very expensive but there seemed to be no other way of supplying a very general desire. Many a soldier carried one of the little song books in his pocket until the flimsy paper was half frayed away or the print obliterated by grime.

In April, 1918, Dr. Freeman sent a questionnaire to divisional religious work directors. The replies covered sixteen divisions or sections with 150 service points. They indicated that regular Sunday services were held morning and evening at practically every service point, with attendance varying from 50 to 1,000, depending upon the

Extent of
Religious
Work

size of the hut, number of troops and local conditions, such as quarantine or Sunday labor. The number of Bible classes was approximately equal to the number of huts. Every reply stated that good relations existed with chaplains. The special needs reported invariably included Bibles, song books and religious literature, and most of them called for more workers and more transportation. A frequently mentioned need was for a "quiet room." At this time the personnel specifically assigned to religious work numbered seventeen, practically all of whom were acting as religious directors for divisions or areas. Thus the actual conduct of this form of service at the 150 points reported was by hut secretaries who included it among their multifarious duties.

Reorganization

In the general reorganization which took place during the summer of 1918, the Religious Work Department experienced numerous changes. Dr. Freeman returned to his home duties in June and was succeeded by William Carlton Harrison, a lawyer of Baltimore, and he in turn in August by Rev. B. V. Edworthy. Both these men had been serving the 1st Division on the fighting front. They brought to their work an energy inspired by their own experience of the need of field workers for vigorous support from headquarters. Meanwhile, Nolan R. Best, editor of the *Continent*, had entered the department in May and in August took charge of the production and distribution of religious literature. When he returned home in the autumn, Homer M. Campbell, who had held a similar position in the London Y headquarters, succeeded him. On August 1st, Bishop Luther B. Wilson was appointed director of the department. Like Dr. Freeman, he did a great deal of speaking in the camps, leaving administrative duties to the care of Mr. Edworthy. At this time the personnel of the department had increased to 73, of whom 67 were in the field. Bishop Wilson returned to the United States in October and President Henry Churchill King became director. From the advent of Mr. Edworthy in August, the department had a continuing policy and administration which was given definite form under President King.

Extended Service in the S O S

While these changes were taking place at headquarters, religious work gradually but steadily increased throughout the Services of Supply and rear training areas. Soon after the establishment of the regional plan, each region had a director of religious work, and their calls for special personnel defined the needs more positively than before. More speakers had been sent from New York, to travel from camp to camp. In addition to Dr. Freeman and Bishop Wilson, men like Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church

of New York City, Rev. Oscar E. Maurer of the First Congregational Church of New Haven, Dr. James Francis of the First Baptist Church, Los Angeles, and Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick, were speaking several times daily. Dr. Coffin and Dr. Raymond King, accompanied by a singer, spent the last week of July at the Issoudun Aviation Camp. Fifty-three meetings were held for Protestants and 23 for Catholics at the eleven service points with the cooperation of all the religious forces of the camp. At Brest there had sprung up the first Honey Bee Club, which was destined to become duplicated until nearly 21,500 negro soldiers had earned the right to wear its badge. The opportunities in the Leave Areas were being provided for. Religious literature distributed in July amounted to 450,000 items and increased to 670,000 items in August.

Religious work in the advanced areas was characteristically opportunistic and individualistic. Assemblies of men in any large numbers were rarely possible. Because buildings that could be easily "spotted" by enemy aviators were forbidden, most Y service points were in small rooms or cellars. Open air assemblies were equally exposed to the observation of the enemy. Sometimes a few hundred reserve or support troops could be gathered among the trees of a sheltering wood, but for the most part the secretary found his religious opportunity with small groups or with individuals. Perhaps in a cellar canteen, a dozen men might afford a chance for a bit of singing, prayer, or informal talk. Perhaps a secretary, pack on back, visiting a sheltered battery could hold a simple service. Most secretaries managed to have two or three Testaments to be given to men who had lost theirs and wanted them replaced. The offer of a Testament might lead to an impromptu Bible lesson, the men discussing in energetic fashion some point suggested by a brief reading, and its application to their situation. Such a lesson would frequently end by the choice of a leader for continuation of a Bible study or discussion group. Secretaries found little time at the front for formal reports and no reports could be expected of the number of such services or group opportunities. Only casual mention of instances in very many letters by secretaries and some by soldiers indicates that secretaries were very generally alert to seize occasions.

It is obviously impossible to make a quantitative survey of personal ministrations. Such things were not matters for record. It was usual in combat for Y workers to be directed by commanders to assist chaplains and medical officers. They worked in practical ways among

Service to
Combat Troops

Personal
Ministration

the wounded and dying in dressing stations, and the distribution of hot chocolate or cigarets was naturally accompanied by the word of cheer, consolation or faith. They received the last messages of dying men, as well as the valuables and messages of men going into the fight. They trudged, some of them, with supplies on their backs into the trenches, where men stood guard on the fire step or snatched broken rest in the dugouts. They penetrated No-Man's-Land as stretcher bearers, searching for and bringing in wounded. They were God-loving, man-loving men to whom Christian faith was a vital reality, and they acted as such men could not refrain from acting amid such scenes.

At Villers-Tournelle in the Cantigny sector, support troops of the 1st Division suffered more casualties from shell fire in the town than the troops in the trenches. There was no chaplain and the two Y workers conducted five or six burial services each night. Sometimes bodies had to be reburied, when shells disturbed the graves. By orders the burial squad took shelter as soon as the body had been placed in the grave. Without orders the Y secretary stood by the grave to repeat the words of immortal hope. A citation for gallantry was the unsought reward of one of these men. Even more significant was the unofficial decoration received by another worker from the men he served. He woke one morning to find that while he slept the buttons had been cut from his uniform and those of the 6th Marines sewed in their place. There could have been no better preaching than that of the daily conduct of secretaries who shared the dangers and discomforts of the soldiers for the sake of doing for them any and every friendly service in their power. It was the exemplification of Emerson's ideal of preaching—the life speaking so clearly that no word was needed to proclaim the spiritual reality that was its inspiration.

Speakers

The itinerant speakers who came from the United States were one in their desire to give their messages to the men at the front. So far as military orders permitted, they were given the chance, and there were some largely attended services within a few miles of the firing line. On September 29th, Howard G. Taylor and Homer Rodeheaver left Paris for a five weeks' trip to the front. Their report mentioned few of the places they visited, but among the number were Fleury, Neuville, Les Islettes, Varennes (then on the firing line), Rachecourt, Souilly. Among the divisions visited were the 26th, 28th, 77th, 29th, and 5th. Any military history will tell where those divisions were to be

found during the Meuse-Argonne fight. Leaving Blercourt on October 9th, the party met the 113th regiment of the 29th division in the woods, and spoke and sang before 7,000 men, General Upton also speaking. Seven men were baptized. As the party left they were told that one hour later the regiment would go over the top. In Verdun they held a continuous meeting in an "opera house" 80 feet underground. The men attended by battalions, one marching in as another marched out. For the most part, however, their services were with groups consisting of a company or less whom they found in the woods as they drove along in their Ford. Such meetings numbered from six to twelve a day, and the report estimated that not less than 150,000 men heard one or more of the addresses. A few other teams of speakers and singers made similar trips, but the necessary passes were difficult to obtain, and the nearer they got to the front the greater was the military risk of assemblies.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE

President King had been director barely two weeks when the Armistice suddenly transformed the situation. The material difficulties of serving troops were reduced to two: transportation and sufficient workers. The first was never overcome, the Religious Work Department being unable in spite of repeated urging, to secure the automobiles it needed. The general force of workers, however, rapidly increased and large numbers were released to the department from other forms of service. By April, 1919, 550 men and women were definitely assigned to religious work. In all 721 served under the department, of whom seven were bishops, twenty college presidents or professors, and 443 ministers, representing sixteen denominations. Ninety-seven women were included.

A vigorous organization was quickly effected. Already experienced men were directing the assignment of workers and the distribution of religious literature. President King became a member of the Y M C A executive committee and established the custom of personally addressing the daily conferences of newly arrived workers on the importance and opportunities of religious work. Mr. Edworthy, who interviewed and assigned workers, was of opinion that these addresses led many secretaries to ask for assignment to the department. Bishop Walter Lambuth became liaison officer with chaplains, and R. G. Clark, who had been serving at Nancy, was appointed general field superintendent. Additional bureaus at headquarters pro-

The
Organization

moted the following activities: speakers, constructive issues of the war, life callings, Bible study, Comrades in Service, Honey Bee Clubs, War Roll, railway workers, and sacred music. A business manager, and when the troops had settled down, field superintendents for the Second and Third Armies, completed the executive staff. The Paris office kept in touch with the field through regional and divisional religious directors, by sending representatives to regional and divisional conferences, and by special religious work conferences.

Religious
Literature

By October, 1918, upwards of two and a half million items of religious literature had been distributed. Developing the methods that had made this possible, Mr. Campbell, with valuable cooperation from the corresponding departments in New York and London, secured and issued eleven and one half million items in the next eight months. The literature consisted of some 60 different books, pamphlets, and leaflets under fifteen classifications, besides Bibles and portions of Scripture, and posters and post cards. More than one million of the latter bearing helpful or inspiring quotations, were sent home by soldiers. The classifications included Christian living, Christian fundamentals, evangelistic, meaning of the war, life callings, gambling, doubt, prayer, home-going. Books by Fosdick, Gilkey, and Eddy, and excerpts from many other writers, especially brief stories and telling messages written by men who had worked with the soldiers in the fighting zone, were taken with apparent eagerness by the men wherever they were offered. In the home-going days at Brest an energetic worker was asked to bring some literature to an outlying camp. The only vehicle he could secure was a wheelbarrow. He loaded that, affixed a sign "take one" and started up the road. His stock was exhausted before he had gone 200 yards and he repeated the trip several times a day for some weeks, never getting more than a stone's throw from his base before being obliged to turn back for a fresh supply. His reports showed an average distribution of 12,000 items daily from his wheelbarrow.

A special service attempted by this bureau was the provision of chaplains' libraries, consisting of 52 volumes selected by President King and Bishop Brent. Orders were cabled to New York in November, 1918. Deliveries were unfortunately delayed but 2,251 sets were distributed to chaplains, who found them useful.

Bible
Study

Prof. Theodore G. Soares of the University of Chicago, who had served on the Meuse-Argonne front, was given administrative charge of Bible study. He prepared the "Honey Bee Lessons"—twelve

simple renderings of the parables of Jesus—for the use of negro troops. He also prepared "Studies in Comradeship" from the Old and New Testaments, and by February 200,000 copies were printed. A total of about 40,000 copies of Adam's "Under the Highest Leadership," Davis' "Meeting the Master," and Fosdick's "Meaning of Faith" and "Manhood of the Master" were distributed for class use. Copies of Dana's "The War in Terms of Comradeship" and Collier's "A New World in the Making" were received late from New York, but about 175,000 were used. Other material used with good results in the home camps, arrived in France in May, too late for use. In all 993,000 Bible study courses were put into the hands of soldiers.

For the promotion of class organization in the camps, Prof. Ray-<sup>Bible
Classes</sup>mond G. Clapp, formerly instructor in Bible literature at Yale, was appointed director in January, and at intervals six men, experienced in such work, were added to the staff for active organization in as many sections of the field. Newly assigned religious work secretaries were instructed and stimulated to activity in this line by office interviews before proceeding to their posts. The field organizers visited the camps, demonstrating methods by actual organization of classes and advising local secretaries. Total results were never recorded. In the St. Nazaire area, during the week ending April 20th, 145 classes met, with an attendance of 5,000. Brest reported a class in every hut. In the Vierzion region 87 classes were meeting weekly with an attendance of 3,500. In a rapid trip through the Second Army in Luxemburg during March, two workers visited 35 towns in twelve days, and organized 40 classes with total enrollment of 650. At Le Mans during February, the director organized 50 classes. Ten per cent of the soldier students at the A E F University at Beaune were enrolled in Bible classes. The small force of organizers, only seven for an army of 2,000,000, and the serious limitations of transportation facilities, made it impossible to reach every point in the field. If each organizer had been able to visit a new point each day it would have taken six months to reach all the 1,500 huts in operation after the Armistice. Many local secretaries organized classes with what help they could derive from correspondence with the department. Inexperience, and in some cases indifference, of secretaries, adversely affected the undertaking at some points. The life of classes varied greatly. Some were found which, having been organized in a home camp, never missed a weekly meeting of at least two or three members up to the time that they embarked for home. Others were broken

up by loss of leadership or separation of members after a few meetings, and some, of course, by lack of sustained interest. The director in his report commented especially upon the harmony found among the workers, irrespective of credal and denominational differences.

Honey Bee Clubs

A very interesting variant of the Bible study work was the Honey Bee Club. A large number of labor troops were required for stevedore and similar work at the ports and various other places in the S O S. Perhaps nothing that had to be done in France was more disagreeable than the work of the Graves Registration Service. Negro soldiers were employed in large numbers for both these tasks. At a religious meeting of negroes, at Brest, a secretary told a little parable of the South, illustrating impurity and purity by the turkey buzzard and the honey bee. At this meeting the idea of the Honey Bee Club was conceived, and the first club, a Bible class numbering 400, was organized. In the late summer of 1918 this same secretary was called into Paris to promote the organization of similar clubs among negro troops throughout France. A badge was adopted and special lessons on the parables of Jesus were prepared. The results as reflected both in disciplinary records and in the spirit of the men attracted attention and cooperation of their commanders. The commanding officer of the 802d Pioneer Infantry stationed at Clermont-Ferrand issued regimental orders regarding the wearing of the Honey Bee Badge, restricting it to men of clean record in every respect, at the same time according special privileges to men who maintained their right to wear it. Military police were ordered to recognize it as a badge of honor, entitling the wearer to pass without restraint or question. Any man who committed an offense was to be publicly deprived of his badge at dress parade. Lieutenant-Colonel Watts reported to General Pershing on his visit of inspection, that not one of his 2,500 men had contracted venereal disease. The Honey Bee Bureau received letters from practically every commander of negro troops commending the influence of the clubs on morale. The number of badges awarded reached a total of 21,550 and 14,200 sets of Honey Bee Lessons were put in use.

Life Callings

Dr. J. Ross Stevenson, President of Princeton Theological Seminary, was secured to direct the Bureau of Life Callings. Most of the young men from whom the personnel of the ministry and other unselfish callings must be recruited for the immediate future, were in the Army. The social importance of such workers in American life gave a very pointed indication that a great national service would be

rendered by sounding the call for recruits. As would be expected of American youth, that "fundamental moral decision made more or less unconsciously by men in their attitude to the war" was already translating itself into a desire for self-devotion to "humanity and the cause of Christian civilization," as was shown by requests for information and advice received from many soldiers. About twenty pamphlets were printed or reprinted, setting forth the responsibilities and opportunities of the ministry, missions, Y M C A secretaryships, and other life callings, together with information as to ways and means of preparing for them. The subject was presented by speakers in gatherings of soldiers and by secretaries in personal interviews with men who showed interest or promise of the requisite qualifications. Any man ready to make a decision was offered a card to be filled out with the information necessary to enable the bureau to send books and to correspond with him helpfully. These cards, collected in Paris, were sent to New York in May, 1919, where they were carefully classified and distributed to the proper educational institutions or other organizations, so that each man might receive welcome and further guidance upon his return home. The most intensive work was done among the men who applied for opportunities (arranged by the Educational Department), to study in the French and British universities. Dr. Stevenson went to England to supervise the work among American students there, while Dr. Cleland B. McAfee of McCormick Seminary, carried on the work in France. The latter instituted a series of Life Calling Conferences in the fourteen French universities and some of the larger camps. The bureau received upwards of 1,000 signed cards and 300 applications for ministerial education. Its director was satisfied that not less than 50,000 men gave definite consideration to the challenge.

With homegoing and the great tasks of reconstruction in mind, the leaders of all the welfare societies united with the Army in the development of an organization of the members of the A E F to perpetuate the comradeship developed in the war and the transference of its basic idealism to the future of America. For this purpose the "Comrades in Service" movement, which had originated at Camp Custer, was selected. Its inventor, Dr. O. D. Foster, was charged with its expansion in the A E F. With the cooperation of the Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, Salvation Army and the Senior Chaplain, the movement was launched at a meeting in Paris, January 12, 1919, President Wilson being present and expressing his ap-

Comrades in
Service

proval. A Central Council, of which Senior Chaplain Brent was president and which included the head of each welfare society and representatives of officers and enlisted men, constituted the directing body. Edwin F. Lee, Senior Chaplain of the Base Section No. 2 (Bordeaux), was chairman of the executive committee. The Army furnished offices in the Elysée Palace Hotel Building and an official bulletin was issued requesting all chaplains to cooperate. General Pershing awarded to this movement a fund placed at his disposal by the *Chicago Tribune*, to be used for the best interest of the men of the A E F. A bi-weekly paper with a circulation of 100,000 copies was published, and field lecturers and organizers were sent to the various base and intermediate sections. The objectives set before the men were promotion of information and interest in religion, education, hygiene, recreation, wholesome entertainment, clean living and general morale, and the perpetuation of the comradeship developed and realized during the war. The emphasis was on patriotic citizenship and the definite aim was to make the organization an influential factor in promoting a broad program of community building after the war, in which every man might unite regardless of politics or creed.

The local organization was wholly in the hands of soldiers. At a meeting of each unit, the commanding officer stated the purpose, and introduced the representative of the Central Council. After his explanation, the men discussed the proposition and decided whether they wished to organize. They elected their own officers, adopted a constitution of their own making, and chose the special forms of activity that pleased them. In one group it would be a club to discuss civic problems, in another a class to study the special Bible lessons prepared by Professor Soares, or emphasis would be on musical, dramatic or athletic activities. The membership enrollment exceeded 200,000.

After the completion of demobilization and the organization of the American Legion with a statement of similar purpose, the Council advised members to suspend the Comrades organization and join the Legion. A continuation committee was appointed to serve as a nucleus in case a revival of the organization became advisable.¹

One of the obviously greatest opportunities for religious work resulted from the removal of restrictions on assembling the men in large numbers when fighting ceased. It was universally recognized

¹ Consult *Home—Then What?* John Kendrick Bangs. New York, 1918—Introduction.

that the best speakers and preachers of America could reasonably be summoned to put before these millions of young Americans, waiting for their return to civilian life, the Gospel of Christ and the strengthening resources of Christian faith. President King, with the hearty approval of the Chief Secretary and the Senior Chaplain, cabled to New York in December for the recruiting of a large number of the most effective men, specifying some thirty-five whose names are familiar to the whole nation. Dr. Clarence A. Barbour, President of Rochester Theological Seminary, at that time directing the Speakers' Bureau in New York, gave almost his entire time to the undertaking, with the active cooperation of Dr. Mott, Robert P. Wilder, and the Federation Committee. More than 150 men were secured for periods of three months or more each. Merely to indicate their caliber, for selection of a few names would be invidious, there may be named the brothers Joseph A. and James I. Vance, Hugh Black, John Douglas Adam, S. Parkes Cadman, Alexander Marvin, G. A. Johnston Ross, Stanley Ross Fisher, Herbert A. Jump, William T. Manning, A. Z. Conrad. Not all who were approached and would gladly have gone, were able to abandon their duties at home. Already the returning Army was beginning to reach America, and there was a work to be done in America among the men who were re-entering civilian life. The great tasks of reconstruction work were imposed with a suddenness as unexpected as the new situation overseas. There was no easy decision as to where a man could be most useful. The men who felt free to go to France counted themselves fortunate.

The routing of these speakers in France was in the hands of the ^{Singers} Speakers' Bureau, headed by Rev. William M. Case. Close liaison was maintained with the Educational and Entertainment Departments, which were also sending out lecturers, in order to avoid conflicting engagements and to distribute the combined forces of the Y M C A as evenly as possible. Evangelistic singers were recruited to work with the speakers, and singers were also secured from the ranks of entertainers in France. The Sacred Music Bureau distributed thousands of copies of songs and anthems, as well as musical instruments, and aided in the organization of orchestras and choruses among the soldiers. Cooperation with the chaplains was more strongly emphasized, and through Bishop Brent, conferences as to programs and methods and preparation for proposed undertakings were promoted. The Speakers' Bureau informed local secretaries well in advance of the coming of speakers, and furnished and suggested advertising ma-

terial and ideas. Thus there was concerted effort, well thought out and carried into effect with intelligent enthusiasm.

Evangelization

There was a general agreement among all religious leaders that a definite campaign of evangelization was the sound method of procedure. The objects were expressed as follows:

1. To draw the men nearer to God and to inspire within them the highest possible ideals, that they may be clean and strong and patient during their trying weeks of waiting.
2. To exalt Jesus, the Christ, as the Master of Life, the only sufficient Saviour; and the principles of Christ as the only sufficient program for a safe civilization. To seek to have the men definitely and sincerely pledged to Him and to His program of brotherhood and service as they return to their homes.
3. To seek out and encourage candidates for the ministry and other forms of specifically Christian work.

On January 25th a week's campaign was started with the 82d Division, on which the senior chaplain of the division reported to Senior Chaplain Brent as follows:

HQ. 82d Division, American E. F., France.

February 11, 1919.

From: Senior Chaplain John Paul Tyler, 82d Division
 To: Senior G.H.Q. Chaplains Office, G.H.Q., A E F.
 Subject: Report on Special Meetings.

During the week, January 26th to February 2, 1919, special religious services were held in the 82d Division concerning which the following report is submitted:

I. PROPOSITION

The need of drawing men of all grades closer to God, each through his own organization, was deeply felt by the chaplain. After discussing the matter with the Commanding General and the approval of the Senior Chaplain, arrangements were entered into with Rev. Dr. H. K. Pitman, Y M C A, whereby special speakers and singers were to be brought into the Division to work with and under the several chaplains of the Division, each speaker working throughout the week in given villages. The Commanding General expressed before the assembled commanding officers of the Division his deep interest in the plan, and his desire for full cooperation on the part of the various regimental and other commanders. Failing in an effort to secure Roman Catholic priests as guests for the week, a memorandum was sent to each Roman Catholic chaplain requesting him to conduct a mission in the village church during the week. Arrangements were also made with the Jewish chaplain of the Division whereby services were arranged for him throughout the Division, so that he could meet two or three groups each day.

II. SERVICES

Services were conducted under the direction of the chaplains at fifteen places within the Division by the Y M C A visiting ministers, who were assisted by eleven singers. Missions were conducted during the same time by four Roman Catholic chaplains, others arranging to hold special services at a later date. No effort was made to engage in any of the professional evangelistical tactics, but rather in a quiet, earnest way to draw the men closer to God. During the day appointments were made whereby for certain hours interviews for men who were interested were held with the visitors. These interviews were largely used, and were greatly effective for good, and the men seemed deeply to appreciate them. In some instances men walked a distance of ten miles to attend these services. In some areas the services were the theme of discussion in the billets and around the fires. Despite cold weather and other obstacles, the attendance at every service was limited only by the capacity of the house, and in some places the necessity of arranging for two sittings was discussed. The meetings were most thoughtful and helpful, as is indicated by the following:

III. RESULTS

Each chaplain was requested to make a special report on these ^{Unity} services, and to express his judgment as to whether or not they had been a source of good. In no case was an adverse report submitted, and, in many instances, the chaplains, both Protestant and Catholic, were enthusiastic. The same is true of the Jewish chaplain. The colonel of one regiment took a personal interest in the services, and, finding that no one else could play the organ, did so himself for the services. Another colonel said that he was willing to assist at the services because the General had requested it, and for that reason only. This officer attended one service with his staff, and from that time on expressed himself as most heartily in favor of them, saying that they would be the source of great good to his men. Other commanding officers have expressed themselves in like manner; in no case has an officer expressed an adverse opinion.

The chaplains worked together with splendid cooperation. In several instances this occurred: The priest said to his congregation—"The Protestant boys are meeting at the Y—let us stop and say a prayer for them"; and the Protestants offered special prayer for the Catholic service. They each sent to the other a delegation to convey greetings and say what had been done. These delegations passed each other as they bore the message. Our chaplain has said that the meetings have made his work for the future much easier and have greatly helped in his battalion.

IV. CONCLUSION

No effort was made to tabulate definite results, but it is felt that large good has been accomplished throughout the Division. One Y M

A secretary observed that during and since the meetings there was a discontinuance of vulgar and lewd remarks previously made during the picture shows. In every case it is felt that the work has been most profitable, and that large gains have been made. Men were urged to commit themselves definitely, each to his own church or synagogue. No thought of proselyting was so much as entertained.

It is believed that could this type of special services, where Catholics, Protestants and Jews cooperate alike, be held through each Division of the American Expeditionary Forces, the future of our country would be greatly affected for good.¹

(Signed) JOHN PAUL TYLER.

Similar campaigns in the 6th and 80th Divisions, drew from Senior Chaplain Brent a letter reminding chaplains of an earlier bulletin requesting them to undertake such services, and renewing the request in the light of the success of the services already held. Campaigns were carried out in practically every combat division of the First and Second Armies and, just before and after Easter, throughout the Third Army.

In setting up its organization for the Third Army, the Y M C A had the advantage of nearly two years' experience overseas and the opportunities of a fresh start. The special dangers connected with the occupation rendered the army command even more desirous of efficient welfare service and evoked increased cooperation. In spite of preliminary transport difficulties, the Religious Work Department for the Third Army was organized in December, 1918, Dr. Maitland Alexander of Pittsburgh serving as director with Dr. Reid S. Dickson as associate. Divisional directors and special workers carried the activities to every part of the occupied territory. Many of the specially recruited speakers already mentioned were sent through the area. The Sunday evening services in the great Fest Halle at Coblenz, seating 1,500, became famous, but not less significant were simple services held with a handful of men on outpost duty. In the long list of supplies distributed, notable items are 611,000 pieces of religious literature, 22 communion sets, 250,000 copies of a special Army of Occupation hymn book, and 1,000 each of rosaries, scapulars and crucifixes. Forum discussions were cultivated. Camionettes, equipped with folding organs, manned by both men and women, were sent through outlying units, distributing canteen supplies and holding brief impromptu services

¹ The responsive attitude of Jews and Catholics can be studied to advantage in A Jewish Chaplain in France, Rabbi Lee J. Levinger, New York, 1922, and in American Catholics in the War, Michael Williams, New York, 1921.

with groups wherever met. Religious work in the Third Army presented little that was new in form, but carried to a high level of success the methods tested by earlier experience. The department measured up in alertness, activity and devotion to the high quality that marked the whole organization with the Army of Occupation.

In the last few months of service, the observance of special days, ^{Special Days} which had been featured from the beginning, was especially emphasized. Dr. Freeman had prepared a remarkable program for the observance of Mother's Day in 1918, which was widely used. Christmas, Easter and Thanksgiving, Memorial Day and Independence Day had been marked by appropriate exercises as well as by athletic sports, and such feasting as was possible, in each year. The Religious Work Department prepared programs, furnished speakers and special music, and some of the largest audiences gathered for any purpose were those at holiday religious services. On Memorial Day especially, French military and civilians showed the utmost interest and sympathy, and many touching incidents were recorded illustrating the respect shown by high and low for the American dead.

In April, 1919, President King closed his active work with the department, in compliance with the request of President Wilson that he should serve with the Peace Conference Commission on Mandates in Turkey. Prof. Cleland B. McAfee who had been closely associated with him for several months became his successor and carried on the work actively through the next few weeks marked by the rapid movement of troops to and through the embarkation points. He continued to head the Bureau of Life Callings, and took over also the direction of the Speakers' Bureau after the release of its director. Organization machinery had been so perfected that he was able to spend much more time speaking in the field than had been possible for President King. In June he left France, and Mr. Edworthy, who had been executive secretary for nearly a year, directed the work until its close. To these three men the effective organization, broad program and energetic promotion which marked the last ten months of the Department's service were largely due. ^{The Last Weeks}

Activities were more and more concentrated at the embarkation centers and ports, and the emphasis on themes suggested by home-going and the coming reconstruction was increased both in speech and literature. The army command was pressing constantly for the rapid reduction of the welfare forces, and the departure of men in their turn resulted in frequent changes in personnel. Yet during June, 1919,

328 religious meetings and Bible class sessions were reported from Bordeaux, while for May, Brest reported 760 meetings conducted by chaplains or secretaries in Y huts, with a total attendance of 379,911, personal religious interviews numbering 7,341 with 6,316 Christian decisions or reconsecrations registered, 25 baptisms, and nearly a million pieces of religious literature distributed.¹ The final report of Mr. Edworthy, covering the entire work of the department was filed July 31, 1919, at which time all departments ceased to function and service of all kinds to the few remaining soldiers in France was directed from a single central office.

¹ In connection with religious literature and war problems, while the disastrous conflict was still in progress, the General War-Time Commission of the Churches and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America by joint action, appointed the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook: "To consider the state of religion as affected by the war, with special reference to the duty and the opportunities of the churches, and to prepare its findings for submission to the churches." Among the first publications of the Committee, *The War and Religion, A Preliminary Bibliography of Material in English*, Prior to January 1, 1919, compiled by Marion J. Bradshaw, New York, 1919, furnishes a carefully selected and well classified list of books and general literature to guide those who desire to study the religious situation or the work of the church in the light of the war. A preliminary series of booklets appeared during 1919, which comprised the following titles: *The War and the Religious Outlook*; *Christian Principles Essential to a New World Order*; *The War and the Woman Point of View*; *Christian Principles and Industrial Reconstruction*; *Christian Aspects of Economic Reconstruction*; *The Church's Message to the Nation*; *The Church and Religious Education*; *The New Home Mission of the Church*; and *The Local Church after the War*. Larger standard works of reference since published by the Committee are: *Religion Among American Men as Revealed by a Study of Conditions in the Army*, New York, 1920; *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*, New York, 1920; *The Missionary Outlook in the Light of the War*, New York, 1920; *Christian Unity, Its Principles and Possibilities*, New York, 1921.

CHAPTER XXXIII

ENTERTAINING AMERICAN SOLDIERS

More than 800 professional theatrical artists crossed the Atlantic to tour the camps of the A E F. Augmented by over 500 professionals engaged in France, and by 12,800 soldier actors in plays, circuses, and shows written, staged, and costumed for the purpose, they played, sang, danced, recited, and did stunts for soldier audiences amounting to the astounding total of eighty-eight millions. One hundred and eighty-one of the finest theaters in French cities were leased, where stage, scenery and auditorium furnished facilities unexcelled for the most elaborate productions. But the entertainers were far from dependent on such aids, and in huts, on shaky improvised stages in hangars or railroad repair shops, in hospital wards and even by the side of the road or in the shelter of a bit of woods, wherever soldiers were congregated, performances were given whose fun was increased by the humorous comments of actors or soldiers on the makeshifts of scenery and properties employed. Ten million feet of films were used to give shows in more than 5,000 places to crowds numbering 94,000,000. All this was under the management of the Y M C A and the expenses were met from its war funds, but it would have been impossible without the assistance and advice of leaders of the dramatic profession and the generous contribution of the time and talent by hundreds of artists.¹

No mistake could be greater than to regard entertainment for soldiers as a pleasant but unnecessary luxury. As Mr. Ames said: "Entertainment has been discovered to be not a luxury but a necessity—as vital as sugar to food." Just as athletic play was demonstrated to be not only a necessity but also an important factor of military efficiency, so entertainment, which made men forget themselves in hearty laughter or stirred their deeper emotions, was proved in the World War to be indispensable to the morale of the Army—indeed, "as vital as sugar to food," or as Augustus Thomas put it, "As neces-

A Need
Unforeseen

¹ The reader is referred to *Entertaining the American Army*, James W. Evans and Gardner L. Harding, New York, 1921, for the complete story of this romantic adventure. It has not been possible within the limits of the present book to recognize the personal services of so many performers, whose names are household words in America.

sary as change of air in a room." In this, as in so many other ways, the war gave clear and general comprehension of what had been only a premonition of the few who had seriously thought of the matter. Entertainment on a grand scale was not provided for in early plans; its organization grew out of a response to an irresistible demand.

Once the idea was grasped, its development, in view of the preparations needed, the conditions to which adjustment must be made, and the proportions of the final result, moved forward speedily. In September, 1917, the Chief Secretary overseas had asked for the establishment of an entertainment organization in New York to prepare for future needs. This was created in October with Thomas S. McLane as director, and the work of recruiting entertainers was begun at once. Mrs. August Belmont (Eleanor Robson) who was serving in France with the Red Cross, had found time in the fall of 1917 to make several tours of the camps presenting selections from her own stage successes. Acting on a suggestion emanating from her, Mr. McLane secured Winthrop Ames and E. H. Sothern to go to France to survey needs and conditions and formulate a plan. Their report at a great meeting at the Palace Theater, New York, in April, 1918, brought in the whole strength of the theatrical world of America through the formation of the Over There Theater League. Actors, managers, and producers vied with each other to make the largest contribution. As soon as the Armistice permitted, the Army always as sympathetic and helpful as its paramount duties would permit, appointed entertainment officers in each unit to cooperate with the Y M C A entertainment directors, detailed men to help in all desired ways, and enlarged privileges of every kind. Funds and management were furnished by the Y M C A, which recruited 1,500 professional entertainers who wore its uniform, and after the Armistice set up four "play factories" for the production of soldier shows. Under its auspices, the Community Motion Picture Bureau furnished and distributed films and machines. It is the story of this cooperative enterprise which this chapter describes.

To recapture the life and color of the experience of the overseas troupers, the reader should consult the first-hand accounts written by the entertainers themselves.¹ At present our concern is rather with entertainment as a feature of a comprehensive welfare program.

¹ The Big Show, Elsie Janis, New York, 1919; Trouping for the Troops, Margaret Mayo, New York, 1919; and in *Scribner's Magazine*, Over There Theater League: A Player on the Fighting Front, E. H. Sothern, New York, July-August, 1918; also, Playing for American Soldiers, E. H. Sothern, New York, June, 1919.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ENTERTAINMENT SERVICE

In July, 1917, a Lecture Bureau was established in Paris to promote educational and entertainment activities. Its first head was Dr. J. G. Coulter, a Chicago lecturer and Chautauqua manager. Then lecturers were put in the field and a small group of entertainers, some sent from America and some recruited in Europe, were started on their rounds. General Pershing authorized the Y M C A to take entire charge of motion picture service for the A E F, so a Cinema Department was added. As rapidly as possible the Lecture Bureau secured the services of French musicians and vaudeville artists. An appeal to New York for 520 sets of lantern slides led to the formation of the Picturelook Committee, which collected and prepared slides for overseas service with lectures or short humorous talks to go with them. Over 40,000 of these slides were finally sent to France. A few movie machines and some reels of films were put in action.

Meanwhile the Entertainment Bureau in New York under the direction of Mr. McLane, recruited entertainers and appealed at large for musical instruments. Individual artists and small groups were sent forward as rapidly as those filling all the requirements could be secured. Thousands of band and orchestral instruments, banjos, mandolins, and ukuleles were collected for service in France.

The demands of the fall and early winter of 1917 made clear the necessity for a thorough organization in France, and the Entertainment Department was established in January, 1918, under the direction of Charles M. Steele, with Walter H. Johnson, Jr., as his assistant. Certain lecturers were transferred to the Educational Department and the Lecture Bureau was absorbed by the Entertainment Department.

In order to prepare for a more extensive program, Mr. McLane persuaded Mr. and Mrs. Winthrop Ames and E. H. Sothern to make a journey to France in order to study needs and possibilities. This party toured the front, making a thorough inspection of all types of camps and stations, while Mr. Sothern gave readings from Shakespeare along the way. They conferred at length with General Pershing and the Chief Secretary of the Y M C A and talked with officers and soldiers.

The Ames-
Sothern Mission

The party returned early in April, just after the first German drive of 1918 had put a new and sinister face on the whole war situation. At a dinner of theatrical managers and representative actors on April 6, Mr. Ames and Mr. Sothern told the story of the real need

for entertainment overseas. That evening the Overseas Theater League was planned. A group of a dozen famous heads of theatrical organizations called a meeting at the Palace Theater on April 23, 1918, where a definite appeal for volunteers was made to the two thousand theatrical folk who crowded the auditorium. The conditions of enlistment in the Y M C A for such service were carefully explained. The immediate response was overwhelming: three-fourths of the audience volunteered and the secretary of the National Vaudeville Artists announced that the whole 9,000 members of that organization were ready to start at once. The Over There Theater League was organized formally with George M. Cohan as president and Winthrop Ames as executive director.¹

The Mobilization
of Entertainers

The casual observer might have inferred that the difficulty of securing an adequate force of overseas entertainers had been surmounted; but the way was blocked by technical obstacles that caused exasperating delays, trying disappointments, and in some cases positive hardship of no light kind. James Forbes, the American dramatist, in May assumed a general direction of the League and arranged for the necessary "try-outs", which included a test before the sailor audience in the big hall at Ellis Island. But the real trouble began after a performer had been accepted by the League and the Y M C A. Anyone familiar with passport regulations will appreciate the difficulty.² The draft took all the able-bodied young men. If one's parents were born in enemy countries, this excluded the American sons and daughters. The rule against man and wife going together broke up many a vaudeville team. Eager women volunteers did not realize that a male relative in the service disqualified them. A well-balanced troupe often found half its members could not go. It was all so uncertain. Many waited until all their savings were used up only to find they were shut out in the end.

As a matter of fact, despite all effort, the first party of 44 League volunteers did not sail until July 31, 1918. But the leaders of the enterprise persisted; and, of the 828 professional volunteers sent overseas, 454 were recruited by the Over There Theater League.

¹ The Over There Theater League expected at the beginning to raise funds for the support of entertainers, but it was soon discovered that there would inevitably arise confusion between such an enterprise and the campaigns for general welfare funds. The League, therefore, confined its efforts to the securing of performers. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader to what an extent theaters and actors assisted in the raising of funds for all war purposes.

² Consult Chapter XV.

The program of entertainment had to be comprehensive, for there were all kinds of occasions to be met. The need was great enough to include everything. If all the gradations of equipment, dialogue, and general stage complexity be filled in between the artist who "let his legs hang over the edge of wagon and told stories to the boys" to the grand opera presented in the Fest Halle in Coblenz, the list of theatrical types will be nearly complete—and that is just the range of entertainment overseas. Sooner or later everything found a place in the varied program. These shows with the movies comprised the means by which the "boys were entertained."

The
Entertainment
Program

There was a second part to this program, however. The American soldiers were not without resources of entertainment within themselves. There were plenty of soldier actors anxious to offer their efforts for the consideration of their fellows. Some of the earliest entertainers began the practice of working up soldier plays, built up in a manner requiring little rehearsing. The importance of this feature led Mr. Ames to send over, in May, 1918, Joseph Linden Smith, a pageant director, to prepare the way for a full development of soldier talent. Later a course in play direction was arranged in America, in charge of Thomas Wood Stephens, Professor of Dramatic Technique, who spent several months in France in first-hand study of the situation. All the men needed was an invitation, a little encouragement, and grease-paint.

The most inclusive activity, however, was the mass singing. The most popular entertainers were those who brought in the whole crowd at the end. The Commission on Training Camp Activities and the commanding officers laid great stress on the idea of a "singing army." The Association endeavored directly to assist this effort; 200 expert song leaders were sent to France and trained 1,000 other secretaries in the elementary principles of the art.¹ The Y also distributed millions of copies of the little book known as "Popular Songs of the A E F." Overseas the soldiers not only sang with vigor under the inspiration of a song leader but many of the men picked up the knack and became the song leaders of their units.

"Entertainment" is a very broad term but its significance was clear in France. It meant relief and recreation, an escape from the strain of an unnatural life both in the enjoyment of exhibitions of talent and skill and in actual participation. It was a necessity.

¹ Consult Chapter XVII.

THE CINEMA

The availability of moving pictures for the purposes of what might be called emergency entertainment requires no explanation. With the late improvements made in portable service, they can travel anywhere. In one sense the movie was the biggest star overseas.

Late in the summer of 1917, the Y M C A was requested by General Pershing to take charge of moving pictures in the A E F. The Cinema Department began its work with a few machines, and some very unsatisfactory films, partly purchased in France and partly imported from America; there was a lack of technically trained men. Shows were given under these conditions, however; but it became very clear early in 1918 that the movie service would have to be planned on a very large scale.

In April, 1918, the Community Motion Picture Bureau, which was supplying films in the home camps, extended its service overseas and became the Cinema Department of the Association. Within the month the whole program had been speeded up to a rate of 700 weekly showings, with 21 portable equipments on the road giving 100 shows a week. The little staff grew until in the spring of 1919 there were 115 Americans directing the motion picture service with more than 1,400 soldier details, French aids and secretaries working under the supervisors. About 10,490,330 feet of films were placed in service, four-fifths of this amount coming from the United States. Over 150,000 showings were given in France. Even this record of showings was surpassed by the machines on transports because, in order to give all shifts and ratings a chance to see the pictures, a program was sometimes repeated steadily for 24 hours. The week of April 26, 1919, registered the high point in distribution, when 4,358 shows were given. As a single moving picture enterprise the Association in France exceeded by many times the operations of the largest commercial concerns.

The organization of this service required a hand to hand grappling with many serious problems. The securing, transportation, management, and repair of the delicate equipment required the time and attention of many experts. Some huts had no electric lights and Delco systems were installed, involving another problem in careful handling. The distribution of films could never have been satisfactorily accomplished but for the establishment of a courier system recruited from among the ranks of French civilians disqualified for military service.

Moving picture service involves the meeting of a series of exacting time schedules day by day. Beyond the general question of supply and personnel, each day's success depended upon the regular operation of machinery not quite so robust as a grindstone and upon the punctuality of couriers subject to a dozen causes of delay. The portable systems set up on trucks carried their schedules with them but they were not immune to accidents of the road.

Shows were given everywhere, from the deck of the transport leaving Sandy Hook to the Leseverein in Coblenz. There are movie curtains riddled by shrapnel; films and machines occasionally fell into the hands of the enemy. Barns, quarries, dugouts, or any convenient place along the roadside served the purpose of auditorium. In the hospitals the cheering pictures brought relief in many tedious hours.¹

This great volume of entertainment offered to nearly a hundred million spectators overseas if paid for at average admittance prices would have cost the soldiers \$20,000,000. The whole service was, of course, furnished free.

ENTERTAINMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Entertainment work in Great Britain was administered by the Social Department. The department organized at London was headed at first by R. C. Bennett, who was succeeded by George L. Coleman. When Mr. Coleman was transferred to France, he was succeeded by Charles C. Washburn.

Equipment was furnished and distributed by this department. It supplied 425 phonographs and 125 pianos, and large quantities of song books, sheet music, orchestral pieces and plays. During the war, sing-songs were immensely popular among the Americans in the United Kingdom, even as they were in France. After the Armistice the men were less inclined to sing and turned to other forms of entertainment. Transportation facilities were freely furnished by the authorities so that as long as there were any camps or groups of Americans remaining in Great Britain they were visited regularly by companies of musicians, vaudeville entertainers, and dancers. At first British talent principally was used. Then American entertainers passing through England on their way to France were pressed into the service. When later the need for these American artists in France was too urgent to permit of delays, British talent was again utilized.

¹ Consult *Entertaining the American Army*, James W. Evans and Gardner L. Harding, New York, 1921, Chapter XXVI.

Voluntary concerts and vaudeville were given by local organizations. In many towns competent amateurs grouped themselves into units to play in neighboring camps. In some cases church choirs gave an entertainment each week. Everybody in England seemed to desire to do something for the Americans.

The Moving Picture Department was under the direction of Fred H. Lawton, who went to England July 15, 1918. At the time of his arrival, the Eagle Hut and the Garrison Theater at Winchester were the only places showing pictures regularly. There were about eight films on hand and a few second-hand Pathé machines. An arrangement was made authorizing the purchase of films in London, pending the arrival of a supply from the United States. The department was thus enabled to meet at once the demand for the movies in the huts and camps of England, and to assist the Allied Associations, as well as to supply films for use on the continent.

Thus through the operation of the Social and Cinema Departments, entertainment work was carried on in the United Kingdom so as to reach in some way practically all of the 1,025,000 American soldiers who passed through the country en route to France, and the 100,000 others who were permanently stationed in Great Britain.

WORK OF THE PARIS ENTERTAINMENT DEPARTMENT

Every known variety of place where theatrical performances could be given figured in the entertainment of the A E F. The buildings most largely used were the huts. These were long, narrow buildings, usually with stage at one end and canteen at the other, badly lighted, with level floors. Not more than a third of the men the room would hold could see or hear well what went on on the stage, and those in the rear talked, moved about, or patronized the canteen. The Ames-Sothorn report contained a section which strongly emphasized the need of certain elementary physical facilities, and recommended modifications in the huts. A simple but standardized stage with one or two sets of sliding curtains was not hard to manage, especially as in most camps soldiers could be found glad to paint a simple back-drop or set of scenes; but the proposal to introduce sloping floors and similar improvements, though carefully studied by the Construction Department, proved impracticable. With the many other uses to which the huts must be put, the only way to provide a satisfactory auditorium was to build, as in the rest camps in England, a special additional building.

On the other hand some of the most beautiful buildings in France were under the direction of the Entertainment Department. The Champs Elysées Theater in Paris was a splendid building, elegant in all its appointments, richly decorated and upholstered, with a seating capacity of 4,000 people. The Albert Theater, also in Paris, was much smaller, but in some ways even better adapted to the presentation of army shows. There were commodious, comfortable, well equipped theaters in practically all the large centers. The Y M C A leased 181 of these in all parts of France and occupied Germany. But these splendid theaters could not be moved up to meet the needs of the soldiers in the rough camps and hamlets of the fighting zone. The most romantic and interesting theaters after all were those makeshift contrivances in barren regions scarred by destruction, amid the very sounds of war. Sometimes a camion did service as the stage, around which gathered the audience hungry for entertainment. Open squares and street corners, any elevated spot which the imagination could picture as a stage, were utilized in emergencies. Sometimes in tents, sometimes in barns, and sometimes on railway station platforms, a program was rendered in whole or in part. More than once a dancer gave her performance along the whole length of platform to an audience of soldiers in the cars. Some units went even into the trenches on their mission of mirth. Some of the hospitals had their own theaters or improvised stages, and sometimes the performance was given in the wards. Endless resourcefulness was exhibited in overcoming the disadvantages of no stage properties, no scenery, and sometimes not even a stage.

Innumerable and difficult as were the problems to be solved before the entertainers could be landed in France, the problems of their care, distribution, and service both in the S O S and in the combat areas were greater. One of the most important and at the same time most difficult of these was the grouping of the actors into suitable units. Questions of temperament and talent as well as of accommodations and transportation from point to point had to be considered. The real burden of this work fell ultimately upon A. M. Beatty, a theatrical manager who arrived in France early in September, 1918. Mr. Beatty was in charge of the personnel section of the Entertainment Department from this time until June, 1919, when he succeeded Walter H. Johnson, Jr., as head of the entire department.

The entertainers arrived in France in miscellaneous parties. One might consist mostly of pianists, and another of singers. Groups

Making up
Units

were carefully organized in New York, then passports would be received for only part of the group, making it necessary to supply substitutes for missing members or to scatter those who reached France in entirely new units. Each unit was limited in number to not more than five, because a single Ford car had to be depended on for its transportation. As a group, it must be capable of giving a well-balanced, varied evening's entertainment. For example, a violinist, singer, dancer, reader, and accompanist, who in addition to their individual specialties could sing together, play a one act farce and two or three vaudeville sketches, and go on although one or more became incapacitated, made up a typical group. Individual peculiarities had to be considered, for with all their devotion artists did not leave their moods in America.

It was Mr. Beatty's practice first to send the units around the circuit near Paris for a few days so that he could keep in personal touch with their work. If the results indicated that the members of the units were not temperamentally adapted to each other or if the program was not as well balanced as desired, readjustments would be made until the units were ready to be booked for the big circuits.

During the winter and spring of 1917-18 entertainment companies were routed from the Paris Headquarters' office in circuits covering all parts of France. To reduce the amount of traveling and to cover the field more thoroughly the length of tours was gradually increased until it became customary to keep parties out on the road about three months at a time. This method continued until a change was made possible in July, 1918, by the creation of the eight Y M C A regions in France. Under this new system entertainment parties were sent to a regional director to tour his region, and were routed by the regional entertainment director. This was found to be a great improvement. Still the Entertainment Department like the other departments was constantly handicapped by the insufficiency of transportation facilities. Arrival at the point of assignment seemed often a sheer case of good luck and many were the mishaps that prevented the carrying out of the carefully prepared programs. Entertainment directors did their best to reach as many of the army units as possible with the forces and facilities they could command.

Occasionally there was a dearth of information concerning the movement of troops, and the disappointments resulting therefrom made the Paris office loath to send out units until definite information was received. The quick and secret movements of the Army during

the fighting period made such mishaps unavoidable. Considering the variety of army units actually reached and benefited by the entertainers, it is reasonable to conclude that the transportation problems caused by auto shortage and the bad condition of the railroads were on the whole fairly met. The Booking Department records show that entertainments were regularly given to infantry, cavalry, artillery, marines, engineers, ordnance corps, signal service, medical service, ambulance corps, services of supply, machine gun section, tank section, gas experimental stations and schools, aviation fields, forestry service, motor transport camps, balloon service, overhaul camps, prison camps, hospitals, convalescent camps, sailors on sea and land, and later the graves registration service.

A list such as this suggests the housing problem involved in these transactions. How could men and women entertainers on circuit be made reasonably comfortable, at least to the extent of not jeopardizing their health? Entertainment secretaries were requested to meet incoming units, direct them to billets or rooms, and see that eating places were provided. The frame of mind in which the actor must live in order to accomplish the best results is easily upset by poor food and really bad accommodations. French billets and hotels were chilly in winter, baths a rarity, and laundry work well nigh impossible. Only hand baggage was allowed. Some of the entertainers were able to take even their rougher experiences humorously, but there were times when the sense of discomfort and danger was too keen to permit of much levity even on the part of the best natured. The local secretary responsible for housing and feeding these artists was often at his wits' end.

A typical camp report shows the extent and quality of the entertainment furnished the camp at Issoudun during the spring of 1918. In March, the camp was visited by a French concert party, the Hubbard concert party (American), Judge Pollard, lecturer, a second French concert party, William Janauschek, impresario, to put on a minstrel show, and Rheta Childe Dorr, lecturer. In April, there were two French concert parties, Elsie Janis, Professor W. A. Shanklin, lecturer, and a vaudeville team. In May, Dr. Paul Van Dyke, Judge Galloway, and Professor Charles Sarolyea lectured, and one French concert party was heard. Each stayed three to ten days, entertaining at all the scattered huts in the large camps.

Up to the time of the Armistice, the Army was in a position only to accept passively whatever entertainment was offered, except

Housing
Entertainers in
the Field

One Camp's
Allotment

Post
Armistice

in certain stationary units of the S O S where dramatic clubs had been formed.¹ For a few weeks after the Armistice, while the forces were being untangled and settling down, one part to hold the Coblenz bridge-head, the other to prepare for home going, confusion reigned supreme. But the same psychological revolution which called for expansion of athletic and educational service, not only spurred the Entertainment Department also to greater efforts, but brought to it the invaluable aid of positive cooperation from the Army. The leaders entered into negotiations with the General Staff, with reference to the development of soldier talent. Conferring with Colonel John R. Kelly and Lieut. Col. R. B. Gamble, entertainment officers of the army and the S O S respectively, the details of general orders and bulletins concerning entertainment were worked out in a way to secure the maximum use of all resources, material and personal, both in the Army and in the Y M C A.

General Orders 241, December 29, 1918, explained in detail the plan and purpose of the Army organization for entertainment work. An officer of the General Staff was detailed to take general charge. He was authorized to coordinate the efforts of the Army and the work of welfare organizations. Entertainment officers were also to be detailed in each army, corps and division, and in such units of the S O S as the Commander might determine. Commanders of regiments and small units were instructed to detail suitable officers to supervise the entertainment activities of their units. All commanders were notified to encourage and develop soldier talent. The second paragraph of this section of General Orders 241 reads:

"The Y M C A, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, has organized a department of entertainment for supervising the routing

¹ The records of the Entertainment Department from March to November, 1918, are summarized below. The figures are minima. Owing to the fact that in many cases entertainers repeated their performances for a second audience and even a third in a hut, the total performances greatly exceed the scheduled engagements. The lectures recorded up to August were those managed by the Entertainment Department and do not include educational lectures.

Month—1918	Entertainers	Engagements	Performances	Lecturers	Lectures
March	17	231	600	20	199
April	25	390	870	23	190
May	35	613	1422	23	355
June	23	782	1668	23	330
July	51	1062	2185	28	395
August	68	1501	2962	33	474
September	83	1849	3144	34	518
October	76	1863	2794
November	93	1848	2772

of professional and amateur entertainers, assisting in the development and training of soldier talent, and assisting and managing qualified groups of entertainers who might be developed in the Army. Secretaries especially qualified in entertainment work will be attached to the staffs of divisions and other similar units to cooperate with and assist the entertainment officer of said unit."

It also provided that:

"In order to obtain the maximum benefit from the Y M C A and other welfare organizations and to increase their efficiency, commanding officers are authorized to assist these organizations in every way consistent with military requirements, and for this purpose to detail non-commissioned officers and privates of their commands to perform duties appropriate to the grades of the men so detailed."

It will be seen from these enactments that the Y M C A was not relieved of any responsibility, nor was its work made any the less by the army organization. The plan was a cooperative one that made possible a larger service but called for increased efforts on the part of the Y M C A Entertainment Department.

The specifications of the General Orders were amplified in Entertainment Bulletin No. 1 under date of January 28, 1919. This plan proposed was to provide suitable entertainments each night in every important center occupied by American troops. To this end all the available entertainment facilities in the A E F were to be utilized.

Entertainers provided by the Entertainment Department at Management Paris were sent to the directors of the regions and routed among the divisions and other organizations. The regional directors were informed by army entertainment officers of the army needs and the localities to which entertainers should be sent. Each division, corps, army, and S O S organization maintained an office in which the officer of the unit and the Y M C A Entertainment Director worked in cooperation. Each area was canvassed for information concerning the number of troops and the local facilities available for entertainment such as theaters, huts, hangars and improvised buildings. The Y M C A booking system was the medium through which all entertainment units whether professional or soldier were routed, but the distribution or allotment of such units was under the control of the Army Entertainment Officer.

The campaign for soldier shows was put in operation at a crucial Soldier Shows moment. Its immediate success demonstrated the greatness of the need. There was plenty of talent in the A E F. The problem was to

discover and assemble it, coach and costume the acts, and furnish theaters. The best soldier talent in the company show went into the regimental show where it was given professional coaching. When the coach considered the troupe good enough it was tried out through the division. Then, if it had sufficient merit to be sent out on the A E F circuit, it was outfitted, costumed, and given travel orders. The Y M C A furnished coaches, costumes, instruments, plays, music, and expense money. The Army Entertainment Officer supervised transportation and all military conditions and requirements.

One of the most successful enterprises was the play factory at Tours. The idea which started there spread until there were similar factories at Paris, Bordeaux, and St. Nazaire. In these factories every form of show, from a vaudeville sketch to a drama with a cast of a hundred or more, was written, rehearsed, costumed and staged. In the last three months, nine original soldier shows were produced and several times that number reconstructed and freshened with new dialogue and songs. From March, 1918, to May, 1919, 23,138 costumes were provided, besides wigs and make-up properties, musical instruments and sheet music, running to hundreds of thousands of items. The Soldier Actor Division soon had 500 special theatrical units, ranging in size from 10 to 100, touring the A E F. Most of these had received their finishing touches at one of the play factories. Another important factor in the process of fitting the units for the circuits was the costume headquarters at Nantes, which attended to the important details of securing or arranging for costumes required by the various entertainment units.

This joint entertainment project resulted in the organization of nearly 700 soldier shows with 12,800 soldier actors. In March, 1919, 10,030 shows were given in the S O S, with an attendance aggregating 9,232,661. There is nothing in the military history of the world to compare with the soldier actor mobilization. The work of the Y M C A Entertainment Department expanded until in March, 1919, when the work was at its height, there were about 110 professional units averaging four people each, under Y direction. Fifty of these units had been recruited by the Over There Theater League from professional talent. When Mr. Johnson relinquished the directorship of the Department to return to America, in June, there were 850 theaters and huts with a seating capacity of 750,000; and 181 of these buildings were first-class fully equipped, full-sized theaters. All France and occupied Germany were covered by this huge entertainment force.

Play
Factories

Extent of
Entertainment

The 39 leave areas, with their beautiful casinos and theaters, supplied the largest audiences. Much of their success depended upon their being able to furnish a generous amount of dramatic entertainment in addition to the local attractions. For example, at the formal opening of the Grand Cercle at Aix-les-Bains, Mr. Sothorn read Hamlet's Soliloquy and other Shakespearean selections. The example and success of the work at this casino probably opened the way to securing famous buildings at other centers. The Prince of Monaco was most favorably impressed with what he saw at Aix-les-Bains and expressed the hope that the Y M C A would also go to the famous resort in his little kingdom on the Riviera. After the Armistice it became possible to extend the work to Monte Carlo, an ideal retreat for Americans on leave, which offered splendid facilities for entertainment on a large scale. Where casinos were not available, theaters were hired. At Annécý the Municipal Theater was secured and at Nîmes, the Grand Municipal Theater. In some places hotels, concert halls, or storage buildings were adapted and used. At Biarritz a large exhibition building was secured and an ample stage erected to accommodate the shows and movies. Entertainment in
Leave Areas

In Paris, to which much freer access was given after November 11th, the Champs Elysées and Albert Theaters were always crowded, and the Cirque de Paris, seating 8,000, displayed the S R O sign twice a day. At the Palais de Glace, in addition to thirteen cinema shows a week, more than 200 theatrical performances were given. In theaters such as these which could be found in every considerable city, large companies could play, and ambitious performances with large casts were the rule. From March to June, 1919, more than 1,000,000 persons were entertained. Paris

The Army of Occupation had its own branch entertainment department, with its own costume and play factory, and in such luxurious playhouses as the Fest Halle and Leseverein it presented old and new plays to enormous crowds. The first professional unit to reach Coblenz broke through with the entertainment director of the Third Army, who appropriated H. F. Sheets' automobile, and went A W O L. Others quickly followed in spite of transportation difficulties and the unsettled condition of the troops, and succeeded in giving 340 performances during the holiday season. The first of these entertainments was given December 17, 1918, at Gessellenhaus Hospiz, Coblenz. The first buildings to be taken over were the great Fest Halle and the Leseverein at Coblenz. At Neuenahr the big Kurhaus was Occupied
Area

utilized and at Andernach the casino was converted into a soldiers' club. Two movies a day were run at the Hotel Dahlman. Another large hotel at Neuwied was turned into a cinema hall. Large crowds could be accommodated in all these places. By the time the Army Entertainment Activity office was established January 15, 1919, 475 shows had been given in the occupied area. Each corps and division received its pro rata share according to weekly schedule. Soldier shows were rapidly developed, the first of these being given on Christmas Day by the 148th Field Artillery at Weissenthurm. A regular department of soldier talent was opened. Some of the Indian soldiers were used in a novel Indian production. Costume and music departments were established and were kept busy obtaining supplies and equipment for the entertainment units. The work increased so rapidly as to compel the Army to enlarge its entertainment staff.

Costumes

The varied activities of the area put a heavy strain on the costume department. Three circuses were given requiring the costuming of about 3,000 persons. A number of the costumes had to be rented for each circus, the department becoming responsible for their distribution and safe return. A dozen laundresses were employed. This department started with a stock of 1,000 costumes from a German costumer, and a working staff of five German women to remake and fit the costumes. A soldier was assigned as interpreter and purchasing agent. As the number of shows increased a larger force of women had to be hired to work on the costumes. The budget required from 5,000 to 15,000 francs a month, and close supervision was necessary to obtain full value for the outlay.

Quality and Character

Under the conditions existing in the occupied area it was possible to carry out a far more elaborate plan of entertainment than the men had had prior to the Armistice. Major Steiner, entertainment officer of the Third Army, declared that the entertainment provided by the Y M C A professional units in the Army of Occupation compared more than favorably with the entertainment provided in towns of the United States of 50,000 to 100,000 population. Among these entertainments could be found "everything from a handcuff king to grand opera singers." The Music Department alone expended 225,535.50 marks, almost equally divided between musical instruments and accessories, and song sheets, song charts and copies of orchestrations.

Almost without exception the shows were of a clean and creditable nature and whenever it was discovered that the platform work did not measure up to standard the censor was called in. Dramatic critics who saw the performance "Seven Keys to Baldpate," produced at the Fest Halle, Coblenz, pronounced it the most finished performance ever given in the A E F. It had special scenery and stage decorations with elaborate lighting effects. This company later toured the S O S and the principal ports.

The extent to which entertainment work was developed in the area of occupation is illustrated by the fact that 492 show places were put into operation. Through the constant cooperation of the Third Army Headquarters' and Divisional Headquarters' officers, motor transportation was furnished so that it was but seldom that an audience was disappointed because of the non-arrival of the companies. It required a vast amount of work to equip many of the halls in the smaller towns where stages had to be constructed, drop curtains and scenery painted, and electric lights installed. The stage in the Fest Halle, Coblenz, was found to be unsatisfactory for both professional and soldier talent troops and a new, large, and completely equipped stage was erected, accommodating the largest productions. Afternoon and evening performances were given daily with the exception of one night each week when boxing exhibitions were held. On Sunday the auditorium was used for religious services. A large platform was erected on the lower floor, and here vaudeville acts and concerts were given afternoons and evenings until the opening of Victory Hut on the front lawn of the ex-Kaiser's palace.

Extent of
Entertainment
Development

ULTIMATE VALUES

It is hardly possible to estimate the amount of entertainment furnished the A E F. Individuals and troupes by no means confined themselves to scheduled performances, but while keeping their engagements wherever transportation permitted, they put on also impromptu shows in all sorts of places to chance audiences. No body of workers were more indefatigable and none more cheerfully endured conditions that not only meant actual discomfort and hardship but continually threatened ruin to their professional equipment. Singing in smoke-filled huts with throats weakened by exposure to inclement weather and by overstrain, caused many a casualty which has no place in the official records of the war. Both to the artists who gave themselves thus without stint and to those who were willing

but whose eager offers could not be accepted, the American Army and the American people owe an inestimable debt.

For the outcome of their service was not merely an hour's pleasure. It was new spirit and new resolve. It lifted away a heavy load of weariness and homesickness, and, dissolving anxiety in laughter, restored the natural buoyancy which, for most men, is an essential of efficiency. No time or money was more profitably spent than that which set men's feet to tapping, and let them live for a little time in a world of imagination, so that they went to their billets chuckling over the comedian's jokes or humming songs which had stirred tender memories.

In theatricals as in athletics, the value and the possibility of self amusement was demonstrated. There is more fun and more recreation in being a performer than in being a spectator, and the soldier shows which sprang up wherever the impulse and guidance could be given, constitute an illuminating experience for the study of those who are concerned with the problems of monotony in civilian life. Under the circumstances of the war and the demobilization, the service of the Y M C A in promoting such shows, and in providing the material accessories, was indispensable. There is an apparent incongruity between wigs and steel helmets, between grease paint and gas masks, which suggests curiosity as to the reaction of a Congressional Committee upon an item in a war budget showing an expenditure of some hundreds of thousands of dollars in female costumes and stage properties for an army in the field. The ability of a civilian organization to face "the instant need of things" and the readiness of the Y M C A to welcome an opportunity of service not obviously germane to its traditional program are noteworthy in this matter.

Without the enthusiastic cooperation of the Army, from the Commander-in-Chief to enlisted men, this great achievement would have been impossible. The ultimate proof of the value of entertainment rests there. The spontaneous desire and satisfaction of the men was confirmed by company and regimental officers in closest contact with them, in ever increasing requests for entertainment and in spontaneous offers of material assistance in providing it. Immense as was the actual performance, there would be hardly a dissenting voice in the Army to the proposition that a far greater provision of musical and dramatic diversion would return far more than its cost in military and civic benefit.

The Value
and Possibility
of Self-
Amusement

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Service with fighting men : an account

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